WILLIAM OF OCKHAM

Questions on Virtue, Goodness, and the Will

TRANSLATED AND EDITED BY

ERIC W. HAGEDORN
St. Norbert College, Wisconsin

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Since love, hate, pride, anger, envy and other passions of the soul hamper and even pervert human judgment in the search for the truth … everyone who pays attention to what was said rather than to who the author of a view is will see what is written with clearer eyes and will more sincerely press on with tracking down the truth.

William of Ockham, *Dialogus* Part 1, Prologue

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Abbreviations

Aristotle:

NE	*Nicomachean Ethics*

Thomas Aquinas:

ST	*Summa theologiae*
QDA	*Quaestiones disputatae de anima*
QDV	*Quaestione disputata de virtutibus*

John Duns Scotus:

Ord.	*Ordinatio*
Rep.	*Reportatio*
Quod.	*Quaestiones quodlibetales*

William of Ockham:

Ord.	*Ordinatio*
Rep.	*Reportatio*
Var. Ques.	*Quaestiones variae*
Quod.	*Quodlibeta septem*
SL	*Summa logicae*
OTh	*Opera theologica*
OPh	*Opera philosophica*

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Note on the Texts and Translation

ON THE TEXTS

As the culmination of his graduate studies at Oxford, William of Ockham was required to spend two years lecturing and commenting upon the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard, a twelfth-century theological compendium of Catholic doctrine organized into four books (on God, Creation, the Incarnation, and the Sacraments, respectively). By Ockham's day, it was no longer typical practice to comment on the *Sentences* line by line; rather, the custom was to use the text of the *Sentences* as an occasion to discuss whichever philosophical and theological questions related to the text the degree candidate found most interesting, and so, especially in his commentary on Books II–IV, Ockham pays little attention to the actual text of Lombard other than as a source of themes to discuss. Given standard practice, Ockham probably spent one academic year lecturing on Books I and II and lectured on Books III and IV the following year; one likely guess is that these lectures took place during the years 1317–19.

A student would have been tasked with keeping a transcript of these lectures; for Books II–IV of Ockham's commentary, this unedited student transcript (known as a *reportatio*) was the only text ever produced. For Book I, however, Ockham personally corrected, emended, and expanded upon the student transcript to produce a more polished version of the text (an *ordinatio*); the completed *Ordinatio* on Book I is significantly longer than the *Reportatio* on Books II, III, and IV combined. Ockham seems to have completed at least an initial version of the *Ordinatio* of Book I before he finished the last of his lectures on the *Sentences*; in the final question of *Reportatio* IV he directs his students to consult "Ockham's *Ordinatio*" by that name. Ockham also made a significant number of later emendations to the text of the *Ordinatio*, though it is unknown exactly when these revisions occurred.

Most of the texts translated in this volume come from the *Ordinatio* and the *Reportatio*. Those that do not come from two other collections of theological and philosophical questions, the *Quaestiones variae* and the *Quodlibeta septem*. The *Quodlibeta septem* is a unified work, comprising seven sets of short questions that may be the result of

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classroom exercises during Ockham's years of teaching in London (perhaps revised and completed while at Avignon); at the least, their content indicates that they are among the very latest of Ockham's academic writings. A complete translation of the *Quodlibeta* already exists in English,[1] but I have included translations of two short questions for reasons discussed below.

Unlike the *Quodlibeta*, the *Quaestiones variae* is not a single unified whole, but a grab bag of short essays, longer disputed questions, and marginal notes collected under that title in the mid-twentieth century by the editors of the critical edition of Ockham's academic writings. It is unclear when or for what purpose any of these texts was produced; many of them are clearly later than the *Sentences* commentary, though at least one question appears to be the original student transcript of part of the lectures on Book I.[2] I have included five texts from this collection in this volume.

One of those texts – *Var. Ques.*, q. 4, on the nature of final causality – provides little to no internal evidence as to its time of composition or purpose. Though much of the question contains material relevant to the topics of this volume, it is exceedingly long, nearly twice as long as any other chapter in this book, and includes long digressions on the metaphysics of causation that are at best tangential to my purposes here. Given this, I have only included a few excerpts from it, largely confined to matters of moral psychology concerning how ends that are loved function differently in the causal process leading to action than do ends that are hated.

The other four texts from *Quaestiones variae* from which I have taken material are worthy of special note by one interested in Ockham's ethics.[3] There is significant internal evidence that what the edition calls articles 9–10 of question 6 were composed together along with questions 7 and 8 in the same manuscript: q. 8 includes explicit references to q. 7 and to q. 6, a. 9; and q. 7 includes such references to q. 6, a. 10, with each of these references stating that the discussion in question can be found on "an earlier page [*quaternus*]." Given both the connection and the content of these texts – on the nature of the passions, the role of self-control and temperance with respect to those

[1] William of Ockham 1991.

[2] *Var. Ques.*, q. 1 seems to be an early version of *Ord.* I, d. 17, qq. 1–2. But other questions, e.g., qq. 7–8, direct the reader back to the completed *Ordinatio* and the latter books of the *Reportatio*.

[3] Namely, *Var. Ques.*, q. 6, a. 9: "On pleasure, pain, and distress," *Var. Ques.*, q. 6, a. 10: "On virtues and vices," *Var. Ques.*, q. 7: "Whether the virtues are connected," and *Var. Ques.*, q. 8: "Whether the will could have a virtuous act concerning an object about which there is error in the intellect."

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passions, the connections of the virtues to each other and to prudence, and whether virtuous action is possible when reason is mistaken – I think it a distinct possibility that these four questions were an attempt at composing a commentary on *Nicomachean Ethics* VI–VII; but when they were written and whether they were intended to be part of some larger project is entirely unclear.

In producing this volume, my aim has been to present as much of the broadly ethical material as possible from Ockham's academic works. (I have not included any selections from the political writings from the second half of Ockham's life; but many of these texts are already available in English.) The most notable absence is the longest part of this hypothesized commentary on the *Nicomachean Ethics*, namely the lengthy question on the connection of the virtues (*Var. Ques.*, q. 7); that text would be twice as long as the next longest chapter in this volume, and besides, a complete English translation of it is already in print, so I would direct the reader to look there.[4] The ethical questions in *Quodlibeta septem* largely tend to be either echoes or elucidations of what Ockham says in the questions translated here, and are already available in English elsewhere, but I have included translations of two short questions that have been widely discussed in the secondary literature and that may differ in subtle points of doctrine from the views Ockham expresses in his *Sentences* commentary: namely, *Quod.* III, q. 14, on whether any acts are necessarily virtuous, and *Quod.* II, q. 14, on the possibility of moral knowledge. I have also included one very short excerpt from *Var. Ques.*, q. 7 that closely parallels *Quod.* III, q. 14 but that seems to have been largely overlooked in the secondary literature. The resulting volume is not an exhaustive collection of Ockham's ethical writings by any means, but it is, I think, as close to complete as could be produced, especially if it is supplemented with the existing translation of *Var. Ques.*, q. 7.

In organizing this material, I have decided to compile it thematically and in such a way that Ockham's doctrines are presented largely in a logical order, rather than following the original order of presentation according to the arrangement of Lombard's *Sentences*. First, I include a number of questions on the nature of the created will and its internal states and abilities, followed by questions about the divine will, then questions about the morality of individual acts and virtuous habits, and I close with a series of questions about charity and grace.

[4] See William of Ockham 1997.

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ON THE TRANSLATION

I have sought to create a translation that is both faithful to the original while being comprehensible by those who are not already experts in medieval philosophy, but the latter goal has generally taken precedence over the former. For example, Ockham's writings have a rather terse style and tend to use multiple pronouns within every sentence, trusting syntactic markers such as grammatical gender and case endings to make the referents of those pronouns clear; throughout I have silently replaced pronouns with their referents in order to prevent potential confusion by the reader over what 'it,' 'this,' 'that,' 'them,' and 'the others' might possibly refer to in any given paragraph; similarly, I have variously translated *dicere* (literally, "says") as "objects," "answers," or "responds" to help make clear the dialectical context. In some cases I have supplied an expression that does not appear in the surrounding text in order to provide greater clarity; such insertions are placed in square brackets.

Furthermore, I have typically translated technical terms with what I believe to be their most fitting English equivalents, rather than using renderings that are widely used within medieval scholarship but that might mislead readers not familiar with that literature. For a few representative examples, because "corruption" means something very different in contemporary English (especially in ethical contexts!), *corruptio* as the contrast of *generatio* has been translated throughout as "destruction." Similarly, *invincibilis* has been rendered as "indefeasible," *doctor* as "professor," *scientia* as "knowledge," *ars* as "technical skill," *tristitia* as "distress," *viator* as "someone in the present life," and *beatus* as "beatified" (to make maximally explicit the connection with the beatific vision and beatific enjoyment). *Intensus* and *remissus* have been translated as "more intense" and "less intense" when applied to acts and "strong" or "weak" when applied to habits. The only verb Ockham uses for sexual intercourse is *fornicare*, but he does not always use it as deserving of censure; I translate it as "fornicate" only where it is explicitly contrasted with marital chastity, opting for more neutral expressions like "have sex" elsewhere. The word Ockham most frequently uses to express obligation is *tenere*, which I have always translated as "obligate"; I have usually translated the less frequently used *obligare* the same way, though I have used "bound" when *tenere* and *obligare* are used side-by-side. Following the example of Thomas Williams, *nolle/nolitio* is always "will-against" or the like (with the hyphen); in addition, I often render *velle/volitio* as "will-for" in cases where *nolitio and volitio* are explicitly contrasted. I have occasionally supplied the Latin in square brackets when I think it will be useful.

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Except in the very rare cases when Ockham emphasizes the gender of a human being in a given example or claim, I have used gender-neutral language throughout.[5] I have assiduously avoided using the word "person" in my translations, as the word *persona* in late medieval contexts is generally reserved only for members of the Trinity; I tend to use "the individual" instead.

One peculiar translation choice requires further explanation. Love is among the most important concepts in Ockham's ethics, and it shows up literally hundreds of times in this volume, occurring in nearly every single question. But Ockham has two different sets of Latin terms for love: *amor*/*amare* on the one hand and *dilectio*/*diligere* on the other. In most contexts, the difference between these terms seems to be minimal or nonexistent; in many passages, Ockham seems to use them as synonyms, moving from one to the other seamlessly, perhaps following the example of Augustine, who explicitly argued in *City of God* XIV.7 that *amor* and *dilectio* are synonymous.

But just frequently enough Ockham will use these terms for love in a way that seems to mark some subtle distinction between them. E.g., throughout *Rep.* IV, q. 16 he uses *dilectio* (but not *amor*) as a synonym for beatific enjoyment and one text could be read as suggesting that *dilectio* is a species of *amor*, identifying *dilectio* with friendship-love but not desire-love.[6] Similarly, in *Quod.* III, q. 14, he says that an individual who has been commanded to not love God cannot possibly have *dilectio* for God, though such an individual might still have *amor* for God, since the former but not the latter entails obeying all divine commands.[7] I am not at all certain that there is a consistent and carefully thought out distinction in Ockham's usage of these two terms across all the texts in this volume, and it would make some inferences difficult to follow if they were translated with different English terms. Thus, I have uniformly translated both sets of Latin terms with some form of "love"; nonetheless, since Ockham does distinguish between

[5] Ockham famously claims in his *Summa logicae* that grammatical gender is a purely contingent feature of spoken and written language and that thoughts do not have anything corresponding to grammatical gender, so I take gender-neutral translation to be a somewhat fitting extension of his thought.

[6] "The rational appetite, though, has two kinds of acts of love [*amoris*] with respect to an absent object: one act by which it loves [*diligit*] this sort of object in itself and because of itself (which is friendship-love [*amor amicitiae*]) and a second act by which it craves and desires this sort of object insofar as it is good for itself or for someone else." (*Rep.* IV, q. 16, n. 72, translated in chapter 8 of this volume.)

[7] "Consequently, by loving [*diligendo*] God in this way, the will would both love and not love [*diligeret et non diligeret*] God; it would perform God's command and not perform it. However, it could love [*diligere*] God with a simple and natural love [*amore*], which is not the love [*dilectio*] of God above all things." (*Quod.* III, q. 14, n. 12, translated in chapter 21 of this volume.)

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them in at least some passages, I have marked every occurrence of each in case it aids some observant reader in noticing a more systematic difference between them. Thus *amor* and all related terms are always translated with a subscripted $_{A}$ while *dilectio* and its forms are translated with a subscripted $_{D}$ (e.g., *amare* is "loving$_{A}$," *diligibilis* is "loveable$_{D}$," and so on). Note that I have not subscripted the occurrences of these terms when they appear in quotes from other authors such as Augustine or Peter Auriol.

Lastly, I have added several forms of apparatus alongside the translations to aid the reader. For one, I have enumerated my translations according to the (unnumbered) paragraphs in the critical edition (e.g., *Rep*. III, q. 11, n. 17 refers to the seventeenth paragraph of the text in the critical edition); I have used these to provide extensive cross-references in the footnotes within and across chapters. A paragraph number appearing in bold square brackets (e.g., **[9]**) always refers to another paragraph within the same chapter. I have also supplied an analytical table of contents for several of the longer and more dialectically complicated chapters to make more apparent the structure of objections, replies, and rejoinders. The italicized section headings within chapters are additions to the original text; some of these I have taken directly from the edition, but I have altered many of the edition's headings, silently adding some and deleting others when I believed it appropriate.

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Introduction

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

As best we can conjecture, William of Ockham was born in the late 1280s in Ockham, a small village near London.[1] He joined – or was given to – the Franciscan order, probably as a teenager, and was eventually sent to Oxford to pursue a graduate degree in theology. During his studies at Oxford he critiqued the views of many of the most prominent theologians and philosophers of the late Middle Ages, including Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274), Henry of Ghent (d. 1293), Henry of Harclay (d. 1317), Peter Auriol (d. 1322), Durand of St. Pourçain (d. 1334), and more; but the majority of his focus was directed at the writings of his Franciscan predecessor John Duns Scotus (d. 1308). Ockham finished his graduate lectures in theology around 1320, but due in part to a backlog of degree candidates, he didn't receive a degree; at the time, to receive a master degree one actually had to become a master (what we would now call a professor). So, as there were no open positions, Ockham was forced to wait to complete his graduate studies until he could take a position in the Oxford theology department, but that day would never come. This is a likely source of Ockham's late medieval nickname, "the Venerable Inceptor" – translated somewhat loosely it could mean something akin to "the old graduate student," though historians have sometimes treated it as something closer to "the respected beginner [of a philosophical movement]."

While waiting for a chair of theology to open at Oxford, Ockham lived and taught at the Franciscan chapter house in London. He stayed there for roughly four years, teaching mostly on Aristotelian logic and science. The Franciscan house in London seems to have been a heated and contentious intellectual environment, and Ockham's views became a regular matter of classroom debate by the other teachers there. Among his fraters at London he met his fiercest intellectual opponent, Walter Chatton, as well as his closest disciple, Adam Wodeham.[2]

[1] This biography is based upon the information in Spade and Panaccio 2019, Keele 2010, Courtenay 1999, and Kynsh 1986.

[2] Wodeham seems to have served simultaneously as Ockham's scribe and as the designated student recorder for some of Chatton's theology lectures; there is manuscript

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In 1324, Ockham was summoned to the papal court in Avignon, France.[3] He was there to face formal accusations that he had taught a number of heretical doctrines in his Oxford theology lectures, including holding views that entailed the Pelagian heresy.[4] Ockham spent the next four years at Avignon, where he was not free to leave but seems to have had a great deal of free time on his hands. At times he was required to meet with a committee that had been charged with assessing the orthodoxy of his theological works, but much of his time seems to have been spent revising and polishing the notes from his theology lectures at Oxford and his philosophy lectures at London.

In 1328, while still under quasi-house arrest[5] at Avignon, Ockham was asked by the Minister General of the Franciscan order, Michael Cesena, to review a number of papal decrees that argued against the Franciscans' understanding of poverty and property ownership. Ockham quickly became convinced that the current pope, John XXII, had contradicted previous papal guarantees to the Franciscans and was also promulgating erroneous views about the poverty of Jesus Christ and his apostles. As Ockham himself describes it,

> At the command of a superior I read and diligently studied three of [Pope John XXII's] constitutions – or, rather, heretical destitutions. In these I found a great many things that were heretical, erroneous, silly, ridiculous, fantastic, insane, and defamatory, contrary, and likewise plainly adverse to orthodox faith, good morals, natural reason, certain experience, and fraternal charity … Because of [these] errors and heresies and countless others, I withdraw from the obedience of the pseudo-pope and of all who support him to the prejudice of the orthodox faith.[6]

evidence that Wodeham took his notes of Chatton's lectures (which were very critical of Ockham's views) to Ockham, who on at least one occasion personally wrote replies to Chatton's arguments in the margins. Around the same time, Wodeham wrote a laudatory preface to Ockham's massive logic textbook, the *Summa logicae*. Wodeham's own theological writings do not slavishly follow Ockham's thought, though they do show obvious respect and admiration for his work.

3 Kynsh 1986 cites documentary evidence that complicates this traditional dating, arguing that the papal investigation into his writings only began in 1327. He speculates that Ockham may have initially travelled to Avignon in 1324 to instead teach at the Franciscan convent there.

4 Pelagianism includes the denial of original sin and the thesis that human beings can merit salvation by their own natural powers; Pelagius's views were declared heretical by a series of ecumenical councils in the early fifth century. It is unclear who brought the accusation against Ockham, though the most common suggestions are either Walter Chatton or else John Lutterell, the Chancellor at Oxford. Ockham argues that his view is actually "maximally distant" from Pelagianism in *Ord.*, d. 17, q. 1, nn. 42–44, translated in chapter 24 of this volume.

5 Kynsh 1986: 72–76, for discussion of Ockham's status in Avignon.

6 William of Ockham 1995: 3–4, 12–13.

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Soon after, on May 26, 1328, Ockham, Cesena, and a number of other Franciscans stole the official seal of the Franciscan order and fled into exile. They were excommunicated from the Catholic Church a few weeks later. The renegade Franciscans traveled to Munich, where they sought refuge with the Holy Roman Emperor, Louis IV, who was himself at odds with the Pope over whether the Emperor's election was valid without papal confirmation.

A late medieval chronicle claims that Ockham told Emperor Louis IV, "If you defend me with your sword, I will defend you with my pen!" This is almost certainly fiction, but Ockham indeed does seem to have permanently set aside his work on science, logic, and theology, and instead spent the remaining twenty years of his life writing political philosophy and screeds against the papacy. These works contain some of the first philosophical arguments justifying a separation of religious authority and civil authority in the history of Western philosophy, as well as an inchoate theory of individual rights, and some primitive attempts to map out a possible system of checks and balances between princes and popes. He remained in Munich, exiled and excommunicated, until his death in April 1347.[7]

In what remains of this introduction, I will not try to weigh in on any significant interpretative issues about Ockham's ethics; I will largely leave it to the readers of this volume to discover Ockham's doctrines on these matters for themselves. Here though, I do wish to say a bit about the overall picture of Ockham's thought and his place with respect to his predecessors, and to relate some matters of current scholarly controversy about Ockham's ethical theory, and I will close by explaining for the reader a key linguistic tool that Ockham makes use of throughout the texts in this volume.

OCKHAM'S PLACE IN THE HISTORY OF THOUGHT

William of Ockham is widely considered to be among the greatest of the Christian philosophers of the late Middle Ages; his thought at the very least foreshadowed, and to some degree actually shaped, much of the course of European thought for several centuries after his death. In Ockham's writing we see the first stages of the transition from ancient and medieval ways of thinking to more characteristically modern ones such as a greater emphasis on individual rights, the primacy of experience, explanatory modesty, and human freedom. His most

[7] Earlier sources would sometimes speculate that Ockham may have been killed by the bubonic plague which marched across Europe in 1348, but we now know that he died before it arrived. See Gál 1982.

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characteristic philosophical views are his nominalist metaphysics, voluntarist ethics, and liberal political theory.

Among philosophers of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, Ockham is best known for being the progenitor of a particular variety of ontological reductionism. Though not the first thinker in the history of philosophy to be a nominalist in the contemporary sense of denying any kind of universal entities (that honor likely goes to the twelfth-century thinker Peter Abelard and his immediate predecessor Roscelin of Compiègne), Ockham is probably the historical figure most readily associated with that doctrine. He shrank the standard medieval Aristotelian ontology considerably through the use of his eponymous Razor along with an array of other metaphysical principles: he argued against the existence of any kind of universals and he also pruned away many of the branches of the Aristotelian categorical tree by arguing that there is no philosophical need to posit any entities at all within the categories of Quantity, Relation, Time, Place, Action, etc. Ockham's world is one that contains only individual substances and individual qualities inhering in those substances; in this way, he prefigures and sets the stage for early modern substance/mode ontologies as found in authors such as Descartes and Locke. (The reader will see some faint traces of this ontological program in this volume, e.g., in texts where Ockham argues against more ontologically expansive theories that suppose moral goodness and original sin must be some sort of property or relation inhering in morally good acts and in unbaptized humans, respectively.)

The content and influence of Ockham's ethical views are less well known today than are his ontological doctrines, but they were no less impactful in the history of thought. Ockham, along with his predecessor John Duns Scotus, helped initiate a momentous shift in the history of ethics. In the century immediately prior to their work, many of the dominant ethical theories were eudaimonist; according to such views, what is right for an agent is importantly grounded in what is good for that agent. Further, many of these views were also in some sense naturalist; they taught that what is good for an agent is a matter of natural fact, at least to some degree discernible through unaided human reason alone. Thus, according to a thirteenth-century thinker like Thomas Aquinas, one can discover most, if not all, ethical truths simply through the natural study of human nature and the human good. Furthermore, Aquinas and many of his contemporaries held that one's conception of the good in some way necessitates the activity of one's will: the very idea of choosing contrary to one's considered judgment was seen as paradoxical at best, outright impossible at worst.

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Scotus begins to sever this theoretical link between the right and the good, arguing that it is at least possible for God to bring about a world in which an agent's ethical duties conflict with that agent's own flourishing, and that it is at least possible that one's ethical duties might not be deducible from the facts of human nature. He also laid out an elaborate doctrine of the will's two inclinations (an idea previously suggested by Anselm of Canterbury in the eleventh century); for Scotus, the will is always simultaneously tugged toward one's moral duty and toward one's own self-interest, and the will's freedom lies in its ability to indeterministically select which of these inclinations to follow.

Ockham extends Scotus's ideas, arguing that the concept of right action is entirely based on relations of duty and obligation, that such obligation holds irrespective of the agent's flourishing, and that the will is empowered to select absolutely anything the intellect can represent. An agent willing what is straightforwardly morally bad while conceiving that very thing as bad is not treated as a paradoxical situation by Ockham; if anything, he seems to take it to be a not uncommon occurrence of human experience, one we should be able to recognize in our own lives.[8] He is firmly committed to the view that an agent is only morally praiseworthy or blameworthy when their actions are both deliberate and unnecessitated; someone acting from drunken rage or from outside compulsion cannot be held morally responsible for those acts, and is in fact blameless in the sight of God (although, of course, the drunk individual might be responsible for deliberately and freely getting drunk).[9] Further, he holds that God has no moral obligations – this seems to be a conclusion he reaches from the premise that the only possible source of moral obligation is the command of a superior authority, together with the belief there is no authority to whom God owes deference – and therefore there is nothing that God could ever do that could count as being morally wrong or unjust in any sense. Rather, God's activity is, in an important sense, simply not subject to moral appraisal.[10] Views such as these would serve to form a basis for the moral and theological reflections of later thinkers such as the early Protestant reformers.[11]

[8] See, e.g., *Var. Ques.*, q. 8, nn. 59–65, translated in chapter 17 of this volume.
[9] See, e.g., *Var. Ques.*, q. 8, nn. 50–51, translated in chapter 17 of this volume.
[10] See, e.g., *Var. Ques.*, q. 8, n. 43; *Rep.* II, q. 15, n. 39; and *Rep.* IV, qq. 10–11, n. 20; translated in chapters 17, 18, and 19 of this volume, respectively.
[11] For more complete accounts of Ockham's career and overall thought, see Spade and Panaccio 2019, Keele 2010, and Adams 1987. For accounts of Ockham's place in the history of ethics, especially in the context of his predecessors, see Hagedorn 2019, Williams 2013, and Irwin 2007: chs. 16–29.

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Recent Scholarship

For the last several decades, the most discussed question about Ockham's ethics is the extent to which he held a divine command theory of ethics, believing that both the content and the force of moral norms depend upon the arbitrary choice of the divine will. Interpreters throughout the early part of the twentieth century took it to be somewhat obvious that he did; Ockham's insistence that adultery, theft, murder, and hatred would be obligatory if God commanded them[12] and his seeming suggestion that God could even command that some human ought to hate God[13] convinced these interpreters that Ockham took morality to be entirely contingent upon God's decrees. Frederick Copleston, for one, recognized that the matter was somewhat complicated by Ockham's regular appeals to the role of right reason in the moral order, but still hewed to the common view by arguing that on Ockham's view "authoritarianism has the last word … the ultimate and sufficient reason why we ought to follow right reason or conscience is that God wills that we should do so."[14]

In the late twentieth century, Marilyn Adams and Peter King both rejected this standard interpretation, though for different reasons. Adams emphasized Ockham's discussions of right reason,[15] noting that just because moral norms are constituted by divine commands that does not prevent the norms also being constituted by right reason; on Adams's view, morality for Ockham rests on two distinct foundations, one grounded in divine commands and the other grounded in conscience and right reason, and those two foundations each independently ground the content and force of moral norms.[16]

Peter King similarly takes Ockham to hold that knowledge of moral norms is achievable through reason alone; King also maintains that love for God is the central organizing principle of Ockham's ethics, emphasizing passages in which Ockham suggests that loving God is an intrinsically virtuous act, one that is necessarily morally right whenever it is instanced.[17] Thus, according to King, though much of the content of morality is fixed by divine command, the obligation to love God is a natural obligation, and it is this natural obligation to love God that grounds all other moral obligations. Thus Ockham is at

[12] See, e.g., *Rep.* II, q. 15, n. 38, translated in chapter 18 of this volume.
[13] See *Rep.* II, q. 15, nn. 39–40, translated in chapter 18 of this volume.
[14] Copleston 1953: 121. A survey of others who interpreted Ockham as a divine command theorist can be found in the opening pages of Osborne 2005.
[15] See, e.g., *Var. Ques.*, q. 6, a. 10, nn. 19–22; and q. 8, nn. 10–32, translated in chapters 16 and 17 of this volume, respectively.
[16] See Adams 1986 and 1999.
[17] See King 1999. The passages he most relies on are *Quod.* II, q. 14 and *Quod.* III, q. 14, translated in chapters 21 and 22 of this volume, respectively.

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best a mitigated divine command theorist, with the central core of morality not depending on divine commands after all.

The interpretations of Adams and King have been challenged in the years since; Taina Holopainen, Armand Maurer, and Thomas Osborne have all argued that the older divine-command theory interpretation is much closer to the truth, and Thomas Williams and Eric Hagedorn have both drawn attention to the emphasis Ockham places on the contingency of all moral norms.[18] Thomas Ward has recently argued that Ockham's ethical theory turns out to be deeply incoherent on the assumption that something like King's interpretation is the right one; Ward takes this to be a reason to dismiss Ockham's thought altogether, though, rather than as a reason to question King's interpretation.[19]

The debate over whether Ockham is a divine command theorist has so dominated the scholarly conversation that for several decades there was little detailed discussion of his other ethical views, but this has happily begun to change in the twenty-first century. Thomas Williams has recently drawn attention to how, despite all the language of virtue in Ockham's works, his moral theory seems entirely focused on the rightness or wrongness of action, almost entirely setting aside the traditional Aristotelian focus on character traits; this singular focus on the morality of actions, rather than of dispositions of character, Williams claims, makes Ockham "the earliest important representative" of "the approach that is commonly said to be characteristic of modern moral philosophy."[20]

In other recent scholarship, Thomas Osborne has given a careful assessment of Ockham's account of practical reason.[21] Sonja Schierbaum has argued that Ockham's account of the indeterminacy of volitions does not preclude the possibility of those volitions still being rational in at least one important sense, Eileen Sweeney has detailed Ockham's understandings of sin and vice, and Terence Irwin has given careful analyses of the arguments Ockham provides for his libertarian account of free will and against eudaimonist ethical theories like Aquinas's.[22] Dominik Perler, Vesa Hirvonin, and Peter King have all drawn attention to Ockham's psychology of the emotions (what Ockham himself calls passions), noting that Ockham (along with Scotus) reconceives of the passions as being in some way active and

[18] See Holopainen 1991, Maurer 1999, Osborne 2005, Williams 2013, and Hagedorn 2019.
[19] See Ward forthcoming.
[20] See Williams 2013.
[21] See Osborne 2014.
[22] See Schierbaum 2017, Sweeney 2019, and Irwin 2007: ch. 27.

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volitional, rather than being states that merely happen to a human being and which one's rational soul ought to pacify.[23]

Readers of this volume should find ample material here with which to interact with this recent scholarship and also to locate previously unexplored aspects of Ockham's thought. Those who want a sort of one-stop summary of Ockham's whole system should first consult the long discussion of virtuous acts and habits found in chapters 14–15; most of the ideas discussed elsewhere at length can be found at least in an inchoate form in those two chapters, perhaps supplemented by the selections from *Var. Ques.* that are found in chapters 2, 16, and 17. Those who are most interested in Ockham's claims about the will and its freedom should especially see chapters 1, 7–8, and 17; those wanting to explore his accounts of moral psychology and practical reason should see chapters 2–6 and 16–17; while those who want to investigate the ethics of divine commands should carefully examine chapters 11–13, 18–22, and 24–27.

Connotation

Perhaps the single most utilized implement in Ockham's philosophical toolbox is his notion of connotative terms; since connotation theory is used a number of times in this volume without actually being explained in any of these texts, a short summary may be useful.[24]

Ockham regularly accuses his predecessors (justly or not) of trying to derive ontological structure from linguistic structure, believing that they assume, for example, that some entities in reality must be common to many because some terms generally apply to many, or that some entities in reality are relational items because there are true sentences containing relational predicates. The theory of connotation is intended to forestall and help clear up such metaphysical confusion.

On Ockham's account, some linguistic terms and concepts are what he calls "absolute"; they signify only individual substances and/or individual qualities that do exist in reality, they are truly predicated of everything that they signify, and the semantic role of these terms just is this signification. (In contemporary terms, we might say their meaning is equivalent to their reference.) Most linguistic terms and concepts, however, are "connotative" and so have multiple semantic roles; they have what Ockham calls both a primary signification and a secondary signification, by which he means that such terms are truly predicated of one real entity (or entities) while conveying or bringing

[23] See Hirvonen 2004, Perler 2005, King 2010, and Perler 2018.

[24] Readers who want a fuller account should see Spade and Panaccio 2019, Keele 2010, or Panaccio 2004. Ockham's clearest account of connotation is found in *SL* I.10.

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to mind some other entity (or entities) as well, but without being truly predicated of the latter entity (or entities).

Examples may help. On Ockham's view, absolute terms like 'Thomas Aquinas,' 'Lucifer,' 'the redness of that ball,' 'dog,' 'human being,' and 'heat' all play a similar semantic role. They differ in that the first three signify unique individuals (an individual human, an individual angel, and an individual quality entity) while the latter three signify all the members of a collection (all the individual dogs, humans, and heat qualities, respectively), but all these terms are similar insofar as they have the same kind of semantic role: each term is truly predicated of all the entities in question, and this, Ockham thinks, is the entirety of its meaning.

The paradigmatic case of a connotative term, on the other hand, is something like 'parent.' On Ockham's view, the word 'parent' primarily signifies all the parents, but secondarily signifies (i.e., connotes) all the children of those parents; the semantic role of 'parent' is that it is truly predicable of all the parents by means of its implicit gesturing to the children, since 'parent' is not truly predicated of someone unless there's a child around somewhere. What Ockham thinks he gains from this theory is he doesn't need to appeal to a relational property of *parenthood* floating around in the external world to explain why it's true that some people are parents and others aren't; rather, it's just a linguistic fact about the term 'parent' that it only applies when both the appropriate primary significate and secondary significate exist.

Similarly, albeit in a more complicated way, Ockham argues in the texts collected here that there is no distinct property of *moral goodness* that actions possess when they are good and lack when they are not good; rather, the term 'morally good' is just a connotative term that primarily signifies the good action while connoting (among other things) that the agent committing that act is under an obligation to perform that act. Likewise, he also claims in this volume that 'intellect' and 'will' are connotative terms with exactly the same primary significate: 'intellect' signifies a rational soul while connoting that soul's thinking, while 'will' signifies the very same rational soul while connoting that soul's desiring. Thus, on his view, the intellect and the will are entirely undifferentiated in reality; the division between intellect and will is, on his view, merely a difference in how we conceptualize and speak about the human mind and the various kinds of operations it can perform.

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Questions on Virtue, Goodness, and the Will

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Questions about Created Wills

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1 *Are Memory, Intellect, and Will Really Distinct Powers?* (Rep. *II*, *q.* 20)

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TEXT[1]

That memory, intellect, and will are distinct powers: 1

This is argued for on the basis that really distinct operations issue 2
from really distinct powers. But the operations of intellect and will are

[1] *OTh* V: 425–447.

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really distinct; therefore, etc. The major premise is argued for in two ways. First, in *Metaphysics* XII the Philosopher argues for the distinction of the [celestial] intelligences on the basis of the plurality of [heavenly] motions, and this argument would not be valid unless a plurality of powers follows from a plurality of operations.[2] Second, in *On the Soul* II the Philosopher says that powers are distinguished by acts.[3]

3 In support of the opposite answer there is what Augustine says: memory, intelligence, and will are not three substances but one substance; not three minds, but one mind.[4]

Aquinas's View

4 One view about this is that the powers of the soul are absolute accidents, added onto the essence of the soul. This view is argued for in several ways.

5 First, operating is related to a power in the same way that being is related to an essence. Therefore, by substitution, being is related to operating in the same way that an essence is related to a power. But only in God's case are being and operating the same; therefore, etc.[5]

6 Likewise, power [*potentia*[6]] and act are in the same genus, and operation is in the genus of accident, therefore, etc.[7]

7 Likewise, anything that is a principle of operating by its essence is always in act. But the soul is not always in act, because the soul is the act of a being in potentiality. Therefore, etc.[8]

8 Likewise, some operations are so different that in no way can they be from the same principle and power, e.g., an operation that cannot be exercised without a bodily organ is different from an operation that does occur without an organ. Therefore, there will be a similar difference between a power that is based in an organ [*organica*] and a power that is not. And this [difference] is not located in the essence of the soul. Therefore, etc.[9]

[2] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* XII.8 (1073a14–1074b14).
[3] Aristotle, *On the Soul* II.4 (415a 16–20).
[4] Augustine, *On the Trinity* X.11.18.
[5] Aquinas, *QDA*, q. 12, sc. The unstated final inference is that, since operating and existing are not identical in creatures, no creaturely power is identical to a creaturely essence.
[6] Ockham's reply to this argument relies on an ambiguity in the Latin word *potentia*. See **[15]**.
[7] Aquinas, *ST* Ia, q. 77, a. 1.
[8] Aquinas, *ST* Ia, q. 77, a. 1.
[9] Aquinas, *ST* Ia, q. 77, a. 5.

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Likewise, a natural power belongs to the second species of [the category of] Quality, and the powers of the soul are natural powers, therefore, etc.[10] 9

Likewise, one and the same thing cannot receive different and contrary forms through the same principle. Consequently, a thing needs to be made determinate by some other absolute things. For if this were not so, anything could be generated from anything. So then, since the soul can receive different operations, it follows that, etc.[11] 10

Furthermore, according to the Commentator accidents are always attributed to substances.[12] But operations are the sort of thing [attributed to a substance] and consequently they are accidents. Therefore, etc.[13] 11

Likewise, accidents that are themselves changing [*in fluxu*] are received into a substance by means of a permanent accident. Now understanding and willing are of this sort, and they are received by means of the powers. Therefore, etc.[14] 12

Objections to Aquinas's Arguments

However, these arguments do not conclusively demonstrate what was claimed, and so I respond to them. 13

To the first argument,[15] I say that it accepts a falsehood. This is so as follows: By 'operation' he means either (i) the very thing produced by a producing power, (ii) the principle of producing, or (iii) some relation [*respectum*] that designates the thing that is producing; for he cannot mean several different things by 'operation.' If the first is meant, then what is assumed is false; for in that case God's existence and God's operation are different, just as God and what is produced are different (whether what is produced is internal or external). If the second is meant, in that case being an operation and being a principle of operation are the same thing in creatures just as they are the same in God, because in this sense 'operation' is taken for the operative principle according to him. If the third is meant, then since that relation is a relation of reason according to him (whether in the case of God or in the case of creatures), that relation is not the same thing as 14

[10] Aquinas, *QDA*, q. 12, sc. Aristotle says that natural capacities are the second kind of quality in *Categories* 8 (9a14–28).
[11] Aquinas, *QDA*, q. 12, resp.
[12] E.g., Averroes, *In Metaphysics* IV, t. 25 and *In Metaphysics* VII, t. 4.
[13] This argument appears in the late fifteenth-century edition of Ockham's works, but does not appear in any of the earlier manuscripts canvassed by the critical edition. However, Ockham does reply to this argument (or, at least, one similar to it); see **[23]**.
[14] The edition ascribes this argument to Giles of Rome, *Quodlibeta* III, q. 11.
[15] See **[5]**.

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God nor the same thing as a creature. So, I respond to the argument that an operation (i.e., the thing produced) is universally and in all cases distinct from the being and the essence of the producer.

15 To the next argument[16] I say that *potentia*[17] is taken in multiple senses. In one sense, it is taken for an attribute [*passio*] or differentiating feature of being. In this sense it is an objective potentiality [*potentia*] and it is in the same genus as act. Indeed, it is the same thing as an act, because it becomes an act; for one and the same human being is first in potentiality and afterwards is in act, and similarly the same act of understanding is first in potentiality and afterwards in act.

In another sense, *potentia* is taken insofar as it is a part of being; in this case it is taken for either an active or a passive power [*potentia*]. If taken for an active power, then that is false [that power and act are in the same genus], and this is clear from itself. If taken for a passive power, then that is also false according to him, because it is necessary that some substance be immediately able to receive some accident or else there will be an infinite regress. Similarly, supposing that he indeed proves that an act is received in the soul by means of some other accident, still one need not posit that there are as many receptive accidents as there are acts. This is clear since understanding and willing are no less compatible with each other in the same immediate subject than are two sensible qualities of different species. (E.g., whiteness and sweetness in milk: neither of them is received in the other because they can be separated, since something can be white and not sweet, and vice versa.) Therefore, understanding and willing can be received in the soul by means of one accident if such an accident is posited. Consequently, one need not posit as many powers as there are acts.

16 To the next argument[18] I say that it assumes something false, unless it is meant that the essence is its own sufficient basis for acting without positing anything else; but this is only the case for God.

17 To the next argument[19] I concede that there is a distinction between powers that are based in an organ and those that are not, as will be made clear elsewhere.[20] But this question concerns the intellect and the will.[21]

[16] See **[6]**.
[17] Ockham's reply here depends on an ambiguity in the Latin word *potentia* that does not entirely correspond to an ambiguity in any possible English translation (e.g., "power," "potency," "potentiality," etc.), and so I have left this occurrence untranslated.
[18] See **[7]**.
[19] See **[8]**.
[20] *Rep.* III, q. 4 (*OTh* VI: 130–148), pp. 135–139.
[21] The unstated assumption is that neither the intellect nor the will is dependent on a bodily organ, and so this point is irrelevant to whether the intellect and will are distinct.

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To the next argument[22] I say that one need not posit a distinction between powers because of a difference in acts, and so there need not be as many powers as there are acts. For otherwise there would be as many intellective powers as there are acts of understanding. 18

You might object that one power extends itself to all acts of the same genus, but not to the acts of a different genus. Contrary to this, the acts of every power are in the genus of Quality, and so then there is no distinction of powers. 19

You might then object that acts that belong to the same proximate genus can have the same power, but this is not the case for acts that only belong to the same more remote genus. 20

Contrary to this, I hold that there is some [genus] common to all vital acts. That common [genus] has different species under it, such that one of those species belongs to one power and another belongs to another power. Therefore, etc. 21

To the next argument[23] I say that prime matter is an immediate principle of many substantial forms, and the intellective power is a principle of different acts of understanding. When he says that "then anything is generated from anything" and so on, I reply that when something is generated from multiple things, a determination by different absolute things is not required. And in fact the same form can be generated both from fire and from water. Therefore, matter can receive forms without any absolute things [determining it to one form or another]. 22

To the next argument[24] I say that the Commentator's meaning is that an accident is always attributed to a substance as to its subject, but not [always] as to its efficient or final cause (although sometimes this can be so). 23

To the next argument[25] I say that a changeable [*fluxibile*] accident can be immediately received in a substance. This is clear because the substance of an angel can be moved from place to place, but according to him[26] motion is a changeable accident and is immediately received in the substance of the angel. Similarly, quantity is a changeable accident, because if it were separated from a substance it could be compressed or expanded; nevertheless, quantity is immediately received in a substance. 24

[22] It is unclear to which argument this is intended to be a response; perhaps it is a second objection to **[8]**. Cf. the argument in **[9]**, which Ockham seems to not address.
[23] See **[10]**.
[24] See **[11]**.
[25] See **[12]**.
[26] I.e., Giles of Rome. See n. 14 above.

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Similarly, what he assumes is false: according to their own nature, the existence of understanding and willing does not consist in changing and becoming any more than does the existence of a stone or an angel (except perhaps that they do not endure as long, just as one angel might endure less than another). For just as a stone or an angel have existence only because of their cause's production and conservation, so understanding and willing have existence from their cause's production and conservation. They have existence just as long as they are conserved; so one act of understanding, in and of itself, can endure for a long time, and the same is the case for an act of willing. Similarly, just as the whole angel or the whole stone is produced and persists both all at once and once and for all (and not as one part following another part[27]), so it is for acts of understanding and willing, according to everyone.

So, I say that the existence of an act of understanding does not consist in changing and becoming any more than does the existence of an angel or of light in a medium (if the sun were to forever stand still in the same position), or of an angel or a whiteness. So, therefore, an act of understanding is one static [*fixum*] accident, just like the [whiteness] is.

25 This argument also fails in another way. Supposing that the existence of those acts of understanding and willing consisted only in changing and becoming, and supposing that a changeable accident has existence only by means of a static accident, then one would still not need to posit a plurality of receiving accidents on the basis of a plurality of changeable accidents that are being received, because all those changeable accidents can be received by means of one accident, and so by means of one power, as has been said.

26 You might object that understanding is a second act (and likewise for willing), and therefore it has existence in a different way than a first act does, and consequently it has a kind of existence that consists in changing.[28]

27 I reply that an act of understanding is a second act, because it presupposes a prior act in the thing from which it comes (i.e., a power and a habit, or at least one of them); but a first act does not do this. Similarly, an act of understanding can be called a second act because it is terminated in another thing; but a first act is not. But it is not in any way called a second act on the basis that its existence consists in

[27] The contrast here is between entities like stones, whose parts all exist simultaneously, and so-called successive entities like musical performances, one part of which exists at one time and another part at another time.

[28] The sense of "first act" and "second act" used here comes from Aristotle, *On the Soul* II.1 (412a20–30), where he refers to the powers of a substance as the substance's first act and the acts of those powers as the substance's second act.

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becoming or changing more than does the existence of a power or a habit, and these are [not called] first acts on the basis that they have their whole existence at a time (even though, as a matter of fact, the second acts do not remain for as long a time as the first act remains).

Henry of Ghent's View

There is another view, that the powers add nothing to the essence of the soul except relations [*respectus*] to different objects.[29] This is argued for as follows: When a thing is indifferently related to multiple things, it only engages in an act concerning one thing rather than another when it is more determined to the one than to the other. But the soul is like this [i.e., indifferently related] with respect to various objects, and this determination cannot be due to absolute items; therefore, it is due to relational items. So, it is posited that various relations to various objects are established in the essence of the soul, and a variety of powers are posited according to the variety of relations. He puts forward the example of prime matter; in it there are various powers to various forms, and this variety is only due to relational items, not due to some absolute items. 28

Against this: 29

If there were a relation of this sort in the soul, it would be either a real relation or a relation of reason. It is not a relation of reason, because a relation of reason is due to some intellect's act of comparing; but the powers exist completely [*perfecte*] in the essence of the soul prior to any act of the intellect. Nor is it a real relation, because even he agrees that there is never a real relation without a really existing terminus; but the powers of the soul can be complete when no object exists, since God can make an intellective soul without making any object in the world. In that case the powers of the soul would be complete and yet there would be no actual terminus (since there are no objects); therefore, etc. (The same argument also holds against his example of [prime] matter.) 30

Likewise, a relation of this sort is posited in matter only because matter is in potency to form. But that is not compelling, because matter that has been annihilated is still in potency to form and to various forms; for when no matter exists, "matter can receive form" is true, yet at that time no relation obtains. So, it is not the case that this sort of relation ought to be posited on the basis that matter is said to be in potency to form. As for the Commentator,[30] I say that he means by 31

[29] Henry of Ghent, *Quodlibeta* III, q. 14.
[30] Averroes, *In Physics* I, t. 70, cited by Henry in the text noted above.

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'relation' a relational extrinsic denomination, namely that there is some word or concept that principally signifies matter and that connotes a determinate form. E.g., matter can naturally receive the form of a donkey from a natural agent; matter thus signified can be called a potency to the form of a donkey. And a different word or concept principally signifies that same matter and connotes some other form (e.g., the form of a cow); matter signified by this sort of utterance or concept is called a potency to that other form. So, in this way various relations can be said to be in matter due to various relational extrinsic denominations, and otherwise this cannot be said, as will be discussed elsewhere.[31]

Scotus's View

32 There is another view that the powers are really the same, both with each other and with the essence of the soul, but they differ formally, not as relations but as absolute things.[32] (He does not put this view forward because of any argument, but only because of authoritative texts.) Also, he says that the powers are virtually contained in the soul, though he distinguishes two senses of virtual containment: in one sense when what is contained belongs to the essence of what contains it (as when what is higher is virtually contained in what is lower[33]), and in another sense when what is contained does not belong to the essence of what contains it (it is in this way that a subject virtually contains an attribute). Search John for this.

33 Against his way of positing two kinds of containment: Items that are really the same are either *per se* one thing in a genus or are parts of something that exists *per se* in a genus. But according to him a subject and an attribute (a soul and a power) are really the same even though they are formally distinct. Therefore, either they are one thing *per se* existing in a genus or they are parts of something that exists *per se* in a genus. Whichever it is, they always belong to the essence of that thing that is *per se* in a genus, just as the parts that constitute some whole existing *per se* in a genus belong to the essence of that whole. So, a power cannot be supposed to be an attribute of the soul any more than a differentiating feature of the genus can be. This is proved as follows: Wherever there is a formal distinction, there are some things neither of which is contained in the other. But according to him the genus and the differentiating feature are formally distinct; therefore,

[31] *Rep.* III, q. 6 (*OTh* VI: 162–191), pp. 184, 187–189.
[32] Scotus, *Rep.* II, d. 16, q. un., nn. 14–19.
[33] By "the higher is virtually contained in the lower," Scotus means that a species virtually contains the genera that it falls under.

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etc. And when the one thing is not contained under the other thing, in that case according to him the one is an attribute of the other; therefore, etc.

You might object that the genus and its differentiating feature are 34
contained in a third thing; but then I will say that the powers of the soul are contained in a third thing.

Ockham's View

So I say – holding on to the first part of John's view even though he 35
does not[34] – that the powers of the soul of which we have been speaking in this case (namely, the intellect and the will, for I am not speaking of the sensitive powers right now, for there will be a discussion of them elsewhere) are really the same as each other and with the essence of the soul. But I make a distinction concerning the powers of the soul: for 'power' is taken in one sense for the entire description that expresses the meaning of the name [of the power], and in another sense it is taken for that thing that is denominated by that name or concept.

Speaking of intellect and will in the first sense, I say that they are distinct, for the description that expresses the meaning of the word 'intellect' is that an intellect is a substance of soul that is capable of understanding, and the description of a will is that it is a substance of soul that is capable of willing. Now then, those descriptions can be taken (i) for the spoken words, (ii) for the concepts, or (iii) for the real things. In the first case, they are really distinct in the same way the spoken words are really distinct; in the second case they are distinct according to reason in the same way the concepts are. And in the third case they are really distinct (at least partially) because although it is numerically the same substance that can understand and will, nevertheless understanding and willing are really distinct acts.

Henry's view (that the powers are distinct by relations) can be 36
understood in this first sense, taking 'power' for the entire meaning of the name [of the power], which is not only the essence of the soul but also the acts of understanding and willing. If his view is understood in this way, then I hold it along with him; otherwise I do not. But speaking of the intellect and the will in the second sense, the intellect is no

[34] A footnote in the edition proposes that Ockham is claiming in this aside that Scotus does not hold the first part of the view on its own; that is, Scotus does not hold the first part of the view (that the powers are really identical with the soul) without also including the second part (that the powers are formally distinct from the soul). Alternatively, I strongly suspect he means to imply that Scotus doesn't actually hold the first part of the view at all; Ockham's belief is that Scotus's commitment to the real identity of the soul and its powers is undercut by his commitment to their formal distinction (as, e.g., he suggests in **[33]**).

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more distinct from the will in this sense than the intellect is from the intellect (or than God is from God or Socrates from Socrates); because in this sense the intellect is not distinct from the will, not in reality nor according to reason. Rather, in this sense there is one substance of soul that is capable of having distinct acts, acts with respect to which it can have various denominations. For insofar as it elicits or can elicit an act of understanding it is called an intellect; insofar as it elicits or can elicit an act of willing it is called a will. This is clear in the divine case, for God has governing power, restoring power, predestining power, and damning power [*reprobativam*]; these powers do not imply any distinction within God. Rather, different effects follow from the creative power of God, the governing power, and the predestining power; and because of these various effects God is denominated by various denominations, and these are extrinsic denominations. So it is in many cases (as has been frequently stated[35]) and so it is in the case at hand.

37 Next, it will be proved that intellect and will (meaning that which is denominated by these concepts or names) are entirely indistinct. First, because it is pointless to do with more what can be done with fewer. Also, because if they were distinct, they would be distinct either (1) according to reason or (2) from their real nature. Not (1), because this sort of distinction is caused by an act of the intellect; but these powers precede every act of the intellect. Not (2), because if they were distinct in this way, this distinction would be posited either (2.1) because their acts are different or (2.2) because the ways in which they bring about [*modum principiandi*] their acts are opposed and different.

It is not the case that intellect and will are distinct in reality because of (2.1), because then there would be as many distinct intellective powers as there are distinct acts of understanding. Now there are many acts of understanding that are distinct according to species or subalternate genus (an example of the first is an act of understanding a human being vs. an act of understanding a donkey; an example of the second is an act of understanding a human being vs. an act of understanding a stone). However, there is not always as great a distinction between the acts as there is among the objects, for the objects can differ according to their most general genera, and yet all cognitive acts are in the genus of Quality. Therefore, one need not posit a distinction in powers because of a distinction in acts.

Nor is it the case that intellect and will are distinct in reality because of (2.2), because bringing-about-freely [*principiare libere*] and

[35] See especially *Ord.*, d. 30, q. 5 (*OTh* IV: 374–395), pp. 382–388; also, *Rep.* II, q. 1 (*OTh* V: 1–26), p. 13.

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bringing-about-necessarily [*principiare necessario*] are not opposed to each other when they concern different things. This is clear in the divine case, e.g., the divine will with respect to the Holy Spirit and creatures: the divine will is a necessary principle with respect to the Holy Spirit and it is a free and contingent principle with respect to creatures. This is even clear in the case of creatures, because according to him[36] the will is a principle that freely and contingently produces an act of willing in itself, but the will is a necessary principle with respect to an act of willing in someone else, inasmuch as it is the object [of the other will's act of willing]. For otherwise, if the first will were a free and contingent principle with respect to the act of willing in the other will, then the first will could prevent the other will from loving$_D$ it, which is false and contrary to experience.

38 So, in response to those authoritative texts that say that the soul "bubbles up" powers, and that the powers "burst forth and flow out" from the essence of the soul, and that they are attributes of the soul (on account of which John posits an absolute formal distinction between the powers), I say that 'power' can be taken (i) for everything that is posited in the description expressing the meaning of the name of the power, or (ii) for [only] that thing that is denominated by that description. In the first sense those authoritative texts are true, because taken in this way 'intellective power' not only signifies the essence of the soul but also connotes the act of understanding, and the same goes for the will. Now in fact the soul does bubble up the act, and the act flows out from the soul and bursts forth as an effect does from its partial cause and principle. All those authoritative texts should be understood in this way. (For example, in the Gospel, "Power went out from him and healed all,"[37] but of course nothing went out except the health that was the effect.) In the same way, a cause can metaphorically bubble up an effect. But taking 'power' in the second sense, this is not true and is not what the authoritative texts mean by those metaphorical expressions.

39 In the same way, 'attribute' [*passio*] can be taken (i) for some accident that inheres in a subject, or (ii) for some connotative concept [that connotes this sort of accident]. In the first sense, a power is not an attribute with respect to its entire signification (and this is so whether 'power' is taken in its first sense or the second sense[38]), for the essence of the soul is part of the entire signification of the power. But taking 'attribute' in the second sense, in this sense a power is an

[36] Scotus, *Quod*. 16, nn. 14–15.
[37] Luke 6:19.
[38] For the two senses of 'power,' see **[35]**.

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attribute, because the name 'power' (or the concept) connotes something that is really a passion [*passio*] and an inhering accident, namely, an act elicited by the soul. For, as was stated elsewhere, an act can indeed be called a passion and can be predicated of the soul, formally or equivalently, in the second mode of *per se* predication in a modal sentence.[39] Hence the Commentator says in *Metaphysics* VII[40] that something is not an accident unless it is an attribute of some subject, and he argues for this on the basis of the claim that something is not an accident unless some subject is posited in its definition; so, consequently, it is called an attribute with respect to its subject.

40 You might object that in that case the will wills through the intellect just as well as through the will. I respond that if 'through' [only] names a circumstance of the efficient cause (which, of course, is an entirely undifferentiated nature that is the principle of both operations), then the will does indeed will through the intellect just as well as through the will, because that same thing that is denominated by 'intellect' is the efficient cause of that willing. But if 'through' names a circumstance of the efficient cause while also indicating that it be taken *per se*, then the will wills through the will in the first mode of *per se* predication, and the will does not do so through the intellect.

41 Alternatively, the 'through' can name a circumstance of the elicitive principle while taking it in the first or second mode of *per se* predication.[41] In the first mode, these are all true: "the will has the ability to will [*volitiva*]," "the will is capable of willing [*potens velle*]," "the intellect has the ability to understand [*intellectivus*]," "the intellect is capable of understanding [*potens intelligere*]," and similarly so are these: "the will wills through the will and not through the intellect" and "the intellect understands through the intellect and not through the will." This is so because an act of willing is connoted by 'the will' and is not connoted by 'the intellect,' and vice versa.

So, the will does not will through the intellect, neither in the first mode nor the second mode of *per se* predication. Rather, "the will wills through the intellect" is an obviously false sentence (and so is "the intellect understands through the will") because the predicate presents something to be understood that is not presented by the subject. This

[39] Ockham argues that passions just are acts of the sensitive soul in *Rep.* III, q. 12, nn. 28–33, translated in chapter 15 of this volume. For more on *per se* predication, see **[41]**.

[40] Averroes, *In Metaphysics* VII, t. 4.

[41] On Ockham's understanding of Aristotle, the first mode of *per se* predication is when the definition of the predicate term occurs either explicitly or implicitly in the subject term, and the second mode is when the subject term occurs either explicitly or implicitly in the definition of the predicate term. For more, see *SL* III–II, c. 7 (*OPh* I: 515–519), translated in Longeway 2007: 161–164.

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is contrary to the first mode of *per se* predication, because in the first mode it is permissible for the subject to include more than the predicate, but the converse is not permissible. (An example of [what is permissible]: "a human is an animal.")

Similarly, in the second mode the predicate is an attribute of the subject. But the will is not an attribute of the intellect (taking each with respect to the whole of what they signify), because although an act of understanding and an act of willing (which are connoted by the names 'intellect' and 'will') are attributes of one soul, nevertheless the whole "soul-together-with-an-act-of-willing" is not an attribute of the whole "soul-together-with-an-act-of-understanding." In the second mode, it is true that "the soul has the ability to understand" and that "the soul has the ability to will," because these attributes are predicated of the soul in the second mode of *per se* predication.

An example of this is found in the divine case, in the way in which "God creates by his productive power and not by his governing power" is *per se* in the first mode. This was written about in the first book; look there.[42]

42 In response to all the authoritative texts that say that these powers are parts of the soul, I respond in the same way that Augustine responds, and this is also what those who hold the view contrary to mine say about "the higher portion" and "the lower portion": for according to them[43] the higher and the lower portion of the soul are not really distinct – not by its real nature – but they are only distinct according to the soul's twofold functions: the soul is called "the higher portion" insofar as it relates to spiritual things and it is called "the lower portion" insofar as it relates to temporal things.

43 Similarly, in response to *Ethics* VI[44], where the Philosopher says that there are distinct "particles" with respect to distinct objects, they[45] say that on account of distinct habits there are said to be distinct particles of the soul. In the same way, I myself respond that one can say there are parts of the soul because of its distinct tasks and acts, though not because of some distinction from its real nature.

44 In response to the other objection,[46] I say that, taking 'will' for the thing that is denominated by this sort of name or concept (namely, for the principle capable of eliciting an act of willing and similarly an act

[42] E.g., *Ord*., d. 2, q. 1 (*OTh* II: 3–49), especially pp. 48–49; also *Ord*., d. 30, q. 5 (*OTh* IV: 374–395), especially pp. 382–388.
[43] E.g., Thomas Aquinas; see *ST* Ia, q. 79, a. 9.
[44] Aristotle, *NE* VI.1 (1138b35–1139a17).
[45] Aquinas, *ST* Ia, q. 79, a. 9, ad 3.
[46] This is a response to an objection not recorded in the text, but it clearly concerns the long-standing dispute over whether the will or the intellect is the higher or more noble power. See, e.g., Aquinas, *ST* Ia, q. 82, a. 3.

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of understanding), then in this sense the will is not more noble than the intellect, just as the will is not more noble than the will. This is because they are entirely the same thing.

However, when taking both 'will' and 'intellect' with respect to the entire thing that is signified by the name's meaning, then one can concede that the will is more noble than the intellect, because the act of loving$_D$ that is connoted by 'will' is more noble than the act of understanding that is connoted by 'intellect.' In this second sense one can also concede that the intellect is prior to the will, because the act of understanding that is connoted by 'intellect' is prior to the act of willing that is connoted by 'will.' This is so because an act of understanding is a partial efficient cause of an act of willing, and because an act of understanding can naturally exist without an act of willing, but not vice versa. However, this priority does not imply any perfection in the thing that is prior, nor any imperfection in what is posterior.

45 In response to Augustine and others[47] who say that there is something in the soul that is preeminent after the body is destroyed and that the preeminent thing is the will, it can be answered in one way that he takes 'soul in a human being' in a sense that includes intellect and will as distinct from the sensitive form. In that case, I say that in humans the intellective soul is more noble than the sensitive soul, because I posit that in humans the intellective soul and the sensitive soul are really distinct. Alternatively, this can be answered according to what has already been said: taking 'will' together with the act and habit of love$_A$, and taking 'intellect' together with the act and habit of understanding, then the will is still more noble than the intellect; but this nobility should be recognized only as belonging to the acts and habits.

46 However, there is then a worry regarding how the agent intellect and the possible intellect are distinguished.

47 I say that the meaning of the Commentator in *On the Soul* III is that there are two really distinct intelligences that do not exist in humans as perfections exist in a perfectible thing, but only as movers of the body, just as he posits an intelligence that moves the heavens and is joined with the heavens as a mover joined to what is movable. But on this point he should be rejected by Christians.

48 Since I say that plurality should not be posited without necessity, so the agent intellect and the possible intellect are entirely the same, both in reality and according to reason. Nevertheless, these names or

[47] This is a response to an objection not recorded in the text. I am unsure which Augustine passage Ockham is referring to here, but cf. Augustine, *On the Trinity* X.11.17–18 and XI.7.12.

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concepts do indeed connote different things, because 'agent' signifies the soul while connoting an act of understanding that proceeds from the soul actively; however, 'possible intellect' signifies the same soul but connotes an act of understanding that is received in the soul. But it is entirely the same thing that both efficiently causes and receives the act of understanding.

But then there is a worry whether the agent intellect has any action 49
in the next life. I respond that the act of the agent intellect is only to cause acts of understanding, and these acts are either intuitive or abstractive acts (and abstractive acts both of singular things and of universal things), as was said previously.[48] Also, the agent intellect has no other action with respect to phantasms as others imagine it does, not "refinement" or "illumination" or the like, as was said previously.[49] Therefore, since God is the total cause of the beatific acts (both vision and enjoyment of the divine nature), and since the intellect and will are related purely passively to those acts (as was said previously in regards to the obstinacy of angels[50]), it follows that the agent intellect does not have any activity with respect to that vision. This is just because of the nobility of that act; it is not because the same thing cannot be both active and passive with respect to the same thing. But with respect to other objects that are such that a cognition of them does not necessarily follow from the beatific vision nor is incompatible with the beatific vision, the intellect can be a partial cause in that case just as it is in this life, as was said previously.[51]

To John's other motive concerning the passions of being (namely, 50
the one and the good), the response is clear by means of connotation. See the question on the divine attributes.[52]

Responses to the Initial Arguments

To the first initial argument[53] I say that sometimes distinct operations 51
require distinct origins [*principia*] and sometimes they do not. For instance, the distinction between sensitive cognition and intellectual cognition does prove a distinction between sense and intellect. But as for when a distinction should be posited and when it should not be, one should fall back upon experience or evident reason. Since neither

[48] E.g., *Ord.*, Prol., q. 1 (*OTh* I: 3–75), p. 15–47; also, *Rep.* II, q. 14 (*OTh* V: 311–337), p. 316.
[49] *Rep.* II, q. 12–13 (*OTh* V: 251–310), p. 308.
[50] *Rep.* II, q. 15, n. 11, translated in chapter 18 of this volume.
[51] *Rep.* II, q. 15, n. 21, translated in chapter 18 of this volume.
[52] *Ord.*, d. 2, q. 1 (*OTh* II: 3–49).
[53] See **[2]**.

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is present in the case at hand, one should not posit a plurality of origins on the basis of the plurality of operations.

52 To the next argument[54] I say that the Philosopher is being cited wrongly. He does not say that powers are distinguished by their acts; rather, it is the expositor who says this, wrongly expositing the Philosopher. The Philosopher only says that acts go before and are better known than their objects; so, he says that our cognition of powers proceeds from the acts. That is enough for me, since sometimes a distinction of powers can be inferred from a distinction of operations and sometimes it cannot.

53 So, in order to know when a distinction of powers can be inferred from a distinction of operations and when it cannot, the following should be known. In general, when all the things external to the cognizer are uniform (e.g., when the object or the many objects are equally present, the medium equally disposed, and all the things external to the cognizer are equally related to the cognizer) then (i) if someone who is cognizing and desiring and who has a power can have one act concerning one object but cannot have a different act concerning the same object (that is, if the act is suited to be had concerning that object, or concerning some other object about which that act is suited to be had), so that the cognizer can in no way have a different act concerning that object (whether the act is cognitive, appetitive, sensitive, or intellective), then a distinction of powers necessarily follows from the distinction of such acts. But (ii) when someone who is cognizing and desiring and who has a power (and while every external impediment is removed) has one act concerning some object and the cognizer can (from itself and with its nature remaining fixed) have a different act concerning that object or another object, then in that case a distinction of powers never follows from a distinction of acts. Rather, what necessarily follows is the identity and unity of the power with respect to those acts.

54 An example of (i): With all objects of the particular external senses equally present to a sensing individual, and with everything external to the individual equally disposed, the cognizing individual can be disposed in such a way that they can have an act concerning one object of a sense (such as a color), but they are unable in any way to have a different act (such as an act of hearing) concerning that color or concerning a sound. And this is so even though by supposition both the color and the sound are equally present to the individual. For example, if some cognizer were to have clear and well-disposed eyes and were also deaf (so that, consequently, they do not have a well-disposed organ of

[54] See **[2]**.

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hearing), then they can have an act of seeing concerning colors but not an act of hearing, neither with respect to a color nor with respect to a sound. So, it necessarily follows that the sense of vision (taking 'sense of vision' for whatever it is by which they elicit an act of seeing) is distinct from the sense of hearing. The distinction between each of the senses can be proved in the same way, and also the distinction between sense and intellect and will. For someone cognizing can be disposed in such a way that they can have every sensitive act and yet cannot have any act of the intellect or the will (e.g., if they were insane); so it necessarily follows from these acts that the sensitive powers are really distinct from the intellect and the will.

An example of (ii): It is impossible naturally (that is, unless God 55
suspends the appetite's act) for some cognitive power (whether sensitive or intellective) to have an act concerning any object without it being the case that the appetite that accompanies that cognitive power has (or can have[55]) the sort of act that it is suited to have concerning that object. For instance, everyone experiences in themselves that, when apprehending any object (whether through the sense or through the intellect), they can immediately have an act of appetite concerning that object that is apprehended. (I do not say that one always necessarily has this act as a matter of fact, only that given this one can immediately have it.) So, a sensitive cognitive power and a sensitive appetite are in no way distinct by their real nature, nor are the intellect and will distinct. (Speaking here about the real essences [*quid rei*] of these powers, not the meanings of their names, as was discussed previously.[56])

You might object that a cognitive power can cognize a bad thing 56
but[57] an appetite cannot want the bad thing and the will cannot will-for the bad thing. Therefore, there follows a distinction between the cognitive and the appetitive power, even according to my own teaching.

I respond that the assumption is false.[58] Nevertheless, even suppos- 57
ing that it is true, I say that no object (neither good nor bad) can be cognized by a sensitive or intellective cognition without it being the case that an appetite that accompanies that power could have an act concerning that object. If a good thing is apprehended, the will can have an act of willing-for concerning that object; if a bad thing is apprehended, then it can have an act of willing-against, or an act of

[55] Reading *vel habere possit* with manuscripts BL.
[56] See **[35–36]**.
[57] Reading *sed* with manuscript E for the edition's *sicut*.
[58] Namely, the assumption that the will cannot will-for a bad thing. See *Var. Ques.*, q. 8, nn. 59–65, translated in chapter 17 of this volume.

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fleeing or detesting. Thus I said above that an appetite can have an act of whatever sort it is suited to have concerning such an object; I did not say that it can always have an act of wanting or an act of willing-against.

58 Two things follow from this. The first is that there are as many appetites as there are distinct cognitive powers. For from the fact that the cognitive powers and their associated appetitive powers are entirely the same, and that the cognitive powers are distinguished from each other, it follows that the appetitive powers are also so distinguished. Consequently, the appetite that accompanies the visual power is distinct from the appetite that accompanies the auditory power, and so on. The second is that when a distinction of powers is not to be inferred from a distinction of acts (but rather a unity of the powers should be inferred), then the acts [of those powers] are elicited with respect to the same object. This is clear since that same object is an object of both the cognitive power and its appetitive power.

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2 *On Pleasure, Pain, and Distress* (Var. Ques., *q. 6, a. 9*)

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TEXT[1]

How These Passions Are Caused in a Sensitive Appetite

1 Regarding pleasure, pain, and distress,[2] it should be known first that pain (which is, properly speaking, a passion and a quality of a sensitive appetite) is caused by a sensitive apprehension. It is not caused by an object apprehended by a sense, nor is it caused by an act of an appetite. Rather, it is only caused by an apprehension, an appetitive power, and God. (But if an appetite had efficient causal power with respect to this passion, then it does not seem necessary to posit [that the passion is partly caused by an apprehension], as will be made clear elsewhere.[3])

2 The first of these claims, namely that pain in a sensitive appetite[4] is not caused by the apprehended object, is clear by means of a commonly accepted principle: an effect sufficiently depends upon its essential causes and the states [*dispositionibus*] of those causes. But if the object is destroyed and the apprehension of the object remains in the sense, the pain or the pleasure can still be caused in the appetite just the same. This is clear in the case when some interior sense (e.g., the imagination) apprehends some harmful or pleasurable object by means of an abstractive act: regardless of whether that object is annihilated, the pain or pleasure can be caused in that sensitive appetite just the same. Also, if God were to preserve the vision of some pleasurable or distressing object while he destroyed the object of that vision, pleasure or distress could immediately be caused in the appetite that accompanies vision, as is clear from experience. Consequently, the apprehended object is in no way an immediate cause of these passions. However, if the apprehended object were indeed a cause (as John posits in the third book of his *Sentences*, in the question on whether Christ suffered pain with respect to the higher portion of his soul), then it would be only a mediate cause with respect to these passions, only a

[1] *OTh* VIII: 251–272.

[2] Ockham explains the difference between these terms himself, but one contrast to be kept in mind is that he uses "pain" (*dolor*) only to refer to a negative state of a sensitive appetite. "Distress" (*tristitia*) and "pleasure" (*delectation*), however, are used to refer to negative and positive states (respectively) of either a sensitive appetite or the will; so sometimes "distress" is used synonymously with "pain" and sometimes it is not. Compare Aristotle's discussion of pleasure and pain in *NE* VII.11–14 (1152b1–1154b35).

[3] Exactly what posit is unnecessary is unclear from the text. But see **[16–17]** and also *Rep.* III, q. 12, nn. 54–55, translated in chapter 15 of this volume, which consider whether a passion can be caused without an apprehension.

[4] Some readers may be surprised by the indefinite article here, but Ockham explicitly affirms a belief in individual, distinct sensitive appetites for each external sense. See *Rep.* II, q. 20, n. 58, translated in chapter 1 of this volume. Despite this, Ockham does sometimes speak of two appetites, the sensory and the intellectual; e.g., see **[3–4]**.

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cause of a cause insofar as that object naturally causes and preserves an intuitive cognition in the sense and this cognition immediately causes the aforementioned passions in the aforementioned way.

3 The second of these claims (namely, that an act of a sensitive appetite does not cause these passions) is clear since a sensitive appetite has an act concerning some object only when the object is absent and not possessed. This is because a sensitive appetite only has acts of desiring and shunning, and these acts only concern objects that are absent and not possessed. Now then, with respect to an object that an appetite desires or shuns, pain and pleasure are never caused in that same appetite while those acts of desiring or shunning persist in it. But when an object that is craved or desired comes to be possessed and becomes present to an apprehensive power, then the act of desiring ceases (for that act only concerns what is not possessed) and then pleasure is caused, which is a passion caused by the apprehension of the desired object in the aforementioned way. The passion is not caused by the act of desiring, for that act does not exist when the pleasure is caused and consequently cannot be its cause. This is clear, because if someone wants to have sex with a woman, for as long as the act of desiring remains they do not yet take pleasure in having sex, no matter how much they look at the woman with whom they desire to have sex. This is because the desiring individual does not yet possess the act of having sex, and one can only take pleasure in an act when one possesses it. So it is in general with respect to any desired object (whether it is desired by a sensitive appetite or by the intellective appetite): for as long as the act of desiring remains in the one power or in the other, pleasure, pain, or distress are never caused in the one appetite or the other.

4 This is confirmed because someone can want an act of sexual intercourse (by an act of either appetite) and can effectively and unconditionally will-against the absence of that act, an act that they still actually lack and that they know that they lack. Consequently, by their wanting in this way they would feel distressed and would be greatly pained in their sensitive appetite (supposing that this case is possible, anyway). Therefore, according to this case, pleasure is not caused in one appetite or in the other with respect to this act of sexual intercourse, however much the act is strongly craved by the act of desiring. (What causes this distress will be made clear later.)

5 It might be objected that this is obviously contrary to experience, since everyone has experienced in their own case that if they see someone [*obiectum*] that is beautiful and pleasurable, then they desire an act of sexual intercourse and they feel extreme pleasure, even if they never obtain the act itself.

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6 Similarly, it might be objected that when someone apprehends (either through the intellect or through the imagination) a harmful object that has hurt that individual at some time (e.g., a battle or something of that sort), a sensitive appetite flees from it and the will wills-against it. Nevertheless, pain is immediately caused in the one appetite and distress in the other, even though that object is also never actually possessed. So then, what was said[5] is not true.

7 I respond to both of these objections at the same time: Neither the aforementioned pleasure nor the distress concerns unpossessed objects concerning which there is an act of desiring or shunning in either [appetitive] power. Rather, both the pleasure and the distress concern (a) an apprehensive act by which this sort of desired object is apprehended, (b) an act of desiring by which this sort of object is wanted, or (c) both; but these acts – both the apprehensive and the appetitive act – are present and possessed. For example, in the proposed example, if someone were to see a woman and desire to have sex with her, this individual would not take pleasure in the act of sexual intercourse which they do not possess.

Pleasure in the will occurs as follows: The intellect apprehends an object and cognizes it. The intellect then perceives and apprehends its cognition (which it actually presently possesses). The will wills-for that cognition with an act of taking pleasure [*complacentiae*], not with the act of desiring that is already possessed. Pleasure in the will follows from this sort of willing for the possessed cognition, and this pleasure in no way concerns the act of sexual intercourse that is not possessed; rather, the pleasure is caused concerning either the cognition of the intellect, the bodily vision, or the sensitive appetite's act of desiring. For example, if the intellect were to intellectually cognize the bodily vision, the sensitive act of wanting, and its own cognition, and if the will were to will-for any one of these acts, pleasure would immediately be caused in the will because it possesses the object of this act of willing (i.e., whichever of these aforementioned acts).

8 In the same way an internal sense (e.g., the common sense or the imagination) apprehends both an act of an external sense and a sensitive act of desiring, as the Philosopher posits in *On the Soul* II.[6] This apprehensive act of the aforementioned acts immediately (i.e., without any first or intermediate act of an appetite) causes pleasure in a sensitive appetite concerning those acts as concerning its objects, not concerning the act of sexual intercourse which is wanted. This is because

[5] Namely, Ockham's claim in **[3–4]** that pain/pleasure/distress cannot be had concerning an object that is not somehow possessed by the agent.

[6] Aristotle, *On the Soul* III.2 (426b8–427a16).

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that act [of sexual intercourse] is not possessed, but what are possessed are the aforementioned acts – those which the pleasure concerns. The same should be said in every way about pain and distress; they occur when a harmful object is apprehended, an object that a sensitive appetite shuns and the rational appetite does not will by means of an act of willing-against. (It is unnecessary to fully explain the application of this case, as it is sufficiently clear from what has already been said.)

These Passions Are Distinct from Desiring and Willing

Moreover, it should be known that the distinction between pain/pleasure/joy/distress and the acts of desiring/shunning/willing-against/willing-for are proved in the following way. First, this distinction is proved on the basis that pain and pleasure in a sensitive appetite can never naturally coexist at the same time with an act of desiring or shunning concerning the same object, but they can indeed coexist [with an act of desiring or shunning] concerning different objects, as was made clear earlier. So, the distinction among them can be proved by their separability: For an act of desiring or shunning only concerns a thing that is not possessed, and so long as a thing is not possessed there is neither pleasure nor distress concerning it. But when a thing that is craved is possessed, then each of those acts ceases and pain or pleasure is immediately caused by a sensitive apprehension (and not by an act of wanting) as was stated above. 9

John argues for this distinction in a second way in the third book, in the question on whether Christ felt pain according to the higher portion of his soul.[7] He argues for the distinction by the separability of those acts, since positive acts of unconditionally willing-against can exist when distress does not. This is clear in the case of God and the beatified who unconditionally will-against some occurrence, even though there is no distress in them, nor can there be, as will be made clear later. 10

But this argument does not prove (in the general case) the distinction between an act of willing-against and distress, or between an act of willing-for and pleasure. This is because the opposition would say that not every act of willing-against is the same thing as distress, nor is every act of willing-for the same thing as pleasure. Rather, they would say only that distress is the same thing as an act of willing-against by which I will-against something when what happens does not accord with my will; for this act of willing-against can never exist without distress (except by a miracle). So then, if God and the beatified were to

[7] Scotus, *Ord.* III, d. 15, q. un.

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will-against something but what occurs does not accord with their willing, then either (a) they would be distressed, or (b) the act of willing-against with respect to its causation of the distress would be miraculously suspended, or (c) that causality would be impeded as a result of the excellence of the pleasure (as will be explained later). (In fact though, when God and the beatified do will-against something's occurring, God prevents that thing from occurring.)

Similarly, the opposition would say that pleasure is the same thing as an act of willing-for by which I will something and that thing (and not its opposite) occurs just as I willed it, since that act of willing never exists without pleasure, except by a miracle or by some impediment (as will be made clear later).

11 So then, there is a better way to prove the aforementioned distinction.[8] A bad angel loves_{D} itself very intensely and it wills good for itself, and it also unconditionally wills that humans sin and many other such things. Often, these sorts of things occur in just the way it wills them, and nevertheless it does not take pleasure in the fact that they occurred in just the way it willed them. This is so because (according to common teaching) just as there is no distress in the beatified, so there is no pleasure in the damned.

In the same way, if the beatified were to will-against some occurrence and what occurs does not accord with their willing, then it could be sufficiently proved that every act of willing-against should be distinguished from distress. For if there were any act of willing-against that is not distinct from distress, it would certainly be an act of willing-against a thing that occurs not in accordance with their willing; but even that act could exist without distress, as in the case of a good angel and the beatified, in whom there would be this kind of act of willing-against without any distress. (This is the proof that John didn't achieve.)

Questions about These Passions

12 You might ask (i) whether distress could coexist with an act of willing-for and (ii) whether pleasure could coexist with an act of willing-against.

The first coexistence might be argued for as follows: if someone were to will that something good occur for their friend and if something bad were to occur instead, then the individual would be distressed that the opposite of what they willed happened, so long as there persists the willing-for concerning the good thing whose opposite occurred.

[8] I.e., the distinction made in **[9]**.

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The second coexistence might be argued for as follows: when someone wills-against[9] some good for their enemy by an act of willing-against, and when that non-good thing occurs to their enemy just as they willed-against, then the individual is pleased that the bad thing occurred, so long as there persists the willing-against concerning the good thing whose opposite happened, as is clear from experience.

13 I respond to the first question that distress cannot be caused by a willing-for alone, since according to Augustine distress occurs when we are willing-against.[10] In response to the argument, I say that if someone were to will a good for themselves and the opposite were to occur, the individual would immediately elicit an act of willing-against concerning the bad thing opposed to the good that was willed, and that act of willing-against would perhaps be naturally caused by the will and by the preceding willing-for concerning the good thing, just as naturally as fire naturally makes things hot. It is just as if someone efficaciously wills to be healthy, and that individual knows that health cannot be attained without some bitter medicine, then the will is necessitated to will-for the bitter medicine. And it is not in the will's power to unqualifiedly not will the medicine at all while this case persists, although it could contingently will-for the bitter medicine by stopping the efficacious willing [for health]. Search for this in Ockham's first book.[11]

14 I respond to the second question in the same way. If someone by a positive act wills-against some good thing for their enemy, and if what occurs accords with what was willed-against (whether some bad thing happens to the enemy, or just that neither a good thing nor a bad thing occurs) then the individual who is willing-against in this way immediately has an act of willing-for concerning that lack of the good thing (or that bad thing) that occurred. That act of willing-for is naturally and necessarily caused by the will and by the first act of willing-against, as was explained earlier.

And so, perhaps, a willing-for by itself can cause pleasure in the will without any willing-against; e.g., if I will something good for someone and that thing occurs. Also, a willing-against by itself can cause distress in the will; e.g., if I will-against something and what was willed-against does not occur. But a willing-for by itself, without any act of willing-against, can never cause distress; nor can pleasure be caused by a willing-against by itself, one without any intermediate act of willing-for.

[9] Reading *nolit* with manuscript H rather than the edition's *non vult*.
[10] Augustine, *City of God* XIV.6.
[11] *Ord.*, d. 1, q. 6, nn. 25–38, translated in chapter 7 of this volume; for further discussion of this case, see *Var. Ques.*, q. 4, nn. 65–66, translated in chapter 4.

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15 You might ask, given what was said about pain, whether pain or pleasure could be caused in a sensitive appetite without any preceding act of desiring or shunning. I respond that they could. It is clear in the case of pain, because if someone were suddenly placed in a fire they would immediately feel pain, even though they had no act of desiring (nor, perhaps, any act of shunning) concerning the fire. It is similarly clear from what has already been said that this is the case; for, as was said, the imaginative power or some other internal sense can apprehend a bodily vision by which sight sees some beautiful and pleasurable object, it can apprehend an act of desiring sexual intercourse, and it can apprehend an act of shunning some harmful thing. Such an apprehension can immediately cause pain or pleasure in the sensitive appetite that accompanies that apprehension without any act of desiring or shunning actually being in that appetite, because those aforementioned acts concern objects that are not possessed. But the objects of an imaginative apprehension are perhaps possessed, as was shown earlier.

16 You might ask whether acts of a sensitive appetite, both pain and pleasure, are always caused by a preceding apprehension. I respond they need not be. For if there were a newborn infant who never apprehended nourishment outside its mother's womb, it would still naturally hunger and thirst (which is nothing other than to want food and drink), and it would feel pain. Therefore, this act cannot be caused by a preceding apprehension since there is no preceding apprehension; rather, in this case it is caused by some bodily quality such as hotness or coldness.

However, if an infant in the womb did apprehend its nourishment, from that apprehension a habit could be generated in the sensitive power, a habit that inclines toward similar acts. If this were possible, then the aforementioned passions could be caused by an apprehension that is caused by this aforementioned habit to whatever extent there were a shortage of nourishment. But if it is not possible for this sort of habit to be generated in the child [in the womb] due to the constant changes, then the other answer would need to be given.

17 But then, if these passions (hunger and thirst) are caused by bodily qualities and not by an apprehension, there is a worry whether any pain is caused that is distinct from these passions. One can answer that an internal sensitive power of an infant could apprehend these passions, and then that apprehension could cause a pain that is distinct from these passions, as was just said. But if it could not apprehend passions of this sort (which I believe to be true), then it would be more reasonable to say that these passions of hunger and thirst are two qualities (or one quality) that are not numerically distinct from pain; and sometimes

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they are called acts of wanting, other times they are called pain. This is because, so it seems, a pain that is distinct from an act of an appetite is only naturally caused by a preceding apprehension, and by supposition there is no preceding apprehension of this sort in this case.

But in us [adults] hunger and thirst are distinct from pain, because in us there are apprehensions of the sort that can cause a pain distinct from those apprehensions. Accordingly, in a child [in the womb] these passions of hunger and thirst are distinct according to species from the hunger and thirst that are possessed after the apprehension of nourishment. After that apprehension, pain and the act of wanting food are distinct in species, due to a distinction between their objects.[12] Beforehand the only distinction between them is a distinction in number, but afterwards the passions are of a different kind.

18 Furthermore, it should be known that in a sensitive appetite there can be pleasure or pain that is so excessive that it can entirely impede the use of reason. This is clear from the experience of a brave warrior who, when attacking something terrifying, can feel so much pain that they are unable to understand or will anything. The same goes for someone engaged in fornication who, because of the powerful pleasure, is not able to understand or will. The cause of this is that, although such an individual has a phantasm and a well-disposed intellect, nevertheless due to the excess of these passions an act of a bodily quality is impeded, and this act is necessarily required in this life in order for an act of understanding to be caused. (This was discussed elsewhere, in the fourth book.[13])

19 But given the previous cases, then there is a worry whether the brave warrior is virtuous in attacking terrifying things when the use of their reason is suspended, and also whether fornication is vicious. I respond that the former act is not virtuous and the latter is not vicious since (as is made clear in Ockham's third book[14]) only a freely elicited act of the will is either virtuous or vicious, meritorious or demeritorious. Any other act is called vicious or virtuous only by some extrinsic denomination, i.e., to the extent that the act can be conformed to that willing. So, when there is no act of willing in a human, then there is no virtuous or vicious act in them, either essentially or denominatively. However, the act by which someone voluntarily put themselves in this state in which they would lose the use of reason is called virtuous or vicious; and that act was an act of willing.

20 But John posits that an exterior act has its own goodness distinct from the goodness of the interior act, and so he has to posit that the

[12] The edition reads *subiectorum* here, but notes that *obiectorum* was clearly intended.
[13] *Rep.* IV, q. 14 (*OTh* VII: 278–317), pp. 281–282.
[14] *Rep.* III, q. 11, especially nn. 38, 68–77, translated in chapter 14 of this volume.

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aforementioned acts would be virtuous or vicious, no matter how much those individuals lack the use of reason.[15] This view seems to be false, as is made clear elsewhere.[16]

21 That his view is false is proved since sin is only present in an act when that act is voluntary and is in the will's power either mediately or immediately. Now, it is possible that someone have an exterior act that was at first elicited in accordance with a vicious willing and that, while that exterior act persists, they unqualifiedly and meritoriously will-against that act; consequently, sin is not present in that exterior act. For example, someone voluntarily jumps off a cliff, but while falling they repent and are pained, unqualifiedly willing-against that act for the sake of God. The act of falling is then no longer voluntary, nor is it within the will's power. So then, sin is not present in that act, because otherwise that individual both would be sinning mortally and would also deserve merit due to their willing-against[17] concerning that sin, which is false. Therefore, sin was not present in that act [of falling] even at first.

22 You might ask whether an apprehension of a pleasurable or harmful sensible thing can cause pain in an appetite without a real alteration of that very sense. I respond that it can. For although taste and touch apprehend a sensible object and at the same time are really altered by that object, still this is only incidental to the causing of the pain. For it is clear that pain is also really caused in the other senses, which only apprehend their object without being altered by it. In the same way, if an object of taste or touch were only apprehended without any alteration, this would still cause pain or pleasure in that appetite, based on whether the apprehension is fitting or unfitting with the power.

23 You might say that then the body of a beatified individual standing in a fire would feel pain and would apprehend the heat. I respond that just as surpassing pleasure banishes every sort of distress from the will, so surpassing pleasure banishes all pain from the senses. Since there is surpassing pleasure in that sort of body, this apprehension cannot cause pain in that appetite. Alternatively, one can posit that God concurs with the heat in causing the apprehension of heat in the beatified individual's body, but God does not concur with the apprehension in causing pain (and perhaps this is true); so the individual does not feel pain even though they apprehend the heat.

[15] Scotus, *Quod.*, q. 18, a. 3, nn. 12–19.
[16] *Rep.* III, q. 11, especially nn. 50 and 61, translated in chapter 14 of this volume.
[17] Reading *nolitionem* with manuscript Z, rather than the edition's *volitionem* (although either reading largely gives the same sense).

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How These Passions Are Caused in the Will

Lastly, it should be known that every pleasure and distress is caused 24
in the will by means of a willing-for or a willing-against, just as is clear from the preceding considerations. But there are two kinds of willing-for and willing-against: some are unconditional and others are conditional. An unconditional willing is that by which I unqualifiedly will-for or will-against[18] something without any condition; a conditional willing is that by which I will-for or will-against under a condition, as when a sailor wills-for[19] throwing their cargo into the sea if doing so could prevent sinking. And each of these, both willing-for and willing-against, unconditional and conditional, are sufficient for causing distress and pleasure in the way explained above.

From all this, it is clear that two of the ways that John posits for 25
causing pleasure and distress are not correct. In the question cited earlier he posits four ways that pleasure or distress can be caused in the will; two of these ways are (i) by an unconditional act of willing and (ii) by a conditional act of willing, and these are correct.[20] The other ways are these: (iii) if an object is naturally fitting or unfitting to the will, it can cause distress or pleasure in the will without any freely elicited act, merely by means of a natural willing that is not an elicited act; and the other way is (iv) if an object is fitting or unfitting to a sense, it can cause pleasure or distress in the will without any previous freely elicited willing. But these latter two ways are false and contrary to all experience; but what he says can only be disproved by experience. For if the will had nothing other than an act of desiring or shunning (as is the case for a sensitive appetite), then he would have evidence: for in that case, when a desired thing was possessed those acts would cease and the aforementioned passions of pleasure and distress would be caused by the intellect's apprehension of the now-possessed object. But since (as is made clear elsewhere[21]) the will does not only have the aforementioned acts but also has an act of taking pleasure in a presently possessed thing (i.e., an act of friendship by which it loves_{D} that thing), it follows that an apprehension never causes anything in the will except by means of some willing-for or willing-against.

[18] Reading *vel nolo* with manuscript Z.
[19] Reading *vellet* with manuscripts FG, rather than the edition's *nolet*.
[20] Scotus, *Ord.* III, d. 15, q. un.
[21] *Rep.* IV, q. 16, nn. 7–21, translated in chapter 8 of this volume. See also *Ord.*, d. 1, q. 3 (*OTh* I: 403–428), especially pp. 407–413.

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Worries and Responses

26 But then there is a worry concerning pleasures that occur all of a sudden [*subreptitiis*]:[22] by what are they caused? Similarly, if a woman is being raped (so that by an act of willing-against she does not consent), if she were to in some way take pleasure in the act, by what is this pleasure caused?

27 I respond that pleasures of this sort are always caused by preceding acts of willing; but perhaps such willings are not within the will's power, but they are instead naturally caused by an apprehension of the intellect and by the will, and afterwards they cause pleasure with the same naturalness and necessity. Or, if these willings were within the will's power, then the will would never take pleasure except when it freely wills them. So, the woman who is being raped (who by an act of willing-against does not assent) may indeed feel pleasure in the sensitive part, but she does not feel pleasure in the will unless her act of willing-against concerning this act were to cease and she freely elicited an act of willing-for concerning the act. However, such acts are not said to be within the will's power, because they are elicited imperceptibly and almost unexpectedly [*quasi subito*].

28 But there is a worry. If unconditionally willing-for and unconditionally willing-against are causes of pleasure and distress when the things proposed or their opposites occur (in the way said before[23]), what about the bad angels, who will-for many things which do occur as they will-for them (e.g., they unconditionally will-for humans to sin and many other things which unqualifiedly do occur just as they will-for them)? Why do they not feel pleasure from this sort of willing, just as humans and good angels do?

29 Similarly, when a good angel has an act of willing-against concerning many things that do not occur in accord with its will (e.g., when a good angel assigned to watch over a human has an act of unconditionally willing-against concerning the human's sin and yet the human still sins), why is it not distressed because of this, as humans and bad angels are?

30 Furthermore, if a conditional willing-against suffices to cause distress in humans and even in Christ (as it does on John's view[24]), and given that it is true that Christ willed-against the penalty that would be inflicted upon him if it had pleased God [to prevent that penalty]

[22] Ockham says in *Quod.* II, q. 6 (*OTh* IX: 136–141) that an *actus surrepticius* [alt: *subreptitius*] is one that "comes to be without a perfect cognition of the act" and which "occurs without deliberation," in contrast to an *actus deliberatus*.

[23] See **[11–14]**.

[24] Scotus, *Ord.* III, d. 15, q. un., nn. 117–127.

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and that willing-against was sufficient to cause distress in Christ (who fully possessed beatitude), why then does a conditional willing-against not suffice to cause distress in a beatified[25] soul when what occurs does not accord with what it willed?

31 One way that the first of these worries[26] can be answered is that this is due to a miracle, i.e., God suspends the activity of the will with respect to causing pleasure in a bad angel.[27] So, even though a bad angel may have an act that of itself is naturally a cause of pleasure, nevertheless that act does not cause pleasure because its activity is suspended by God not causing together with it.[28]

32 Alternatively, it can be said in response to this worry that there are some things that are incompatible with each other and are incompossible with respect to created power, which nevertheless are not unqualifiedly and absolutely incompatible with each other with respect to uncreated power. For example, it is incompatible for two bodies to exist in the same place with respect to created power, but they can exist in the same place by the absolute power of God. (This is clear when Christ passed through the locked doors.[29]) Hence someone that exists in one location can naturally move to another location in which another body exists; but it is impossible by nature for them to be received into that place while the previous body remains there. Nevertheless, this can come about by divine power.

33 To the case at hand, then, I say that it is impossible for maximal distress and pleasure to exist together in the same power naturally and as regards created power, for with respect to created power they are unqualifiedly incompatible, but as regards uncreated power it is not incompatible for them to exist together. For just as beatitude and maximal pleasure banish all distress (except when the opposite takes place due to a miracle, as it did in Christ's case), so misery and maximal distress banish every pleasure.[30] According to this view, no matter how much the things willed by the bad angel occur, the act of willing does not suffice for causing pleasure in the angel while maximal distress persists. The first worry could be answered in this way without any

[25] Reading *beato* with manuscripts DG, rather than the edition's *bono*.
[26] See **[28]**.
[27] The edition includes an additional sentence here, but context demands it belong to **[33]** below. See fn. 30.
[28] For more discussion of this case, see *Rep.* II, q. 15, especially nn. 30, 42–43, translated in chapter 18 of this volume.
[29] That the resurrected Jesus passed bodily through a locked door is the standard medieval understanding of John 20:26.
[30] The logic of the passage demands that this sentence be placed here, but the edition places it as the second sentence of paragraph **[31]** and indicates no discrepancy in the manuscripts.

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miracle. And this [second] response would be good except that those acts of willing (whose objects[31] occur just as they were willed) can be intensified and multiplied; for it does not seem plausible that they could not cause one tiny pleasure if they were not miraculously prevented from doing so.[32]

34 From this, the reply to the additional worry[33] (the one that concerns Christ) is clear: Christ's conditional willing-against was sufficient to cause distress, but God miraculously (beyond his general influence) suspended the action of maximal pleasure with respect to destroying that distress. For from its own nature that maximal pleasure would expel any distress that were present there, and it would prevent any distress from being caused that was not already there, had that destructive and expulsive action not been suspended by God's power. In the same way, when God according to his general influence concurs with a body so that it moves from one place to another, that body would expel any other body from that place so that they do not coexist at the same place, unless its expulsive action is suspended by a miracle. And in the case of a good angel, although according to his general influence God concurs with its conditional willing so that it causes distress, nevertheless he does not suspend the activity of the maximal pleasure with respect to destroying that distress. It is because of this that distress is not caused in a good angel as it was in Christ, no matter how much the object that was willed-against occurs.

35 To the other worry,[34] it can be replied that a good angel does not have an act of unconditionally willing-against anything that does not occur in accord with that willing. This is so because a beatified individual does not will anything except in conformity with the divine will, and they only will something if God wills them to will that thing. So, if they will something unconditionally, God prevents the opposite from occurring, and so, formally, a good angel only has an act of conditionally willing-against concerning a sin (e.g., if it were pleasing to that sinning human to not sin, then the angel will will-against it). Alternatively, it can be said that, even if the angel were to unconditionally or conditionally will something whose opposite happened, still distress would not be caused in it; this is either because of a miracle (e.g., because God does not concur with this sort of willing in order to cause distress) or because distress and maximal pleasure are incompatible with respect to created power, just as was said earlier.

[31] Reading *obiecta* with manuscript H for the edition's *opposita*.
[32] For elaboration of this point, see *Rep.* IV, q. 16, n. 34, translated in chapter 8 of this volume.
[33] See **[30]**.
[34] See **[29]**.

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36 In connection with what was said, you might ask whether there was any strife in Christ between his lower and his higher powers [*vires*]. I respond that there was no vicious strife. This is because no matter how much there was an inclination and a desire in his sensitive appetite for, let us suppose, an act of fornication, so long as he did not have an act of willing concerning this act then he did not ever sin. This is because, as is made clear elsewhere, sin is present only in an act of willing and is in no way present in an exterior act (other than by some extrinsic denomination).[35] So, this act of a sensitive appetite would not be vicious. Nevertheless, I believe that Christ had no act in his sensitive appetite of the sort that is called vicious by extrinsic denomination by a concurring act of willing. That Christ had no such act is either because God did not act together with Christ's sensitive apprehension to cause this sort of act and pleasure or else because Christ had many acts of willing (or one intense willing) by which such acts of a sensitive appetite were impeded, as is clear from experience. For it is clear that someone who has an act of desiring and some pleasure in a sensitive appetite concerning that act can intensely think of and will some object (e.g., Christ's suffering) so that the whole act of desiring is destroyed and likewise the pleasure. From this it is clear that an act of willing has a real destructive and productive effectiveness over bodily qualities, e.g., someone falls ill only because of an act of willing-against and distress, while they acquire health by means of an act of willing-for together with pleasure. And perhaps it was so for Christ.

37 But with respect to those acts that are not commonly called vicious, not even by extrinsic denomination (such as acts of eating, drinking, sleeping, and so on), there was strife between Christ's appetites or powers. For he said on the cross, "I am thirsty," and he was hungry after he fasted for forty days; consequently, he desired food and drink through his sensitive appetite.[36] Nevertheless, according to right reason he willed-against drinking on the cross when he was about to die, and according to right reason he willed-against eating when the tempter approached him.[37] So then, in those sensible acts there was strife between those appetites; and the same would have been the case for human beings even if they had remained in the state of innocence, but that strife would have been neither virtuous nor vicious.

[35] E.g., *Rep.* III, q. 11, nn. 56–57 translated in chapter 14 of this volume.
[36] John 19:28; Matthew 4:2; Luke 4:2.
[37] Matthew 27:34; Mark 15:23; Matthew 4:3–4; Luke 4:3–4.

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3 *On Practical Activity, Ends, and Moral Knowledge (*Ord., *Prologue, qq. 10–12, excerpts)*

TEXT[1]

The Process of Practical Activity

34 So, regarding this question of which operations of the soul should be called practical activity [*praxis*], I say that the greater difficulty here rests in the words than in the reality. For everyone (or almost everyone) posits that in the soul there is an act of understanding that displays both the end and those things that are for the end, and that in that place there is also an act of willing the end, and also deliberation [*consilium*] about those things that are for the end. After that deliberation or investigation there follows (or can follow) a decision [*sententia*], by means of which [the intellect] dictates about the things that are for the end. After that decision by which it is dictated that one thing should be chosen and another thing should not be, there follows (or can follow) a choice, and by that choice whatever was dictated or decided should be chosen is preferred over the things that are not thus decided to be chosen. After that choice there follows whatever was dictated and decided, if there is no impediment.

For example, some sick individual is shown by the intellect that health should be obtained, and then the intellect has one practical principle about the end, by which it dictates that health should be acquired. After that dictate, there follows an act of willing in the will by which health is desired (although perhaps this does not follow necessarily); and after this willing there follows the intellect's deliberation or investigation by which it inquires how it can best obtain that health, e.g., whether by walking, medicine, a poultice, or some other way. And after that deliberation or investigation there follows a decision, by which it is determinately decided that health is best obtained in this or that determinate way. That decision or dictate is followed (or can be

[1] *OTh* I: 285–289, 292–296. These excerpts are taken from a series of three questions treating the distinction between the practical and the speculative and whether theology is a practical or a speculative enterprise.

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followed[2]) by a choice of the will, by which one determinately wills to walk or to take the medicine or so on. After that the walking (or whatever else) determinately follows, if there is no impediment.

This process is admitted by (almost) everyone, even by those who 35
hold different views about practical activity, and so there is little disagreement about the reality. But there are different views about which of these [acts] ought to be called "practical activity" and which should not be. So, because words should be used in the way [authoritative] authors use them, and because among those authors who spoke using this term the Commentator on the books of the *Ethics*[3] used it quite frequently, so what I call practical activity is according to his meaning, because he also used this term in harmony with the usage of Aristotle, his commentator Averroes, and other philosophers.

Four Senses of 'Practical Activity'

Therefore, I say, according to that Commentator in *Ethics* I, comment 36
1, practical activity can be taken in four senses: broadly, strictly, more strictly, and most strictly. In the first sense, practical activity is the same thing as an operation of any power [*virtutus*], whether free or natural. This is clear since energy and practical activity (speaking in this sense) are the same thing, and energy is an operation of any power; therefore, etc. …

In a second sense, practical activity (as well as energy) is said to be 37
any operation or passion that follows upon someone cognizing insofar as they are cognizing (that is, it follows a cognition),[4] and in this sense practical activity is the cognition itself. For every act of any power that is cognitive or appetitive, and also passions (namely, pleasures, distresses, and so on) can be called energies or practical activities…

In a third sense, 'practical activity' is taken more strictly; spoken of 38
in this sense, practical activity is the same thing as an occurrent [*existens*] operation that is within our power. This is clear as follows: Every occurrent operation that is within our power is a work of virtue or vice since every operation of this sort can be virtuous or vicious. And practical activity is a work of virtue or vice. Therefore, etc. …

In a fourth sense, 'practical activity' is taken most strictly for an 39
operation that is elicited in conformity with a dictate of reason and a

[2] This parenthetical is a later addition by Ockham.
[3] When Ockham speaks of "the Commentator on the *Ethics*," he is referring to Eustratius of Nicaea (c. 1050–1120), who produced a widely read commentary on Books I and VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.
[4] This parenthetical was a later addition by Ockham.

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choice of the will. In this sense, practical activity is always elicited in conformity with the deliberative intellect; consequently, it is elicited in conformity with a choice of the will, because according to the Philosopher "what can be deliberated about is the same as what can be chosen."[5] …

***

44 I say that every operation that is within our power is practical activity in the third, stricter sense. So, since cognition and willing, and also exterior acts, are within our power, it follows that each of these can truly be called practical activity. Nevertheless, 'practical activity' is said primarily regarding the act of the will, since it is primarily within our power and no other act is in our power except by mediation of the will's act, and so no other act is primarily called practical activity.

45 And it seems that every operation of this sort could be called practical activity, because every action that is within our power can be virtuous or vicious. But every such operation is practical activity. Therefore, etc. Therefore, this can be said to be a description of practical activity in general.

46 But this practical activity is divided into virtuous and vicious practical activity, because each of these is within our power. And virtuous practical activity can be described thusly: virtuous practical activity is an occurrent operation within our will's power that is apt to be elicited in conformity to right reason in order for it to be right. The first condition is clear because an operation that is not presently [*existens*] within the will's power is not virtuous; rather, it is natural instead. The second condition is clear because according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* VI, there is no right choice (and consequently, no right operation) without right reason, because there is no more reason for one operation than for any other.[6]

And vicious practical activity is an occurrent operation that is within the will's power that is apt to be elicited in deformity to right reason, or in conformity to erroneous and false reason. The first condition is clear because otherwise the operation would not be imputable, because what is not within the will's power is in no way imputable. The second condition is clear because for every bad elicited act, it can be dictated that the act should not be elicited.

47 Some conclusions follow from this. One, that it is not the case that for every practical activity there is some practical knowledge such that the activity ought to be conformed to that cognition (or, more properly, such that it is apt to be elicited in conformity to that cognition in

[5] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VI.1 (1025b24).
[6] Aristotle, *NE* VI.2 (1139a32–35).

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order that it be right). This is because no matter the extent to which there could be a true dictate about any practical activity that it ought to be elicited or not elicited (and so in some way should be conformed to that dictate), nevertheless there is some bad practical activity that can in no way be elicited in conformity to right reason, because no right reason can dictate that the activity should be elicited, just as no right reason can dictate that an enemy should be hated, contrary to the divine command.[7]

Another conclusion follows, that there is some practical activity 48
that is not elicited in conformity to right reason and also is not elicited in deformity to it, e.g., activity that is elicited when it is posited only that the object is being shown by the intellect, without any true or false dictate.

A third conclusion follows, that 'practical activity' does not formally 49
name just some act by itself, but it names an act while connoting the will by which the act is effectively and freely produced, just as 'meritorious act' does. From this it follows that the same operation in species (and perhaps even the same in number) can be practical activity at first and not be practical activity later. For if the will freely and contingently elicits some operation, then that operation is called practical activity; but if God were to continue that same operation without any causation or conservation of it by the will, then that operation would be truly said to not be practical activity, because it would not be within the will's power.

Next, I say that 'practical activity,' taken in the last and strictest 50
sense, is every occurrent operation that is within the will's power, having been deliberated upon by the intellect, with respect to which there is a choice by the will. In this sense practical activity names (or can name) an action of the will, an operation of the intellect, and even an exterior operation.

It is clear that it can name an operation of the will, because when there exists an appetite that concerns health as an end to be acquired, then there can be a doubt whether that health could be best acquired by means of an exterior operation or by means of love_A or hate in the will, or even by study and exertion of the intellect. For according to medical doctors (and experience also teaches this) any of these can be a cause of sickness (at least a partial cause) and any of them can also be a partial cause of health. Therefore, there can be investigation about which of them is best for acquiring health. Consequently, each of them can be deliberated about and consequently each of them can be chosen. Consequently, since each of them is an operation and an act,

[7] Namely, the command to love one's enemies (Matthew 5:44).

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each of them will be able to be an operation that follows a choice of the will, and consequently each will be practical activity speaking in this last sense. For according to the Commentator on *Ethics* VI, "An act is generated from a choice. For when we choose what has been demonstrated by the mind to be good, rather than choosing its contrary, we operate and we act so that we might obtain it."[8] So, I concede that pure speculation can be practical activity, speaking in this sense, because there can be deliberation and choice about it.

51 From this it also follows that an exterior operation that has been commanded by the will is not always practical activity, speaking in this sense, because when the will pre-establishes some operation as an end, then it cannot be deliberated about or chosen, and consequently it is not practical activity, speaking in this sense. For, according to what Aristotle says in *Ethics* III, "We do not deliberate about ends but about those things that are for ends. For the medical doctor does not deliberate if they will heal, the orator if they will persuade, the politician if they will bring about peace, nor does anyone else do so about an end. Rather, they presuppose their end" (and this either according to right reason or according to the will's pre-establishment) "and they consider how and by what means they will do it."[9] Nevertheless, although it is not the case that every exterior operation commanded by the will is always practical activity in this strictest sense, it is possible for them to be practical activity if they are ordered to a further end.

52 Therefore, it is clear that not only operations of the sensitive or lower powers are practical activity, but also operations of the intellect and will can be practical activity, speaking in the most proper sense.

TEXT[10]

Two Senses of 'End'

17 'End' is taken in two senses. In one sense, for something that is to be acquired by some operation, in the way that health is the end of walking; and this kind of end is loved$_A$ and desired with desire-love$_A$. The other kind of end is loved$_A$ with friendship-love$_A$, and it is for the sake of this sort of end that the first sort of end is produced. E.g., because a

[8] Eustratius, *In Nicomachean Ethics* VI, c. 2.
[9] Aristotle, *NE* III.3 (1112b12–16).
[10] *OTh* I: 306.

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human being loves$_D$ themselves, they desire health for themselves, and so they operate in order to obtain health. Similarly, because someone foremostly loves$_D$ God for God's own sake, so everything they do is for God's sake, and so God is the end of all their acts.

The first kind of end is prior in intention but last in execution, because it is really an effect; generally, it is less noble than that which is for the end, at least less noble than the agent who intends it. But the second kind of end, in general, preexists the operation and if it is intended according to right reason it is not less noble than that which is for the end, nor is it an effect, nor is it properly speaking acquired by an operation.

TEXT[11]

On Moral Knowledge

I say that 'moral knowledge' is taken in two senses. In one sense, for 101
knowledge that is only about conduct [*moribus*] that is within our power, so that in all the things that are known something is posited that conveys something that is within our power. In another sense, 'moral knowledge' is taken for the knowledge that was handed down by Aristotle, the philosophers, and the saints.

In the first sense, moral knowledge is unqualifiedly practical and has no speculative component. This is because in that sense it contains only sentences that include some term that conveys something that can be done by us, and the cognition of this sort of sentence is more directive than is a non-sentential cognition of that thing that can be done. In this sense moral knowledge does not speculate about what is true unless it is unqualifiedly practical.

Hence, taking 'moral knowledge' in this sense, the truths "everything that is in the soul is either a passion, a power" (and so on), "the soul is divided into the practical intellect" (and so on), and others like them that are posited in the books of the *Ethics* do not pertain to moral knowledge. In the second sense, such truths do pertain to moral knowledge, and in this sense one part of moral knowledge is unqualifiedly speculative and another part is unqualifiedly practical. The reason for this is that, as has already been said, many practical conclusions depend on speculative principles and are known through them, and so someone who wishes to pass on cognition of such practical

[11] *OTh* I: 359–360.

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conclusions must make use of speculative principles from which these conclusions follow. Because of this, many unqualifiedly speculative truths are found in the moral knowledge that is handed down by the philosophers and the saints, and they call it moral knowledge because practical moral conclusions are ultimately acquired in that knowledge.

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4 *On Love, Hate, and Final Causes* (Var. Ques., *q. 4, excerpts*)

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TEXT[1]

On Ends and Final Causes

It should be known that 'end' is sometimes taken for a final cause, 8
which is one of the four causes. … In another sense, 'end' is taken for whatever is last in a thing or in an operation, in the way we say that a

[1] *OTh* VIII: 99, 103–104, 120–131, 135–137, 139–141, 152. The question from which these excerpts are taken is entitled, "Given that something moves as an end, does it follow that it has real existence outside the mind?"

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point is the end of a line. This question is not about that second sense. So, we need to look into the nature of an end in the first sense, that is, the nature of a final cause.[2]

***

18 I say, taking 'final cause' properly, that a final cause is that for the sake of which an agent acts when that thing is loved$_A$ with friendship-love$_A$. This sort of thing is universally and always either more noble than the agent or as noble as the agent. For this reason, health is not the final cause of walking, properly speaking; rather, the human being who wants health is the final cause of walking. This is because it is the human being (when they are loved first) that moves (in the manner of an end) the agent (namely, themselves) to walk. For when there are multiple effects in order from the same agent, so that one effect is ordered to the next, whatever is the final cause of the last effect is the final cause of all the preceding effects. But health is one effect that is caused by something else, walking is another effect, and these two effects are ordered to each other. Therefore, since the final cause of health (which is one effect) is that very human being, properly speaking the final cause of the walking will be that human being who, when loved$_A$, will move the agent to act.

19 Therefore, I say that every natural agent, and also every agent that acts rationally, acts for the sake of a loved$_A$ final cause that is equally perfect or more perfect than the agent. From this it is clear that the last operation of an agent is not a final cause, properly speaking, although it could be called an end in some other way, e.g., in the way the last acquired perfection of a thing is called the end…

***

On the Causality of Ends That Are Loved

54 Concerning the difficult matter that touches on the motion and causality of a final cause, I say that – when speaking of a final cause that has been pre-established by the will and that is a final cause properly speaking, and not speaking of an end that is intended by a superior agent who is giving direction, and speaking of the effect that is produced by an act of the will that is formally commanding that some exterior or interior act be carried out [*exsecutione*] – then I say that the causality of the end is not the end's being loved$_A$ unconditionally, nor is it the end's first being loved$_A$ unconditionally and then something

[2] The reader should keep in mind that the Latin for "end" (*finis*) and for "final cause" (*causa finalis*) are closely related, such that *causa finalis* might well be translated as "the end cause" or "the cause associated with an end."

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else's being loved$_A$ for the sake of the loved$_A$ end. Rather, the causality of the end is (i) that at first the end is unconditionally cognized and loved$_A$ by one act, and then later (ii) that end is loved$_A$ by another act and some other thing is loved$_A$ [by that same second act] for the sake of the loved$_A$ end, in such a way that (iii) the agent acts to bring about an exterior or interior effect, so that the second willing seems to be a willing that formally commands the carrying out [of that exterior or interior act].

The first two parts of this conclusion[3] are clear from one argument: 55
All the causes of a given effect concur at the same time to bring about their effect. Therefore, the final cause causes in its genus only when the efficient cause causes in its genus. Consequently, there is never any causality of a final cause except at the time the effect is produced. But I can love$_A$ a final cause, and for the sake of this very thing that I love$_A$ as a final cause I can love something else without willing that [the effect] be carried out, and so without causing an exterior or interior effect. Therefore, there can be these two loves without the causality of a final cause actually causing with respect to the third effect.

An example about health and bitter medicine: At first I can love$_A$ 56
health unconditionally, and later I can love$_A$ health and love$_A$ bitter medicine for the sake of that loved$_A$ health, without willing to drink the medicine when it is offered to me; perhaps I will-against drinking it because of its bitterness or some other impediment. So, that willing by which I will-for the bitter medicine in this way is not formally commanding; rather, it is only commanding in a way equivalent to (for instance) willing to drink if there were no impediment. But if (i) at first I unconditionally will-for health by one act, and (ii) later by another act I will-for health in such a way that for the sake of that loved$_A$ health I will to drink the medicine when it is presented to me, and (iii) positing that willing, I then immediately drink the medicine (and so long as that effect – namely, drinking – is not impeded), then that second loving$_A$ or willing has the causality of a final cause with respect to the act of drinking.

The same should be said if some interior act is commanded, e.g., an 57
act of studying; then the produced exterior effect and the act of the will that is formally commanding have the same final cause, namely, health.

But when there are two loves$_A$ in the will, the second of which nec- 58
essarily presupposes the first in the way just discussed, and the second willing is not formally commanding the carrying out [of an act] but

[3] Namely, that the final cause is not just the end being loved or just the end and the means to the end being loved.

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only commands equivalently [i.e., the second willing commands to carry out the act if there is no impediment], or else is not formally ordered to carrying it out (e.g., if I were to unconditionally $love_D$ God at first by one act and later, by another act, I were to $love_D$ my neighbor for the sake of God as cognized and $loved_D$ by me, so that if I did not $love_D$ God I would not $love_D$ my neighbor, and if I do not will or $love_D$ anything else), then in that process the thing that is the object of the first $love_A$ is the final cause of the second $love_A$. E.g., God $loved_D$ in himself is the final cause of that $love_D$ by which I $love_D$ my neighbor for the sake of God, because God in himself is first cognized and $loved_D$, and is accepted by the will in such a way that I $love_D$ my neighbor for the sake of the $loved_D$ God. And all these are required for the causality of a final cause, and they also seem to be sufficient for it.

59 According to this example, the causality of a final cause is (i) the end's being $loved_A$ and (ii) something else's being $loved_A$ for the sake of that $loved_A$ end, and (iii) that latter thing would not be $loved_A$ if the end were not $loved_A$. It is not required that the agent brings about some third effect in order for us to have the causality of a final cause. For it is certain that the second $love_A$ by which I $love_D$ my neighbor for the sake of God has a final cause (it is in virtue of [being for the sake of God] that this second $love_A$ is itself an effect[4]). The second $love_A$ does not only have an end that is intended by a superior agent such as God (the first $love_A$ [only] has a final cause in this sense, as will be made clear later[5]). It has a final cause because it is for the sake of an end that was pre-established by the created will, because it $loves_A$ neighbor for the sake of the cognized and $loved_A$ God. Therefore, it has an end that was pre-established by the created will, and nothing else in this process can be [the final cause] except the object of the first $love_A$ (namely, God); etc.

60 Several corollaries follow from this. The first is that the first act of $love_A$ is truly an efficient cause of the second act by which I $love_D$ both the end and the other object for the sake of the end. For something is truly an efficient cause when it is such that when it is posited something else can be posited, and when it is removed the other thing cannot be posited, etc. But when the first $love_A$ (that by which the end is $loved_D$ unconditionally) is posited, then there can be posited the second $love_A$ (by which the other thing is $loved_D$ for the sake of the $loved_D$ and cognized end). And when the first $love_A$ is not posited the second $love_A$ cannot be posited, because the second $love_A$ necessarily

4 The Latin in this parenthetical (*ex quo est effectus quidam*) seems somewhat ambiguous. An alternative rendering that I find plausible in context: "the second $love_A$ is where that [third] effect comes from."

5 See **[83]** and **[112]**.

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requires the first; therefore, the first love_A is necessarily an efficient cause of the second love_A.

A second corollary is that not every final cause is loved_A with friendship-love_A; some are loved with friendship-love_A and some with desire-love_A. For I say that the first end that is pre-established by the will (that for the sake of which all intermediate ends are intended by the will) is loved_A with friendship-love_A, but intermediate ends are only loved_A with desire-love_A. An example of this: a human being wills-for health for the sake of their life, so that they would will-against health except that it leads to life. Similarly, someone wills-for bitter medicine for the sake of health, and they would in no way will-for the medicine except that it leads to health, and proceeding in this way all the way to the last intended end. In this process the life of the human is the first end pre-established by the human's will (at least, let us suppose this is so), and health is a subordinate end. Supposing this case, I then say that the human being or the life of the human is loved_D with friendship-love_A, but health is loved_D only with desire-love_A. Nevertheless, each very truly has the causality of a final cause. 61

The first part of this conclusion[6] is clear because (as was said before and as will be said again later) the will pre-establishes nothing for itself, nor does it take something as being for the sake of something else that it loves_A, unless that end is first cognized and loved_A by a different love_A than the love_A by which it loves_A the other object for the sake of that end. This is required by the nature of reality, as experience teaches. 62

Now, I consider that love_A by which human life is loved_D, and I ask whether it is friendship-love_A or desire-love_A. If it is friendship-love_A, then the claim is established that the first intended end is loved_A with friendship-love_A. Or else it is desire-love_A, but this cannot be said because this end is the first intended end (by stipulation), so therefore it is not loved_A for the sake of some prior end, nor is this end desired for someone, nor is something else desired for it; rather, it is unconditionally loved_A for its own sake. Therefore, it is loved_A by friendship-love_A.

The second part of that conclusion[7] is clear because health is loved_A by two loves_A: one by which the will loves_A life and loves_A health for the sake of the loved_A life, and another by which it loves_A the bitter medicine for the sake of health. These two loves_A are both desire-loves_A, because by each love_A something is desired for someone. Nor 63

[6] The first part of the main claim of **[61]**, namely, that some ends are loved with friendship-love.

[7] The second part of the main claim of **[61]**, namely, that some ends are loved with desire-love.

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does there seem to be any necessity for positing any friendship-love$_A$ of the health, because before it was pre-established by the will as an end, it was previously cognized and loved$_D$ by the love$_A$ by which it is loved$_D$ for the sake of human life, and it suffices for the causality of the final cause that it be cognized beforehand and loved$_D$ with love$_A$ by that individual who pre-establishes it as an end. Therefore, health is only loved$_D$ with desire-love$_A$ (and *a fortiori* the bitter medicine is only loved$_D$ with desire-love$_A$).

64 A third corollary is that any end pre-established by a created will is loved$_A$ by two loves. For any end of this sort is either a first intended end, an intermediate end, or a last end.

If the end is a first end, it is loved$_A$ by friendship-love$_A$ (by the previous conclusion), and it is also loved$_A$ by another love that is called desire-love$_A$, by which something else is loved$_D$ for the sake of that end, because that latter love$_A$ has for objects both the end and also the other thing that is loved$_A$ for the sake of the end.

If the end is an intermediate end, then it is loved$_A$ with two desire-loves$_A$: one by which the intermediate end is desired for the sake of some prior end, and another by which some other object is loved$_A$ for the sake of this end, something that would not be loved$_A$ if there were no intermediate end. (E.g., it is clear of health that it is loved$_D$ by one love$_A$ just for the sake of human life, and the same health is also loved$_D$ by a different love$_A$ by which the bitter medicine is loved$_D$ for the sake of health.)

If the end is a last end [e.g., the medicine], it is loved$_D$ by one love$_A$ for the sake of health (without which it would not be loved$_D$), and by a different love$_A$ by which the bitter herb is loved$_D$ only for the sake of the bitter medicine.

65 A fourth corollary is that desire-love$_A$ (by which something is loved$_D$ for the sake of an end) is sometimes caused freely and contingently when some act of the intellect has been posited (e.g., the love$_A$ by which the bitter medicine is loved$_D$ for the sake of health). But sometimes it is caused naturally and necessarily and is in no way within the will's power.

For if the love$_A$ by which health is loved$_A$ is not an efficacious willing but is only a conditional willing or a willing at one's pleasure [*complacentiae*] – e.g., if a sick individual willed-for health by an act at their pleasure, or if they willed-for health so long as there is no impediment such as bitter medicine that they would will-against drinking – then while such willing remains in the will and while there remains in the intellect a dictate that health cannot be attained in any way without drinking the bitter medicine, the individual is never necessitated to

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will the bitter medicine. Rather, they can still contingently will the bitter medicine [or not will it]. The entire reason for this is that their willing of health is not efficacious.

But if their willing of health is efficacious in such a way that the sick individual entirely wills to be healthy, so that they will to remove every impediment that is within their power in order to have health, then while that efficacious willing remains and the previous dictate remains unchanged in the intellect (namely, the dictate that health cannot be attained except by means of the bitter medicine), it is necessary that they will to drink the bitter medicine, and they cannot fail to will it. So, that willing is in no way within their power. So, there seems to be no necessity for positing that the will has any activity with respect to that act of willing; rather, the will is only passive with respect to it.

66 In this way it is clear that some act is immediately within the will's power when no other act is posited; however, with the mediation of two other acts that act is not immediately within the will's power. E.g., the act of willing by which the sick individual wills the bitter medicine is immediately within the will's power when the efficacious willing for health or the intellect's dictate has ceased, and the will can freely and contingently elicit that act in that case. But while those aforementioned acts remain in the intellect and the will in the way previously discussed, the will necessarily will elicit that same act concerning the bitter medicine (or it will conserve the act if it was already elicited).

67 So then, it is clear regarding this conclusion that the causality of a final cause, which it has by means of a willing, is (i) the end's being loved_A in itself by one act and (ii) something else's being loved_A for the sake of the end by another act (and the latter thing would not be loved_A except for the sake of the loved_A end), so that (iii) the agent acts to bring about some exterior or interior effect (e.g., at least a willing of the other thing) for the sake of the end. Nor is anything else necessarily required for the causality of a final cause that is pre-established by the will by means of an act of willing.

On the Causality of Ends That Are Hated

68 The second principal conclusion is to see about the causality of an end that is pre-established by a created will by means of an act of willing-against or hating: that is, when a will hates something by an act of willing-against, and on account of that willed-against thing it has an act of willing-against concerning some other thing, and it would not have had that latter act of willing-against in any way except on

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account of the other thing that it willed-against first. For example, a healthy individual hates death, and they hate sickness on account of that hated death, and on account of the sickness they will to take the bitter medicine so that they do not become sick.

69 Regarding this difficulty, I answer in a way similar to what was said about the causality of an end by means of an act of willing-for: the causality of an end in the process in the posited example is death's being hated by one act of willing-against. For the will never pre-establishes something for itself as an end on account of some other willed-against thing just because of that latter thing; it only does so because the intellect previously cognizes that willed-against end, and then the will wills-against it and condemns it ("previously" by nature, at least [if not previously in time]).

On account of that end that is condemned by an act of willing-against, the will can hate sickness by another act of willing-against and on account of the willed-against death, so that it would not hate sickness except that it hates death. In that case, death is the final cause of the second willing-against by which that sickness is hated on account of death, but death is not the final cause of the first willing-against by which death is hated. The same sickness is the final cause of that willing by which I will to drink the bitter medicine; I will to drink the bitter medicine just because sickness is willed-against and cognized beforehand.

70 From this it follows that, with respect to the act by which I will-against sickness just on account of the willed-against death, the object of that act of willing-against or hating is the final cause that was pre-established by the created will. And the sickness is the final cause of that willing by which I will-for the bitter medicine on account of the willed-against sickness. This is proved by the same argument which was given earlier about the ordered volitions with respect to God and neighbor – look there.[8]

71 But the causality of a final cause by means of an act of willing-for does differ from the causality of a final cause by means of an act of willing-against. These causalities differ in this: the first willing-for does not have a final cause pre-established by a created will, as will be made clear later; but the first willing-against, however, just like every other willing-against, does have a final cause pre-established by a created will. For every willing-against (speaking naturally) presupposes a willing-for, as will be made clear below.

For I do not hate or will-against anything positively except because of something that I will-for, something with which the willed-against

[8] See **[58–59]**.

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thing is not fitting, but rather is incompatible or disharmonious. E.g., I do not hate death by an act of willing-against except because I will-for and love$_D$ my life, with which death is incompatible, so that I hate death just because I love$_D$ life.

So, whatever is the object of the act of willing-for that is necessarily presupposed by the first act of willing-against is the final cause of that first willing-against. This is clear from the frequently accepted principle that a final cause pre-established by a created will is whatever is loved$_A$ or willed-against in itself and which is such that only for the sake of that loved or willed-against thing some other thing is loved$_A$ or willed-against. But my life is cognized and loved$_A$ by me in this way, and I hate death only for the sake of my loved$_A$ life. Therefore, my life is a final cause with respect to that first act of willing-against by which I will-against and hate death.

***

Some Further Claims about Willing-For and Willing-Against

The third principal conclusion is that the first love$_A$, which is friendship-love$_A$, does not have a final cause pre-established by a created will. This is because whatever is pre-established by a created will as an end must previously be cognized and loved$_A$ (I say "previously" by nature [if not previously in time]). In what way the first love$_A$ and first cognition do have a final cause, search at the end of the following doubtful matters[9] where it will be answered well enough; so I will pass by it for now. 82

Concerning the end of the first willing-against, one should answer in a way similar to what was just said about the end of the first cognition and willing-for, and for the same reason. For it seems that it is possible to grant that there is a first act of willing-against that is not preceded by any act of willing-for, as will be made clear later.[10] If this is true, then concerning the end of that first act of willing-against, one should answer in a similar way to what was said about the end of the first act of willing-for; namely, that it does not have a final cause pre-established by a created will, but only one pre-established by a superior agent. However, earlier the opposite was said, namely that every willing-against has an end pre-established by a created will. That was said on the supposition that every willing-against necessarily presupposes a willing-for; if that were true (and I believe that it is not true) then it would have a final cause pre-established by a created will. 83

[9] See **[111–112]**
[10] See **[90, 93]**.

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Search what was said about the end of the first willing-for, and answer similarly about the end of the first willing-against.

84 The fourth principal conclusion is that some acts of desire necessarily presuppose an act of friendship and others do not. Similarly, some acts of willing-against necessarily presuppose an act of willing-for and some do not. …

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88 Some acts are (i) just acts of willing-for, others are (ii) just acts of willing-against, and others are (iii) both an act of willing-for and an act of willing-against in numerically the same act. An example of (i): an act by which I only love some object (or multiple objects), or by which I love_D one thing for the sake of something else, so that I will-against none of these by that act. An example of (ii): an act by which I hate one object (or multiple objects), or by which one thing is willed-against on account of something else that is willed-against, so that I will-for none of these by that act. An example of (iii): an act by which I hate sin for the sake of God: that act has both sin and God for objects. Insofar as this act is terminated in God it is called an act of willing-for (since I cannot meritoriously will-against God); but insofar as it is terminated in sin it is called an act of willing-against (since sin is hated by means of that act).

***

90 An act that is an act of both willing-against and willing-for does not necessarily presuppose an act of just willing-for. For the intellect can apprehend and dictate, prior to any act of the will, that sin should be detested for the sake of God, and the will can then will in conformity to what is shown by the intellect. Therefore, this sort of act of willing-against does not necessarily presuppose a willing-for.

***

92 But an act of simply willing-against does, as a matter of fact, necessarily presuppose an act of willing-for. For as a matter of fact no one hates something except because it is unfitting with or incompatible with something that is loved_D.

93 You might object that the intellect can dictate that something should be unconditionally willed-against and that the will can will-against that thing with a first act, presupposing no other act. This conclusion can be conceded. Then there would not be such necessity that a willing-against on its own presupposes an act of friendship. Nevertheless, as a matter of fact, there seems to always be such necessity.

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You might object that every effect has a final cause, and $love_A$ and cognition are effects, therefore they have final causes. And there is nothing else than the health that is $loved_A$ and cognized, therefore its causality is nothing other than its being $loved_A$. 111

I respond that the same thing should be said about the end of the first cognition and first $love_A$ that is said about the end of any natural action (e.g., the generation of fire, and so on): the end of such things is whatever is intended by a superior agent (e.g., God himself, or whatever is intended by God). $Love_A$ of this sort does not have a final cause that is intended and pre-established by the will, any more than in the case where I $love_A$ a human being unconditionally, not for the sake of anything else, and I do not intend anything else. There seems to be no final cause here other than God. 112

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5 *Should Everything Other than God Only Be Used?* (Ord., *d.* 1, *q.* 1)

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TEXT[1]

1 Regarding the first distinction, in which the Master [Peter Lombard] discusses enjoyment and use, I first ask this question about use: should everything other than God only be used?

2 That this is not the case:

3 I argue this in two ways, and first I argue that it is not the case that everything other than God should be used. First, the act of using should not be used; therefore, it is not the case that everything other than God should be used. The inference is clear. I argue for the antecedent as follows: If the act of using is itself to be used, this will either be by the same act or by another act. It cannot be used by the same act, because the same act cannot be both a direct act and a reflexive

[1] *OTh* I: 371–393.

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act. Nor can it be used by another act, because then there would be two acts in the will at the same time.

Second, everything that can be used can be misused. But there are some things that cannot be misused; therefore, there are some things that cannot be used. The major premise is clear because opposite things have to apply to one and the same thing; but use and misuse are contraries, and therefore the same thing can be both used and misused. The minor premise is clear because the virtues cannot be misused. This is so because, according to the Master, "no one uses virtues badly," and so no one misuses them.[2] 4

Third, anything that can be related back [*referibile*] to God should be used, but there are many things that cannot be related back to God; therefore, etc. The major premise is clear as follows: Using is "loving$_D$ something for the sake of something else."[3] Consequently, everything that should be used can be loved$_D$ for the sake of something else. But each individual thing should especially be loved$_D$ for the sake of God, and therefore everything that should be used can be related back to God. The minor premise is clear because second intentions, since they cannot establish a real relation to God, cannot be related back to God.[4] Similarly, second intentions should not be loved$_D$ since they are not real things. Additionally, bad things (which should not be loved$_A$, either for themselves or for the sake of something else) cannot be related back to God. 5

The second thing I show is that God should be used. This is so because everything that can permissibly be an object of desire-love$_A$ should be used, but God can permissibly be loved$_A$ with desire-love$_A$; therefore, God should be used. The major premise is clear as follows: That which is loved$_A$ with desire-love$_A$ is loved$_A$ for the sake of something that is loved$_A$ with friendship-love$_A$. (This is so because being loved$_A$ with desire-love$_A$ is being loved$_A$ for the sake of a thing that is loved$_A$ with friendship-love$_A$; and this is because being loved$_A$ with desire-love$_A$ is being desired or wanted for someone else.) But anyone who loves$_D$ something for the sake of another thing uses the former; therefore, anyone who loves$_D$ something with desire-love$_A$ uses it. The minor premise is clear because something that is useful for someone who is loved$_A$ with friendship-love$_A$ can be desired for that individual, and consequently that thing can be loved$_A$ with desire-love$_A$. But God 6

[2] Peter Lombard, *Sentences* I, d. 1, ch. 3.

[3] Augustine, *On Christian Doctrine* I.4.

[4] Very roughly, a second intention is a metalinguistic entity, in particular a word that applies to words (e.g., 'verb' or 'monosyllabic') or a concept that applies to concepts (e.g., the concept of *genus* insofar as genera are considered to be concepts). For Ockham's discussion, see *SL* I, chs. 11–12 (*OPh* I: 38–44).

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is useful for a rational creature that is loved$_A$ with friendship-love$_A$; therefore, God can permissibly be desired for that creature, and so that creature can permissibly use God.

7 For the opposite conclusion:

8 All and only that which can be ordered to something else should be used. But everything other than God can be ordered to God, who is the end of all things; and God cannot be ordered to anything else. Therefore, etc.

Several Senses of 'Use'

9 With respect to this question, how to understand the question will be explained first, and then the question itself will be answered.

10 Regarding the first, it should be known that this question should not be understood to be about use in the sense of an operation of any power whatsoever, which is the sense in which 'use' is taken when it is said "that whose use" (and so on).[5] Nor is it about the sense of 'use' where we are said to use powers in order to elicit the acts of those powers, nor the sense of 'use' where we are said to use habits when we will, nor the sense of 'use' where we are said to use the act itself when we will. Rather, this question is about the sense of 'use' where we are said to use a thing as an object. Understanding the question in this way, I say that 'use' is taken in two senses, one broadly and one strictly. Broadly, 'use' is taken for every act of the will, according to blessed Augustine.[6] Strictly, however, it is taken for the act of the will that is distinct from enjoyment; this question is instead to be understood in this particular sense.

11 Regarding this, first it should be seen what distinguishes an act of using from an act of enjoying, and second what the object of an act of using is.

What Distinguishes an Act of Using from an Act of Enjoying

12 Regarding the first point, it should be known that someone can take something up in their faculty of will in two ways: either for the sake of itself or for the sake of something else. A thing is taken up in the faculty of will in the first way when the intellect presents the thing to the will, and even if nothing else were presented the thing would still be taken up in the faculty of will. A thing is taken up into the faculty of

[5] The full quote is "That whose use is good is itself also good, and conversely." Boethius, *De differentiis topicis*, Book II (1190B).

[6] Augustine, *On the Trinity* X.11.17.

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will in the second way when something is taken up in the faculty of will along with something else that has been presented, such that if that latter thing had not been presented to the will or had not been taken up in the faculty of will[7], then the former thing would not be taken up in the faculty of will.

The first kind of act is not an act that involves relating [one thing to another]; namely, it is such that the will elicits that act concerning a thing in such a way that the same act would be elicited even supposing that nothing else were displayed to the will (e.g., if God were displayed to someone, they would want God even if nothing else were displayed to them). The second kind of act does involve relating, since that act would not be elicited concerning that thing if nothing else were displayed to the will or if nothing else were taken up in the faculty of will[8] (e.g., when someone wants bitter medicine that they would not want if they did not also want health).

But there are two ways for an act to not involve relating: either because the act's object is accepted as the foremost thing possibly presented to the will (that is, the object is accepted as what it should love as foremost)[9], or else because the object is accepted unconditionally and taken up unconditionally in the faculty of will, neither as foremost nor as non-foremost. The first sort of act, when something is accepted as unqualifiedly foremost, is an act of enjoyment. The second sort of act is neither enjoyment nor use, properly speaking. But the third kind of act [namely, the act that does involves relating] is use, properly speaking.

On the Object of Use

Regarding the second point,[10] I say that the object of use in general – 13
that which is common both to properly ordered use and to disordered use – is anything, either created or uncreated. This is clear because anything that the will can relate back [*referre*] to another thing is an object of use; but the will, from its freedom, can relate anything back to anything else, and so it can use anything. The major premise is obvious. The minor premise is clear as follows: with anything being displayed to it, the will can love_D something else even more, and consequently it can love_D the former because of the latter.

The second conclusion is that God is not an object of properly 14
ordered use. For if he were, he would either be the object of a

[7] The second disjunct is a later addition by Ockham.
[8] The second disjunct is a later addition by Ockham.
[9] This parenthetical is a later addition by Ockham.
[10] See **[11]**.

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properly ordered willing-for or a properly ordered willing-against. But God is not the object of a properly ordered willing-against, because no one can hate God in a properly ordered way; neither is he the object of a properly ordered willing-for, because then something else could be loved$_A$ in a properly ordered way more than God. Similarly, the ultimate end cannot be related back to some other thing; but God is unqualifiedly the ultimate end.

15 The third conclusion is that everything other than God can be an object of properly ordered use. This is proved as follows: Everything other than that which is accepted as foremost can be taken up in the faculty of will for the sake of that thing accepted as foremost. But God is accepted in a properly ordered way as foremost. Therefore, everything other than God can be taken up in a properly ordered way in the faculty of will for the sake of God, and consequently everything other than God can be an object of properly ordered use. The major premise is clear as follows: Everything other than that which is accepted as foremost is either a good thing or a bad thing. If a thing is good, it can be loved$_A$ for the sake of the thing accepted as foremost. If a thing is bad, it can be willed-against by the will in a properly ordered way for the sake of the thing accepted as foremost. So, everything other than that which is accepted as foremost can be taken up in a properly ordered way in the faculty of will for the sake of that thing. Therefore, etc.

Three Difficulties about Use

16 However, there are three difficult issues with respect to what has been said. The first concerns whether the intermediate act [between use and enjoyment][11] is possible and whether that act is necessarily good or bad.

17 A second difficult issue is whether the act of using (most properly speaking) is unqualifiedly numerically one act or whether it includes multiple numerically distinct acts, one which just concerns the end and another which just concerns that thing that is for the sake of the end.

18 A third difficult issue was touched on during the first initial argument,[12] namely whether an act of using by which someone makes use of their very own act of using is numerically the same act or is a distinct act.

[11] See **[12]**.
[12] See **[3]**.

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First Difficulty: On Acts That Are Intermediate between Use and Enjoyment

In response to the first difficult issue, I say that there is a kind of intermediate act by which a thing is loved$_A$ neither as an unqualifiedly ultimate end nor as actually related back to something else. 19

It might be objected that if the thing is not loved$_A$ for the sake of another thing, then it is loved$_A$ for itself; however, everything of this sort is loved$_A$ as an ultimate end. I respond to this as follows: A thing of this sort is indeed loved for itself – this is so because even if nothing else were displayed to the will the will would still love$_A$ that thing. Nevertheless, it is not loved$_A$ as an ultimate end – at least, not positively.[13] This is so because something is loved$_A$ as an ultimate end when it is accepted as a thing that is loved$_A$ (or should be loved$_A$) more than anything else, no matter what else could be displayed to it as worthy of love$_A$. But not everything that is loved$_A$ for itself is loved$_A$ as an ultimate end in this way: for example, someone apprehending a virtue and not thinking about happiness wants the virtue, but does not want it for the sake of happiness. Yet they also do not want the virtue as something that should be wanted more (or less) than anything else that could be displayed to them. So there is the intermediate act that was discussed, just as in the case of this loved$_A$ virtue. 20

The Philosopher discusses this in *Ethics* I, where he holds that some things can be chosen for the sake of another thing, other things only for the sake of themselves and in no way for the sake of another, and still other things for the sake of both themselves and another. This is why he says in *Ethics* I, chapter 8, "That which can be pursued for its own sake we call more perfect than that which can be pursued for the sake of another, and that which can never be chosen for the sake of another we call more perfect than the things that can be chosen both for their own sake and for the sake of that former thing. And we call unqualifiedly perfect a thing that can always be chosen for its own sake and never for the sake of another. Happiness seems to especially be of this sort, for we always choose it for the sake of itself and never for the sake of another. We do indeed choose honor and pleasure and understanding and every virtue for the sake of themselves, since we would certainly choose any one of them even if nothing else resulted. However, we also choose them to gain happiness, expecting that from them we will be happy. But no one chooses happiness for the sake of these things, or in any way for the sake of another thing."[14] From this it is clear that there is something that can be willed when nothing else is being presented to the will, and so in that case it is not positively 21

[13] The remainder of the paragraph after this point is a later addition by Ockham.
[14] Aristotle, *NE* I.7 (1097a30–b6).

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chosen for the sake of something else; nevertheless, it is not an ultimate end for it can be chosen for the sake of some other end.

22 It might be objected that when something that is for an end [*ad finem*] is loved$_D$, but not for the sake of that end [*propter finem*], then that act [of love] is bad. I respond that an act concerning something that is for an end is able to not be bad even if the thing is neither loved$_D$ [for the sake of the end] nor positively related back to the end. This is especially the case when the end is not apprehended.

23 It might be objected that if any circumstance that is required for an act to be good is lacking, that makes the act bad. However, the circumstance of the end is required for an act to be morally good; so whenever the end is lacking, the act will be bad. But the end is lacking in the case at hand; therefore, etc.

24 I respond that not every lack of a circumstance that is required for an act to be morally good makes the act to be bad or sinful, for then ignorance would never excuse; however, ignorance sometimes excuses all, according to both the professors and the saints. When there is some circumstance that is lacking and that circumstance is one to which the individual eliciting the act is obligated at that time, then the act is bad; but, if at that time the individual is not obligated to that circumstance, then the act is not bad. This is so in the case at hand, for in this sort of case this individual is not obligated to will this thing for the sake of the end. However, if the individual were to elicit an act concerning that thing that pre-established that thing as their end with respect to all other things, then the individual would sin.

Second Difficulty: Arguments for the View That Every Act of Use Entails Multiple Acts

25 Regarding the second difficult issue,[15] it could seem to some that there is another act, distinct in both number and species, such that this sort of act of using cannot exist without there being [two] distinct acts that are really different from each other.

This can be argued for, firstly, as follows: When a thing that is for an end is loved$_D$ for the sake of the end, both the end and the thing that is for the end are loved$_D$. But the end and the thing that is for the end cannot be loved$_D$ with just one act; and so there are multiple acts in this case.

The major premise is clear as follows: It is certain that the thing that is for an end is loved$_D$, for otherwise this would not be an instance of an act of using since there would not be a willing of that thing. It is

[15] See **[17]**.

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also clear that the end is loved$_D$, because "each one [is loved] for the sake of that thing, and that thing [is loved] more."[16] Therefore, if the thing that is for the end is loved$_D$ for the sake of the end, it must be that the end is loved$_D$ even more.

The minor premise is argued for on the basis that the end is loved$_D$ by an act of enjoyment, because it is loved$_D$ for itself; but the thing that is for the end is loved$_D$ by an act of using. Therefore, if there were only one act, then numerically the same act would be both an act of using and an act of enjoyment. This consequent is false, because those acts belong to opposed species.

A second way that this can be argued for: If there were numerically 26
just one act, an act of using would be more perfect than an act of enjoyment. This consequent is false; therefore, the antecedent is false. The falsity of the consequent is clear as follows: there would be an act of the will that would be more perfect than the enjoyment of the divine essence, and consequently that act would be more perfect than beatitude. This inference is clear as follows: When there is an act by which many objects are considered by some power, that act is more perfect than an act which considers fewer objects, as long as the former act and the latter act consider their objects equally perfectly. But if it is supposed that enjoyment (i.e., an act of enjoyment) only concerns an end and that an act of using concerns both the end and that which is for the end, and if it is supposed that the act of using and the act of enjoyment concern the end equally perfectly (for from the fact that someone loves$_D$ some creature for the sake of God it does not follow that they love$_D$ God less), then the act of using a creature would be more perfect than an act of enjoying God.

Third, thus: The will cannot have two perfect acts concerning the 27
same object at one and the same time. But supposing there to be a meritorious act in the will by which someone loves$_D$ God for God's sake, the intellect can offer the will something that is capable of being properly ordered and loved$_D$ for the sake of God, and the will can then love$_D$ this thing for the sake of God. But [in order to love the other thing] it is not necessary for the will to abandon the first meritorious act. So then, the act elicited second will be terminated only in a creature; for otherwise there would be two acts in the will concerning God at the same time.

Fourth, thus: Just as someone can love$_D$ a thing for the sake of 28
something else that is loved$_D$, so someone can detest a thing for the sake of something that is loved$_D$. So, if an act of loving$_D$ something for the sake of another thing is numerically one act that has both of these

[16] Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I.2 (72a29–30).

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two things for its object, then by that same reason an act of detesting something for the sake of another thing (that is, for the sake of one's $love_A$ for the other thing) is also one act that has both of the two things for its object. But this is impossible, because then an act of $loving_A$ and an act of hating would be numerically one act. This final inference is clear as follows: If this act is terminated at an end, that end is either $loved_A$ by this act or hated by this act. The end is not hated, therefore, it is $loved_A$ by this act. So then, the act is an act of $loving_A$ and also an act of hating (because something is hated by the act).[17] Therefore, etc.

29 Fifth, thus: Numerically the same act cannot be both more and less intense, both perfect and imperfect. But anyone who $loves_D$ something for the sake of another thing (i.e, for the sake of an end) $loves_D$ the end more perfectly and more intensely, and they $love_D$ the thing that is for the end less intensely and more imperfectly. Therefore, they do not $love_D$ each of them with the same act.

30 This argument is confirmed as follows: If each thing were $loved_D$ by the same act, then someone $loves_D$ a creature meritoriously with just as perfect an act as with which they meritoriously $love_D$ God. Consequently, they would $love_D$ the creature just as much, and so God would not be the thing that is to be foremostly $loved_D$ and above everything else. But this is absurd.

31 Sixth, thus: From *Ethics* III: "Choice is not will, because choice is of those things which are for an end, and will is of the end itself."[18] But if they were the same act, choice would concern the end from the fact that it would concern something that is for the sake of an end.

32 Furthermore, just as the intellect cannot understand many things [with one act at one time], so the will cannot will many things [with one act at one time]. Therefore, there is not one act, nor are both things willed at the same time.

Second Difficulty, Continued: A More Plausible View, That an Act of Use Can Be a Single Act

33 Despite these opposing arguments, it seems probable that [an act of using] could be two acts and that it could be just one act.

34 This can be shown as follows: The will is related to an end and to those things that are for that end in the same way that the intellect is related to premises and to conclusions. Now the intellect can know some conclusion by means of an act distinct from the act by which a

[17] This parenthetical is a later addition by Ockham.
[18] Aristotle, *NE* III.2 (1111b20, 26–27).

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premise is cognized, and it can also cognize both premise and conclusion by a single act. Therefore, in the same way the will can have distinct acts concerning the end and concerning the thing that is for that end, and it can also have one act concerning both.

The major premise is self-evident, because the will has no less power over its objects than the intellect has over its objects. The first part of the minor premise is clear as follows: A cognition of a premise is a cause of a cognition of a conclusion, and a cause is really distinct from its effect. Therefore, there can be different acts by which the premise and the conclusion are cognized. The minor premise's second part is clear as follows: It is no more incompatible for the intellect to understand one series of arguments [*discursus*] or one inference with a single act than it is to understand one sentence with a single act; but the intellect can understand one sentence with a single act. This is clear from what the Philosopher says in *On the Soul* III, where he divides the intellect's operations into operations concerning simple items and operations concerning composite items; so, if this division is correct, there will be an act of understanding with respect to sentential items [*complexi*], just as there is with respect to non-sentential items [*incomplexi*].

Furthermore, in *On the Soul* III he says that the common sense 35
cognizes the difference among the various sensible items of a given sense. This, then, is either done by a single act or by distinct acts. If the common sense does this with one act, then *a fortiori* both the intellect and the will can have multiple objects for a single act. If the common sense does this with distinct acts, then the particular sense can too, but then there is no need to posit the common sense on account of this activity.[19]

It might be objected that if there were distinct acts [in the will at 36
the same time], then neither of these acts will be an act of using; for it is obvious that the first act [which concerns the end] is not an act of using, and the second act is also not an act of using, and the proof of this is as follows: When some act is not an act of using when it exists

[19] **[35]** is a later addition by Ockham. It replaces two deleted arguments: "Furthermore, if there is not just one act, then there are two acts with distinct objects. But this is false, because then there would not be composition and division [of sentences] without having multiple acts that concern multiple objects. But this is obviously false, because then a sense could compose and divide just as well as the intellect can, since a sense can have distinct acts concerning distinct objects (e.g., sight can see multiple white things at the same time, or a white thing and a black thing at the same time). Furthermore, according to general consensus, in the next life the intellect understands many things by a single act (e.g., the Word and something that is in the Word), and similarly one loves God and a creature with a single act. Therefore, since there does not appear to be any evident argument, experience, or authoritative Scripture that says the contrary, one should not deny that this is the case in this life."

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without another act (an act from which it can be separated), then the former act will still not be an act of using when it exists alongside the latter act, because the latter act does not make numerically the same former act become an act of using when it was not previously an act of using (nor vice versa). Now an act which is only terminated in something that is for an end could exist without any act concerning that end, because the will can freely be brought to any object that is displayed to it while [considering] no other thing. So, if this is supposed, then the act will not be an act of using because the thing is not loved$_D$ for the sake of something else. Therefore, the act will also not be an act of using when it exists at the same time with an act that concerns the end.

This objection is confirmed as follows: An act that is terminated in just one thing and that can exist without any other act does not aim at one thing for the sake of another thing. So, if the act does not aim at some other thing, then the act is not an act of using, which is an act that aims at one thing for the sake of another thing.

37 In response to this objection it can be said that the sort of act that is terminated only in something that is not foremostly accepted (that is, not accepted as the foremost thing) is not an act of using, taking 'act of using' in the strict sense. So 'act of using' can be taken in three senses: in one sense it is taken for every act that is not enjoyment; in a second sense for an act that is terminated in some object and is caused by an act of enjoyment concerning some other object; and in a third sense it is taken for a single existing act that aims at one thing for the sake of another.

That act [discussed in the objection] is an act of using in the first sense, whether or not it exists alongside another act, but it is an act of using in the second sense only when it is caused by another act that exists alongside it. And taking 'act of using' in this second sense, numerically the same act is able to be an act of using at an earlier time and it can persist to a later time at which it is able to not be an act of using. This is so because at first it can be caused by some other act concerning the end or by some act of enjoying, and if that act of enjoying is destroyed the will can continue that numerically same act. For example, if someone at one time unqualifiedly loves$_D$ medicine because they love$_D$ health, then at that time the love$_D$ of the medicine will be an act of using [in the second sense] because it is caused by the other act. But if by the will's freedom they continue loving$_D$ medicine even when they are not actually loving$_D$ health, then [the love of the medicine] will not be an act of using, because at that latter time it is neither caused nor conserved by an act concerning health.

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'Act of using' is taken most strictly in the third sense, and in this sense an act of using is always one act that concerns multiple things. So, I say that it is not unfitting for numerically the same act to concern both the ultimate end and those things which are for that end.

Second Difficulty, Continued: Responses to the Arguments for the Multiple Act Account

In response to the first contrary argument,[20] I say that when some items signify one thing and connote different things, then although according to the words they seem to be different or opposite, and although they convey an opposition about one and the same thing, nevertheless those items can pertain to one and the same thing, though with respect to different things. This is the case for 'natural' and 'free,' and also for 'contingent' and 'necessary' – both cannot pertain to the same thing with respect to the same thing; nevertheless, it is not unfitting for both to pertain to the same thing with respect to different things. For instance, according to everyone the divine will is a principle for necessarily producing the Holy Spirit and yet it is also a principle for contingently producing creatures. So it is in the case at hand: the same act can be an act of enjoying with respect to the ultimate end and yet be an act of using with respect to that which is for the end. This is clear, for an act of loving$_D$ God is enjoyment with respect to the divine essence, and yet a creature is used, not enjoyed by that act; and this can be said in the case at hand. 38

Similarly, the intellect knows a conclusion by one act; consequently, by that act it understands not only the conclusion but also the terms of that conclusion. Nevertheless, by that act the intellect knows the conclusion but it does not know some nonsentential part of that conclusion.[21] And so, the same act is called knowledge with respect to the conclusion but is not called knowledge with respect to the terms (though the act can be given some other name with respect to the terms). Therefore, it is not unfitting for numerically the same act of the will to receive different designations on account of different objects, so that by that act the will is said both to enjoy one object and to use another object. Similarly, sometimes there is an act of using without any act of enjoying.

[20] See **[25]**.

[21] Ockham does not make clearly explicit the terminological assumption here: even though the act of knowing some sentence must include *understanding* of all the components of that sentence, the act is not an act of *knowing* the individual terms since knowledge, by definition, is only of structured sentences.

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39 In response to the second argument,[22] I concede that it is not unfitting for an act of using to be more perfect than an act of enjoying when that act of using is also an act of enjoying that object; so it seems that an act by which a creature is loved$_D$ just for the sake of God is more perfect than an act by which only God is loved$_D$ (this is so if the acts are equally intense, which is not always the case). Nevertheless, perhaps beatific enjoyment in the next life will come just from God alone and will concern God alone, and yet it will be more perfect than any enjoyment that can concern both God and a creature at the same time. This will be because the enjoyment that can concern both God and a creature can be elicited by a created will, but the other [beatific] enjoyment cannot be elicited by a created will.[23]

40 In response to the third argument,[24] I concede that the will can have two perfect acts at the same time concerning the same object, especially when that object is the total object of one act but only a partial object of the other act. So it is in the case at hand, for when an end is loved$_D$ just for its own sake, then that end is the total object of that act, since nothing other than that end terminates the act. But when a thing that is for an end is loved$_D$ for the sake of the end, then the end is only a partial object of the act. This is how, as was said earlier, when something nonsentential is understood at one time and then something sentential is understood at a later time, the first cognition will be able to persist along with the second cognition. Otherwise, when apprehending some terms, the intellect would not be able to form a sentence from them at once and in the same instant, and consequently the apprehension of the terms would not be presupposed per se in composition and division. (This is because a thing is presupposed per se by some effect only when it can persist along with that effect; it is for this reason that the Philosopher posits that privation is only a per accidens principle. But how this saying should be understood will be shown elsewhere.[25])

41 In response to the fourth argument,[26] it can be conceded that numerically the same act can be called "detestation" (i.e., an act of detesting) with respect to one thing and can be called an act of loving$_A$ with respect to another thing, when by that single act I detest the

[22] See **[26]**.
[23] The final two sentences (starting with "Nevertheless") are a later addition by Ockham.
[24] See **[27]**.
[25] The final sentence is a later addition by Ockham; the reference is likely to one of his commentaries on Aristotle's *Physics*. See, e.g., *Summula philosophiae naturalis* I, chs. 5–7 (*OPh* VI: 165–176), especially pp. 175–176.
[26] See **[28]**.

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former thing for the sake of the latter thing that is loved$_A$ by that same act.

It might be objected that [detest and love] are opposite acts; and, similarly, willing-for and willing-against are opposite acts. But to detest just is to will-against a thing, and to love$_A$ is to will-for a thing. Therefore, etc. 42

It can be replied that an act of loving$_A$ and an act of hating are only opposed when the same thing is both loved$_A$ and hated, for the acts are not opposed when one thing is loved$_A$ and something else is hated.[27] (The same should be said about willing-for and willing-against, as well as about enjoying and using.) Insofar as they are connotative terms both [love and hate] cannot pertain to the same subject concerning the same thing, though they could pertain to the same subject concerning different things. 43

In response to the fifth argument,[28] I concede that the same act cannot be both more and less intense; nevertheless, by the same act one thing can be loved$_D$ more intensely and something else loved$_D$ less intensely, just as God loves$_D$ himself maximally intensely but does not love$_D$ any creature maximally intensely. 44

In response to the confirming argument,[29] I deny the inference that if someone loves$_D$ what is for the end with an equally intense act [as the act by which they love the end], then they love$_D$ that thing equally intensely [as they love the end]. The reason for this is that 'loving$_D$ equally intensely' connotes more than does 'an equally intense act'; how this should be understood will be made clear elsewhere.[30] 45

This response is confirmed: Let God be more favored than everything else by a single less intense act. Supposing this, it is still possible for there to be a more intense act that concerns a creature. So, it does not follow that something is loved$_D$ just as much [as another thing] because it is loved$_D$ by an act that is just as intense [as the act by which the other is loved].

In response to the sixth argument,[31] I say that choice is not will according to the Philosopher's meaning, because will concerns a thing 46

[27] The first sentence is a later addition by Ockham, replacing the following deleted text: "It can be said that according to what they name, some absolute items are opposites; that is, those absolute items, when they are distinct, are opposites. And so, an act of detesting that is not an act of loving is opposed to it; that it, it is of a different species. But an act of detesting that is the same as an act of loving is not opposed to it."

[28] See **[29]**.

[29] See **[30]**.

[30] I do not know what text Ockham is referring to here. The edition suggests that *Var. Ques.*, q. 4 (translated in part in chapter 4 of this volume) treats similar issues, but I cannot locate a relevant passage in that text.

[31] See **[31]**.

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as a total object, but there is not choice concerning a total object. Similarly, will concerns impossible things, but choice does not concern such things. Hence, he calls 'will' that which concerns only one thing and not one thing for the sake of another; but he calls 'choice' that which relates to something that has been willed previously.

47 It is commonly said in response to the seventh argument[32] that the intellect cannot understand many things at the same time insofar as they are many but can only understand many things insofar as they are one thing, and that in the same way the will cannot be brought to many things insofar as they are many, but can only be brought to many things insofar as they are one thing.[33] For this reason, it is said particularly in this case that the will can be brought to those things that are for the end either insofar as they are ordered to the end (and in this way the same act of the will concerns the end and concerns those things that are for the end), or else the will can be brought to those things insofar as they are things that are per se desirable (and in this case the will is brought to them by a distinct act). So it is said that (in the first way of the will's being brought) the end is the formal object and, as it were, the reason for the will's being brought to those things, and that which is for the end is the material object; and the end and that which is for the end are one object in the same way that light and color are one object.

48 But this response[34] is unsound, because a thing is understood just as distinctly when it is understood together with another thing as when it is understood without the other thing and is understood under its very own concept. This is so since it can be understood under its very own definitional concept [*ratione definitiva*], and in that case it is not understood insofar as it is one, but typically insofar as it is multiple.[35]

49 Furthermore,[36] if the end were the formal object and that which is for the end is the material object, then the act would not be differentiated by a difference of the thing which is for the end, because acts are not differentiated as a result of a difference in their material object. But the consequent is false, because otherwise loving$_D$ God for the sake of God and loving$_D$ a creature for the sake of God would be numerically the same act.

[32] See **[32]**.
[33] See, e.g., Scotus, *Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle* IV, q. 1, n. 35.
[34] Namely, the response in **[47]** to the argument in **[32]**.
[35] The point here is that when a thing is understood through its definition, it is understood through the multiple parts of its definition, i.e., its genus and contracting difference.
[36] This is a further objection to **[47]**'s response to **[32]**.

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So, I reply to that argument[37] that the intellect can understand many things with one act and can also do so with distinct acts (as will be made clear elsewhere[38]). If it is asked whether these things are understood insofar as they are many or insofar as they are one, I say that they are not understood insofar as they are many, nor insofar as they are one. Neither of these is true with the 'insofar' clause [*nota reduplicationis*].[39] 50

Third Difficulty: Whether an Act of Use Can Use Itself

What to say about the third difficult issue[40] will be made clear in another question, so it will be postponed until then.[41] 51

Responses to the Initial Arguments

As will be discussed later,[42] I say in response to the first initial argument[43] that an act of using should be used and should be an object of another act of using. Also, I concede the conclusion that there can be two acts of willing in the will at the same time. 52

In response to the second initial argument,[44] I say there are two senses in which a thing is used or misused: either as an object of an act of the will or as a habit that inclines to its very own act. (There are other senses in which something is used or misused, but those are not relevant to the case at hand.) Concerning the first sense, I say that everything that can be used can be misused, but not vice versa; this is so because the sense of 'use' that is distinguished from misuse is properly ordered use. Now then, God can be misused but can in no way be used, because no one can use God in a properly ordered way. Nevertheless, everything that can be used in a properly ordered way can be misused, because anything that can be an object of properly ordered use can be an object of misuse. 53

When it is said that "the virtues cannot be misused," I say that the virtues can be misused as objects. This is so because someone who

[37] See **[32]**.
[38] *Rep.* II, q. 17 (*OTh* V: 382–394).
[39] In *Prior Analytics* I.38, Aristotle treats of syllogisms "with reduplication," which (very roughly) are arguments containing at least one statement with a *qua*-clause.
[40] See **[18]**.
[41] This reference is probably to *Rep.* II, q. 17 (*OTh* V: 382–394); that question does not explicitly treat whether an act of using is used by itself or by another act, but it does treat the structure of reflexive acts in general.
[42] See **[56–59]**.
[43] See **[3]**.
[44] See **[4]**.

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desired charity for its own sake (as for the sake of the foremostly loved_{A} ultimate end) would misuse charity, and similarly for the other virtues. It is in this sense (according to some[45]) that the first angel misused beatitude, because the angel inordinately wanted it for itself and for its own sake, as for the sake of an ultimate end.

In the second sense, charity cannot be misused, because charity does not incline one to a bad act. (This is the meaning of Augustine and the Master.) Nevertheless, considering every absolute item in any virtue other than charity, those things can be misused, as will be discussed in the third book.[46] When it is said that "contraries have to apply to the same thing," I reply that contraries have to apply to the same subject, and so in any subject in which there can be [an act of] use, there can also be [an act of] misuse that is contrary to it, and vice versa; but they do not have to concern the same effect, nor always the same object. So, no matter how much there could be misuse concerning God, it still need not be the case that there can be use concerning God that is contrary to that misuse. Similarly, even if some habit with respect to some effect can be used, it still need not be the case that we can misuse that same habit with respect to some effect, because that habit does not have any bad effect.

54 It might be objected that from this it follows that God can be used in a properly ordered way: Properly ordered use is contrary to misuse and there can be misuse concerning God in the will. So, from the fact that when one of a pair of contraries can exist in a subject the other contrary can also exist in that subject, there could also be properly ordered use concerning God in the will.

55 I respond that this misuse concerning God does not have any properly ordered use for its contrary, because every [act of] use that concerns God is not properly ordered – and so [every such act] is misuse. So, it need not be the case that [use and misuse concerning God] could exist in the same subject, because they are not possible in the natural realm. Nevertheless, it should be conceded that there are some [acts of] use concerning God that are contrary to each other; but each of these will be [an act of] misuse.

56 In response to the third initial argument,[47] I say that all things can be related back to God, because all things should be taken into the

[45] Scotus, *Ord.* II, d. 6, q. 2, nn. 40–63.

[46] I do not know precisely what text Ockham is referring to here. This may be an oblique reference to his view that everything other than acts of the will has moral status only in reference to some act of the will; therefore, any "virtuous" habit can fail to be morally good if it does not conform to a virtuous act of the will. See *Rep.* III, q. 11, nn. 26–38, 77–78; also *Rep.* III, q. 12, nn. 73–90, translated in chapters 14 and 15 of this volume, respectively.

[47] See **[5]**.

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faculty of will for the sake of God. In response to the first subargument [for the minor premise], I say that second intentions can be related back to God, because someone can will-for them to exist in the way in which they exist and will-for them to be understood in order to honor God. When it is said "they cannot establish a real relation," I concede this; but it does not follow from this that they cannot be related back to God. Hence, when someone desires some bitter[48] medicine for the sake of health or desires health for the sake of God, those things are being related [to another thing] because they are desired for the sake of something else. Nevertheless, they do not establish a real relation because they do not exist; and this answer can be given in the case in hand. When it is additionally said that they are not real things and so they are not related back to God, I deny this inference because (according to the view that supposes that they only have objective being[49]) beings of reason can be related back to God from the fact that they can be considered to exist in the way in which they exist for the sake of God.

In response to the second subargument [for the minor premise][50] I say that there are two ways in which something can be understood to be ordered or related back to God: either as something that is willed-for for the sake of God or as something that is willed-against for the sake of God. Sinful badness should not be used in the first way, because it should not be willed-for for the sake of God; but it should be used in the second way, because it should be detested for the sake of God. And so, the will can have an act of willing-for, an act of willing-against, an act of accepting, or an act of enduring with respect to any thing whatsoever, and these acts are such that the will would not have them unless God is displayed to the will by the intellect. Hence, those things should be used.

It might be objected that an object of an act of using is a useful thing. But not everything other than God is useful (e.g., bad things and second intentions and so on). Therefore, it is not the case that everything is an object of an act of using. 57

I respond that not every object of an act of using is useful, because a useful thing (properly speaking) is that which should be wanted for the sake of something worth seeking or for the sake of something worth preserving. An object of an act of using, though, is anything that can be taken into the faculty of will by any act for the sake of something else. That is, the will would not elicit this sort of act concerning 58

[48] Reading *amaram* with manuscript H instead of the edition's *futuram*.
[49] This parenthetical was a later addition by Ockham.
[50] See the final sentence of **[5]**.

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that thing (whether it be an act of willing-for, an act of willing-against, of detesting, of suffering, or any other act at all) unless the other thing were presented to the will (or were taken into the faculty of will)[51] and the will has some act concerning that other thing.

59 In response to the fourth initial argument,[52] I say that the will does not always use that which it loves_A with desire-love_A; rather, it uses it only when it loves_D that thing with desire-love_A and not with friendship-love_A. Now then, the will does not love_D God only with desire-love_A but also with friendship-love_A. When it is said that "to use something is to love_D it for the sake of something else," I say that this is true when the thing is only loved_D for the sake of something else. As was said earlier, using something, properly speaking, is when the will elicits an act concerning that thing, an act which the will would not have elicited unless some other thing were presented to it and the will has another act concerning that other thing.

[51] This parenthetical is a later addition by Ockham.
[52] See **[6]**.

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6 Is Enjoyment an Act of the Will Alone? (Ord., *d.* 1, *q.* 2)

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TEXT[1]

Secondly, I ask about enjoyment: first, whether enjoyment is an act of the will alone. 1

That it is not: 2

The best and most pleasurable act is in the most noble power. But this act [of enjoyment] is the best and most pleasurable, and according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* X the intellect is the most noble power because he posits happiness to be in it.[2] Therefore, enjoyment is in the intellective power. 3

[1] *OTh* I: 394–403.
[2] Aristotle, *NE* X.7 (1177a12–1178a8).

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4 Second: enjoyment [*fruitio*] is formally beatitude, because the name comes from the fruit [*fructu*] that is the culmination, and beatitude is of this sort. But beatitude is an operation of the intellect, according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* I and *Ethics* X.[3] Therefore, enjoyment will be an operation of the intellect.

5 This argument is confirmed as follows: Natural beatitude and supernatural beatitude ought to be posited in the same power. But the Philosopher posits natural beatitude to be in the intellect.[4] Therefore, supernatural beatitude is also there.

6 For the opposite:

7 According to blessed Augustine, "to enjoy is to cling to a thing with love for its own sake."[5] But loving$_A$ belongs to the will alone. Therefore, etc.

8 With respect to this question, first it must be shown that enjoying is an act of the will alone, and second it must be seen how the will is related to this act.

Enjoyment is an Act of the Will Alone

9 One cannot sufficiently argue for the first point [that enjoyment is an act of the will alone], because words are used however one pleases. But for that reason they should be used as [authoritative] authors use them, and they hold that enjoying is an act of the will alone.

10 This is clear as follows: according to them[6] the word 'enjoy' [*frui*] comes from 'fruit' [*fructus*]. But a fruit is a culmination [*ultimum*]. Therefore, enjoying will be an ultimate act, and it is an act of the will that is ultimate.

11 Additionally, an act of the will alone is most capable of bringing a thing to rest [*quietativus*]. But enjoying is an act that is most capable of bringing a thing to rest. Therefore, etc. The major premise is clear as follows: That act which most brings a thing to rest is either pleasure or an immediate cause of pleasure. But this sort of act belongs to the will alone. This is so because if pleasure were in the other power [i.e., the intellect] or if there were pleasure without any act of the will, then equal pleasure would persist (or at least some pleasure would persist) when an equal act of that other power persists. This consequent is false, as is clear from experience: for when someone understands a given thing to a great degree, they do not take pleasure in that thing if they do not love$_D$ it; and if they hate it, then they are more distressed.

[3] Aristotle, *NE* I.13 (1102a5–1103a10) and *NE* X.7 (1177a12–1178a8).
[4] Aristotle, *NE* X.7 (1177a12–1178a8).
[5] Augustine, *On Christian Doctrine* I.4.
[6] Scotus, *Ord.* I, d. 1, p. 2, q. 1, n. 74.

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This argument is confirmed as follows: Distress belongs to the will alone, because according to blessed Augustine distress concerns those things which occur when we are willing-against them.[7] Therefore, since contraries belong to the same subject, the pleasure that is contrary to distress belongs to the will alone. Therefore, etc. 12

This is also clear from what blessed Augustine says in *On Christian Doctrine* I: "Enjoying is clinging to a thing with love for its own sake."[8] But it only pertains to the will to cling to a thing with $love_A$; therefore, etc. Additionally, in *On the Trinity* X, chapter 10, he says: "We enjoy those things that we cognize when the will, being pleased, comes to rest in them."[9] 13

Nevertheless, it should be understood that when it is said that enjoyment is an act of the will alone, I do not intend to deny that enjoyment is an act of the intellect (properly speaking and according to the literal meaning of the words). This is so because (as will be revealed elsewhere[10]), the intellect and the will are entirely the same thing, and so anything that is in the intellect is in the will, and vice versa. So, enjoyment is in the intellect and is an act of the intellect from the fact that it is an act of the will. But I do intend to say that enjoyment is neither understanding nor knowing, and so on for all the other acts that are called cognitive in any way. So, to conform my way of speaking with that of others, this is what I mean when I say that enjoyment is an act of the will and not an act of the intellect, and other things like that.[11] 14

How the Will Is Related to the Act of Enjoyment

Concerning the second point, I say that 'enjoying' is taken in multiple senses. In one sense it is taken broadly for every act by which something is taken into the faculty of will for its own sake as foremost, regardless of whether the thing is present or absent, whether it is possessed or not possessed. In this sense we are said to enjoy now, in this life, when we $love_D$ God for his own sake as foremost and above everything else. 'Enjoying' is also taken in a strict sense for the ultimate beatific act, and it is in this way that the beatified are said to enjoy in the next life. In this sense, we are not said to enjoy God at this time. 15

[7] Augustine, *City of God* XIV.6.
[8] Augustine, *On Christian Doctrine* I.4.
[9] Augustine, *On the Trinity* X.10.13.
[10] *Rep.* II, q. 20, translated in chapter 1 of this volume.
[11] This paragraph is a later addition by Ockham.

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The Will, by Its Own Nature, Can Actively Enjoy Anything

16 With this distinction set forth, I say first that when the intellect displays an enjoyable object to the will (whether clearly or obscurely, in particular or in general) the will can actively elicit an act of enjoyment concerning that object, and can do so on an entirely natural basis. Second, I say that the will is in no way actively related to the beatific act, but is only passively related to it.

17 The first of these conclusions is clear with respect to the first part (namely, that if an object is displayed obscurely and in general, the will can elicit an act of enjoyment, i.e., it is able to love_D it foremostly and above all things). This is clear as follows: The will can conform itself to a right dictate of reason. But the intellect can rightly dictate that this sort of object should be loved_D in this way. Therefore, the will can elicit such an act in conformity to that dictate.

18 The other part of the first conclusion (namely, that the will could elicit an act of enjoyment in this way when the object is seen clearly) is also clear as follows: The will can [relate to] an object that is more perfectly cognized at least as well as [*non minus quam*] it can to an object that is less perfectly cognized. But the will can elicit this sort of act concerning an object that is cognized obscurely; so it can do so all the more concerning an object that is cognized clearly.

19 This is confirmed by the prior argument[12] as well. The will can conform itself to a dictate of reason, but when an object is seen clearly the intellect dictates (or can dictate) that that object should be foremostly loved_D in this way; therefore, etc.

20 Furthermore, every free power can have an act concerning an object that is displayed to it. Therefore, the will can have an act concerning God, when God is seen clearly. Now, the will does not have a disordered act necessarily; therefore, on an entirely natural basis it can have a properly ordered act (although it cannot have a meritorious act on an entirely natural basis). But this act would not be properly ordered unless it aimed at God for God's own sake; therefore, etc.

The Act of Beatific Enjoyment Comes from God Alone

21 The second of these conclusions[13] (namely, that the act of enjoyment that is the beatific act does not actively come from the will) can be persuasively argued for as follows. First, when some items are essentially ordered and belong to the same genus, if the first and more imperfect item does not actively come from any creature (either

[12] Namely, the argument of **[17]**.
[13] See **[16]**.

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totally or partially) but comes from God alone, then the item that is supreme and ultimate will actively come from God alone. Now, the vision of the divine essence and the enjoyment that is the beatific act possess this sort of order and belong to the same genus, because each of them is supernatural. Therefore, since the uncloaked vision of the divine essence actively comes from God alone, this enjoyment will actively come from God alone.

22 Nevertheless, since for each of these two acts one could deny that they come only from God, I argue that they come only from God. First, as follows: When two things are supernatural, if the more imperfect one, because of its perfection, can only be created by God, then the more perfect one can only be created by God. But the habit of charity and the light of glory (if that is posited) are supernatural, they are more imperfect than the supernatural acts corresponding to them,[14] and (according to general consensus) they actively come from God alone. So, all the more do these acts [of beatific vision and beatific enjoyment] come from God alone. Therefore, etc.

23 Furthermore, I argue as follows with respect to the will's act in particular: Every power that is acting freely and contingently is able, by its own absolute power, to cease from its act. (It can do so either mediately or immediately; I say this because of an objection brought up against a view in another question.[15]) Now then, the will acts freely and contingently with respect to each of its objects; therefore, by its absolute power it is unqualifiedly able to cease from its own act. So then, the will would unqualifiedly be able to make itself not be beatified, and thus a beatified will would not be confirmed in its goodness, in the same way that the will of someone in this life is not confirmed in goodness. The major premise is obvious. The minor premise is clear because the will cannot be necessitated with respect to anything.

24 Furthermore, it is no less incompatible for a beatified will to receive a beatific act from God alone than it is for a damned will to receive an act of the will from God alone. But there is an act of their will to which a damned individual is not actively related, because if they were actively related to that act, they could make themselves not have that act; consequently, they could make themselves not have distress and, consequently, not have punishment. (This argument will become clear in the second book.[16])

[14] That is, charity is less perfect than beatific enjoyment and the light of glory is less perfect than the beatific vision.

[15] *Ord.*, d. 1, q. 6, nn. 24–25, translated in chapter 7 of this volume. This parenthetical is a later addition by Ockham.

[16] *Rep.* II, q. 15, nn. 7–10, translated in chapter 18 of this volume.

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25 I do not bring up these arguments as though they are unanswerable, because a way to respond to them will be given later in various questions.[17] Nevertheless, I hold this part as more probable: with respect to the beatitude of either the intellect or the will, God alone is the effective cause, and this is because of the nobility of that beatitude.

Three Objections and Responses

26 But one can argue against what has been said, as follows. First, every act of the will that concerns God-as-clearly-seen is a beatific act, because every such act maximally brings one to rest. However, it was conceded that the will, with its object being clearly seen, can actively enjoy God. Therefore, it can be actively related to that enjoyment, which will be beatific enjoyment.

27 Furthermore, it is more noble to act than to be acted upon [*pati*]. So, this can pertain to the will with respect to that by which the will is most perfected. But the will is most perfected by a beatific act, and therefore it ought to be actively related to that act.

28 Furthermore, reward corresponds to merit. Therefore, reward is received by the same thing, and in the same way, as merit is earned. Now the will earns merit, and it earns merit actively. Therefore, that same will will be rewarded, and it will be rewarded actively.

29 In response to the first of these objections,[18] I say that an individual who sees the divine essence can elicit an act of loving$_D$ God, but that act will not be beatific. It will also not be the act most capable of bringing that individual to rest, since another more perfect act will bring them to rest even more.

30 It might be replied that then a beatified individual would always have two acts of enjoying God, one that comes from God alone and a second one that actively comes from the individual; and the consequent seems unfitting. The inference is clear because the will of a beatified individual is obligated to love$_D$ God as much as it can and in every way that it can; therefore, if the will can be actively related to some enjoyment, it elicits that act so long as it is not impeded. But the will's act of enjoyment is not impeded by the beatific act, for since these acts are of different species and are not contraries, neither one impedes the other.

31 This can be answered by conceding the conclusion that a beatified individual has two acts concerning God (one that comes from God

[17] *Rep.* IV, q. 16 and *Rep.* II, q. 15, translated in chapters 8 and 18 of this volume, respectively.
[18] See **[26]**.

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alone and another that comes from both God and the individual) and by saying that this conclusion is not unfitting. But someone who wishes to deny this can say that the will does not elicit this act because God does not will to act together with the individual to bring about that act.

32 In response to the second objection,[19] I say that it is true that acting in general is more noble than being acted upon in general, because the most noble acting thing is more noble than the most noble thing that is acted upon. However, there are some cases where being acted upon is more noble than acting; there are some cases of this where the acting and the being acted upon concern the same thing and other cases where they concern different things. A case where they concern the same thing is clear as follows: If intellect and sense were just passive, then it would still be more noble to receive those cognitions than to cause [*agere*] them; hence the power receiving them would be more noble than the object efficiently causing them because the act of understanding would be more noble [than the object]. A case where they concern different things is clear because it is more noble to receive an act of understanding than it is to produce an instance of heat. So, I say that the nobility of the will is in no way incompatible with its just being passive with respect to the beatific act.

33 It might be objected that it follows at least that the will is imperfect. I respond that the will is not unqualifiedly perfect in such a way that it does not have any imperfection.

34 In response to the third objection,[20] I say that the argument supports the opposite position more, because merit and reward ought to be related in a way opposite to the activities of meriting and of rewarding. This is so because it belongs to the nature of merit to actively come from the one who is earning the merit, but it more belongs to the nature of reward to be passively in the one who is being rewarded, since a reward ought to actively come from the one who is rewarding. Indeed, it is accidental to reward and not part of its nature for it to actively come from the one being rewarded, insofar as a thing that came entirely from the one being rewarded would not possess the nature of reward at all. So, I say that earning merit and being rewarded are the same thing, but one will earn merit actively and will be rewarded more passively, and the reward will actively come from the one from whom merit is earned – namely, from the one who does the rewarding.

[19] See **[27]**.
[20] See **[28]**.

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Responses to the Initial Arguments

35 In response to the first initial argument,[21] I concede that enjoying is in the most noble power. When it is said that "the intellect is the most noble power," I also concede that. Similarly, the will is also the most noble power, because the power that is the intellect and the power that is the will are in no way distinct, neither distinct in reality nor distinct in reason, as will be discussed elsewhere.[22] This is because these names signify the same thing, just connoting different acts (namely, the acts of understanding and of willing).

36 However, if these powers were distinct, I would say that the power capable of willing would be more noble. Even Thomas says this (although he said the opposite in other places); e.g., in book one, distinction one, question one, he says, "The highest part possesses intellect and will. Of these, the intellect is higher with respect to order and the will is higher with respect to perfection. A similar order exists in habits and also in acts, e.g, vision and love. Enjoyment, however, names the highest operation with respect to its perfection."[23] So, in this place he – as though he were forced by the truth – says that enjoyment (which is the will's act) is more noble than the intellect's act. However, in many other places he says the opposite, following the errors of his own head.

37 In response to the second initial argument,[24] I say that one part of beatitude is in the intellect and another part is in the will. More on this elsewhere.[25]

38 In response to the confirming argument,[26] I say that natural beatitude (if there were such a thing) would be in the will just as in the intellect. By positing that happiness is in the intellect, the Philosopher does not deny that it is in the will, because happiness does not consist in just one act but in two.

[21] See **[3]**.
[22] *Rep.* II, q. 20, translated in chapter 1 of this volume.
[23] Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super Sententiis* I, d. 1, q. 1, a. 1, ad 1. The Parma edition reads that "the intellect is upper with respect to *origin*."
[24] See **[4]**.
[25] It is not clear to me what text Ockham is referring to here, but see, perhaps, *Rep.* IV, q. 15 (*OTh* VII: 318–339).
[26] See **[5]**.

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7 *Does the Will Contingently and Freely Enjoy the Ultimate End?* (Ord., *d. 1*, *q. 6*)

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TEXT[1]

1 Fifth, I ask whether the will contingently and freely enjoys the ultimate end.

2 That it does not:

3 The will is naturally inclined to will the ultimate end, just as each thing is naturally inclined to its own perfection. So it cannot do the opposite, because the opposite of what something is naturally inclined to do occurs [only] when compelled by force; but the will cannot be compelled by force. Therefore, etc.

4 For the opposing answer:

5 The will is capable of receiving acts of willing-for and willing-against concerning any object. But it is only capable of receiving that with respect to which it is active. So, the will can actively elicit either a willing-for or even a willing-against concerning any object. Therefore, it does so freely and contingently.

Scotus's View[2]

6 In response to this question, it is said that the will (i) does not necessarily enjoy the ultimate end when it is displayed in general, (ii) nor when the ultimate end is displayed in particular but obscurely, (iii) nor when the ultimate end is displayed in particular and clearly.

7 He first argues for the first claim in this way: "Natural necessity cannot coexist with freedom, because nature and will are active principles that have opposite modes of bringing about [*principiandi*], and so nature's mode of bringing about cannot coexist with the will's mode of bringing about. But the will freely wills an end, and therefore it cannot will an end with natural necessity; consequently, neither can it in any way necessarily will an end. The assumption (namely, that the will freely wills an end) is proved as follows: Since it is the same power that wills both the end and what is for the end, it has the same mode of acting, because different modes of operating imply different powers. However, it operates freely concerning those things that are for the end, therefore it also operates freely concerning the end."[3]

8 Furthermore, "according to Augustine in *Reconsiderations* I, chapter 9, 'Nothing is within the will's power as much as the will itself is,' which

[1] *OTh* I: 486–507.

[2] In what follows, Ockham directly quotes several of Scotus's arguments, but with some omissions. I have included ellipses in square brackets where Ockham has skipped a significant portion of Scotus's text. My translations of Scotus have benefited from comparison with those of Thomas Williams (see Williams 2017: 53–60).

[3] Scotus, *Ord.* I, d. 1, p. 2, q. 2, n. 80.

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is to be understood only with respect to the act elicited. […] So then, if the will's act were in the will's power mediately, by means of an act of some other power, then *a fortiori* it is within the will's power immediately. But it is within the will's power to will or not to will an end mediately, by means of an act of intellect […] since it is within the will's power to turn the intellect away from consideration of an end."[4] Therefore, etc.

"This reason is confirmed because that which is necessitated to act – 9
if it is not impeded – necessarily removes anything that prevents its action if it is able to do so. Therefore, if the unimpeded will is necessitated from its nature to will the ultimate end, it necessarily removes everything that prevents its act of willing if it can. But the non-consideration of the end prevents that willing, and the will is able to remove it by making the intellect continuously consider the end. Therefore, by necessity the will makes the intellect continuously consider the end. The major premise is clear because that which from itself is necessitated to act is prevented only by something incompatible with it that overcomes its active power. This is clear in the case of a heavy object, for it is prevented from falling because some incompatible thing overcomes the heavy object's inclination; and with equal necessity the heavy object removes that impediment if it can do so."[5]

Additionally, he initially argued for it in this second way: 10
"Everything acting from necessity acts according to the full extent of its power, because neither its action nor its mode of acting (namely, whether [acting] to a strong degree or not to a strong degree) are within its power. So then, the will from necessity would always will its end as much as it could; but we experience the opposite."[6]

Third, he argues as so: "A power that is free by participation does 11
not aim at a perfect object more than any other object; therefore, neither does a power that is free in virtue of its essence. But there is no difference between the [ultimate] end being willed and something else being willed, other than that the one object is more perfect. The antecedent is clear because sight (which is a power that is free by participation to the extent that its act is under the will's command) does not necessarily see a beautiful object more than a less beautiful object; and so it equally turns away from each one and sees each one equally contingently."[7]

[4] Scotus, *Ord.* I, d. 1, p. 2, q. 2, nn. 91–92.
[5] Scotus, *Ord.* I, d. 1, p. 2, q. 2, n. 93.
[6] This argument is present in some manuscripts of Scotus's *Ordinatio*, though he eventually deleted it and replaced it with the argument in **[11]**. See Scotus, *Ord.* I, d. 1, p. 2, q. 2, n. 133, fn. b (*Opera omnia*, ed. C. Balić *et al.*, vol. II: 88–89).
[7] Scotus, *Ord.* I, d. 1, p. 2, q. 2, n. 133.

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12 Secondly, it is said that the will does not necessarily enjoy the ultimate end in particular when it is apprehended obscurely.[8]

13 The third claim[9] (namely that even the will elevated by charity does not necessarily enjoy the ultimate end when it is seen clearly) is first argued for in this way: "When an elicitive principle does not elicit necessarily, the thing that possesses that principle does not act necessarily; and an elicitive principle that is in the same state as it was at some earlier time when it contingently elicited an act in no way elicits [that act] necessarily now. Therefore, the agent that possesses that principle also will not act necessarily. So, a will that contingently elicited an act of enjoying at one time and that possessed the same charity then that it has now therefore does not now necessarily elicit that act, since there has been no change on its part. This is clear in the case of Paul's rapture: if he had the same charity at first that he had during his rapture, and if there was no change on the part of the will or the elicitive principle, then there was no more necessity for eliciting [enjoyment] at that time than there is now," and, consequently, no more necessity of acting.[10]

14 "Alternatively, this reason is fashioned: There can only be a necessity for acting from something intrinsic in an active principle. But from the fact that in enjoyment the intellect now sees the object, nothing new is intrinsic in the active principle. Therefore, there is no new necessity for acting. The major premise is proved as follows: otherwise the necessity for acting would not come from the nature of the active principle and so it would either be from nothing or from an extrinsic principle,"[11] and consequently it would act from that. The minor premise is clear, because vision is either not the cause of the enjoyment or not the principal [cause]. But "a necessity for acting can only come from something intrinsic in a primary active principle, for a secondary principle does not give activity to a primary principle, nor does the secondary determine the primary to act. Rather, the converse is true: the primary uses the secondary and acts from itself according to its own mode; so, if nothing in the primary principle excludes contingency, the entire act will be contingent."[12]

15 "Additionally, either the end brings about [enjoyment] or else the power does. If the end does so, it is clear that there is no necessity, because that end does not necessarily bring about any created act. If the will does so (and given that the will has no difference on the part

[8] See **[6]**.
[9] See **[6]**.
[10] Scotus, *Ord.* I, d. 1, p. 2, q. 2, n. 136.
[11] Scotus, *Ord.* I, d. 1, p. 2, q. 2, n. 137.
[12] Scotus, *Ord.* I, d. 1, p. 2, q. 2, n. 137.

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of the object other than approaching it more or approaching it less), then I argue as follows: a different approaching of a patient to an agent does not cause necessity, but only causes a more intense action. (This is clear in the case of a hot thing with respect to some things that are able to be heated approaching it more or less closely.) But a difference in the object's presence (e.g., being seen vs. not being seen) seems to be just a different approaching to the will by that thing of which there ought to be an act of the will. Therefore, that does not make a difference to necessity or non-necessity, but only makes the act more intense or less intense."[13]

Objections to Scotus's Arguments

Although I believe that these conclusions should be held, still these arguments do not seem to be sufficiently conclusive. So, I will argue against them. 16

Against the first argument,[14] the force of which rests on the claim that the same power cannot have different modes of bringing about, I argue that this principle is unqualifiedly false if he means that the very same operative real thing, in reality undivided in every way, cannot have different modes of bringing about with respect to different things. It is false because according to him the divine will is necessarily the principle of spirating the Holy Spirit, and the same divine will is contingently the principle of creating creatures. And this is how he replies to someone else's view, a view that says that the very same will is a natural and necessary principle when willing the ultimate end and a contingent and free principle when willing those things that are for the end. 17

It might be objected that bringing about contingently and bringing about necessarily can pertain to the same thing with respect to different things, but bringing about naturally and bringing about freely cannot. But this is unsound; bringing about some things naturally and bringing about other things freely are no more incompatible than are bringing about some things necessarily and bringing about other things contingently. Likewise, if this is granted [namely, that the same thing can bring about both necessarily and contingently], then the conclusion follows that it is not unfitting for the will to be carried to the end necessarily and still to be carried contingently to what is for the end, so that from these different modes of bringing one cannot 18

[13] Scotus, *Ord.* I, d. 1, p. 2, q. 2, n. 138.
[14] See **[7]**.

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prove the opposite (even though, according to him, in both cases the will is carried freely).

19 Furthermore, as will be discussed later,[15] the intellect and will are in no way distinct in reality, and yet according to him the intellect causes an act of understanding necessarily and the will causes an act of willing contingently and freely.

20 Furthermore, not only can the very same principle be a cause of things that are of different species in such a way that it can be a natural cause of some things and a free cause of other things, but it seems that it can be both a natural cause and a free cause of distinct things of the same species. For, according to that professor, the will freely and contingently causes love_D of itself in itself, and the same will naturally and necessarily causes love_D of itself in another will. The assumption is clear as follows: According to that professor, an object is a partial cause of both an act of understanding and an act of willing. But [the former will that is] the object, which is distinct from the will that is moved, does not cause the latter will's act freely and contingently, because then the act of the latter will would be within the former will's power, and consequently the former will could prevent the latter will from loving_D it according to the former's own pleasure, which is obviously false. Therefore, [the love in the latter will] is caused necessarily by the [former will].

21 It might be objected that a will does not immediately cause an act of willing in another will, but only does so mediately, by means of an act of cognizing. But this answer is not sufficient, because it does not seem to be this professor's intention that an act of understanding is, properly speaking, an effective cause of an act of willing. Nevertheless, something other than the will is a partial active cause of the act of willing; therefore, that partial cause will be an object of that act. Similarly, granting this, at the very least the conclusion follows that the will is a contingent and free cause of an act of loving_D itself and also that the same will is a natural and necessary cause of something, whether that something be an act of willing in another will, or an act of understanding, or an intelligible species (if such a thing is required prior to an understanding and an act of will). Whichever of these is granted, the conclusion follows that the same thing can be a natural principle with respect to one thing and a free principle with respect to another.

22 It might be objected that an object is not an effective cause, per se and properly speaking, but only according to some special mode of causing. But this response is contrary to the principles of that

[15] *Rep.* II, q. 20, translated in chapter 1 of this volume.

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professor, who argues that an object is a partial cause of an act of understanding on the basis that an act of understanding cannot be posited without an object. So, he seems to posit that an object is a cause, properly speaking. Similarly, one could just as easily posit that heat does not effectively cause, properly speaking, but only according to some special mode of causing.

Furthermore, his second argument[16] is inconclusive, because [opponents] would easily reply that blessed Augustine meant this about the act of the will that concerns those things that are for an end, not about the act of the will that concerns the end itself. 23

Furthermore, the confirming argument[17] does not seem to be conclusive, since it is not unfitting that something be within the will's power mediately by means of some act and still not be immediately within its power (so that if that other thing is posited, the will will necessarily aim at the act). The assumption is clear as follows: When the will is aiming at some antecedent thing, it necessarily aims at the consequent that is known to be the consequent. So then, while the prior act of willing persists (together with a prior act of intellect)[18] the will is necessitated to a second act of willing, and it cannot fail to elicit the second unless the first willing is destroyed. This is how others would say that while the understanding of the end persists, the will is necessitated to will the end, so that it cannot fail to will the end unless the understanding of the end is destroyed.[19] 24

It might be objected that, although the one act of willing necessarily follows when the other act of willing exists, nevertheless this is not possible in the case of an act of understanding. This is so because the ordering of a willing to an understanding (or the ordering of an understanding to a willing) is not similar in kind to the ordering of one willing to another willing. 25

On the contrary, this objection is insufficient. For the will can be disposed in such a way that it has some act within its power (that is, with no variation occurring prior to the act, the will can freely elicit or not elicit that act) and just with the arrival of an act of understanding the will would necessarily elicit that act, so that now the will does not have the act within its power in that way – that is, it is no longer the case that the will can freely elicit or not elicit the act with all the previous things persisting in their same disposition. Therefore, it is not unfitting that some act be within the will's power mediately, by means of an act of the intellect, and yet when an act of the intellect is posited

[16] See **[8]**.
[17] See **[9]**.
[18] This parenthetical is a later addition by Ockham.
[19] E.g., Thomas Aquinas, *ST* Ia–IIae, q. 10, a. 2.

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to exist together with the other dispositions that act of the will is no longer unqualifiedly within the will's power.

This assumption is clear as follows: Suppose that someone efficaciously wills their own health but does not know whether or not some bitter medicine is necessarily required in order to acquire health; in that case, they can freely will to take the bitter medicine and can freely not will that. However, should they come to believe that there is no way they can acquire health without the bitter medicine, then while that belief and the earlier efficacious willing for health both persist, an act of willing for the bitter medicine will follow necessarily, just as necessarily as heat in a piece of wood follows upon the presence of fire.

26 From this it is clear that the principle "that which is necessitated to act, if it is not impeded, necessarily removes anything that prevents its action if it can do so" is not universally true, because (as has been shown) when the will has an efficacious willing for health and also has a sure dictate that health cannot be obtained in any way without the bitter medicine, it is necessitated to will-for the bitter medicine in such a way that while those things persist it is not able to not will-for the bitter medicine. Nevertheless, it is not necessitated to remove everything preventing it, because a willing-against of health is something that prevents that willing-for, and yet the will is freely able to remove that act of willing-against or to not remove it. So, I say that the principle is true with respect to total causes – the kind of total cause that a creature can be[20] – so that if some creature is necessitated to act (with every other creature set aside), that creature removes anything that prevents it if it can do so. But the principle is not true with respect to partial causes, when one creature concurs with another in order to cause something; although sometimes the sentence is true [in such cases].

27 From this, the response is clear to the argument for that principle, when he accepts that "that which from itself is necessitated to act is prevented only by something incompatible with it that overcomes its active power."[21] This principle is true only with respect to total causes, when one creature suffices without any other, as is clear from his example of the heavy object. And so, just as one partial cause is impeded merely by the non-assistance of another partial cause, so sometimes one partial cause causes necessarily with another partial

[20] Strictly speaking, God's concurrence is part of every total cause, because no created cause brings about its effect unless God concurs with that cause. So, the aside here is Ockham indicating that for present purposes he is using total cause to mean the rest of the total cause apart from God's concurrence.

[21] See **[9]**.

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cause assisting it (yet it does so with conditional necessity, namely it causes necessarily so long as it does not will to destroy the other concurring cause)[22] and sometimes when that second partial cause is removed the first partial cause causes contingently.

From this it is clear that not only can the same thing have different 28
modes of causing with respect to different things, but the same thing can have different modes of causing with respect to the same thing at different times or when differently disposed. For example, the will contingently wants the bitter medicine when it lacks an efficacious willing for health or when it lacks a firm belief by which it believes that it cannot acquire health without the bitter medicine. However, when an efficacious willing for health and the intellect's firm belief that health cannot be acquired in any other way are both posited, then the will does not will-for the bitter medicine in an unqualifiedly contingent way. Instead, it wills-for the medicine necessarily, with a kind of necessity such that it is not able to not will-for the medicine unless it wills to destroy either the efficacious willing for health or that belief of the intellect.[23]

But he could object against what has been said, in the same way he 29
objects against others:[24] It is impossible for one extreme to relate [*respicere*] to another extreme with any necessity whatsoever unless such necessity relates to whatever is necessarily required [as an intermediary] between those extremes; for otherwise, something necessary would depend necessarily on something that is not necessary. Therefore, with whatever necessity the will aims at the bitter medicine, it will aim at the willing of health with that same necessity. This is so because the will does not aim at the bitter medicine without that willing for health.

Furthermore, whatever necessarily rests in something present to it 30
necessarily holds onto that thing present to it if it has it and if it can do so. So, if the will necessarily aims at the bitter medicine and, as it were, rests in it, then it necessarily holds onto it if it can. But it does not do this without an act of willing for health; therefore, the will necessarily aims at the willing for health.

In response to the first of these objections,[25] I say that the foregoing 31
claim[26] is true only when one extreme is the cause of each of the other two things – both the other extreme and the required intermediary –

[22] This parenthetical is a later addition by Ockham. For an example of what Ockham has in mind here, see the final sentence of **[28]**.
[23] The final two sentences (beginning with "However") are a later addition by Ockham.
[24] Scotus, *Ord.* I, d. 2, p. 2, q. 2, n. 95.
[25] See **[29]**.
[26] Namely, Scotus's claim in **[29]**.

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and the one extreme is related to the other by an absolute necessity so that the former cannot be posited naturally unless the latter is also posited. But when the one extreme is not the cause of each of the other two things, then it is not an extreme, properly speaking, and so the required thing is then not an intermediary between the extremes. Or else if the one extreme is the cause of each of the other two things but if it can be posited unqualifiedly and on an entirely natural basis without the other extreme, then his claim does not need [to be true].[27]

This [second possibility] is how it is in the case at hand, where the will is the cause both of the willing for health and of the willing for the bitter medicine, but on an entirely natural basis the one can occur without the other. When it is said that then "something necessary would depend necessarily on something that is not necessary," I reply that something unqualifiedly necessary cannot depend on something that is not necessary; but no creature is necessary in this way, nor does any effect necessarily depend in this way on any cause whatsoever. Still, it is not unfitting for some effect to be necessarily elicited from a cause in such a way that at that time the effect is not unqualifiedly within the cause's power, except mediately by means of some other thing that is not necessary, namely, by means of something that is within its power.

32 In response to the second objection[28] I reply that when something necessarily aims at or rests in another, the former necessarily holds itself in the latter if it can, so long as no other creature that is within the former thing's power concurs with it; but when another creature that is within its power concurs with it, then the former thing need not do so.

33 From what has been said, others would respond to his next argument[29] by conceding that the will would always equally want the end as long as the equal consideration of the end exists (e.g., the bitter medicine will be equally wanted while the equal willing for health exists, so long as the firm belief remains equal). Hence the principle "everything acting from necessity acts according to its utmost power"

[27] This is not the clearest of discussions. Scotus's claim in **[29]** was that if Z is necessitated by X by means of some intermediary Y, then Z is necessitated by X only to the extent that Y is necessitated by X. (E.g., if a willing for medicine is necessitated by the will by means of an intermediary willing for health, then the willing for medicine is necessitated only to the extent that the willing for health is necessitated.) Ockham's reply here is to say that Scotus's claim is true only when X causes both Y and Z and absolutely necessitates Z; Scotus's claim is false, according to Ockham, if: (1) X is not a cause of Y and Z, or (2) if X causes Y and Z but does not absolutely necessitate Z (i.e., that X can exist without Z).

[28] See **[30]**.

[29] See **[10]**.

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is true with respect to a cause acting necessarily with everything else set aside, and it is also true with respect to a cause acting necessarily when nothing that is within its power is concurring with it, but the principle is not true of a cause acting necessarily when something that is within its power concurs with it.

They would easily answer his next argument[30] by saying that the 34
cases are not similar, because a power that is free by participation relates to all its objects equally with respect to indifference and contingency. For if it did not, then it would not only be free by participation, but with respect to some object it would be free by its essence. However, a power that is free by its essence does not relate to all its objects equally with respect to indifference and contingency; rather, it relates to some of its objects contingently and to others necessarily.

From what has been said it is clear that the arguments that were 35
given for the third part of his view are not sufficiently conclusive.[31] This is so because it could be said that the vision of the divine essence is a partial cause of enjoyment, so that the will necessarily elicits enjoyment when the vision is posited and only contingently elicits it when there is no vision. So, with respect to the first argument[32] it would be replied that something that has the same elicitive principle always elicits in the same way, unless some other elicitive thing concurs with it at one time and not at another. But if some other elicitive principle concurs with it, then the former principle need not always elicit in the same way. E.g., the will necessarily elicits an act of wanting the bitter medicine when an efficacious willing for health and a firm belief that health cannot be acquired without the bitter medicine are both concurring with the will. But if they are not concurring with it, then the will does not necessarily elicit the act.[33]

The next argument[34] is answered in the same way: a necessity for 36
acting in one active principle can be due to another active principle that is concurring with the former principle.

It might be objected that one active principle does not bestow a 37
mode of acting on another principle, just as it does not bestow activity on it; so then, the same active principle with respect to the same thing will always have the same mode of acting. I reply that, just as one partial cause does not bestow activity on another partial cause (as if the

[30] See **[11]**.
[31] Namely, the arguments of **[13–15]**, which were intended to prove the third clause of the claim in **[6]**.
[32] See **[13]**.
[33] The final sentence here is a later addition by Ockham.
[34] See **[14]**.

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one receives something from the other), and yet it is still the case that without the former the latter cannot act, so likewise sometimes one partial cause does not bestow a mode of acting on the other cause (as if the one receives something from the other), but it is still the case that the latter cause can act together with the former cause in one mode but can act without the former cause in a different mode. No cause can be found for this other than that the natures of those partial causes are the way they are.

But how do we know that their natures are the way they are? From experience; for we experience that prior to the efficacious willing for health we are able to freely and contingently want the bitter medicine or not want it, but we are not able to do so when this willing coexists with the firm belief that health cannot be acquired in any other way.

Nevertheless, if it were conceded that the same active principle always had the same mode of acting with respect to effects of the same species, the aforementioned arguments would still not be conclusive, because since it is obvious from experience that sometimes an act of the will necessarily and naturally follows from some act of the intellect together with some act of the will, it would need to be said in that case that the act is sufficiently caused by those preceding acts without any activity of the will. So, there would not be in that case a new necessity of acting in an active principle that previously acted contingently; instead, the new necessity of acting would be in a new active principle, one that is a sufficient cause for positing the effect without any activity of the preceding principle that acts contingently.

38 From what has been said one could reply to the final argument[35] as follows (although this does not comport with the views of those against whom he was arguing): This sort of different presence of a cognized object (such as a thing's being seen vs. not being seen) is not only a different approaching, but is instead the presence of one partial cause. The will is apt to act necessarily with that partial cause; without it the will is apt to either act contingently or not act at all. Or else this different presence is the presence of one cause that is a sufficient cause without any activity of the will, just as I believe that, according to the truth, one should posit the other aforementioned view about how the act of willing for the bitter medicine relates to the willing for health and the firm belief that health cannot be had without the bitter medicine.

[35] See **[15]**.

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Ockham's View

In response to the question, I will first set forth some distinctions and 39
then I will set out some conclusions.

The first distinction concerns contingency. 'Enjoying something 40
contingently' can be taken in two senses (for now), as can 'producing something contingently.' It can be taken in one sense for a thing that unqualifiedly can enjoy and not enjoy, or unqualifiedly can produce and not produce. In this sense, anything that produces any effect produces it contingently, because God can make that thing not produce that effect. In another sense it is taken for a thing that produces some effect and that without any change on its part or on the part of anything else that thing has it within its power to not produce as well as to produce, so that from the thing's nature it is determined neither to produce nor to not produce. The same thing should also be said about enjoying contingently, and this question is to be understood in this second sense.

The second distinction concerns enjoying freely. In one sense, free- 41
dom is distinguished from coercion; this sense is the most improper sense, because in this sense freedom can pertain to the intellect. In another way, freedom is opposed to the enslavement of a rational creature, either the enslavement of sin [*culpae*] or the enslavement of penalty [*poenae*]. In this way, the beatified are freer than those in this present life, because they have been freed more from the enslavement of sin and penalty.

In a third sense, freedom is opposed to necessity (specifically, to the necessity that is opposed to contingency when 'contingency' is taken in the second sense mentioned in the previous distinction); taken in this sense, freedom is a sort of indifference and contingency and it is contrasted with a natural active principle. It is in this sense that the philosophers use 'freedom' and 'will'; and it is in this sense that active principles are distinguished in *Physics* II and *Metaphysics* IX.[36]

That the philosophers use 'freedom' in this third sense is also clear from what John of Damascus argues, namely that non-human animals do not have free choice because instead of acting they are instead acted upon. For either (i) he means that non-human animals are acted on according to their substances; but this is irrelevant to his claim, because in that sense humans and angels would then not have free choice since they are acted upon in that way. Or else (ii) he means this about their acts, and then that "they are acted upon" is either (iia) because their acts come from something external, rather than from

[36] Aristotle, *Physics* II.5 (196b10–25); *Metaphysics* IX.5 (1048a1–10).

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within; but this does not establish his claim, because it could be supposed that a sensitive appetite effectively causes its own acts in itself, just as can be supposed of the intellect, of a heavy object, or of any other thing that moves itself. Or else (iib) he means that they do not have free choice because they are acted upon, which is to say that they do not have acts within their power, nor do they have lordship [*dominium*] over their acts. This does establish his claim, namely, that those things that have free choice have lordship and power over their own acts. But this cannot be the case without indifference and contingency; therefore, etc.

42 The third distinction is that, just as according to Anselm[37] there is an inclination for self-advantage [*affectio commodi*] and an inclination for what is right [*affectio justi*], so there is also a sort of aversion to disadvantage [*nolle incommodi*] and a sort of aversion to what is wrong [*nolle injusti*]. This is true when willing-for and willing-against [*nolle*] are elicited according to a dictate of reason.

43 The fourth distinction is that, just as there is a kind of willing-for with respect to non-sentential items [*incomplexi*] (and this is called 'love_A,' properly speaking) and also a kind of willing-for with respect to sentences [*complexi*] (taking 'sentence' broadly), such as willing that one has beatitude, or willing that one does not exist or something of the sort, so there is also a kind of willing-against with respect to non-sentential items that can be called 'hatred' or 'detestation' and a kind of willing-against with respect to sentences, such as willing-against one's existing, or willing-against one's having wealth or having honors – but this does not mean that one hates wealth or honors, unless 'hating' is taken in a broad sense.

44 So then, the first conclusion will be this, that the will contingently and freely (in the sense discussed) enjoys the ultimate end when it is displayed in general, i.e., it is able to love_D beatitude and able to not love_D beatitude, and it is able to want beatitude for itself and able to not want it.

45 This conclusion is persuasively argued for, first in this way: Whatever the intellect can dictate should be willed-against can be willed-against by the will. But the intellect can believe that no beatitude is possible, since it can believe that the state that we in fact see is the only state possible for it. Thus, it can will-against anything that is incompatible with the state that we see (and, consequently, it can will-against beatitude[38]). The major premise is obvious, because although the will is not necessarily conformed to the judgment of reason (as will

[37] Anselm, *On the Fall of the Devil*, 12–14.
[38] This parenthetical is a later addition by Ockham.

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be discussed elsewhere[39]), nevertheless it can be conformed to the judgment of reason, whether that judgment is right or erroneous.

This argument is confirmed, because the will can will-against anything in which it believes it cannot come to rest; but it can believe that it cannot come to rest in anything that is possible for it. Therefore, it can will-against everything that is possible for it, and it is obvious that it can also will-against everything that is impossible for it. So then, it can will-against anything. 46

Furthermore, anyone who can efficaciously will-for some antecedent can will-for what is believed to be or known to be the consequence [of that antecedent]. But someone can efficaciously will that they not exist, and it can be evidently known that not-being-beatified is a consequence of not-existing. So, they can will that they not be beatified, and consequently they can will-against beatitude. The assumption is clear, since many who have the use of reason (both from among the faithful who believe in a future life as well as infidels who do not believe in a future life) have killed themselves or abandoned themselves to death; thus they willed that they not exist. 47

This argument is confirmed, because even some faithful who believed that they could achieve beatitude if they did not sin still chose to sin while knowing or believing that because of such sin they would have eternal penalty. This would not be the case unless they had a willing-against concerning beatitude, not only in general but also in particular. 48

The second conclusion is that someone can will-against beatitude in particular. This can be argued for by means of the preceding arguments. 49

The third conclusion is that someone can will-against beatitude in particular, a beatitude that is believed to be possible, so that someone can will-against having beatitude. One can persuasively argue for this conclusion as follows: Anything that can be dictated by right reason can fall under an act of the will; but right reason can dictate that this individual will always lack beatitude. Therefore, one can will-for [that individual] to always lack beatitude, and so one can will-against it for oneself. 50

This is confirmed, because someone who is damned with both the penalty of pain [*poena sensus*] and the penalty of separation [*poena damni*] could – if left to themselves – conform themselves in their willing to the divine will (both as it is known and as it is believed). Now the divine will wills for this individual to always lack beatitude. So, this 51

[39] *Rep.* IV, q. 16, nn. 37–70 and *Var. Ques.*, q. 8, nn. 59–65, translated in chapters 8 and 17 of this volume, respectively.

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can be willed by the damned will; consequently, by the same reason it can be willed by the will of someone in the present life.

52 Furthermore, anyone who efficaciously wills something wills everything that is such that they believe they cannot acquire what they have willed without it. And some faithful individual believes that they cannot in any way acquire beatitude without a good life, and yet that individual does not will to live a good and holy life. Therefore, that individual does not efficaciously will beatitude; consequently, by the same reason that individual is able to not will it at all.

53 The fourth conclusion is that someone seeing the divine essence and lacking beatific enjoyment can will-against that enjoyment. This is argued for on the basis that (as was said earlier) every will can be conformed to the divine will in what it wills; but God can will that an individual always lacks beatific enjoyment. Therefore, etc.

54 Furthermore, anything that can be willed-for or willed-against at one time can be willed-for or willed-against at all times, and a will can will-against having beatitude for some set time (e.g., for as long as God wills for it to not have beatific enjoyment). Therefore, it can will-against it unqualifiedly.

55 The fifth conclusion is that someone seeing the divine essence and lacking love_D for God by the divine absolute power (this will be made clear in the fourth book[40]) can will-against God. This is proved (or at least persuasively argued for) as follows: Every disadvantageous thing can be the object of a willing-against (whether it is truly disadvantageous or only reckoned to be so), just as every advantageous thing (whether truly advantageous or only reckoned to be so) can be the object of a willing-for. But God can be disadvantageous to this individual, or at least can be reckoned to be so. Therefore, God can be the object of a willing-against. The assumption is clear since someone could be punished by God by both the penalty of separation and the penalty of pain.

56 This argument is confirmed as follows: Christ, regardless of the fact that he was beatified, was punished and sustained bodily penalties. But every punishment or affliction can be disadvantageous to the one receiving it, whether truly disadvantageous or only reckoned to be so. So then, God can possess the nature of the disadvantageous (truly or reckoned) with respect to such an individual.

57 There are many worries contrary to what has been said; these will be made clear in the fourth book, in the material on beatitude, and so I pass by them for now.[41]

[40] *Rep.* IV, q. 16, nn. 44–47, translated in chapter 8 of this volume.
[41] *Rep.* IV, q. 16, translated in chapter 8 of this volume.

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From what has been said, one can respond to the main question as 58
follows: 'The ultimate end' can be taken in two senses, either for the created beatitude that is possible for a will, or else for the object of that beatitude. In the first sense, it is not permissible for a will to enjoy the ultimate end (speaking properly of enjoyment). Nevertheless, it can contingently and freely enjoy it, because it is both able to not enjoy it (precisely because it is not permissible to enjoy it in this sense) and also able to enjoy it (because if a will is able to enjoy some lesser created good, how much more is it able to enjoy the foremost created good possible for it). But if enjoyment is taken broadly for any act of wanting, then I say that the will can unconditionally will-for, will-against, or not will the ultimate end (whether displayed in general or in particular, whether in this life or in the next life). It is in this sense that the preceding conclusions were posited.

And speaking of the ultimate end in the second sense, I say that in this life the ultimate end can be the object of both willing-for and willing-against. If the ultimate end is displayed clearly and uncovered, and if God were to suspend the activity of the will with respect to willing-for, then it can be the object of willing-against. But if God did not suspend the activity of the will and were to leave it to its own nature, then what would happen is more dubious. This will be discussed in the fourth book.[42]

Response to the Initial Argument

To the initial argument,[43] I respond that the will is not naturally 59
inclined to the ultimate end, not unless we take "according to natural inclination" to mean whatever happens according to the ordinary course of things; but it is not true of that sort of inclination that anything that occurs contrary to that inclination is compelled by force. Also, when it is said that "each thing is inclined to its very own perfection," this should be denied when taking 'inclination' strictly, except in the case where a perfectible thing is a natural active thing. But the will is not a thing of this sort.[44]

[42] *Rep.* IV, q. 16, translated in chapter 8 of this volume.
[43] See **[3]**.
[44] The final sentence is a later addition by Ockham.

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*8 Does a Beatified Will Necessarily Enjoy God? (*Rep. *IV, q. 16)*

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Responses to **W1** [58], **W3** [59–63], and **W2** [64]
Response to **W4** [65], a rejoinder [66], and response [67–70]
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Response to the Initial Arguments [77]

TEXT[1]

That it does not: 1

This is argued for on the basis that the same power has the same mode of acting concerning all of its objects, the will is the same power in this life and in the next life, and in this life it does not necessarily enjoy God. Therefore, neither does it do so in the next life. 2

Furthermore, "a rational power has power over opposites."[2] The will is a power of this sort. So, it can engage in enjoyment and in its opposite, and therefore it does not enjoy necessarily. 3

For the opposite: 4

If a beatified will does not enjoy God necessarily, then it could sin; for it would be able to enjoy God but it would also be able to not enjoy God when it is obligated to enjoy him. Therefore, etc. 5

With respect to this question we should proceed as follows: First, it should be seen what enjoyment is and what it concerns; second, whether natural reason could prove that enjoyment is possible for our nature; third, whether enjoyment is elicited from the will necessarily or else contingently, so that it is within the will's power; and fourth, some worries will be raised. 6

[1] *OTh* VII: 340–361. It should be noted that one medieval manuscript ascribes this question to Ockham's disciple, Adam Wodeham, and that this question is rather unusual in that it explicitly references Ockham's *Ordinatio* (see **[21, 37, 54, 76]**), a work that is generally dated after the lectures that compose the *Reportatio*. The edition argues persuasively that this question should nevertheless be taken to be authentic, largely on the basis that (i) Ockham promises throughout the *Ordinatio* and *Reportatio* that he will address the topic of this question, (ii) the doctrines presented here are continuous with the views Ockham presents elsewhere but at odds with what Wodeham says in his own works, and, most tellingly, (iii) the papal commission at Avignon that investigated Ockham's works for heresy included material from this question in their report.

[2] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IX.2 (1046b4–6).

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Whether Enjoyment Is Pleasure

7 Regarding the first point,[3] because there seems to be a conformity[4] between love_D (that is, enjoyment) and pleasure, there is a difficulty whether they are the same or are really distinct.

8 There are some[5] who say that enjoyment is nothing other than a kind of pleasure, in such a way that this view posits that enjoyment and pleasure are really the same and are not distinct. This is argued for on the basis that when an end is apprehended by an act of the intellect, the will has no act other than an act of pleasure; therefore, etc.

9 Furthermore, it seems that similar things hold of a sensitive appetite and of the intellective appetite. But after a sensitive appetite has an act of desiring some pleasurable thing, when that thing is presented to the appetite, the appetite has no act except pleasure. Therefore, neither does the intellectual appetite.

10 Furthermore, an appetite is related to a pleasurable object in the same way a heavy thing is related to the center [of the earth]. But a heavy thing in the center has no act other than rest alone. Therefore, in the same way, when a pleasurable thing is present to an appetite, that appetite has only pleasure.

11 Furthermore, if enjoyment and pleasure were distinct then there could be enjoyment without pleasure, which seems absurd.

12 Furthermore, if enjoyment and pleasure were really distinct, then I ask what would be the subject of that pleasure? The pleasure would either be in the act of enjoyment or in the will. But it would not be in the act of enjoyment, because then there could be enjoyment that coexists with distress since the subject is in neutral potency to each of these contraries.[6] Nor would the pleasure be in the will, for whatever is jointly possible with one contrary in a subject is jointly possible with the other contrary in the same subject. Consequently, pleasure would be jointly possible with an act of hating in the will, and enjoyment would be jointly possible with distress. But both of these seem to be false.

13 Against this view:

[3] See **[6]**.

[4] The "conformity" here is linguistic as well as conceptual: the Latin terms for love and pleasure are *dilectio* and *delectatio*.

[5] According to Peter Auriol, this was the view of Peter Auvergne. See Auriol's *Scriptum super Primum Sententiarum*, d. 1, q. 7. A brief discussion of Auvergne's view can be found in Flüeler 2015: 391–414.

[6] The claim here is that pleasure and distress are contraries, and so if the act of enjoyment is the subject of pleasure, then that act of enjoyment can also be the subject of distress. (For more on the relation between pleasure and distress, see *Var. Ques.*, q. 6, a. 9, translated in chapter 2 of this volume.)

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Friendship-love$_A$ is more perfect than desire-love$_A$. But desire-love$_A$ 14
concerning the beatified will remain in the next life. So friendship-love$_A$ concerning God will also remain.

Furthermore, hatred and distress are not the same thing; therefore, 15
love$_A$ and pleasure are not the same. The assumption is clear because when I will-against something – e.g., I will-against this individual sinning – then if he does not sin, I will be pleased in my willing-against. But if what comes about does not accord with what I willed-against, then I will be distressed in my willing-against. Consequently, both pleasure and distress are consistent with an act of willing-against. So, consequently, hatred and distress are not the same thing, because they can be separated. Similarly, pleasure is consistent with an act of loving$_A$ (e.g., when I will-for something and things turn out just as I willed), but when the opposite comes about, then there is distress with the act of willing-for, without there being any new act of willing-for. Therefore, pleasure and love$_D$ are distinct in the same way, because they can be separated.

Furthermore, pleasure is consistent with both desire-love$_A$ and 16
friendship-love$_A$, but desire-love$_A$ and friendship-love$_A$ concerning the same object cannot coexist at one time. Therefore, pleasure is not the same as either of them.

Furthermore, love$_D$ and pleasure are no more inconsistent with 17
each other when an object is present than desire and pleasure are inconsistent when an object is absent. But pleasure coexists with an act of desiring in the absence of an object. Therefore, etc.

So, I say that love$_D$ and pleasure are really distinct, but I do not say 18
this on account of the reason that others have put forward – namely, that an act of willing-for is related to pleasure in the same way that an act of willing-against is related to distress.[7] For an act of willing-against can exist without distress, as is clear in the case of the beatified, who will-against humans sinning and yet are not distressed; and for this reason, those who would posit the aforementioned identity between love$_D$ and pleasure would say that pleasure is not identical with every act of loving$_D$. Rather, they are the same only when something that is loved$_D$ turns out just as the individual wills-for and loves$_D$ it, for in every such case pleasure will follow and [the love] is the same thing as the pleasure. But when the opposite of what is willed-for comes about, then they are not the same, because in that case distress follows.

Similarly, they would say that distress is identical with an act of willing-against when what occurs does not accord with what was

[7] Scotus, *Additiones magnae* I, d. 1, q. 3, n. 3.

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willed-against, because in every such case there is distress; but when what occurs does so accord, then there is pleasure. So, they would also say that if the angels and the beatified were to will-against something happening and what comes about does not accord with their willing-against, then they would be distressed. Consequently, if they were to will-against humans sinning and the humans were to sin, then they would be distressed.

19 Or else it can be said that: (i) the good angels will-against humans sinning, (ii) nevertheless, frequently what occurs does not accord with what they willed-against without their being distressed, and (iii) this happens miraculously because God suspends the activity of the act of willing-against so that distress is not produced in the good angel. Similarly, a bad angel wills-for humans to sin, and what is willed often follows (i.e., when humans sin) without any pleasure; this is so due to a miracle, because God suspends the activity of that act of willing-for so that the pleasure is not produced.

20 Alternatively, it can be said that surpassing pleasure excludes every distress and surpassing distress excludes every pleasure. So, since an angel has surpassing pleasure, even when the opposite of what it has willed occurs it does not become distressed. Similarly, a bad angel has surpassing distress, and so it is not pleased even when what it has willed comes about. This seems to be the most powerful reason for arguing for a distinction between pleasure/distress and the act of willing-against/willing-for – namely, that they can be separated, as is clear in the case of a good angel and a bad angel. The first response is better, though.[8]

21 So, I posit a distinction between them, because they can be separated. This is clear in the case of a bad angel who loves_{D} itself very intensely and still takes no pleasure from it. Look for it somewhere in Ockham's *Ordinatio*.[9]

Whether Natural Reason Can Prove That Enjoyment Is Possible

22 With respect to the second point,[10] it has seemed to some that it can be demonstrated that enjoyment is possible for our nature.[11]

[8] Presumably, what Ockham means here is that the response of **[18]** is a better response to Scotus on behalf of Auvergne than the responses of **[19–20]**, as the latter two responses do imply a distinction between pleasure and enjoyment.

[9] *Ord.*, d. 1, q. 3 (*OTh* I: 403–428), especially pp. 407–413. See also *Var. Ques.*, q. 6, a. 9, nn. 28–35, translated in chapter 2 of this volume.

[10] See **[6]**.

[11] What follow are abbreviated versions of arguments that Scotus argues against. See Scotus, *Ord.* I, Prol., p. 1, q. un., nn. 13–27.

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First, because cognition of an end is necessary for everything acting for the sake of an end. 23

Second, because a cognitive power can cognize its own capability to be ordered [*ordinabilitas*] to an end. 24

Third, because a power that has something common for its object does not come to rest except in the most perfect thing contained under its object. 25

Fourth, because a power that relates to many objects does not come to rest in anything other than that which virtually includes all those objects. 26

Fifth, because a human can naturally cognize that being is its natural object; therefore, etc. 27

Look for these arguments in John, in the first question of his *Ordinatio*. 28

These arguments are inconclusive, so I will respond to each of them. 29

In response to the first,[12] I say, regarding the major premise, that when an end does not follow naturally from those things which are for the end, but rather the end is only freely bestowed by the mere will of someone who accepts such things as being ordered to the end, then a cognition of the end is not necessary. And so it is in the case at hand. But when the end follows by natural necessity, then a cognition of it is necessary, either in the one who is acting or in the one who is directing the one who is acting. Regarding the minor premise, I say that although beatitude is our end, nevertheless we cannot naturally cognize that it is our end. This is so because enjoyment is our end by means of a clear and uncloaked vision of the divine essence; but we cannot naturally cognize that that vision is possible for us. 30

In response to the second,[13] I say that – as is made clear elsewhere[14] – a non-sentential cognition of one thing never leads us to a first non-sentential cognition of another thing. So, no matter how much it is cognized that some power is capable of being ordered to beatitude with respect to everything positive in it, beatitude in particular is still not cognized on account of this. 31

In response to the third and the fourth,[15] I say that it cannot be proved naturally and sufficiently that the power comes to rest in the most perfect thing contained under its object. This is so, first, because it cannot be proved that we cognize this sort of object in particular in our present state, but this is required in order for the power to come 32

[12] See **[23]**.
[13] See **[24]**.
[14] *Ord*., Prol., q. 9 (*OTh* I: 226–276), especially pp. 240–244.
[15] See **[25–26]**.

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to rest. Second, this is so because, even if it were granted that we could cognize this sort of object in particular, still it cannot be sufficiently proved that the power will come to rest in that object. This is so because it comes to rest when it has a pleasure that excludes all distress coming from every direction; but this cannot be proved of the pleasure that follows from enjoyment. This assumption [that beatific pleasure cannot be proved to exclude all distress] is proved since, no matter how much someone takes pleasure in God, still that individual can will-for and will-against many other things – e.g., they can will-for a friend to act rightly and will-against that friend sinning, and the opposites of both of these can happen. Consequently, this individual can be distressed about those occurrences, because, according to Augustine, distress concerns those things that happen contrary to our will.[16]

33 You might object that God can suspend the activity of those acts with respect to pleasure and distress, just as I said earlier.[17] This is true, but it cannot be proved naturally, because this can only be done miraculously.

34 You might object that, according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* IV[18] and also according to my own view[19], surpassing pleasure excludes all distress. I respond that, as a matter of fact, this is often the case; but even so I do not see why there could not be distress [coexisting with surpassing pleasure]. For although surpassing pleasure could exclude the distress coming forth from two or three acts and causes of distress, nevertheless it could be that so many causes concur and with such frequency that the pleasure would be unable to exclude all the distress; for instance, if one were to will-for and will-against many things whose opposites occurred.

35 Furthermore, it cannot be sufficiently proved that a power cannot come to rest except in the most perfect thing. This is so because of the following: Either you understand "it comes to rest" in such a way that it excludes all the actual distress there is in fact, or else that it excludes all possible distress.

If you mean the first, then the [rational] appetite[20] can come to rest in a finite thing. For it is clear that a sensitive appetite can take such pleasure in some sexual act such that no pain can inhere at that time. The will can then follow the sensitive appetite, setting reason aside, and, consequently, the will can thus come to rest in willing that act so

[16] Augustine, *City of God* XIV.6.
[17] See **[19]**.
[18] The edition reads "IV *Ethicorum*," but see Aristotle, *NE* VII.14 (1154b13–14).
[19] See **[20]**.
[20] Omitting *sensitivus* with manuscripts CEKL and reading an implicit *rationalis* instead, as the logic of the passage seems to demand.

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that then there is no distress in the will. Therefore, etc. Furthermore, an erring intellect can judge that this sort of act is the foremost pleasurable object, and so the will can follow the intellect. Therefore, etc.

If you mean the second, the will takes pleasure of this sort in no object – not in the most perfect object, nor in any other object – because it cannot be proved that an act of this sort could not be destroyed and distress could not be caused by some other act. Even if the first act persists, someone can will-for and will-against many things whose opposites can occur.

In response to John's fifth argument (the one about the adequate object),[21] I say that the claim that being is naturally cognized to be the natural and adequate object of our intellect can be understood in two senses. 36

In one sense, this claim can be understood to mean that 'being' is predicated as the what-it-is [*predicatur in quid*][22] of every object that can naturally be apprehended by our intellect in our present state. In this sense it is true that a human can naturally cognize being to be their natural and adequate object, because they can naturally abstract the concept of being, which is capable of being predicated as the what-it-is of everything that can naturally be apprehended by the intellect.

In another sense, that being can naturally be cognized to be the adequate object of the intellect can be understood to mean: (i) that it is naturally cognized that the concept of being is predicated as the what-it-is of everything that can naturally be apprehended by the intellect, as well as (ii) that everything that is contained under that concept (that is, everything of which the concept of being is predicated as the what-it-is) can naturally be apprehended by our intellect in our present state. In this sense, the aforementioned statement – that being is naturally cognized to be the adequate object of our intellect – is false. This is because there are many things contained under being, things of which 'being' is predicated, which nevertheless cannot be naturally apprehended in particular and in themselves by our intellect in our present state: for example, all substances (both material and immaterial), and also many accidents. But the aforementioned claim would have to be true in this latter sense for the argument[23] to be sound.

So, I say that it cannot be sufficiently proved by natural reason that the beatitude we look forward to in the next life is possible for our nature; rather, this should only be held by faith.

[21] See **[27]**.
[22] X is predicated *in quid* of Y iff X is the name of Y's species or the name of a genus under which Y falls.
[23] Namely, the argument of **[27]**.

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Whether Enjoyment Is Elicited Necessarily or Contingently

37 With respect to the third point,[24] look for what is said about freedom, contingency, and necessity in Ockham's *Ordinatio*, book one, distinction one, and how the will enjoys God in this life and in the next life.[25]

38 But in addition to what was said there, I say first that the will in our present state can will-against the ultimate end, whether it is displayed in general or in particular. This is proved first in this way: Whatever the intellect can dictate should be willed-against can be willed-against. (This is obvious in itself.) However, the intellect can believe that there is no ultimate end and no beatitude; consequently, it can dictate that the ultimate end (or beatitude) should be willed-against.

Secondly, it is proved thus: Anyone who is able to will some antecedent can will what they believe to be a consequence of that antecedent. But someone can will that they not exist; therefore, they can will-against their own existing, and so they can will-against a beatitude that they believe is a consequence of their own existence.

39 Second, I say that even when the intellect judges that a given thing is the ultimate end, the will can still will-against this end. This is proved because a free power is one that can receive two contrary acts, and for this reason the power can engage in the one act or in the other. But the will (as a free power) can receive both a willing-against and a willing-for concerning any object whatsoever. Therefore, if the will can engage in a willing-for concerning God, by the same reason it can engage in a willing-against concerning God.

40 Additionally, a power that can deviate from what is right [*obliquabilis*] is one that is not necessarily conformed to right reason, and so if such a power can engage in the opposite of one thing that is dictated by the intellect, for the same reason it can engage in the opposite of anything that is dictated. Now a created will is a power that can deviate from what is right, and it can engage in the opposite of one thing that is dictated by the intellect here in this life, as is clear from experience. Therefore, even if the intellect were to dictate that a given thing is the ultimate end, this does not prevent the will from being able to will-against that end.

41 Furthermore, anything that a will can will-against for one individual of a species, it can will-against[26] for any other individual of that species. And the will can will-against beatitude for some individual (say, for John); therefore, it can will-against its own beatitude.

[24] See **[6]**.
[25] *Ord.*, d. 1, q. 6, nn. 39–57, translated in chapter 7 of this volume.
[26] Reading *nolle* with manuscripts EK instead of the edition's *velle*.

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Third, I say that with the good being displayed in general (such as in some common concept), it is not necessary that the will will-for that good (rather, the will can will-against it), because if it believes it cannot come to rest in a thing then it does not necessarily want that thing (rather, it can will-against it). But it does not believe that it comes to rest in the good in general. Therefore, etc. 42

Furthermore, the motion of a power is the same when aiming at what is higher as when aiming at what is lower.[27] But the will does not necessarily will-for the good in particular; rather, it can will-against it. Therefore, the will also does not necessarily aim at the good in general; rather, it can will-against it. 43

Fourth, I say that the vision of the next life can exist without there being enjoyment. This is clear from the rule that any prior thing can be separated from what is posterior to it. 44

Fifth, I say that a will that has been uplifted by charity (or by any habit that does not remove the use of reason) can will-against beatitude inhering in it. This is proved because everything that can be an object of the will at some time can be its object at any time. However, beatitude can be an object of willing-against in one who is sinning mortally at the time at which that individual is sinning; therefore, it can be object of willing-against at any time in the state of this life, and so the same holds for the state of the next life. 45

Furthermore, every will can conform itself to a divine command. But God can command a created will to hate him, and so a created will can do this. 46

Furthermore, everything that can be a right action in this life can also be a right action in the next life. But hating God can be a right action in this life (e.g., if it were commanded by God); therefore, it can also be a right action in the next life. 47

Sixth, it can be said that, if someone clearly sees God and has a beatific act that has been entirely caused by God, they cannot will-against God because of a formal incompatibility between those acts of hating and loving$_D$. However, if the beatific act were not entirely caused by God, and if the will were entirely left to its own nature and to its own freedom, and if the beatific enjoyment were suspended by divine power, then the will could will-for God but that act [of willing] would not be a beatific act. This is because that act is in the will's power; consequently, if the act were a beatific act, then that 48

[27] "Higher" and "lower" here referring to a more general genus versus a more specified species.

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beatified human could freely become beatified or wretched at their own whim.

Also, if God suspended the activity of the will concerning that willing of the beatific act, then the will could will-against God. This is proved elsewhere,[28] and it can be confirmed further as follows: Every power that is naturally inclined toward some act receives a contrary act only by being forced. So, if the will were naturally inclined toward willing-for God, then it would receive an act of willing-against God only by being forced. But this is false.

49 Furthermore, if a beatified will were not able to will-against God, this would be only because the beatified intellect judges that God should be willed-for and should in no way be willed-against.[29] However, since this sort of error concerning something other than God could exist in the intellect – namely, an erring intellect can judge that something other than God should be willed-for and should in no way be willed-against – then the will would necessarily will-for what was judged and so in no way could it will-against that thing.

50 Given that,[30] for whatever reason the will must be conformed to the intellect in that act [of willing-for what the erring intellect tells it should be willed-for], then for that same reason it would have to be conformed to the intellect always, and concerning anything at all. Consequently, no act would be either meritorious or demeritorious, because no act would be within the will's power. But this is false.

51 Furthermore, the will is no more necessitated toward willing anything than it is toward willing what is impossible. But the will can will-for or will-against what is impossible. Therefore, in the same way it can will-for or will-against any other thing.

52 You might ask whether a perfectly beatified individual can will-against something that has been willed by God. I respond that they cannot, due to the incompatibility between the acts. For a perfectly beatified individual wills-for and loves_{D} God, and they will-for and love_{D} everything that is willed-for and loved_{D} by God. Therefore, if they were to will-against something that has been willed-for by God, then they would will-for and will-against the same thing at the same time, which is false.

[28] *Ord*., d. 1, q. 6, translated in chapter 7 of this volume.

[29] Reading *esse volendum et nullo modo nolendum* with manuscripts DFKZ, as opposed to the edition's *esse nolendum et nullo modo volendum*.

[30] Omitting *praeterea*. The edition describes the argument of **[49]** as "incomplete and confused." But the key to understanding **[49]** is to realize that **[50]** is the completion of that argument, not a separate argument.

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Four Worries

But there are some worries against what has been said. 53

The first worry is that it does not seem that indifference belongs to 54
the nature of freedom, as Ockham claims in *Ordinatio*, distinction one.[31] This is so because, according to Anselm[32], being able to sin is not freedom, nor is it any part of freedom, and a human being sins because they are indifferent between these acts or those acts. Therefore, etc.

The second worry is how the will can be moved contrary to the 55
judgment of reason. For according to Aristotle "every bad individual is ignorant"; also, in *Ethics* VII: "a drunkard deserves to be rebuked twice."[33]

The third worry is that then the will would move itself, which is 56
contrary to what the Philosopher says in *Physics* VII, where he says and argues that everything that is moved is moved by something else.[34] Furthermore, then it could never be proved that one must reach an unmoved mover.

Furthermore, in *Metaphysics* IX: a rational power has power over 57
opposites.[35] But the will is not a rational power; therefore, it does not have power over opposites.

Responses to These Worries

In response to the first of these worries,[36] I concede that being able to 58
sin is not freedom, nor is it a part of freedom. For if it were a part of freedom, then it would belong to anyone to whom freedom belongs. Consequently, God would be able to sin – which is false – and likewise for the beatified. So, I say that freedom and being able to sin are related as [logical] superior and inferior: anyone who can sin has freedom, but the converse is not the case.[37] The cause for this is that someone who can sin has freedom and contingency with respect to those actions in which sin consists, but neither God nor the beatified have freedom of this sort with respect to such acts; rather, they have freedom with respect to other acts in which there is no sin. For although God could cause everything that is positive in a sinful act, still God would not sin because God is not obligated to cause the

[31] *Ord.*, d. 1, q. 6, n. 41, translated in chapter 7 of this volume.
[32] Anselm, *On Free Choice*, 1.
[33] Aristotle, *NE* III.1 (1110b28) and *NE* III.5 (1113b31–32).
[34] Aristotle, *Physics* VII.1 (241b24–242a21).
[35] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IX.2 (1046b4–6).
[36] See **[54]**.
[37] A logical inferior entails but is not entailed by its superior.

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opposite in the way in which creatures are obligated. So, God would not sin if he were to cause this act or its opposite.

59 In response to the third worry[38] I say that Aristotle presumes several principles. One of them is that a thing that is indivisible and cannot be split into parts cannot be moved.[39] Another is that anything that is moved can be moved by something else that is more noble than it.[40] This principle could be proved as follows: Everything that is moved is, from itself, in essential potency; and everything that is in essential potency is reduced to act by something else. The reason for this is that everything of this sort can cause an effect from itself, with everything else set aside. But while the disposed patient and the natural agent exist, both cannot persist without the effect existing. This is clear from what Aristotle says in *Physics* VIII where he distinguishes that there are two kinds of potency in natural things just as in intellectual things. And after that, he adds, "But something similar holds concerning what is heavy and what is light; for a light thing comes from a heavy thing, just as air comes from water. Now what is in potency at first, once it is [actually] light it will immediately perform its operation unless something prevents it." And after that, he adds, "Nevertheless, here it is asked why heavy things and light things are moved into those places. The cause is that they are inherently apt to be there, and this is what it is to be heavy and light: namely, that this one is led upwards but that one is led downwards." And after that, "If the impediment is removed, it acts and goes upward."[41]

60 It might be objected that he goes on to say: "They have a principle of motion, not of moving [something] nor of doing [something], but of being acted upon." The reply to this is what he says next: "For [it is moved] either by the thing that is acting and making it be light or by the thing that is removing the impediments and hindrances."[42] So it is generally the case that when something in natural things is in potency, something moving either essentially or accidentally [*per se vel per accidens*] is required, as was said above.[43]

61 This is made clear by the Commentator in the same text: "It is said that it is characteristic of an essential potency that it does not come into act except because of an essential mover, and that it does not come to an act except when two things are gathered together, namely

[38] See **[56]**.
[39] Aristotle, *Physics* VII.1 (242a6).
[40] I take from the argument that immediately follows that Ockham takes this principle to be implicit in Aristotle's discussion in *Physics* VII.1–2 (241b24–245b2); it does not seem to be explicitly present there.
[41] Aristotle, *Physics* VIII.4 (255a30–255b21).
[42] Aristotle, *Physics* VIII.4 (255b30–256a2).
[43] *Rep.* IV, q. 15 (*OTh* VII: 318–339), pp. 334–337.

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the agent and the recipient. Contrarily, it is characteristic of an accidental potency that in order for it to engage in an act it does not need any extrinsic mover other than an accidental mover, that is, the removal of an impediment."[44]

Furthermore, later the Commentator says, "In order to engage in 62
an act, an essential potency needs an agent essentially.[45] An accidental potency does not since it is in potency only because of some impeding thing or because of some defect in the subject."[46]

And again, later he says that it does not need any other extrinsic 63
mover to engage in an act, since it is an accidental potency.[47]

In response to the second worry,[48] I say that every bad individual is 64
called ignorant, not because humans are unable to knowingly act contrary to the judgment of reason, but because a bad individual falls into many errors of ignorance that they would not rush into if the individual were good. This is because through training and experience in good acts they could acquire an awareness of many things of which they are ignorant because of their badness.

In response to the final worry,[49] properly speaking the will is a 65
rational power that has power over opposites, according to the Philosopher's meaning [of 'rational power']. For it is because of the will's freedom that it can indifferently perform one or the other of two opposite acts; if the will were only passive and were in no way active it is not apparent how its freedom could be preserved.

You might say that, according to the Philosopher in that same text, 66
in order for a rational power (in the Philosopher's sense) to perform one of two opposites and not the other, it must be that the power is determined by something. Therefore, the will does not determine itself with respect to such opposites.

I respond that there are two kinds of action that pertain to human 67
beings: exterior actions and interior actions. For the will to perform one exterior action (either mediately or immediately) rather than the opposite action (e.g., to walk or to not walk, to eat rather than to not eat), it must be determined to one of these by something other than itself, e.g., by a choice or an efficacious willing by which the will wills for the one act to exist and not the other. This is what the Philosopher means when he says that it is determined by decision and choice.

[44] Averroes, *In physicam* VIII, t. 32.
[45] Reading *essentialiter* with the Latin text of Averroes for the edition's *accidentaliter*.
[46] Averroes, *In physicam* VIII, t. 32.
[47] Averroes, *In physicam* VIII, t. 32.
[48] See **[55]**.
[49] See **[57]**.

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68 There are two kinds of interior operation. There is one sort that is immediately within the will's power (e.g., an act of willing). There is another sort (e.g., an act of understanding) that is only within the will's power by the mediation of the former act, so that the latter sort of act is not within the soul's power if the former sort of act is destroyed. So, the soul elicits the one act freely and contingently; the other it elicits naturally.

69 Speaking of the first sort of act, when everything has been posited that is sufficient and necessarily required for the act (i.e., in the case of an act of willing, that its object is cognized and that God wills to concur with the created will in causing it whenever it pleases the created will to do so), then the will can elicit or not elicit that act or its opposite, from its own freedom and without any other actual or habitual determination. So, with respect to this act, there need not be something that determines the will other than the will itself.

70 But speaking of the second sort of act (e.g., of an act of understanding one of two opposites rather than the other, when each is equally present to the intellect), then I say that in order for the soul to understand one rather than the other, it must be that the soul is determined by another act that is immediately within its power (i.e., by a willing) so that it understands the one thing and not the other. This is the meaning of the Philosopher in the aforementioned text.

Responses to the Arguments That Enjoyment Is Pleasure

71 In response to the arguments for the other view[50]:

72 In response to the first and the second arguments,[51] I say that there is no such similarity between a sensitive appetite and the rational appetite, because a sensitive appetite does not have any positive act beyond an act of desiring and its opposite (i.e., fleeing or retaliating). The rational appetite, though, has two kinds of acts of love_A with respect to an absent object: one act by which it loves_D such an object in itself and because of itself (which is friendship-love_A) and a second act by which it craves and desires this sort of object insofar as it is good for itself or for someone else. Now then, when a pleasurable object is present, the act of desiring in a sensitive appetite ceases, because that act only concerns an absent object insofar as it is absent. So then, a sensitive appetite has no act concerning this sort of [present] object; rather, it only has the pleasure that is caused by the object

[50] Namely, the view of **[7]**, that pleasure and enjoyment are identical.
[51] See **[8–9]**.

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by the mediation of the sensitive cognition, without any mediating act of the appetite.

However, when a previously desired object is present to the will (or when the object is present to someone else for whom the will desired it), then the will no longer has an act of desiring, because of this same reason; but the will does have then an act of friendship by which it loves_{D} this object in itself, because that act can exist indifferently with respect to present and absent things. Then, by the mediation of that act of friendship, pleasure is caused in the will, and perhaps that pleasure is increased by the apprehension of this object's presence. Also, after the act of desiring, that cognition can immediately cause pleasure in the will, just as is the case in a sensitive appetite.

So then, either (i) there are two kinds of pleasure in the will: one kind that follows an act of desiring when the object is present, and that kind of pleasure would be caused by the object and the apprehensive cognition (just as is the case in a sensitive appetite), and a second kind of pleasure that is caused by the act of friendship; but this seems to be superfluous. Or else (ii) there is one kind of pleasure that will be more intense [when there is an act of friendship] than[52] if the will only had an act of desiring or loving_{A}; and this seems to be true.

Hence, if the only act the will had (and could have) concerning an absent object was an act of desiring, then consequently it would have to be said that when this sort of object is present the will would only have pleasure and would have no other act. And, as a matter of fact, the will has no other act concerning an absent object other than an act of desiring. Nevertheless, it could have another act, and it does have that act when the object is present, and thus a distinction can be posited between pleasure and this kind of act.

In response to the argument about the heavy thing,[53] it is clear that there is not a similarity here, because the only act that a heavy thing naturally has is motion toward the center [of the earth] when it is outside [of the center]. So, when it is at the center it only has the rest that is the opposite of that motion. This is not so in the case at hand, however, for the aforementioned reason. 73

You might ask what the heavy thing is effectively moved by when it is outside of its place. I respond that it is moved by its heaviness, which is a quality distinct from its substance, and so if the heaviness were separated from the substance by God's power, then the heaviness would still move itself toward the center. 74

[52] Reading *quam* with manuscript Z.
[53] See **[10]**.

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75 In response to the next argument,[54] I say that enjoyment and pleasure can only be separated from each other miraculously, as is clear in the case of good angels and bad angels, as was discussed above.[55]

76 In response to the last argument,[56] it was made clear in Ockham's *Ordinatio* that the soul is the subject in which pleasure exists. Look for the response there.[57]

77 The responses to the initial arguments are clear from what has been said.

[54] See **[11]**.
[55] See **[19]**.
[56] See **[12]**.
[57] *Ord.*, d. 1, q. 3 (*OTh* I: 403–428).

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Questions about the Divine Will

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9 *Could God Make a World Better than This World?* (Ord., *d. 44, q. un., excerpts)*

TEXT[1]

Regarding the forty-fourth distinction, I ask whether God could make a better world than this world. 1

That he cannot: 2

That which does not admit of more and less cannot be made better. But a world does not admit of more and less. Therefore, one world cannot be better than another. Therefore, etc. The minor premise is clear because a world consists of substances which do not admit of more and less. 3

Furthermore, supposing that God could make a better world than this world, by that same reason he could make a world better than that world, and so on to infinity. Consequently, God could make a world be infinite, which is impossible. 4

In support of the opposite answer is what the Master says in this text.[2] 5

Ockham's Answer

Regarding this question first it must be seen (i) what is conveyed by 'world,' second, (ii) what is conveyed by 'better,' and third (iii) the answer to the question. Regarding (i), I say that 'world' is taken in two senses. Sometimes it is taken for the whole gathering of all created things, whether they are substances or accidents. Other times it is taken for a particular whole, one that is composed or aggregated from many things that are contained by one body, together with the thing containing that whole. This latter sense is itself taken in two senses, either narrowly for the parts that are substances or indifferently for all the things. In this question, 'world' should be taken narrowly for the one entirety [*universo*] that is, as it were, composed from the parts that are substances; 'world' should not be taken insofar as it includes the accidents of substances. 6

[1] *OTh* IV: 650–655, 660–661.
[2] Peter Lombard, *Sentences* I, d. 44, c. 1.

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7 Regarding (ii), I say that something can be better than something else either by essential and substantial goodness or by accidental goodness.

8 Regarding (iii), it must first be seen (iv) whether God could make a world that is better than this world according to essential (that is, substantial) goodness and that is distinct in species from this world; second, (v) whether he could make a better world that is only numerically distinct from this world; third, (vi) whether he could make a world that is better by accidental goodness.

9 Regarding (iv), what ought to be held about this is doubtful. For if one were to hold the view that God can make a substance that is more perfect than every substance that has been made, and could do so on to infinity (just as he can increase to infinity a quality that admits of more and less, so that no limit can be posited), then consequently it must be said that God can make a better world that is distinct from this one in species, because he will be able to make other individual substances that are distinct in species and that are better than those substances which he has in fact made.

10 But holding that there is a limit in such things (so that it is granted that there is some most perfect possible substance that can come from God), the issue is more doubtful. By holding that view, each part [of claim (iv)] can be held as probable, namely, that God can make another [better] world that is distinct in species from the actual world. In favor of that part, this seems to be Augustine's view, and it also seems to be the view of the Master in this book, where he says, "God was able to make a kind of human who neither would will to sin nor would be able to sin."[3] On the basis of this authoritative text I argue thus: For anything that pertains to some individual in a most specific species, something similar to that thing is not formally incompatible with any individual of that same species. Now it pertains to this human being that they can sin – which is obvious. Therefore, sinning is not incompatible with any individual of the same species. Yet God, according to Augustine, can make a human being with whom sinning is incompatible.[4] Therefore, a human being of this sort would not be of the same most specific species as that human being. Therefore, this other human would belong to some other species. Consequently, God can make an individual of another species than the species he in fact made, and consequently he can make a world of some other species, and by the same argument he can make a better world.

[3] Peter Lombard, *Sentences* I, d. 44, ch. 1.
[4] Augustine, *On the Literal Interpretation of Genesis* XI, c. 7, n. 9.

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One might contend against this argument that what it assumes is 11
false. For it pertains to this human being that they can sin and, nevertheless, being able to sin is incompatible with that human (said while pointing at Christ). But despite this fact, Christ is of the same most specific species as this human who can sin.

Similarly, human being is a most specific species. Therefore, there 12
cannot be a human being of some other species than the species of this human being who can sin.

The first of these objections is not conclusive. For although being 13
able to sin is incompatible with the divine Word, nevertheless being able to sin is not incompatible with the nature that is united to the Word; for if the human nature were to be set loose from the Word, then that nature could sin. And that nature is of the same most specific species as this human who can sin, but the nature is not of the same species as the Word who cannot sin.

The second objection is also not conclusive, for 'human being' can 14
be taken in two senses. In one sense, it can be taken for anything composed from a body and an intellectual nature; and 'human being' taken in this sense would not be a most specific species. So, if that human were made unable to sin because of their nature, they would not belong to the same most specific species as this human who can sin. 'Human being' can be taken in another sense for a thing composed from a body and the kind of intellective soul that we have; 'human being' taken in this sense is a most specific species, and that individual who was made unable to sin would not be a human being when taking 'human being' in this sense.

Also, by holding that there is a limit in individuals that are distinct 15
in species, it could be held that God could not make an individual of another species that is distinct [from all the species that have been made]. For if there is a limit in such things, then there is some fixed number of all of the most specific species that are able to be made by God. Consequently, it is difficult to prove that there are some individuals of some species that have been produced by God and that there are others that have not been produced by God; and it does not seem that any agreement could be had about this [limit] except perhaps on the basis of some authoritative text, but it is difficult to find such a text in Scripture. According to this view, God could not make another world that is distinct in species from this world.

This sort of limit could be posited in a third way, by positing that 16
there are individuals of some other species that are producible by God and that have not been produced, but that God has produced an individual of the highest species. For if it were posited that there is a highest species, it does not seem likely that God would have produced

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individuals of lower species but not an individual of this highest species.

17 Augustine seems to also support this in his book *Confessions*, when he says, "Lord, you have made two things, one that is near to you and one that is near to nothing."[5] Therefore, just as it does not seem that something could be made that is lower than prime matter (which Augustine calls "near to nothing"), so it does not seem that something could be made that is more perfect than an angel, which Augustine calls "near to God."

18 So then, it is clear that three views could be posited concerning this part of the question. But I reckon that it is probable that God could make another world, better than this one and distinct from it by species, and I especially reckon [that God could do this] with respect to some real things that are distinct by species and with respect to the number of species.

19 Regarding (v)[6] I say that God can make a world that is better than this world and that is only numerically distinct from this world. The reason for this is that there are infinitely many individuals of the same character [*ratio*] as those which now exist, which God could produce. Therefore, God can produce as many and more individuals as he has in fact produced, belonging to the same species. But he is not confined to producing them in this world. Therefore, he could produce them outside this world and make one world from these individuals, just as he has made this world from those individuals which he has now produced.[7]

***

32 Regarding (vi)[8] I say that God could make a world that is better with respect to accidental goodness. This would be so only if he were to make a world that is informed by more perfect accidents, and this is possible, since God could increase the accidents and consequently could make them more perfect, and so make the world better.

Responses to the Initial Arguments

33 To the first initial argument[9] I say that although the world does not admit of more and less in the way in which accidental qualities are susceptible to more and less, one world still can become more perfect

5 Augustine, *Confessions* XII.7.
6 See **[8]**.
7 Paragraphs **[20–31]** contain an extended discussion of objections against the possibility of multiple worlds taken from Aristotle's physics and cosmology. I have not included them here.
8 See **[8]**.
9 See **[3]**.

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than this world. It can become so by addition, just as water can become so by addition (e.g., one small body of water can become a different larger body of water, and consequently can become more perfect in that way).

To the other initial argument,[10] different people would answer it in different ways. There are some who say that there is no limit of individuals of other species: for any given thing, a better thing could come about. They would say that God could make a world better to infinity, but not that he could make an infinite world, in the same way that God can make any given body of water larger, but he cannot make it infinite. Others would say that a world could be made such that none better could be made. 34

[10] See **[4]**.

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10 Is God's Will the Immediate and First Cause of Everything that is Made? (Ord., *d. 45, q. un.*)

TEXT[1]

1 Regarding the forty-fifth distinction, I ask whether the will of God is the immediate and first cause of everything that is made.

2 That it is not:

3 Whenever two things are really the same, if one of them is a cause of something, then the other is also a cause of that same thing. But God's essence and God's will are really and unqualifiedly the same; therefore, if God's will is the immediate and first cause of everything that is made, then God's essence will be the first and immediate cause of everything that is made. But the consequent is false: God's essence is merely a natural cause of everything of which it is the cause, but God is not a natural cause of everything that is made, as was shown previously;[2] therefore, etc.

4 Furthermore, every effect can be demonstrated from its cause. But none of the things that are made can be demonstrated from the divine will, because if the divine will causes at all then it causes entirely contingently; the means of a demonstration, however, must be necessary.

5 Blessed Augustine supports the opposite answer, as does the Master in this text.[3]

6 Regarding this question, there can be two issues. One is whether the divine will is a cause of everything in some way that the divine essence and the divine intellect are not. A second is whether the divine will itself or the divine essence is unqualifiedly a cause of everything.

Scotus's View

7 Regarding the first issue, it is claimed that God's essence is not an immediate cause of any externally produced effect; rather, only God's

[1] *OTh* IV: 661–669.
[2] *Ord.*, d. 42, q. un. (*OTh* IV: 610–622).
[3] Augustine, *On the Trinity* III.4.9; Peter Lombard, *Sentences* I, d. 45, c. 4.

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will is.[4] The argument that is put forth for this is that God's essence is a natural cause of everything of which it is the cause, and God does not naturally produce anything external; therefore, God produces nothing external through his essence.

This view does not seem to be true. First, as was shown previously[5], 8
the divine essence is in no way distinct from the divine will; rather, the essence is the same as the will according to every sort of identity by which the essence is the same as the essence. Therefore, if the will is a cause, the essence will be a cause.

Furthermore, whatever can be an immediate object of some power 9
can be the immediate cause of that power's act (especially in the case of the apprehensive power and of a power that proceeds from potency to act). But in the beatific vision the divine essence is the immediate object of the intellective power, which proceeds from potency to act. Therefore, it can be an immediate cause of the intellective power's act.

Furthermore, anything that does not imply [*importat*] an imperfec- 10
tion should be attributed to God. Being able to immediately bring about an effect implies no imperfection, though, and therefore this should be immediately attributed to the divine essence.

Furthermore, the argument for this view is not sound, because 11
causing contingently is no more incompatible with the divine essence than causing or producing necessarily is incompatible with the divine will, and producing something necessarily is not incompatible with the will, as is clear according to him in the case of the divine will with respect to the Holy Spirit.[6] It is also clear in the case of a created will that naturally produces (at least as a partial cause) a cognition of itself in another [intellect], because in order to have a naturally occurring intuitive cognition the object must always concur in the manner of a cause. Thus when one angel intuitively sees the will of another angel, the second angel's will is a partial cause of the first angel's intuitive act of understanding; but that will is not a free cause because then it would be within that will's power to not be seen, which is obviously false. Therefore, it is a natural cause.

Ockham's Answer

So, regarding this issue I say that the divine essence is not the cause of 12
creatures more than the will is; nor is the converse the case. For there is no distinction at all between the divine essence and the divine will,

[4] Scotus, *Ord.* II, d. 1, q. 2, nn. 69–92 and Scotus, *Rep.* IA, dd. 39–40, qq. 1–3, nn. 31–43.
[5] *Ord.*, d. 2, qq. 1–2 (*OTh* II: 3–74) and *Ord.*, d. 10, q. 1 (*OTh* III: 317–330).
[6] Scotus holds that the production of the Holy Spirit by the divine will is necessary. See Scotus, *Ord.* I, d. 10, q. un., n. 39.

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nor between the divine will and the divine intellect, as was shown earlier. Hence, if some name were imposed that exactly signified the divine essence and nothing else, without any connotation of anything, and similarly if some other name were imposed in order to signify the divine will in the same way, those names would be unqualifiedly synonymous names; anything that would be predicated of one would be predicated in the same way of the other.

13 Regarding the second issue, it must be seen first what an immediate cause is; second, what a first cause is; and third, what to say to the issue. Concerning the first point, I say that although I will not attempt to say in general what an immediate cause is, still I say that the following is sufficient for something's being an immediate cause: something is an immediate cause when, if that absolute real thing is posited, then the effect is posited, and when the thing is not posited and all other concurring causes with respect to all similar conditions and dispositions [are held fixed], then the effect is not posited. Everything that is such with respect to something else is the cause of that latter thing (although perhaps the converse is not the case).[7]

That this suffices for something's being the cause of something else seems to be obvious; for if it did not suffice, then every route to recognizing that something is an immediate cause of something else is ruined. For if this thing's being the cause of that effect did not follow from the fact that the effect follows when this thing is posited and the effect is not posited when this thing is not posited, then there is no way in which it can be recognized that fire is the cause of the heat in the wood. This is because it can be said that there is some other cause of that heat which, nevertheless, only acts in the presence of fire.

14 Other things follow from this. One is that a universal cause that is such that its effect does not occur when it is removed is just as much of an immediate cause as a particular cause is. So, since generable and destructible things are not produced when the sun is absent (even though those things are produced by means of particular causes), it follows that the sun is an immediate cause of those things. Unless you perhaps say evasively that the sun is a cause of some other thing which is the immediate cause of those generable and destructible things; but then it always has to be the case that the sun is an immediate cause of something, namely either of the effect [i.e., the generable and destructible things] or of the cause of that effect, and this is sufficient

[7] Ockham's claim here is that, for any entities X and Y and background conditions C, if C+X entails Y and C+~X entails ~Y, then X is a cause of Y. The final "perhaps" indicates that he is unsure whether to endorse the biconditional version.

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for the claim at hand [namely, that a universal cause is an immediate cause].

15 Another thing that follows is that since the effect is not posited when either a particular or a universal cause is removed, then neither of them is a total cause, but rather is only a partial cause. For neither of them is a sufficient cause, because neither by itself can produce the effect. Consequently, neither is a total cause.

16 Another thing that follows is that every cause, properly speaking, is an immediate cause. This is because any "cause" that is such that the effect follows just the same from the nature of reality whether the cause is posited or removed, and that is such that the effect does not follow when the cause is posited but other things are set aside, cannot be judged to be a cause; and it is clear via induction that every "cause" that is not an immediate cause is of this sort. Therefore, etc.

17 But the following objection can be brought against this: Anything that is a cause of a cause is then a cause of what is caused. Nevertheless, a cause of a cause is not an immediate cause. Therefore, a cause of a cause is a cause properly speaking, even though it is not an immediate cause.

18 Furthermore, it can be objected that extrinsic causes are ordered just as intrinsic causes are; but not every intrinsic cause is an immediate cause, and therefore not every extrinsic cause is an immediate cause.

19 Furthermore, it can be objected that if every cause properly speaking were an immediate cause, then there would be no more essential order between a universal cause and a particular cause than there is between two individuals who are pulling a ship. For just as neither of the pulling individuals pulls by means of the other, but rather each immediately pulls the ship, in the same way a universal cause would not cause by means of the particular cause (nor vice versa), but each would cause immediately.

20 In reply to the first of these objections, I say that it is not always the case that anything that is a cause of a cause is then a cause of what is caused, any more than anyone who is a father of a father is thus the father of the [latter's] son. So, just as "Socrates is the father of Plato and Plato is the father of Cicero, therefore Socrates is the father of Cicero" does not follow, so also "A is a cause of B, and B is a cause of C, therefore A is a cause of C" does not follow. And just as a father of a father is called the father of that son (of that other father) when taking 'father' broadly rather than strictly, so also a cause of a cause is called a cause [of the latter's effect] when taking 'cause' broadly, but it is not called a cause when taking 'cause' strictly unless it is an immediate

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cause. So, it is generally true, taking 'cause' properly and strictly, that a thing is a cause of another only if it is an immediate cause of it.

21 To the next objection it can be said that although intrinsic causes are sometimes ordered as mediate and immediate with respect to a form (of which they are not the cause), nevertheless they are never ordered in that way with respect to what is caused, namely, the whole (of which they are the cause). Also, just as a cause of a cause is not properly speaking a cause, so it can be conceded that the matter of [one] form is not the matter of a [second] form that is received by the mediate form. For example, if prime matter at first receives a form of corporeity, and then that [form of corporeity] receives a soul, the prime matter will not be called the matter of the soul, unless speaking of matter in an extended sense.

22 To the third objection I say that there is more essential order between a universal cause and a particular cause than there is between two people pulling a ship, because neither of the two pullers essentially depends upon the other. A particular cause, however, depends on a universal cause (at least it often does). Nevertheless, each concurs immediately [in causing], because otherwise each would not be a cause properly speaking.

23 Regarding the second point[8] – what a first cause is – I say that either (i) a first cause is first according to a priority of perfection (e.g., if the sun and fire concur for the same effect, the sun will be a prior cause according to a priority of perfection); or (ii) it is first according to a priority with respect to limitlessness, such that it can concur or does concur for producing more effects (e.g., as the sun can concur for producing more effects than an angel can). These [kinds of] priority are distinct since (as was discussed earlier[9]) sometimes one thing is prior to another according to one kind of priority and is posterior to the other according to the other kind of priority. Or else (iii) a cause is called first according to a priority of duration, and this can occur in two ways: either that the one precedes according to its nature or else that it causes earlier with respect to duration (e.g., if at first one individual but not the other were dragging the ship, and later they both dragged it at the same time).

24 Regarding the third point,[10] I say that God's will, and also God's essence in the same way, is an immediate cause of everything that is made, although this could not be demonstrated on a purely natural basis. Nevertheless, this can be persuasively argued for, as so: A second

[8] See **[13]**.
[9] *Ord*., d. 9, q. 3 (*OTh* III: 292–317), pp. 298–300.
[10] See **[13]**.

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cause depends on a cause that is unqualifiedly first, unqualifiedly unlimited and infinitely more perfect no less than it depends on a cause that is imperfect and limitless only in some respect. But some second cause depends in this way on a cause that is universal in some respect and limitless in some respect; this second cause cannot bring about its effect unless that universal cause immediately concurs with it. For instance, this is clear in the case of the sun and the lower causes with respect to many effects, as is proved well enough by the Philosopher in *On Generation* II.[11] Therefore, no unqualifiedly second cause can bring about its effect unless an unqualifiedly first cause (namely, God) immediately concurs with it.

Second, I say that God is a first cause according to the priority of perfection, the priority of limitlessness, and the first kind of priority of duration, but not always according to the second kind of priority of duration that was mentioned. The affirmative claims are clear because: God is more perfect than everything else; God concurs in bringing about every effect, which no other cause does; and God existed from eternity, which is the case for no other cause. The negative claim is also clear because although God could cause some effect at one time and could later permit another cause to conserve that effect together with God (and, consequently, to act together with God), nevertheless, this is not generally true; indeed, it occurs rarely or never. 25

Responses to the Initial Arguments

To the first initial argument, I concede that the divine essence is a cause of everything just as the divine will is. Nevertheless, it is not a necessary cause. Rather, it causes contingently, and just as contingently as the will does, because in every way it is the same thing as the will. 26

To the second initial argument, I say that an effect cannot always be demonstrated from its own extrinsic cause. But if this were true, it would be true only of natural causes, not of voluntary causes; and the divine essence and the divine will are of this sort. 27

[11] Aristotle, *On Generation and Corruption* II.10 (336b17–19).

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11 *Could the Divine Will Be Impeded by Any Creaturely Power?* (Ord., *d.* 46, *q.* 1)

TEXT[1]

1 Regarding the forty-sixth distinction, I ask whether the divine will could be impeded by any power of a creature.

2 That it could be:

3 A will whose command is not fulfilled is impeded, and God's commands are not always fulfilled, as is obviously clear. Therefore, God's will is impeded.

4 Furthermore, whatever is understood by the divine intellect is either willed-for or willed-against by the divine will, and a bad thing is understood by the divine intellect. Therefore, it is either willed-for or willed-against by the divine will. But it is not willed-for; therefore, it is willed-against. Nevertheless, the bad thing happens. Therefore, something happens contrary to the divine will and so the divine will is impeded.

5 Furthermore, "God wills that all humans be saved,"[2] and yet not everyone is saved. Therefore, the divine will is not always carried out and consequently it is sometimes impeded.

6 For the opposite:

7 The psalm says "He did everything that he willed."[3] Therefore, God's will is always carried out, and consequently it cannot be impeded.

8 In response to this question, it is commonly said that God's will is twofold; namely, the will of his good purpose [*voluntas beneplaciti*] and his revealed will [*voluntas signi*]. The revealed will is distinguished into five [parts]: prohibition, command, counsel, fulfillment, and permission. Similarly, God's will of good purpose is distinguished into an antecedent will and a consequent will. Nothing happens that is contrary to God's consequent will of good purpose, but some things do happen contrary to God's antecedent will of good purpose, as do some

[1] *OTh* IV: 670–676.
[2] 1 Timothy 2:4.
[3] Psalm 135:6.

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things contrary to the revealed will. So, it is thus clear how God's will can be impeded and how it cannot be.

Ockham's Answer

9 While I agree with others in this response, the aforementioned distinctions should be considered first, and then the question. With respect to the first distinction [namely, the five parts of God's revealed will], it should be known that this distinction is not something that is really in God and that is really [the same as] God, because there is in no way a multiplicity of wills in God. Indeed, the divine will is not even distinct from the divine essence in any way. Rather, these distinctions are distinctions among words and ways of speaking that signify the very will that is God. Nevertheless, these words are not God himself nor the divine will itself, because the noun 'will' (and, similarly, the verb 'wills' or 'willing'), when attributed to God in Holy Scripture, is taken in various senses. So, sometimes when it says in Scripture that "God wills," this is equivalent to the whole sentence "God commands this." Similarly, sometimes when it is said that "this happens contrary to God's will," this is the same as saying that this thing happens contrary to God's command or contrary to God's prohibition. Thus, the noun 'will' in Holy Scripture sometimes signifies the same thing as the noun 'command,' sometimes the same thing as 'prohibition,' sometimes the same thing as 'counsel,' sometimes the same thing as 'permission,' and sometimes the same thing as 'fulfillment.' The same is the case for the verb 'wills' and also for other verbs corresponding to the five aforementioned nouns.

That this is true – namely, that this very noun 'will' or the verb 'wills' could be taken in various senses and so they are distinct from the divine will – is clear from what the Master of the *Sentences* says in the forty-seventh distinction:

> God's will is not different, but there are different locutions about the will, because the noun 'will' is taken differently.[4]

And after that,

> Sometimes, according to some figure of speech, something that properly speaking is not God's will – such as a command, prohibition, counsel, and even permission and operation – is called God's will.[5]

[4] Peter Lombard, *Sentences* I, d. 45, c. 5.
[5] Peter Lombard, *Sentences* I, d. 45, c. 6.

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And after that:

'Will' can be taken here for God's command and his counsel: "May your will be done on earth as in heaven,"[6] and again, "One who does my father's will,"[7] and so on.[8]

From these it is clear that there is no multiplicity there except the noun 'will' or the verbs corresponding to it.

10 The second distinction [namely, the distinction between God's antecedent will and consequent will] should not be understood in God's case as it is in our case, namely that there is one will or act of willing that precedes an act and another will or willing that follows after an act, by which one takes pleasure in the act. For there is no multiplicity of this sort in God; rather, everything in God in every way is the essence, a person, a relation, or something that is constituted from the essence and a relation. So, it ought to be understood that this is a multiplicity of nouns, such that 'antecedent will' is equivalent to this whole: "giving to someone the means [*antecedens*] so they can do something, and doing this together with a command or counsel to do it, and God is prepared to act together with that individual if the individual so wills." The last condition[9] excludes the case when God willed for Abraham to sacrifice his son; although God gave Abraham both the power of sacrificing and also a command to sacrifice, nevertheless God did not will to act together with Abraham to bring about the sacrifice.

11 It might be objected that God willed to act together with Abraham if Abraham had so willed. It can be answered that God did not. Or, if God did will this, then the aforementioned definition[10] should be supplemented by adding the condition that "God will not make the contrary obvious to that individual," and the opposite of that condition occurred for Abraham. So the definition expressing the content of the name "God's antecedent will" would be this: the antecedent will of God is "that by which God gives someone the natural conditions [*naturalia*] or the means so they can do something, and God is prepared to act together with that individual if the individual so wills, and God will not make the contrary obvious to that individual, and God gives those things together with a command or counsel to do it." The case of Abraham is excluded by the middle condition. The case of bad things is excluded by the final condition, because no matter how much

[6] Matthew 6:10.
[7] Matthew 12:50.
[8] Peter Lombard, *Sentences* I, d. 45, c. 6.
[9] The text reads *primum* ("the first"), but "the last" is clearly intended.
[10] Reading *definitio* with manuscripts CGZ instead of the edition's *distinctio*.

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God gives to someone the natural conditions or means by which they can do something bad (e.g., fornication, theft, and so on), and even though God does not make the contrary obvious to that individual (namely, that he does will-against acting together with them), still he does not command or counsel sinning; rather, he commands and counsels the contrary. Thus God is not said to antecedently will bad things, and in the same way God is said to antecedently will for the individual to earn merit, act rightly, or something of that sort.

God's consequent will, however, is that by which God efficaciously wills something by positing it into being.

12 With these distinctions understood in this way, I say (as others do) that nothing happens contrary to God's consequent will of good purpose, but some things do happen contrary to God's antecedent will and contrary to his revealed will. The first part is clear as follows: Nothing can happen contrary to a will that is omnipotent and unable to be impeded when it is willing something efficaciously, and the will of God is omnipotent and unable to be impeded, as I suppose at present. Therefore, etc.

13 The second part – namely, that some things happen contrary to the antecedent will of God – is also clear. For it is obvious that: (i) God gives to each individual the natural conditions by which they can perform a meritorious act, (ii) God is prepared to act together with them to bring about a meritorious act, (iii) God does not make the contrary obvious to them (namely, God does not make obvious that he wills-against their eliciting a meritorious[11] act) because he never commands they do the contrary, and (iv) God gives them a command and counsel that they perform the meritorious act. Nevertheless, not everyone elicits a meritorious act; rather, many elicit demeritorious acts. Therefore, such things happen contrary to God's antecedent will.

14 The third part – namely, that some things happen contrary to the revealed will of God – is clear, because many things happen that are contrary to both his commands and counsels. Therefore, many things happen contrary to the revealed will.

15 Given what has been said, one can respond to the formulated question by saying that God's consequent will cannot be impeded. However, God's antecedent will and likewise God's revealed will can be impeded. This is nothing other than saying that there are some things that happen whose opposites God antecedently wills. That is, there are some things that happen whose opposites are such that (i) God gives to someone the natural conditions by which they can do that opposite, (ii) along with a command or counsel to do that

[11] Reading *meritorium* with manuscripts EZ, instead of the edition's *contrarium*.

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opposite, and (iii) God neither commands nor counsels the opposite [of that opposite]. Similarly, God's revealed will is impeded because something happens contrary to a divine command or divine counsel.

16 "But surely it should not be unqualifiedly conceded that the divine will is impeded?" According to the literal meaning of those words, it should be answered that one should not concede that the divine will is impeded. But when it is understood as "a divine command was not done," "what God counseled to be done was not done," or the like, this ought to be conceded.

Responses to the Initial Arguments

17 In response to the first initial argument,[12] it is clear how the divine will is impeded (because his command is not fulfilled) and how it is not impeded.

18 The response to the second[13] will be made clear in the next distinction.[14]

19 In response to the third,[15] I say that God antecedently wills for all humans to be saved. That is, God gives to everyone the means by which they can obtain salvation, along with a command and counsel to do it; God will never command the contrary; and God will be prepared to act together with them, permitting them to freely will to act for the obtaining of salvation. (That final condition excludes one quibble that could be made about the damned, that God does not antecedently will that they be saved.)

[12] See **[3]**.
[13] See **[4]**.
[14] *Ord.*, d. 47, q. un., translated in chapter 12 of this volume.
[15] See **[5]**.

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12 *Could God Command that a Bad Thing Be Done?* (Ord., *d.* 47, *q. un.*)

TEXT[1]

Regarding the forty-seventh distinction, I ask whether God could command that a bad thing be done. 1

That God could do so: 2

God commanded the children of Israel to despoil the Egyptians. Therefore, God commanded theft. But theft is a bad thing. Therefore, God commanded a bad thing. 3

Furthermore, God can command anything that he can will. But God can will a bad thing, just as God can understand a bad thing. Therefore, God can command a bad thing. 4

For the opposite: 5

God can command nothing other than what God can will. But God cannot will a bad thing because then he could be bad. Therefore, God cannot command a bad thing. 6

Ockham's Answer

Here it must first be seen whether God could will a bad thing; second, whether God could command a bad thing. Concerning the first, someone could say that according to the literal meaning of the words it should be conceded that "God wills a bad thing," because nothing more is denoted by the literal meaning of these words than that God wills something that is bad. For instance, God wills some act, an act that is done badly by someone who is bad, and consequently that act is bad, and so God wills a bad thing. That is, God wills an act that is a bad act. 7

It can be persuasively argued from the literal meaning of the words that a sentence of this kind [namely, "God wills an act that is a bad act"] should be conceded, by arguing as follows. Suppose that someone is giving alms out of vainglory. Then this follows:

[1] *OTh* IV: 680–685.

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That giving of alms is from God.
That giving of alms is a bad thing.
Therefore, a bad thing is from God.

Then, furthermore, this follows:

Therefore, God brings about [*facit*] a bad thing.

The first line of argument is clear because it is an expository syllogism.[2] The final inference is clear from conversion or by some similar form of arguing.

8 It might be objected that the aforementioned line of argument contains a fallacy of accident or a fallacy of grammatical form.[3] But, contrary to this, it is clear that it is entirely the same manner of arguing as in this case:

Socrates is a human.
Socrates is white.
Therefore, something white is a human.

There is no variation of terms, no mistaking of one category for another, nor any other defect that can be assigned to the former line of argument more than to the latter. Nor is there more defect in that line of argument than in this one:

Loving_{D} God is done by God.
Loving_{D} God is a good thing.
Therefore, a good thing is done by God.

9 Therefore, some would say that "a bad thing is done by God" should be conceded according to the literal meaning of the words. This is so because 'a bad thing' refers [*supponit*] here to some act which is in reality truly bad, that act is done by God, and so it is said that a bad act is done by God. Similarly, a white thing is said to be a human being, because 'something white' refers to a thing that is a human being. Hence, just as 'a good thing' refers to an act that is from God and so it is said that a good thing is done by God, so also 'a bad thing'

[2] An expository syllogism is a syllogism with a singular middle term, e.g. in this case, "that giving of alms."

[3] Very roughly, the fallacy of accident occurs when one cannot validly infer the conclusion of a syllogism due to some sort of ambiguity or defect in the syllogism's middle term; e.g., "Socrates is a man, Plato is a man, therefore Plato is Socrates." The fallacy of grammatical form (*figurae dictionis*) occurs (again, roughly) when there is an ambiguity of grammatical case; e.g., it is a fallacy of grammatical form when a given term might be plausibly understood as being either in the genitive case or in the ablative case, or when surface grammar causes one to mistake which ontological category the referent of a given term belongs to. See Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations*, 4–5 (166b10–36). Ockham gives his own account of these two fallacies in *SL* III-4, chs. 10–11 (*OPh* I: 791–826).

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refers to an act that is from God when I say "a bad thing is from God." For this reason, "a bad thing is from God" will be true.

It might be objected that whoever brings about a bad thing is bad, 10
just as whoever brings about a good thing is good. Therefore, if God brings about a bad thing, then God is bad. But the consequent is impossible; therefore, so is the antecedent.

Furthermore, a given act depends on God no less than it depends 11
on a created agent (e.g., a human). Therefore, the act should be called good because it is done by a good God no less than it should be called bad because it is done by a bad human. Therefore, for the same reason that the act is bad then it will also be good for that reason. Consequently, the same act will be both good and bad, which is impossible.

In response to the first of these objections, those who wish to hold 12
the aforementioned view[4] would say that "whoever brings about a bad thing is bad" is not true, nor is it true that "whoever brings about a good thing is good," just as it is not true that "whoever brings about a meritorious act earns merit." In the same way, according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* II, not everyone who brings about just deeds is just, but only someone who brings about just deeds justly is just. So also, someone who brings about a bad thing badly is bad; but it is not the case that everyone who brings about a bad thing is bad. Hence, even though God brings about something that is bad and, consequently, brings about a bad thing (for the terms 'a bad thing' and 'something that is bad' are interchangeable, since every bad thing is something that is bad, and everything that is bad is a bad thing), nevertheless, God does not bring about a bad thing badly, since he does not bring about a thing that he is obligated to not bring about. In the same way, God does not will a bad thing badly, and so God is not bad even though he wills a bad thing.

In response to the second objection, they would say that the same 13
act is good according to this sort of goodness and also bad [according to this sort of badness], just as the same act is just because it is done justly by one individual and is unjust because it is done unjustly by someone else. For example, if some superior were to command one subordinate to do something and were to prohibit another subordinate from doing it, then if each of the subordinates were to do that thing, then the same deed will be both just because it is done by someone who is obeying the command of a superior and unjust because it is done by someone who is going against the command of a superior. So

[4] The "aforementioned view" is the view put forth in **[7–9]**.

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then, entirely the same thing can be done justly by one individual and unjustly by another individual.

And just as entirely the same thing can be done justly by one individual and unjustly by another individual, so also entirely the same act is done badly by a human being and is done justly and rightly by God. So, the same act will be both good and bad, in that way in which an act is good or bad. This is so because an act's being bad is nothing other than the act's being done badly by someone, and an act's being good is nothing other than the act's being done rightly by someone. So, when the same act is done badly by a human and done rightly by God, then the same act will be both good and bad. This does not seem to be any more unsuitable than to say that the same human being is both a father and a son, or is both similar and dissimilar with respect to different things.

14 I am only a reporter of all these things, reporting a view that some could have, regardless of whether that view is true or false, erroneous or Catholic or heretical. But whether the aforementioned view is Catholic or heretical, I say that, according to the intention of the saints, neither "God wills a bad thing" nor "God brings about a bad thing" should be conceded. This is so because – whether according to the literal meaning of the words or not – the saints understood such sentences as stating that "God wills something badly and unjustly" and "God brings about something badly and unjustly." These latter sentences cannot have any good interpretation, because then God would bring about or will something whose opposite he is obligated to bring about or to will, which is entirely absurd.

15 Regarding the second question [namely, whether God can command something bad],[5] those who wish to hold the prior view would say that God can command a bad thing, though cannot do so badly; they would also say that God can command an unjust thing, though cannot do so unjustly.

Others would say that, just as "God commands something unjustly or badly" is impossible, so also "God commands an unjust or bad thing" is impossible. So, speaking logically, they would say that God cannot command a bad thing. On account of this, they would say that the distinction[6] that supposes that God can command a bad thing that does not remain bad, but that he cannot command a bad thing that does remain bad (so that "God can command a bad thing" is true in one sense but false in another sense), is not keeping with the art of

[5] See **[7]**.

[6] This distinction can be found in Bonaventure, *Commentaria in quatuor libros sententiarum* I, d. 47, q. 4.

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logic but is instead unsuitable. Nevertheless, I will pass by this here because similar matters were touched on elsewhere.[7]

Responses to the Initial Arguments

In response to the first initial argument,[8] I say that despoiling the Egyptians was not bad; indeed, it was good. So, when God commanded the children of Israel to despoil the Egyptians he did not command a bad thing, nor did they sin in doing so – except for those who did so with a bad mind, who despoiled but did not do so only out of obedience to the divine command. 16

The response to the second initial argument[9] is clear from what was said. 17

[7] *Ord.*, d. 46, q. 1 and *Rep.* II, q. 15, nn. 38–40, translated in chapters 11 and 18 of this volume, respectively.
[8] See **[3]**.
[9] See **[6]**.

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13 Is Every Created Will Obligated to Conform Itself to the Divine Will? (Ord., *d.* 48, *q. un.*)

TEXT[1]

1 Regarding the forty-eighth distinction, I ask whether every created will is obligated to conform itself to the divine will.

2 That this is not the case:

3 No one is obligated to that which is not within their power. But conforming itself to the divine will is not within every will's power, for the will of a damned individual does not have it within its power to conform itself to the divine will. Therefore, that will is not obligated to do this.

4 Furthermore, if it were so obligated, then the will would sin whenever it did not conform itself to the divine will, because it would not be doing that to which it is obligated, and consequently someone who was honoring their parents (parents whom God does not himself will to honor[2]) would sin. The consequent is false; therefore, so is the antecedent.

5 For the opposite:

6 Every created will is obligated to conform itself to its rule, and the divine will is the rule of every created will; therefore, every created will is obligated to conform itself to the divine will.

Ockham's Answer

7 Regarding this question, first I will set forth some distinctions; second, I will respond to the parts of the question. Regarding the first, it should be known that a will *A* can be conformed to another will *B* in three ways:

(i) *A* wills what is willed by *B*, or
(ii) *A* wills what *B* wills for *A* to will, or

[1] *OTh* IV: 686–691.
[2] The concern here is that the divine will does not honor Gretchen's parents, so if Gretchen honors her parents, her will does not conform to the divine will.

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(iii) *A* wills what *B* wills for *A* to will, and does so in the same way that *B* wills it.[3]

Second, it should be known that each of these conformities can be either actual or habitual. If the conformity is habitual, either it is habitual because of some habit that immediately inclines toward a certain sort of act (e.g., someone is said to habitually will or love_D something when they have a habit generated from acts concerning that thing, or else when they have some other habit which inclines just as immediately as the habit generated from the acts inclines), or else it is called habitual because of a habit that inclines mediately, in the way in which a habit in the intellect concerning some premises inclines mediately to an act concerning their conclusion (namely, the habit concerning the premises inclines by means of its act concerning the premises). 8

Third, it should be known that some things have been willed by God unconditionally, as it were; of this sort are all good things, which are not bad from sin [*culpae*] or punishment. Other things have been willed by God on account of some preceding sinful badness [*malum culpae*] in another individual for whom there is a penalty. 9

Having seen this, the parts of the question should be discussed. Hence, it first should be said that every created will (whether in this life or the next life) is obligated to mediately habitually conform itself to the divine will (taking 'divine will' for God's will of good purpose[4]) with respect to the things that are willed in the first sense just mentioned[5], by willing those things unconditionally and not willing their opposites conditionally. This is clear since something that has been willed by God and that has neither the nature of sinful badness nor punishing badness [*malo poenae*] ought to be willed by a created will, because a will ought to take pleasure in it. And everything that has been willed by God in the first sense is of this sort; therefore, etc. 10

Second, I say that a will ought to will unconditionally the other things[6] that have been willed by God; nevertheless, one can conditionally will-against them and conditionally will-for their contraries. So, a will ought to unconditionally will-for someone to be justly punished by God, though it can conditionally will-for that individual to not be punished. 11

[3] Ockham just uses 'it' and 'the other' to refer to the two wills; I have added the names *A* and *B* for clarity.

[4] For the distinction between God's will of good purpose (*voluntas beneplaciti*) and God's revealed will (*voluntas signi*), see *Ord.*, d. 46, q. 1, translated in chapter 11 of this volume.

[5] Namely, the things willed according to the first sense of **[9]**.

[6] Namely, the things willed according to the second sense of **[9]**.

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12 It might be asked what this habit is that inclines one to will everything that has been willed by God. It should be said that it is some habit such that by it everything that pleases the divine will is also pleasing to the [created] will. This habit ought to always be present in everyone who has the use of reason after they have reached (or were able to reach) some cognition of God. However, this habit does not immediately incline to everything that has been willed by God, for it is necessary to presuppose a cognition by which it is known that a given thing has been willed by God; it is by means of that latter cognition that the habit inclines to the act [of willing the thing that has been willed by God].

13 However, two senses of 'mediately inclining to an act' can be distinguished. In one sense, a habit is said to mediately incline when it is not sufficient [on its own] for inclining to an act; and this is the sense in which the aforementioned habit mediately inclines to willing what has been willed by God. Alternatively, a habit is said to incline mediately because it does not concur [in causing the relevant act], neither being sufficient on its own nor together with another [cause] to [bring about] the act. Rather, the habit first inclines to one act, which then itself is the cause of the other act. The aforementioned habit also inclines mediately in this sense, because it first inclines to an act by which everything that comes from God is pleasing to the will.

14 Third, I say that it is not the case that everyone is obligated to conform itself to the divine will by habitually immediately willing what has been willed by God, because they are not obligated to know that a given thing has been willed by God. Consequently, they are not obligated to habitually immediately will that thing. However, if someone were to know that this thing had been willed by God by his will of good purpose, then they are obligated to will it (i.e., to take pleasure in it, either habitually or actually).

15 But what is to be said about those things that have been willed by God according to his revealed will?[7] It should be said that if there is a command that has been willed by God according to his revealed will, a will is obligated to conform itself [to that command]. But if what has been willed according to God's revealed will is only divine counsel, then the will is not obligated. More will be said about these things in the later books, so I pass over them at present.[8]

16 Fourth, I say that it is not the case that everyone is obligated to always actually conform themselves to the divine will by willing

[7] See fn. 4.

[8] It is not clear to me what passage Ockham is referring to here, but see *Var. Ques.*, q. 8, nn. 35 and 42–45; and *Rep.* II, q. 15, nn. 38–39, translated in chapters 17 and 18 of this volume, respectively.

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everything that has been willed by the divine will. This is so both because they are not obligated to be cognizant of everything that has been willed by the divine will and also because they are not always obligated to fulfill affirmative divine commands.

17 Fifth, I say that a will is obligated to conform itself to the divine will by willing those things that the will of God wills that created will to will. This is so if God wills the created will to will that thing according to his will of good purpose or according to his commanding will. However, if God wills the created will to will that thing according to his counseling will, then this need not be the case, as was said previously.

18 Regarding the third kind of conformity,[9] there are many difficulties. These will be discussed in the second book, where all this material will be more fully drawn out.[10] What has been said should suffice for closing this book.

Responses to the Initial Arguments

19 The response to the first initial argument[11] will become clear in the second book, where the cause of obstinacy in demons is dealt with.[12]

20 In response to the second initial argument,[13] it should be said that someone that does not conform themselves to the divine will at a time and in a place at which they are obligated in order for them to be saved commits a mortal sin. But, as was said previously, it is not the case that everyone is obligated to do so at all times; this is especially so with respect to affirmative commands, although everyone is always obligated by the negative commands.

21 It might be objected that the will ought never be in deformity with the divine will. So someone who wills to honor their parents, whom God does not will to be honored, has a will that is in deformity with the divine will, and therefore that individual sins in honoring their parents.

22 It should be replied that if God wills that these parents are not to be honored (neither by this individual nor by that one), then this individual sins in honoring their own parents. Nevertheless, if God wills that they are *not* to be honored by the one individual, but also wills

[9] See **[7]**.
[10] It is not clear to me what passage Ockham is referring to here, but see *Rep.* II, q. 15, nn. 34–39, translated in chapter 18 of this volume; see also *Var. Ques.*, q. 8, nn. 42–46, translated in chapter 17 of this volume.
[11] See **[3]**.
[12] *Rep.* II, q. 15, nn. 11–24, translated in chapter 18 of this volume.
[13] See **[4]**.

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that they *are* to be honored by the second individual, then the latter individual does not sin in honoring them, nor is that latter individual in deformity with the divine will. Rather, that latter individual is in conformity with the divine will, to whom there is honor and glory for ages and ages. Amen.[14]

[14] This prayer serves as the conclusion of Ockham's *Ordinatio*.

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Questions about Virtue and Moral Goodness

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14 Does a Virtuous Habit Have the Intellective Part as its Subject? (Rep. *III*, *q. 11*)

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TEXT[1]

1 That virtues are not in the intellective part of the soul:

2 This is argued as follows: elicited acts have the sensitive part as their subject; therefore, so do habits. The inference is clear, because acts and habits have the same thing as their subject. The antecedent is argued as follows: an act elicited from a habit has to moderate the passions, and the passions are in the sensitive part; therefore, etc.

3 Secondly, it is argued as follows: A habit is required to direct every power that can act well and act badly with respect to its object. A sensitive appetite is a power of this sort. Therefore, etc.

4 Additionally, opposites are apt to come about with respect to the same thing. But virtue and vice are opposites, and there is vice in the sensitive part. Therefore, etc.

5 For the opposite:

6 *Ethics* II, ch. 5, at the end: "A virtue is a habit concerning choice, determined by reason, relative to us."[2] But choice belongs to the will itself, because it is said in *Ethics* III that "not everything is voluntary, but surely that which has previously been deliberated is."[3]

[1] *OTh* VI: 351–390.
[2] Aristotle, *NE* II.6 (1107a1–2).
[3] Aristotle, *NE* III.2 (1112a14–15).

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Aquinas's View

There is one view on this question that holds four conclusions: First, 7
that some virtues should be posited in the sensitive part. Second, that these virtues are not in the will, nor is there anything corresponding to these virtues in the intellective part. Third, that there are some virtues in the will. Fourth, that these virtues in the will do not have other virtues in the sensitive part that correspond to them.[4]

The first conclusion is argued as follows: "An act that proceeds 8
from one power insofar as it is moved by another power cannot be perfect unless each power is rightly disposed."[5] For example, an act of sawing that proceeds from a craftsman by means of a tool is not perfect unless both the tool and the craftsman are rightly disposed. But an act elicited in the sensitive part is perfectly virtuous; therefore, there is some disposition in the sensitive part.

Additionally, habits are necessarily located wherever the passions 9
with which virtue is concerned are located. The sensitive part is this sort of place. Therefore, etc.[6]

Additionally, in every power that can be a principle of a human act 10
there is a human virtue. An appetite is of this sort, because Aristotle, in *Politics* II, says that there are two forms of command.[7] One command holds of the soul with respect to the body; it is a despotic command and pertains to what cannot resist. The other is the command of the soul with respect to a sensitive appetite; he calls this a political command and it pertains to what can resist. Hence the body is ruled by the soul by a despotic command because it cannot resist, but a sensitive appetite is ruled by a political command because it can resist. Therefore, a sensitive appetite is a principle of a human act.[8]

The second conclusion is argued as follows: The will does not need 11
a habit inclining it toward a proportionate good, and the will relates to all the objects of the virtues of the sensitive part as to a good and proportionate object. Therefore, etc.[9]

The third conclusion is argued as follows: some objects are not 12
proportioned to the will, and a habit is necessarily required concerning such things.[10]

[4] Aquinas, *ST* Ia–IIae, q. 56, aa. 4 and 6. One of Ockham's most central disagreements with Aquinas is not well emphasized in the text: Aquinas's view is that some virtuous habits (e.g., courage and temperance) are located *only* in the sensitive part of the soul, while Scotus and Ockham hold that all virtues are located in the will alone.
[5] Aquinas, *ST* Ia–IIae, q. 56, a. 4.
[6] Cf. Aquinas, *ST* Ia–IIae, q. 59, a. 4; also Aquinas, *QDV*, a. 4.
[7] Aristotle, *Politics* I.5 (1254b3–6).
[8] Cf. Aquinas, *ST* Ia–IIae, q. 56, a. 4, ad 3.
[9] Aquinas, *ST* Ia–IIae, q. 56, a. 6; see also Aquinas, *QDV*, a. 5.
[10] Aquinas, *ST* Ia–IIae, q. 56, a. 6; see also Aquinas, *QDV*, a. 5.

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13 The fourth conclusion is argued as follows: in the will there is no object of the aggressive [*irascibilis*] or sensual [*concupiscibilis*] powers.[11]

14 Additionally, according to authoritative texts it is necessary to posit virtues in the sensitive part. The Philosopher says in *Ethics* I that moral virtues are in the nonrational part, which nevertheless participates in reason and is capable of obeying reason.[12]

15 Additionally, in *Ethics* III: "Next let us speak of temperance, for there seem to be these virtues of the nonrational parts."[13]

16 Additionally, in *Ethics* VII, where he distinguishes between being self-controlled and being temperate, he says that a temperate individual is one who wills rightly and does not have malformed desires; the self-controlled individual also wills rightly, but they have malformed desires even though they do not follow them.[14] So if the self-controlled individual follows right reason just as the temperate individual does (since the one deviates from right reason no more than the other does), then they are equal with respect to every act of the will. But the self-controlled individual, because of their malformed desires, does not have an act of temperance. Therefore, in addition to the act of the will, something must be posited in the sensitive part.

Four Insufficient Arguments for Positing Virtues in the Will[15]

17 Against this view, [in support of the claim] that virtues should be posited in the will concerning the same objects with respect to which virtues are posited in the sensitive part: The will is drawn indeterminately to its object, and it can be drawn well or poorly. So, the will needs a habit inclining it in order that it be drawn well.[16]

18 Additionally, the intellect is determinately drawn toward the truth no less than the will is drawn toward the good, and the intellect needs a habit. Therefore, so does the will.[17]

19 Additionally, the will can often elicit an act concerning the same sort of matter concerning which a sensitive appetite can elicit an act; and I say that the will can do this according to a dictate of right reason. Therefore, etc.[18]

[11] Cf. Aquinas, *ST* Ia–IIae, q. 56, a. 4.
[12] Aristotle, *NE* I.13 (1102b13–35).
[13] Aristotle, *NE* III.9 (1117b22–23).
[14] Aristotle, *NE* VII.9 (1151b34–1152a2).
[15] The first three arguments of this section are taken from Scotus. Ockham does not accept these arguments; see **[33–35]**.
[16] Scotus, *Ord.* III, d. 33, q. un., n. 22.
[17] Scotus, *Ord.* III, d. 33, q. un., n. 24.
[18] Scotus, *Ord.* III, d. 33, q. un., nn. 34–36. Scotus's presentation is much more detailed than this very sketchy version. In Scotus's telling, the will is able to moderate

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Additionally, if it is the case that such virtues should not be posited 20
in the will, then they should not be posited either (i) because there is a necessary connection between intellect and will, or (ii) because there is a determination of the will toward the good, or (iii) because of the freedom of the will.

The first condition does not prevent positing virtues in the will because, so it seems, there is no greater connection between the intellect and the will with respect to things that are naturally loveable$_D$ than with respect to things that are supernaturally loveable$_D$. For according to you[19] when the intellect dictates that everything that is naturally pleasurable should be loved$_D$, the will cannot dissent from the judgment of reason such that the will does not will that judgment. In the same way, when the intellect dictates that God should be loved$_D$ above all else, the will cannot dissent. So, in all things there seems to be an equal connection with respect to both kinds of loveable$_D$ thing. However, notwithstanding the second connection, a habit can be posited in the will that inclines toward eliciting supernatural acts, as is clear regarding infused and acquired charity. Therefore, etc.[20]

Similarly, the connection between intellect and will is not such that the will could not will the opposite of what is judged by the intellect; for otherwise the will could not sin.

Nor does the second condition prevent positing such virtues in the 21
will. First, because the will is no more determined with respect to any of its objects than any other power is with respect to that power's own proportionate object. But regardless of whatever proportionality there is between a power and any of its objects, a habit should be posited in that power. (This is clear in the case of both the intellect and the sensitive appetite.) Therefore, etc.

Second, the will is no more determined to the good than if it were to necessarily follow the judgment of reason, but even then it can have a habit with respect to any of reason's dictates. Therefore, etc.

Nor does the third condition prevent positing such virtues in the 22
will, because the will is as free with respect to God as it is with respect to any other thing. But with respect to God, the will can have a habit

passions in the sensitive appetite by "referring that [sensory] pleasure to an end that is suitable according to right reason," which the will could not do if it did not have some virtuous habit concerning those sensitive passions.

[19] I.e., Aquinas.

[20] In short, Aquinas posits that the habit of charity is in the will even though he thinks that the will is necessarily moved by the intellect's dictate that God is to be loved; therefore, the fact that the will is necessarily moved by the intellect's dictate that naturally pleasurable things should be loved is no reason to not posit cardinal virtues such as courage and temperance in the will.

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that inclines toward loving$_D$ God and a habit that inclines toward hating him.

When a Habit Should Be Posited in a Natural Power

23 So then, first it should be seen what necessity there is for positing a habit in various powers. Regarding this, it should be known that the necessity for positing a habit in a natural power (whether active or passive) is different than the necessity for positing one in a free power; and there is more necessity in the case of a natural power, e.g., how habits should be posited in the intellect, in the sensitive appetite, and in the power of sensitive apprehension. This is because a power of this sort is of itself indifferent to many acts, but sometimes the power is determinately carried into one of its acts in such a way that it cannot be carried into the opposite act (nor into any other act) except by a command of the will (which is a superior power); but at other times the power is not determinately carried into one of its acts in this way. Therefore, in this sort of power there necessarily must be something left behind by acts, something which inclines the power toward similar acts and not toward contrary acts.

For example, a human can frequently elicit with pleasure acts in a sensitive appetite concerning some object, such that unless they are held back by their will the individual cannot elicit a contrary act any more than can a beast in its own sensible pleasure. E.g., an insane individual who has a habit in the sensitive part that was acquired earlier (when they had the use of reason) concerning some pleasurable object: unless some more powerful distress overtakes them, it must be that they – persisting in madness and not having the use of reason – are necessarily carried into that act into which they earlier need not have been carried because of a command of the will.

Therefore, it is necessary to posit an inclining habit in this sort of power (namely, a power that is necessitated to some act to which it was not necessitated before), a habit that was not to be posited earlier. In the same way, the intellect can elicit so many acts concerning some object that from itself it cannot apprehend any other object without a command of the will, and this necessarily will be due to an inclining habit. Therefore, etc.

When a Habit Should Be Posited in a Free Power

24 However, a habit cannot be posited in a free power for that reason. This is because no matter how much a free power is inclined toward some object, that power from itself can still engage in the opposite act

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because of its freedom. Nevertheless, a habit can be posited in a free power for this reason: everyone experiences in their own case that after many acts elicited in the will concerning some object, the will is now more easily and more intensely inclined toward eliciting similar acts after many such acts than it was before. Although the will could elicit an act contrary to that inclination because of its freedom, nevertheless this will involve distress and difficulty; but at first, before it elicited these acts, the will did not elicit them in this way. On the contrary, before eliciting such acts, perhaps the will could elicit the one act or its contrary with equal pleasure.

For example, suppose that someone elicits many acts of loving$_D$ 25
about one human; then they cannot hate that individual except with distress. And after this sort of act of hating, they have a gnawing of conscience which, so it seems, is nothing other than some distress left behind in the will because the will elicited an act that was contrary to an inclination that was acquired with the mediation of a right dictate of reason. And it is because of this inclination to engage in an act more easily, more intensely, and with pleasure that it seems necessary to posit a habit in the will; not because of some freedom, nor because of any reason given previously.

Ockham's View

Having posited these things, I hold four conclusions regarding this 26
question.

First, habits inclining toward acts should be posited in the sensitive 27
appetite. Second, these habits are not virtues, properly speaking. Third, habits should be posited in the will concerning each thing with respect to which habits are posited in the sensitive part. Fourth, only habits in the will are virtues properly speaking.

The first conclusion is proved in this way: Every power that, after 28
frequent acts, can bring about similar acts more easily[21] and cannot do so for contrary acts acquires a habit that inclines it toward such acts. A sensitive appetite is of this sort, unless it is impeded by a command of the will. This is clear, for someone can acquire such a great habit of courage that they very easily engage in acts of this sort and do not very easily engage in the contraries of those acts, unless the will impedes. Consequently, it follows that something is left behind in that sensitive appetite by those acts, something which was not there before.

[21] Reading *facilius* with manuscript B, as both Ockham's view and the logic of the passage demand its inclusion.

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29 The second conclusion is proved as follows: A habit is no more virtuous than is the act elicited from that habit. This is clear, because a habit is only called virtuous by a certain extrinsic denomination, namely, to the extent that it inclines toward a virtuous act that is virtuous properly speaking. But no act of this sort [of a sensitive appetite] is intrinsically and properly speaking virtuous. This is proved as follows: If any such act [of a sensitive appetite] were virtuous, this would be only because of that act's conformity to right reason. But this does not work:

First, because then an act of any organ whatsoever would be virtuous, properly speaking, since that act can be elicited in conformity to right reason. Consequently, moral virtues would be posited that had a writer's hand and a singer's mouth as their subjects, because a habit can be generated from frequently elicited acts of this sort; but no one posits virtues in such organs.

Also, because a non-human animal can be directed in its operations by someone who has right reason, just as an animal can be directed by its appetite; but no one posits virtues in an animal. You might object that the habit, the virtuous act, and the right reason must belong to the same underlying subject [*suppositum*]; but surely that is not sufficient for the habit to be a virtue.

Third, because when something receives opposite denominations while remaining entirely unchanged, neither denomination is intrinsic to it; rather, each denomination is extrinsic. But acts of the sensitive part are of this sort; therefore, etc. The assumption is clear because someone can go to church in order to celebrate or pray for the sake of God's praise and glory, and then their act of walking is called virtuous. And they are able, while continuing that same act of walking entirely unchanged, to change only the will's act and to intend some bad end (e.g., they will to walk to church in order to celebrate and pray out of vainglory). Then numerically the same act of walking, not changing in itself, which was previously called virtuous is now called vicious, so that it takes on opposite denominations. It is certain that these denominations are not intrinsic; therefore, they are extrinsic.

Therefore, no act or habit of the sensitive part is called virtuous or vicious except by some extrinsic denomination. For if someone sings or prays with knees bent, and at first they will it for the sake of God's honor, and while the same act of praying or singing persists they change their will so that they will it to be done out of vainglory or will it so that they might be thought to be good, then numerically the same act of the sensitive part that was called virtuous at first is now called vicious, and this is only by a certain extrinsic denomination.

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From these arguments it is clear that numerically the same habit in 30
the sensitive part can incline indifferently toward both virtuous and vicious acts, because the habit is of itself totally indifferent, and there is no need to posit one habit there inclining toward virtuous acts and another habit inclining toward vicious acts. For example, if someone who is trained in war acquires in their sensitive part and corporal limbs a habit inclining toward similar acts, and if they elicit some act according to that habit's inclination for the sake of a good end (e.g., if they believe they are in a just war and so they fight for justice or faith or God's honor), then that sort of act of the sensitive part is denominated as virtuous, and the habit is similarly denominated as virtuous. But if in that same war they elicit a different act according to the same habit's inclination for the sake of a bad end (e.g., for vainglory or because they want to be seen by others or something of that sort), then both that habit and that act are said to be vicious. Consequently, numerically one quality in the sensitive part can incline toward opposite acts, namely, toward virtuous acts and vicious acts.

You might object that a habit is generated from acts characterized 31
by either good or bad circumstances. I respond that the circumstances contribute nothing to an act or habit of the sensitive part, but only to an act of the will, because the circumstances are objects of the will's act, as will be made clear later.[22]

Additionally, [you might object] that this sort of habit is only called 32
a virtue, properly speaking, because it inclines toward an act that conforms to right reason. But this does not work. For the habit can incline toward an act that conforms to supernatural reason, but it is still not called a meritorious habit; therefore, it is also not called a moral virtue. The assumption is clear because with the same act and habit persisting, unchanged in every way, the habit can incline toward both a meritorious and a demeritorious act. It is clear this happens when: (i) at first one prays for the sake of their soul's salvation and for God's honor, and then prays and continues in that same act for the sake of vainglory and hypocrisy; or (ii) one gives alms first out of love for God, and then out of worldly vanity; or (iii) one always eats temperately, but sometimes for a good end and other times for a bad end (this is clear in the case of an insane individual who is inclined to eat moderately just as they were previously inclined). In all these cases[23] there can be a single quality in the sensitive part that is in itself indifferent to virtue and vice.

[22] See **[69–70]**.
[23] Reading *quibus* with manuscript B and punctuating before *in omnibus*.

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33 The third conclusion (that habits should be posited in the will concerning each thing with respect to which habits are posited in the sensitive part) is not proved on the basis of (i) the indetermination of the will, nor because of (ii) some likeness with the intellect, nor because of (iii) the will's freedom.[24] It is not proved by the first, because his argument – that the will can elicit an act rightly or wrongly and so it is determined to neither, and thus it needs a determining habit – is not sound. For just as the will because of its freedom can elicit its first act rightly or wrongly for the sake of a praiseworthy or a blameworthy end without any prior habit (since there is no habit in the will before its first act), so in the same way the will is able to elicit its second, third, fourth, and all the following acts for the sake of a praiseworthy or blameworthy end, with the same freedom and indetermination persisting, without any prior habit. Nor is there more reason why the will would need a habit for the latter acts than for the former.

34 Nor does a habit need to be posited in the will because of its likeness with the intellect, on the basis that a habit does need to be posited in the intellect and the will is no more inclined toward what is good than the intellect is inclined toward what is true.

35 I say that it cannot be proved that a habit should be posited in the intellect due to its being inclined toward what is true, but rather for this reason: after having been shown an object that is then removed or destroyed, the intellect can engage in some acts that it could not engage in before the object was present, so that the presence of the object is not always required when the intellect understands. If the intellect were unable to have some act without the object itself being present, then there would not seem to be any necessity for positing a habit in the intellect. But since the intellect can have an act concerning an object that was previously understood by the intellect or sensed by the senses (even while no particular sense is engaging in an act), it is necessary to posit a habit in the intellect that inclines toward an act concerning such an object.

There is the same necessity for positing a habit in the imaginative power, because the imagination can have an act of imagining when no external sense is engaging in its act.

The same is the case with respect to the will: if the will were able to elicit its act without being shown the object by the intellect after its first presentation, then there would appear to be the same necessity for positing a habit in both the intellect and the will. But the will needs the object to be shown for its third or fourth act (and for all the successive acts) just as for its first act, because the will can never

[24] These alternative arguments for this conclusion were presented in **[17–19]**.

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actually will-for or will-against anything unless that thing is actually cognized. So, there does not appear to be the same necessity for positing a habit in the will as there is in the intellect.

Nor does one need to posit a virtuous habit in the will for the reason that the will is sometimes inclined toward a virtuous act with more difficulty than at other times, since this can occur as a result of the passions and habits that are present in the sensitive part.

36 So, I say that a habit should be posited in the will because of the greater perfection of its act and the greater inclination and ease of eliciting that act when all else is equal. So then, I argue thus: Any power that is more inclined after an act than it was before, and that is more inclined toward a more intense act (when all else is equal in all other things), acquires a habit from those acts. But the will is a power of this sort, because with everything that exists in the sensitive part being equal, the will is more inclined toward an act now than it was before. This is clear in the case of a self-controlled individual who has malformed desires and does not follow them, even though they followed them earlier. In this case there is no difference in the sensitive part, because the latter desires are just as malformed as they were before. But now, unlike before, the will is positioned and inclined to not follow these desires; otherwise, the individual would not be self-controlled. So, it seems that it is necessary to posit a habit in the will.

37 Additionally, there is no more reason to deny that there is a habit in the will concerning one object than concerning any other, because from the will's side the will relates to every object in the same way. And concerning some objects, a habit should be posited in the will after multiple acts, because after multiple acts [of loving] the will is more inclined with respect to an act of love_D than it was before. So, there does not seem to be any reason why some habits should be posited in the will and not others.

38 The fourth conclusion [namely, that only habits in the will are virtues properly speaking] is proved because the only habits that are virtues properly speaking are those whose acts are the only acts that are virtuous; but only acts of the will are virtuous. This is proved as follows: Only an act of the will is praiseworthy or blameworthy; therefore, it alone is virtuous. So, only a habit generated from this sort of act is a virtue. This is confirmed by the Philosopher in *Ethics* III, where he says that an act is blameworthy only if it is within our power; for no one blames a man born blind because he is blind. But if he is blind as a result of his own sin, then he can be blamed.[25]

[25] Aristotle, *NE* III.1 (1109b30–31) and III.5 (1114a26–27).

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Objections to Aquinas's Arguments

39 Having seen these conclusions, now to respond to the arguments for the first view.[26] In response to the first argument,[27] the one about a proportionate object, this equally shows that a virtue should not be posited in a sensitive appetite, because a sensitive appetite's object is proportionate to it.

40 You might object that the object is proportioned to the sensual power by a habit. But then I say the same about the will, that it can relate to some disproportionate object and can be proportioned by a habit, and there is no more reason in one case than in the other. So, I say that when a power is ordered to some object in such a way that it cannot be brought to that object more or less intensely, then a habit should not be posited in that power. However, the will can be brought to its object more or less intensely, because after multiple acts it is brought to its object more intensely and more easily than it was before. So, a habit should be posited.

41 The second argument[28] equally shows that a habit should be posited in the visual and auditory powers as well as in a sensitive appetite, because the acts of these powers can be elicited by means of an act of the will, since the will can command exterior acts just as it can command interior acts. But those acts are not called virtuous for that reason, nor would the habits be called virtuous if they were posited there. Even supposing that the argument does show that a habit should be posited in a sensitive appetite, nevertheless it does not show that there is no virtuous habit in the will.

42 To the next argument[29] I say that a virtuous habit ought to be posited in any power in which a passion that is called praiseworthy or blameworthy is posited. But no passion of this sort is posited in the sensitive part, because [a passion in the sensitive part] is called praiseworthy or blameworthy only as a result of a choice of the will for a good or a bad end, and it is so called by extrinsic denomination.

43 To the next argument[30] I say that the body sometimes resists the will. This is clear in many bodily motions: for anger, desire, and other passions of this sort are caused by various bodily states, and these things are not within the will's power in such a way that it could entirely restrain them. They are thus ruled by a political command, for they are able to resist in this way, and habits can be posited wherever

[26] Namely, the view of Aquinas, given in **[7]**.
[27] See **[11]**. Note that Ockham does not reply to Aquinas's arguments in the same order they were presented.
[28] See **[8]**.
[29] See **[9]**.
[30] See **[10]**.

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there is this sort of rebellion. But the soul dominates the body with respect to exterior operations (e.g., eating, drinking, and walking) that are totally within the will's power, because it is within the will's power to eat or not to eat (and likewise for the others). With respect to such operations the body is just like a slave to the soul, because with respect to such operations the body is totally within the soul's power. This is what the Philosopher means by the distinction between political or civil command and despotic command.

44 To all the authoritative texts from the Philosopher,[31] I say that by 'the nonrational part' he means the will, which is not rational according to its essence. Understanding him in this way, although the intellect and will are one entirely undifferentiated essence, nevertheless that essence is called rational according to its essence when it elicits an act of understanding, and it is called nonrational (or rational according to participation) when it elicits an act of willing. For an act of willing is not a reason [*ratio*]; that is, it is not an act of understanding.

45 Alternatively, it can be said that the Philosopher posits virtues in the sensitive part because there are habits there that incline toward the acts of the sensitive part, and these habits are called virtues by an extrinsic denomination, as was already said.[32]

Four Worries

46 But there are many worries brought against this. First, it does not seem that in a sensitive appetite there is always a habit of this sort generated from acts, as was said earlier.[33] For a habit is always generated from acts, but there are some habits that do not require and cannot have any act in the sensitive part: e.g., virginity, poverty, humility, and patience do not have any acts in the sensitive part; therefore, they do not have habits there.

47 The second worry concerns the claim that a habit in the sensitive part is called a virtue only by extrinsic denomination to the extent that it is elicited in conformity to right reason and commanded by the will. For, contrary to this claim, in that case virtue would be posited in the intellect just as properly as in the sensitive part, which is contrary to the Philosopher, who posits moral virtues in the sensitive part in *Ethics* I and *Ethics* VI.[34] The assumption is clear because an act of the intellect can be commanded by the will and elicited in conformity to right

[31] See **[14–16]**.
[32] See **[29–30]**.
[33] See **[28]**.
[34] Aristotle, *NE* I.13 (1103a5–10) and VI.1 (1138b35–1139a5).

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reason just as much as an act of a sensitive appetite can. For when the intellect dictates that something should be tasted or eaten and the will commands that sensitive appetite to taste, then that act of that sensitive appetite is denominated as virtuous because it is elicited in conformity to a dictate of right reason and a command of the will. In the same way, when the intellect dictates that it should study now about some such thing and the will commands the intellect to study, then that act of studying will be called virtuous because it is elicited in conformity to a dictate of reason and a command of the will. Therefore, etc.

48 The third worry is that it seems that an act of a sensitive appetite has the nature of goodness[35] and badness primarily and properly speaking. This is because the interior act (namely, the will's act) and the exterior act (namely, a sensitive appetite's act) are prohibited by distinct commandments; therefore, they are distinct sins. The inference is clear, because otherwise there would not be distinct commandments. The antecedent is clear, because an interior act is prohibited by the commandment "do not covet (etc.)," but an exterior act is prohibited by "do not steal." Therefore, etc.

49 Additionally, Augustine says in *On the Trinity* XIII, ch. 5, "Everyone is made wretched by a bad will alone, but they are made more wretched by the power which carries out the desire of the bad will."[36] He means that the will is more wretched when it is accompanied by an exterior act than when it is not. But if the exterior act were only bad by extrinsic denomination, the will would not be worse or more wretched with that exterior act than without it. And I argue the same is true for the will: when the will has a good willing, then it is good; but when it acts [on that good willing], then it is even better.

50 Additionally, the goodness of a moral act is the completeness [*integritas*] of those things which according to the agent's right reason ought to coincide in that act.[37] So, the goodness differs when the completeness of such things coming together differs. But there is a different completeness of those things that ought to come together for the interior act than there is of those things that ought to come together for the exterior act; so, there are different goodnesses for the interior and exterior acts. So, the exterior act is not only good by extrinsic denomination. Therefore, etc.

51 Additionally, someone is punished more for having willed and done something than for only willing it. Therefore, etc.

[35] Reading *bonitatis* with manuscripts CE instead of the edition's *virtutis*.
[36] Augustine, *On the Trinity* XIII.5.8.
[37] Scotus, *Ord.* I, d. 17, p. 1, qq. 1–2, nn. 62 and 92.

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The fourth worry is that it seems that the arguments given do not 52
prove the conclusion. For just as the same act can remain entirely unchanged in the sensitive part, and at first the act is good by extrinsic denomination when it is done for a good end and later it is bad when it is done for a bad end, so in the case of the will someone can at first love_{D} God for his own sake and later can love_{D} God for their own self-interest (and the act in the will remains the same throughout); then at first the act is good because of the good intention and later the act is bad because of the bad intention.

In the same way, just as someone can be going to church in order to pray, and while continuing on can then be going in order to sin, and then the act is good at first and bad later, so in the same way if reason were to dictate that one should pray, one can will to pray and the will's act will be good because it is elicited in conformity to right reason, but if reason were to dictate that the individual should not pray, if they then will to pray then the will's act will be bad, because it is elicited in deformity to right reason. Consequently, numerically the same act [of will] can be called good at one time and can be called bad at another time. So, any act of the will will be good or bad only by extrinsic denomination.

This is confirmed, because an act is virtuous or vicious only because 53
it does or does not conform to right reason. Therefore, the first virtuousity of a moral act will be in right reason and not in the will, as is clear.

Responses to the Worries

In response to the first worry,[38] I say that although it is possible for 54
there to be a sin without any positive act (i.e., a sin of omission – for example, someone is obligated to pray at a certain time, and supposing that they do not pray at that time and do not have an act of willing to pray, then they incur a sin of omission only as a result of the absence of the act that is owed), nevertheless it is not possible that there be an actual sin without any positive act, nor can there be a habitual sin without any habit. So I say that poverty, virginity, etc., are virtues that are generated from acts of the will that are characterized by the appropriate circumstances. E.g., virginity is generated from an act of willing to refrain from sex because of God, poverty is generated from an act of willing to renounce all things for the sake of Christ, and humility is generated from an act of willing to endure adverse things (e.g., not setting oneself in opposition to them, not complaining about them,

[38] See **[46]**.

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and not resisting them, all for the sake of Christ). So, it is impossible to prove in any way that humility is a virtue without it being possible to prove in the same way that poverty is a virtue; and so it is concerning all virtues that are generated from good acts of willing and are characterized by right circumstances.

But the virtues just enumerated (and many others like them) are virtues that do not require any positive act in the sensitive part in order to be generated; consequently, they do not require any habit that is generated from the acts. Rather, they only require acts of the will from which they are generated. For, as blessed Jerome says about the Gospel text, "He who would leave behind father or mother,"[39] leaving behind everything was [characteristic] of the philosophers, but leaving behind everything for the sake of Christ and in order to follow Christ is [characteristic] of the perfected.[40] Nevertheless, although these virtues do not require any act or habit in the sensitive part, they still require charity in order for the act elicited from them to be meritorious. Hence the Apostle says, "If I were to hand over my body so that I burn and I do not have charity, I am nothing."[41]

But there are other virtues that do require (speaking of the natural case) both an act and a habit in the sensitive part and that are generated from acts of the will, and they also require charity in order for them to cause a meritorious act. So, charity is a partial efficient cause of every meritorious act. Nevertheless, a virtue can be sufficiently moral with respect to natural morality if it has the appropriate circumstances of such virtue according to nature. In this way the philosophers were virtuous without any charity, but they could not have a meritorious act without charity.

55 In response to the next worry,[42] I say that the purest speculation that we are capable of doing is within our power, just as was said in the Prologue.[43] And so, by extending the meaning of the word 'virtue,' purest speculation can be called virtue and morally virtuous just as it can be meritorious, and just as any act of any sensitive part can be. For example: just as someone can receive merit by giving alms, so someone can receive merit by studying geometry (e.g., if this is done out of obedience to someone whom the individual is obligated to obey). And so this act of studying geometry can be morally good, virtuous, and meritorious, just as an act of the sensitive part can be; but it will not be

[39] Matthew 19:29.
[40] Jerome, *Commentary on Matthew* 19.
[41] 1 Corinthians 13:3.
[42] See **[47]**.
[43] *Ord.*, Prol., q. 10, n. 50, translated in chapter 3 of this volume.

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so intrinsically, but by some extrinsic denomination to the extent that this act is elicited in conformity to right reason and a command of the will, just as is the case for an act of the sensitive part. For only an act of the will is intrinsically morally good or bad.

56 In response to the next worry, the one about distinct commandments concerning interior and exterior acts,[44] it can be said that the one commandment [namely, "do not covet (etc.)"] prohibits only an interior act, while the other commandment [namely, "do not steal"] prohibits both an interior and an exterior act. So, they are distinct commandments and distinct sins in some way. For although formally there is sin only in the interior act, nevertheless when the interior act is followed by a deed, it pleasures and delights more and so the sin is greater. It is as if there is a twofold sin. By this I do not mean that any nature of sin is present in the exterior deed; but when there is an exterior operation, the interior operation is intensified and the act becomes more intense and more pleasurable than it was before. The exterior act is prohibited for this reason, not because the nature of sin is present in it.

57 Alternatively, it could be said that it is not because they are distinct sins that the interior and exterior acts are prohibited by distinct commandments (for sin is present only in the interior act, which can be one and the same act both when there is an exterior act and when there is not), but they are prohibited by distinct commandments so that no occasion for erring be given to ordinary people. For someone could believe that there is sin only when the interior act is bad and the exterior act is similarly bad. This is the view of many, namely, that there is no sin in the will alone, but there is sin only when the will is imposed in a deed. So, in order to remove this occasion for error and in order to impress that there is sin not only when a human being has both an interior and an exterior act at the same time, but also when they have only an interior act, the interior and exterior acts are prohibited by distinct commandments.

58 In response to the next worry about greater punishment and so on,[45] I say that as a matter of fact, according to both human law and divine law, sometimes a weightier sin is punished less than a less weighty sin is. For example: stealing a donkey or a cow is a less weighty sin than giving false testimony, lying, or falsely defaming someone, and yet the first is in fact punished more weightily by human law than the second is. This is not because the sins are

[44] See **[48]**.
[45] See **[51]**. Note that from this point on the order of the replies does not match the order in which the worries were presented.

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weightier, but because they are a greater occasion for the destruction or subversion of society, and yet the second is punished more weightily than the first is in the sight of God and by eternal punishment.

It is the same in the case at hand. For if someone has an act of the will that is sinful and that is equally intense without an exterior act as with an exterior act, then that individual is punished in the sight of God and eternally just as much when there is not an exterior act as when there is an exterior act. But by temporal punishment, to which human laws extend themselves, the individual is not punished for the interior act but only for the exterior act.

Nevertheless, if the will does not have an equally intense act without the exterior act as with the exterior act (because the will is more pleased when the bad will leads to an exterior deed), then the individual does not sin as much in the will without the exterior act as with the exterior act. For when the exterior act is elicited [in such a case], then the interior act is intensified and so the sin is made heavier and the individual is punished more weightily in the sight of God when there is an exterior act than when there is not; nevertheless, they are not punished for the exterior act but for the more intense interior act.

59 There are examples of this. Here is one: let us suppose that there are two lords here, each of which has a will to kill [the same] man, but the first has an intense will and the second has a less intense will. If each lord were to command his own servant to kill that man, and if the servant of the second lord killed him but the servant of the first lord did not, then it is certain that the first lord sinned more, because he hated the man more intensely and was more intent that the man be killed than the second lord was. Nevertheless, the second lord would be punished more with a temporal penalty than the first would be, even though the second lord sinned less. Thus sometimes the lesser sin is punished more weightily. Further, suppose that the second lord repented of his bad will and his command, that the first lord did not, and that only the servant of the second lord killed the man; positing this, the first lord sins and the second does not sin in the killing of the man, and still the second lord would be punished and the first would not be.

60 In response to the next worry,[46] what Augustine says can be interpreted as meaning that the carrying out of a bad will in a deed intensifies the will's bad act and makes it worse. Similarly, by carrying out a bad will in a deed, [the individual] can do many sins that would not be done if their will were not carried out. Thus they are dragged from sin to sin, because by what they do they tempt their neighbor, and so the

[46] See **[49]**.

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individual can become more wretched. Hence if one sin is a private one and another sin is a public one by which another human is tempted, then the individual is punished more for the public sin than for the private sin.

In response to the worry concerning completeness,[47] I say that not all circumstances make sin heavier. This is so because a sin is not made heavier just because the exterior act was done at a specific time or place; rather, what makes the sin heavier are the circumstances of the will's act. Hence when moral goodness or badness do not pertain to an act in and of itself, then that act does not have goodness or badness from the completeness of its circumstances. For example, an act of a sensitive appetite is not apt to be morally good in and of itself, but is so only by extrinsic denomination, as was said earlier.[48] So then, an act of a sensitive appetite is not good from the completeness of its circumstances (i.e., that it was done at a particular place, at a particular time, etc.). 61

But when an act is apt to be morally good [in and of itself], then the completeness of its circumstances is required for the goodness of the act. When the act lacks some circumstance, if that circumstance is necessarily required for the act to be morally good then the act is not morally good; although perhaps it is not vicious because a bad end was not intended.

In response to the next worry,[49] I say that an act of loving$_D$ God for God's own sake as for an end, and later doing so for a different end, are distinct acts according to species. It is clear that they are distinct acts because whenever the primary objects of some acts are different, necessarily the acts are different, because it is impossible that one act is terminated at one time in one of its primary objects and not in another, and that at a later time the same act is terminated in the other primary object. Now ends are primary objects of acts of the will, for when a will loves$_D$ a thing only because of some end, then the will loves$_D$ the end more [than it loves the thing that is for the end], because without [the end] the will would not love$_D$ the other thing. 62

This is also clear in another way. If there were two acts concerning two objects, and one of the acts were the cause of the other, then if the two objects were later loved$_D$ by a single act, then that object would be first whose act is the cause of the other act when the objects are loved$_D$ by distinct acts. But if [someone] loved$_D$ the end with one act and it loved$_D$ something else for the sake of the end by another act,

[47] See **[50]**.
[48] See **[29]**.
[49] See **[52]**.

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then the act by which I love$_D$ the end would be a cause with respect to the other act, because I love$_D$ the other thing only because I love$_D$ the end. So, in this case, if the act concerning the end is posited, then the other act can be posited; but if the act concerning the end is not posited, then the other act cannot be posited. So the first act is a cause, according to a frequently accepted principle.[50] Therefore, if I love$_D$ both an end and another thing by a single act, then the end is the primary object. So, any difference of end results in a different act, and consequently those acts [with different ends[51]] are distinct acts.

63 That those acts[52] are distinct according to species is clear because the one is an act of enjoying God and the other is an act of enjoying a creature; similarly, one act is an act of friendship-love$_A$ and the other is an act of desire-love$_A$, which are distinct according to species.

64 You might object that the end is a circumstance of a moral act and thus not an object of the act. I respond that all the circumstances of an act of the will are partial objects of that act, so that for every act its end is its principal object, as was made clear earlier.[53] The other circumstances are secondary partial objects of the act.

65 For example, consider an act of the will by which someone wills to pray to God. In order for that act to be perfectly virtuous, these circumstances are necessarily required: that the individual wills to pray in order to honor God, according to a dictate of right reason, at an established time (e.g., on Sunday) and in an appropriate place (e.g., in church). Then that act, virtuous in that way, has the honor of God for its principal object; an act of praying for its common object; and right reason, Sunday, and church for its secondary and partial objects. It has these in such a way that with respect to the act of the will those circumstances are objects and partial effective causes with respect to that act. But these circumstances are not partial objects with respect to the exterior act (which is called the common object of the will's act), because an act of praying or walking (or any such exterior act), does not have a time, a place, right reason, or an end for an object, in the way in which another act – e.g., an act of eating – has food for its object, or an act of walking has a path for its object. The other circumstances with respect to that [exterior] act do nothing except coexist

[50] The "frequently accepted principle" is that if x is sufficient for y and the absence of x is sufficient for the absence of y, then x is a cause of y. See *Ord.*, d. 45, q. un., n. 13, translated in chapter 10 of this volume.

[51] Ockham is referring to the example given in the worry, namely the act of loving God for God's sake and the act of loving God out of self-interest. See **[52]**.

[52] Namely, the acts in the example given in **[52]**.

[53] See **[62]**.

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alongside the act; that is, they "stand around" [*circumstant*] the act without [contributing] any causality.

66 You might object that the act that is principally intended by the will seems to be the primary object of the will's act, and if someone wills to walk to church in order to pray for the sake of God's praise, then the act that is principally intended is the act of praying or walking. So those acts are the primary object with respect to the will's act.

67 I respond that the principal object of an act of the will is that thing the love$_D$ of which is principally intended; and the end is of this sort. Nevertheless, if the item that is the common object (as distinguished from the circumstances) is called "the principal object," then in this way the exterior act is the principal object. This is so because the exterior act is the common object, since the same exterior act can remain with respect to many acts of the will. E.g., if at first I will to go to church in order to honor God, then "walking to church" is the common object and "honor" is a circumstance. But if later I will to go at the established time, then the will's act is different, and yet the same act of walking can remain. If I then will to go in order to honor God at the established time and according to right reason, and I am walking all the while, then the exterior act always remains the same even as the act of the will differs. So, the exterior act is called the common object because it can be an object of many acts of willing and can remain the same with or without the circumstances. From this it is clear that whenever some circumstance of the act of willing is different, then the will's act itself is different, even though the exterior act is not.

A Fifth Worry

68 But there is yet another worry, whether there are any indifferent acts in the will (as there are in a sensitive appetite), acts that can be called good or bad (or neither) by extrinsic denomination.

69 First, I respond that numerically the same [act] cannot at first be indifferent and later be intrinsically good or bad. An act is said to be intrinsically good or bad which is primarily imputable and to which praise or blame primarily pertain; an act of the will is indifferent when it is elicited concerning an object fitting for an act of that sort but without the circumstances that are required for the goodness or badness of the act. E.g., if I were to love$_D$ some human, not for any good or bad end, neither according to right reason nor contrary to it, neither at an appropriate time and place nor at an inappropriate time and place, and so on for the other virtuous and vicious circumstances, then that act is neither morally good nor morally bad, but is neutral and indifferent.

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Therefore, in order for an act to become good or evil, it needs to be characterized by virtuous or vicious circumstances; e.g., that the will loves$_D$ this human for this sort of end, at the appropriate time, and so on for the other circumstances. But by loving$_D$ in this way the will has a different act because – as has already been said – the circumstances are nothing other than the partial objects of a virtuous act of the will, and necessarily the act differs when those objects are different.

70 For that same reason, no act of the will can be at first intrinsically virtuous and later vicious (I mean numerically the same act) because there can be no change without a change in the circumstances – that is, that at present the act is characterized by good circumstances but later by bad ones – and a change in circumstances cannot occur without there being a change of act. This always holds, because the circumstances are objects of the act, such that a difference in the circumstances is followed by a difference in acts. For the same reason, there cannot be one act which is at first imperfectly virtuous (that is, it has only some of the circumstances required for a perfectly virtuous act) and later is perfectly virtuous (that is, it has all the required circumstances). This is because the addition or subtraction of some circumstance (which is an object and partial cause of the act) always results in a different act.

71 Secondly, I say that if it is asked whether any act of the will could at first be indifferent to goodness and badness and later be made good or bad by extrinsic denomination (in the way an act of the sensitive part can be), then there is a distinction that should be made. For either it is supposed that in the will there naturally can be two acts of willing at the same time, or else this is not supposed. If this is not supposed, then in the will there cannot be any act that is indifferent in the manner just described, because it could not be indifferent in this way except to the extent that it could be conformed to some other act, one that is perfectly and intrinsically virtuous, (just as this is the only way in which an act of a sensitive appetite is called virtuous), as is clear.

72 But if there naturally can be two acts of willing in the will at the same time (which I believe to be true, as was proved in the first book[54]) then in the will there can be some act that is indifferent in the aforementioned way. For example, if I were to love$_D$ some human unconditionally, terminating that act of willing in that human being and not in any good or bad circumstance, then that act is neither morally good nor morally bad, but is neutral. If I were to then elicit (with that first act persisting) another act by which I will to love$_D$ that

[54] *Ord.*, d. 1, q. 1, nn. 25–50, translated in chapter 5 of this volume.

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human for the sake of God, according to right reason and according to all the other required circumstances, then that second act is perfectly and intrinsically virtuous. Then the first act, which had been indifferent, is now virtuous by extrinsic denomination to the extent that it is elicited in conformity to a perfectly virtuous act and to a right dictate.

It is just as if I were to will to eat for the sake of God, according to right reason and the other circumstances, and I were to then eat; then that eating is virtuous by extrinsic denomination because it is elicited in conformity to right reason and to a perfectly and intrinsically virtuous willing. Similarly, with numerically the same act of eating persisting alongside some difference in the act of the will (e.g., that I will to eat on account of a bad end such as uncontrolledness, and against right reason), then numerically the same act of eating that was once denominated as virtuous is now called vicious, because it is elicited in conformity to a bad willing and contrary to the judgment of reason. So, it is vicious by extrinsic denomination.

So then, with the first act that is indifferent in itself persisting in the will alongside a change in the second act (e.g., suppose that I now will to love_D that same human because it displeases God, or because they are a sinner, or for the sake of some other bad end and contrary to right reason), then that [first] act [of loving] was at first indifferent in itself and virtuous by extrinsic denomination, and now that numerically same act is vicious by extrinsic denomination. In this way it is clear how an act of the will can be indifferent and how it cannot be indifferent.

On Moral Goodness and Badness

From these things it is clear what moral goodness or badness adds 73
onto the substance of an act; and what should be said according to this view is different than what should be said according to John's view.[55] For John posits that the substance of a virtuous act can be the same as the substance of a vicious act, but the act is called virtuous because of its conformity to the required circumstances, which he does not consider to be partial objects of the virtuous act. So, according to him, goodness adds onto the substance of the act a relation [*respectus*] of its conformity to all the circumstances. Look it up.

But according to my [*istam*] view (which supposes that all the cir- 74
cumstances required for the act are immediate partial causes that are necessarily required for a perfectly virtuous act) a virtuous act and a

[55] Scotus, *Ord.* I, d. 17, p. 1, qq. 1–2, nn. 62–65.

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vicious act are related to act in general just as this particular whiteness is related to whiteness in general. For just as this whiteness is of itself a 'this' (and not because of something extrinsic to it), so a virtuous act – one that is primarily virtuous and primarily imputable – is of itself formally and intrinsically virtuous, so that this substance of the act is this goodness of the act, intrinsically and not extrinsically. Similar considerations hold for a vicious act: this substance of the act is this badness of the act. From these two [good and bad acts] the concept of act in general can be abstracted, just as from this whiteness and that whiteness the concept of whiteness can be abstracted.

75 You might ask what the act has its goodness or badness from. I answer that the act has its goodness or badness from the same items from which it has its substance, namely from its common object and all its circumstances, as from many partial causes which, when all posited simultaneously, make one total cause.

76 And you might ask what the goodness or badness of an act adds onto the substance of an act that is called good [or bad] only by some extrinsic denomination (such as an act of the sensitive part, or similarly an [indifferent] act of the will). I answer that no cause whatsoever adds anything positive (neither an absolute item nor a relative item) that is distinct from the act and that has being in the act. Rather, that [extrinsic] goodness is only a connotative name or connotative concept, principally signifying the act that is neutral in that way and connoting the perfectly virtuous act of the will and the right reason in conformity to which the act is elicited; and so this sort of act is denominated virtuous by extrinsic denomination.

77 Another way[56] that an act in the will can be called indifferent is if the act were totally caused by God. For then it would be not called morally good or bad, since those names connote an activity of the will, just as the name 'meritorious act' does.

Furthermore, I say that acts of the sensitive part and of the intellect, as well as acts of the will, can be called indifferent in the aforementioned way and can be denominated as good or bad by extrinsic denomination. This is no less fitting in regards to the intellect's act than in regards to a sensitive appetite's act or the will's act; e.g., if the intellect were to dictate that one should study at a certain time, and if the will were to command the intellect to study for the honor of God, and so on for all the other circumstances, then that act of studying would be called good by extrinsic denomination. And this is how I respond to that other worry.

[56] This is a further response to the worry of **[68]**.

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In response to the next worry[57] I say that an act is not virtuous just 78
because it conforms to right reason. For if God were to make in my will an act conforming to right reason while my will is not acting in any way, then that act would be neither meritorious nor virtuous. So, for the goodness of an act it is required that it be in the power of the will having that act. Similarly, an act is no more virtuous as a result of right reason than as a result of the end or the other circumstances, because the end and the time when are partial objects of a virtuous or vicious act just as right reason is. Nevertheless, no one supposes that the first goodness of an act comes from the end or from its time, but only an act of the will that is primarily imputable is primarily morally good or bad. After this, the will is denominated as good or bad by means of its act, and sometimes its act is also denominated [as good or bad] by extrinsic denomination.

Responses to the Initial Arguments

In response to the first initial argument,[58] I say that whether a virtuous 79
act is a passion or is distinct from a passion, in either case it is not in the sensitive part properly speaking, but only by some extrinsic denomination, as is clear from what has been said.

In response to the next argument,[59] I say that a virtuous habit is 80
required to direct every power that can act well or act badly when the operation of every other power is set aside. But a sensitive appetite is not a power of this sort when the will's operation is set aside.

In response to the next argument,[60] I say that vice, properly speak- 81
ing, is only in the will, because according to Augustine, sin is voluntary to such an extent that if something is not voluntary then it is not a sin.[61]

[57] See **[53]**.
[58] See **[2]**.
[59] See **[3]**.
[60] See **[4]**.
[61] Augustine, *On True Religion*, 14.27.

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15 Is Every Virtuous Habit Generated from Acts? (Rep. *III*, *q. 12*)

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Response to **W2.2** [57], along with two questions [58–61] and answers [62–63]

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Response to **W2.3** [64]
Response to **W2.4** [65]
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Response to **W3** [68], a question [69] and its answer [69–70]
Response to **W4** [71–90]
The connection of habits within the sensitive part [71–72]
The connection of prudence to the moral virtues [73]
The connection of the moral virtues to prudence [74–80]
The connection of the moral virtues to each other [81–89]
That right reason is required for perfect virtue [90]

TEXT[1]

That it is not the case that every virtuous habit is generated from acts: 1

This is argued for on the basis that virginity, gentleness, and the like are virtuous habits, and yet they are not caused by acts. Therefore, etc. 2

Additionally, whenever an act generates a habit, then a different habit is generated from a different act. So then, there will be as much distinction among habits as there is distinction among acts. So then, there will be just as many moral virtues of distinct species as there are acts of distinct species. But then there would not be only four moral virtues. 3

Additionally, if this were so, then one virtue could be generated without generating any other virtue. But this is false, because one virtue cannot be possessed unless all of them are possessed. 4

Additionally, there are no acts in the sensitive part other than passions. But a passion is not capable of generating a habit, because otherwise it would follow that someone would be more virtuous to the extent that they were more afflicted with passions. That, however, is false, because the more someone is afflicted by passions, the more vicious they are; or, at least, the less disposed to virtue they are. 5

For the opposite: 6

Ethics II, chapter 2: "The generation, destruction, and strengthening [of virtues] not only come from and are caused by the same things, but the operation [of those virtues] are also in the same things."[2] By this he means that habits are generated, destroyed, and strengthened by the acts to which those habits are apt to incline. 7

[1] *OTh* VI: 391–428.
[2] Aristotle, *NE* II.2 (1104a26–28).

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8 Regarding this question there are four things that must be done. First, it should be seen whether virtues inhere in us from nature; second, whether they are effectively generated from our acts; third, which virtues are generated from which acts; and fourth, whether acts that are distinct according to species generate habits that are distinct according to species.

Whether Virtues Inhere from Nature: Aquinas's View

9 Regarding the first, there is one view that posits that virtues inhere in us from nature.[3] But, according to him, something is said to be "from nature" in two ways: either in whole or in part (in which case it is partly from nature and partly from an external principle). Similarly, something can inhere in a human in two ways: either on account of the species or on account of the individual. So then, he says that in the apprehensive powers there can be a natural habit in an inchoate way, both on account of the species and on account of the individual. For example, understanding (which is a habit concerning premises) inheres on account of the species according to nature in an inchoate way; this is why when the premise "every whole (etc.)"[4] is proposed, the intellect immediately assents to it. Therefore, it is from nature in an inchoate way. But because the terms [of the premise] are cognized only through representations [*species*] abstracted from phantasms, as a consequence the cognition of the premises is partly from the object as from an extrinsic principle. However, in the appetitive powers there is no habit that comes from nature in an inchoate way on the side of the soul, but only on the side of the body, because different individuals are disposed in different ways according to different bodily constitutions.

Objections to Aquinas's View

10 But this view is contrary to what the Philosopher says in *Ethics* II, where he proves that virtue is not from nature.[5] For whenever someone is accustomed to what is contrary to that toward which nature inclines, then that [habit] does not inhere in them from nature. But this is the case with respect to many who acquire virtue. Therefore, etc.

11 You might object that the Philosopher means that virtue is not from nature insofar as the virtue is complete, but only insofar as it is incomplete (that is, in an inchoate way), as was just said.

[3] Aquinas, *ST* Ia–IIae, q. 63, a. 1 and *QDV*, a. 8.
[4] The full principle is that "every whole is greater than each one of its parts."
[5] Aristotle, *NE* II.1 (1103a15–25).

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On the contrary, the Philosopher argues that virtues are generated and strengthened by the same things. Therefore, if virtues are from nature insofar as they are incomplete, then they can be strengthened by similar acts and can be from nature insofar as they are complete. Or, if virtues cannot be from nature insofar as they are complete, then they are not strengthened by the same things from which they are generated. 12

Additionally, what he said about the apprehensive powers is also false according to the Philosopher in *On the Soul* III: "The soul is like a blank tablet on which nothing has been written."[6] But if there were a habit concerning premises in an inchoate way, then the soul would not be like a blank tablet, because it would have a habit from its nature, albeit only in an imperfect way. 13

Additionally, his argument about the habit concerning premises[7] supports the opposite claim. Because even if every habit is destroyed, when the intellect apprehends the terms 'whole' and 'part,' it immediately assents to the premise "every whole (etc.)" without any habit. Therefore, there is not a preceding habit that inclines the intellect to assent to this. 14

Additionally, at the end of *Posterior Analytics* II, the Philosopher argues that a habit concerning premises is acquired from acts in the same way a habit of knowledge is, that is, that a habit concerning premises is acquired through multiple experiences.[8] 15

Additionally, what he says about the appetitive powers[9] does not seem to be true. This is because a bodily disposition is not in any way a habit, but is a certain bodily quality (or multiple qualities) that precede any act, just as well-proportioned bodily qualities bring about health. Similarly, if such qualities were virtues, then there would be virtue in everyone. 16

Whether Virtues Inhere from Nature: Ockham's View

So then, I say that something is natural when it is caused by natural things prior to any further act; and in this sense there is something natural in human beings that is capable of inclining toward acts of virtue and vice. Second, I say that this natural thing is not a habit, but is a purely natural quality (or qualities). 17

The first claim is shown by this, that it is no less fitting for something of this sort to exist from nature prior to any act than it is for 18

[6] Aristotle, *On the Soul* III.4 (429b30–430a2).
[7] See **[9]**.
[8] Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* II.19 (100a4–100b4).
[9] See **[9]**.

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something of this sort to come from or be increased by technical skill without any natural act; but a quality of this sort can be increased or reduced by medicine. Also, nature and medicine can incline one individual to an act of temperance, but they can incline someone else to an act of intemperance as a result of their different natural constitutions. This is also clear in the case of inflamed blood around the heart, which is both caused by and reduced by other artificial causes.

19 The second claim is proved as follows: This quality is not a habit, because something is not called a habit, properly speaking, unless either (i) it inclines to an act of some power or (ii) it is an inclining item that has been caused by acts and that remains in the absence of those acts.[10] But a habit cannot be posited for the first reason, because an act can incline toward an act of the same power or of another power. For example, an act of understanding a premise inclines to an act of understanding a conclusion, and an act of dictating in the intellect inclines to an act of the will (because an act of understanding, not an external object, is truly the efficient cause of an act of willing). This is clear from a commonly accepted principle, because "that which when posited (etc.)."[11] Therefore, one need not posit that the aforementioned quality is a habit on account of this reason, because an inclination of this sort can belong to an act. Nor must a habit be posited on account of the second reason: the quality [of bodily constitution] does not incline to an act as something that has been generated from acts and that remains in the absence of acts, because that quality precedes any act.

20 Additionally, a vicious habit is in no one from nature, and yet some people are naturally disposed to vice. Therefore, neither is a virtuous habit in anyone from nature. Hence some are inclined to courage and others are inclined to overconfidence, to fearfulness, to theft, and to lust because of their bodily disposition.

21 Additionally, qualities of this sort vary according to age, for according to the Philosopher, if an old man were to take on the eyes of a young man, he would see just as the young man does.[12] In the same way, if the old man were to take on the bodily constitution of the young man, he would be inclined to vicious or virtuous acts just as the

[10] The way Ockham puts this point is curious. It may appear that he says here that there are two possible ways for a thing to be called a habit; but in the next sentence he argues that the first criterion isn't sufficient after all, since acts can also meet it. Presumably, he takes the first criterion to be one his opponent wrongly endorses.

[11] The "commonly accepted principle" here is that "something is a cause when, if that thing is posited, the effect is posited, and when that thing is not posited, the effect is not posited." For further discussion, see *Ord.*, d. 45, q. un., n. 13, translated in chapter 10 of this volume.

[12] Aristotle, *On the Soul* I.4 (408b20–24).

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young man is, and vice versa. Nevertheless, this is not due to any habit that has been generated by acts. Therefore, in a human being one should posit some quality that precedes every act and that inclines toward a vicious or a virtuous act. This quality can be warmth in some and coldness in others, and this quality can be increased or reduced, as is clear.

That Habits Are Generated from Acts

22 Regarding the second issue, I say that an act is an efficient cause of a habit. This is proved as follows: Anything upon whose existence some other thing follows should be supposed the latter thing's cause, unless it is evidently apparent that causality should be denied of the former thing. But given that a frequently elicited act is posited, then a habit is posited, and the habit cannot be posited naturally without the act, and there is no reason why [causal] activity ought to be denied of the act. Therefore, the act is an effective cause of the habit. The assumption is clear, for if this activity were to be denied of the act, this would be because either: (i) a habit is not an absolute quality but rather a certain relational item that cannot be a principle or a terminus of any operation, or (ii) a habit can be totally caused by a power alone, or (iii) an act is caused by a habit and not the converse on pain of circularity. The first does not prevent [ascribing causal activity to the act] because it was disproved earlier.[13] Nor does the second, because if a power is the total cause of a habit, then it can cause a habit without any act at all; but this is false, because at least a first act can be caused without any habit, but not vice versa. Nor does the third prevent this, because in partial causes there can indeed be a circle [of causes]; consequently, an act can be a cause of a habit, and that habit can be the cause of another act, and so on in succession.

How Habits Are Generated in the Sensitive Part: Aquinas's View

23 Regarding the third issue, there is a great difficulty about the sensitive part: from what acts are habits generated in the sensitive part? For there seems to be nothing other than passions in a sensitive appetite; but a passion does not seem to generate a habit since it ought to be restrained by a habit. So, it is said about this that there is an order to the generation of this sort of habit: First, there is a natural power [in the sensitive part] as a foundation. Second, there is a natural leaning

[13] *Rep.* III, q. 7 (*OTh* VI: 192–219), pp. 197–199.

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[*habilitas*] that is called "character" [*mos*]; *Ethics* VI speaks of this, saying that there are some natural virtues and some principal virtues.[14] Third, in [a sensitive power] there is a passion or passible quality by which [the power] is moved to what is good and is turned away from what is bad. Fourth, there is an act that is elicited frequently concerning the aforementioned matter [namely, the passion]. Fifth, the generation of a habit follows. Sixth, elicited acts then follow from the perfectly virtuous habit.[15]

24 Against this: First, contrary to the first claim, when he says that there are "leanings" of this sort in an appetitive power, this seems to be false. For it is pointless to do with more what can be done with fewer; but different leanings are caused in the body – not in the power – just by bodily variation in constitution, just as someone because of a bodily disposition can lean more toward an act of temperance than to an act of fortitude (and vice versa). This is why these leanings vary according to age (i.e., there is a different leaning in a young man than in an old man), and why in the very same individual a leaning is greater at one time and lesser at another time. From this it is clear that such leanings should be posited in the body; consequently, it is pointless to posit them in the power.

25 His other saying – namely, that a passion precedes an act – is false and contrary to what the Philosopher says in *Ethics* II. For the Philosopher says that in the soul there are only three things: namely, passions, powers, and habits.[16] But it is obvious that there are acts in the soul, and so by "passion" the Philosopher means "act."

26 You might object that the Philosopher includes sensible representations under "power" and includes acts under "passion." Contrary to this, if this were granted, then he would not establish what he intended, because he argues that virtue is a habit on the basis that it is neither a power nor a passion. But if passion is distinguished from act, then this argument is not sound, because it can be objected that a virtue is something other than a power or a passion, such as an act or a representation. So then, his argument would be void.

27 Additionally, it is clear from his own example that by "passion" he means "act." For he says, "And indeed, I call desire, anger, fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendship, hatred, desire, fervor, and justice

[14] Aristotle, *NE* VI.13 (1144b1–10).

[15] I take it that this is intended to be a summary of Aquinas's position, though Aquinas never presents it in precisely these terms. See, e.g., *ST* Ia–IIae, q. 53, aa. 1–2 and q. 58, a. 1; *Scriptum super Sententiis* III, d. 33, q. 1, a. 2; *Commentary on the Books of the Ethics*, Book II, Lecture 11; and *QDV*, a. 9.

[16] Aristotle, *NE* II.5 (1105b20).

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'passions'."[17] But all of these are acts of an appetitive power. Therefore, etc.

How Habits Are Generated in the Sensitive Part: Ockham's View

28 So, I agree with the Philosopher that in the soul there are only passions, powers, and habits; that passions are themselves acts of the sensitive part; and that by "passion" the Philosopher means act. This is proved as follows: Every passion is either pleasure or distress or something that leads to one of those two. But neither pleasure nor distress is a passion; for according to the Philosopher pleasure and distress are what follow passion, and therefore they are not passions themselves. Therefore, a passion is something that leads to pleasure and distress. But nothing leads to them except acts. Therefore, a passion, properly speaking, is an act, and this is what the Philosopher means; nor is there any difference between an act and a passion, when speaking properly about passion.

29 Nevertheless, it should be known that 'passion' is taken in three senses. In one sense, 'passion' is taken properly, and in this way it is taken for an act that is elicited from a sensitive appetitive power, an act that is effectively caused by an apprehension (i.e., a sensitive cognition, either intuitive or abstractive) as one partial cause and by that appetitive power as another partial cause.

30 Note here that this sort of habit can be generated in a sensitive appetite of any interior or exterior sense; and then that apprehension (i.e., sensitive cognition, whether it is intuitive or abstractive) will be an efficient partial cause with respect to the first act elicited from the sensitive power. (The external sensible object will not be a cause.) The Philosopher calls that first act of an appetite a passion, and it generates a habit in such an appetite in the aforementioned way.

31 In another sense, 'passion' is taken improperly for the pleasure or distress that follows a passion (speaking in the first sense). But 'passion' is taken improperly in this sense.

32 The first sense of 'passion' can be taken broadly, and in this way it is taken for every act of a sensitive appetite. That first sense of 'passion' can be taken in another way, strictly, and in this sense it is taken for an intense and forceful act [of a sensitive appetite], an act that forcefully pushes one to perform an exterior act. Thus these two senses are distinguished only to the extent that the act is more or less intense. This is clear according to the Philosopher in *Ethics* II, chapter 8, where he

[17] Aristotle, *NE* II.5 (1105b21–23). Note that Aristotle closes the list with pity rather than justice.

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says that virtue concerns passions and operations. "For in such things there is excess, deficiency, and a mean: e.g., fear, confidence, desiring, aversion, anger, pity, and, in general, pleasure and distress."[18]

33 It follows from this that passions are not objects [of virtuous acts], passions are not related to habits as their objects, nor are passions the matter of virtues that are in the sensitive part. Rather, passions are acts that generate habits, and they are also effectively elicited from those habits or virtues, because that virtue of the sensitive part cannot have different acts elicited from it.

That Habits of Different Species Are Generated from Acts of Different Species

34 Regarding the fourth issue, I say that, in general, habits that belong to distinct species are generated from acts that belong to distinct species. In every case, there is as much distinction among the habits as there is among the acts, and vice versa. This is clear because an act generates a habit, therefore, etc.

35 Additionally, there is as much distinction among moral habits as there is among intellectual habits. But intellectual habits are distinct in species according to the distinction among intellectual acts, as was made clear in Book I, in the question on the unity of a body of knowledge.[19] There it was proved that the habit and act that concern one sentence belong to a different species than do the habit and act that concern some other sentence, for both actual and habitual cognition of the one sentence are compatible with both actual and habitual error concerning some other sentence. Therefore, moral habits are distinct in species according to the distinction among moral acts.

36 Additionally, every habit inclines immediately only to acts that are similar to the acts from which the habit was generated. But if the habits did not vary in species as the acts varied in species, then multiple habits of the same species would incline to acts of different species; consequently, some habit would incline immediately to some act that is not similar in species to the act from which that habit was generated, which is false.

37 Nevertheless, it should be known that one habit can incline to acts of distinct species, but only insofar as it immediately inclines to one act and mediately inclines to some other act (or to multiple other acts). For a habit concerning a premise immediately inclines to an

[18] Aristotle, *NE* II.6 (1106b16–19).
[19] *Ord.*, Prol., q. 8 (*OTh* I: 207–225), pp. 218–219.

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elicited act concerning that premise, and by means of that act the habit mediately inclines to an elicited act concerning a conclusion, and by means of that second act the first habit can incline to an act concerning some other conclusion, and so on for multiple conclusions in order. Then the first habit is ordered to the first act as an immediate cause to its immediate effect; and the first habit is ordered to the second act and the third act (and so on for the successive acts) as a remote cause to a remote effect, for it is a cause of a cause.

Four Worries

38 There are some worries against what has been said. The first worry concerns when it was said that virtue is not in us by nature, because in *Ethics* VI, chapter 16, the Philosopher distinguishes between natural virtues and principal virtues. Hence, it seems that he posits some natural habits, and he calls them virtues that are less than the principal virtues. This is why he says: "But natural virtue is similar to principal virtue in this way. For it seems to everyone that each sort of character exists from nature in some way; indeed, we are just, temperate, brave, and have the other [virtues] immediately from birth."[20] And so the Commentator says after this that "It is obvious from the common opinion of the ancients that one virtue is natural and another is principal." He means that there are some natural habits that incline to acts and some principal habits that are acquired after acts.[21]

39 Additionally, the argument that was given[22] does not seem to be sound, because it is not unfitting for the same effect to have multiple equivocal causes. For example, the same heat can be produced by either the sun or a fire. Therefore, it does not seem unfitting for a habit to first be generated without an act and afterwards to be strengthened by an act.

40 The second worry is that it seems that a passion is not the same as an act of a sensitive appetite, because we praise and blame on account of acts; but we do not praise and blame on account of passions, according to *Ethics* II.[23] Therefore, etc.

41 Additionally, contrary acts are not elicited from virtues of the same species, because a virtue inclines according to the mode of its nature. But there can be contrary passions with respect to the same virtue: e.g., temperance concerns both pleasure and distress, courage

[20] Aristotle, *NE* VI.13 (1144b3–7).
[21] Eustratius of Nicaea, *In Nicomachean Ethics* VI, c. 17.
[22] See **[12]**.
[23] Aristotle, *NE* II.5 (1105b31–1106a2).

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concerns both fear and confidence, and in every case every virtue concerns passions of both excess and deficiency. Therefore, etc.

42 Additionally, if passions were the same as acts, then someone who is more marked by passion would be more virtuous. This is false and contrary to the views of everyone.

43 Additionally, virtue is for calming passions, not stirring them up. So, individuals who are marked by passion are either not virtuous or they are less disposed to the virtues.

44 Additionally, according to *Ethics* VI, a temperate individual does not have malformed desires as a self-controlled individual does.[24] But it is obvious that the former has passions; therefore, etc.

45 Additionally, if passions were the same as acts, then passions could be posited in the will just as they are posited in the sensitive part. For morally good and bad acts are posited in the will, and those [kinds of acts] are passions according to your [i.e., Ockham's] view. But this conclusion is false and contrary to the views of everyone, who all posit that passions are only in the sensitive part.

46 The third worry is that it seems that there are not distinct habits on account of distinct acts, because according to the Philosopher there can be one prudence even though it contains multiple acts concerning different virtues, since there seems to be just one prudence for all the virtues. Therefore, notwithstanding that there are multiple acts, there still can be one habit with respect to all of them.

47 The fourth worry is about the connection among the moral virtues.

Response to the Worry about Natural Virtues

48 In response to the first worry,[25] I say that according to the Philosopher in *On the Soul* II a bodily disposition greatly disposes an individual to knowledge, for he says that those with soft flesh are more mentally adept.[26] Hence, one individual is more disposed to virtues due to the constitution of their body, while another individual is more disposed to vices; and insofar as an individual is disposed to one or the other, they are thus more inclined to the one or to the other. The Philosopher (and also the Commentator) calls natural dispositions of this sort "natural virtues,"[27] and it is clear that this is his intention, because he says that such virtues are found in non-human animals and in children; but in children there are no such habits that have been

[24] Aristotle, *NE* VII.9 (1151b35–1152a2). See also Ockham's account of temperance and self-control in *Var. Ques.*, q. 6, a. 10, translated in chapter 16 of this volume.
[25] See **[38]**.
[26] Aristotle, *On the Soul* II.9 (421a25–26).
[27] Aristotle, *NE* VI.13 (1144b1–10).

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generated from acts, but only bodily dispositions, and in non-human animals, different animals are disposed by them to different things in different ways. They are in [adult] humans in the same way; and just as in non-human animals and in children these dispositions are not habits generated from acts, so neither are they habits in [adult] humans. However, if 'habit' is taken to mean any inclination to an act, then such qualities could be called habits in that sense, both in humans and in non-human animals.

You might object that the Commentator says in *Ethics* VI, comment 6: "'It seems to everyone that each sort of character exists from nature in some way.' For we call 'character' those characteristics that are in souls from nature; that is, the features that are not only in rational beings but also in irrational beings."[28] And he says that these are virtues perfecting the soul, not just bodily virtues. 49

I respond that these [bodily dispositions] are not in the soul formally and do not have the soul as their subject, but they are in the soul in this way, that a quality of this sort cannot [result] in the act to which it is apt to incline except through the mediation of the soul. For example: the disposition that inclines a lion to bravery and confidence does not have a sensitive appetite as its subject (speaking here about the disposition that precedes every elicited act); rather, it is in the body. But this sort of disposition does not incline to an act of bravery unless the soul concurs. Hence, the Commentator says, "Just as we say that by nature a lion is brave, confident, hardy, and disregarding of terrors, so we also say that a fox is clever and cunning."[29] 50

In response to the second argument,[30] I say that plurality should not be posited without necessity. But there does not appear to be any necessity for positing different causes with respect to the generation of a habit and the strengthening of it. So, it is superfluous to posit it in this case. 51

Response to the Worry about Passions

In response to the second worry,[31] I say that different things should be said about acts and habits of the sensitive part than about acts and habits of the rational part. For the habits of the sensitive part do not relate to passions as the objects of those habits; this is because passions are the acts that are elicited in a sensitive appetite from a habit, and these acts also generate habits in the same part. Both the habits of a 52

[28] Eustratius of Nicaea, *In Nicomachean Ethics* VI, c. 17.
[29] Eustratius of Nicaea, *In Nicomachean Ethics* VI, c. 17.
[30] See **[39]**.
[31] See **[40]**.

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sensitive appetite and the acts that are called passions have other things for their objects, such as an act of an executive power. For example, when I want to eat, an act of eating is the object both of that act [of wanting] and of the habit in the sensitive appetite.

That these passions are elicited acts is clear both by example and by argument. For example, anger is supposed to be a passion, and being angry is an act of a sensitive appetite; and it does not seem that anger and being angry are in any way distinct.

Similarly, according to the Philosopher hatred is a passion of the sensitive part,[32] but one should not suppose there are two kinds of hatred there, one a passion and the other an act. The case of desire is similar; there are not two kinds of desire there, one a passion and the other an act.

Similarly, the Philosopher says in *On the Soul* II that a movement of an appetitive power is when there is an imagination of a good or bad thing together with the passions.[33] And he says that those movements are passions. But those movements are acts. Therefore, passions are acts.

Additionally, in *Ethics* II he says, "we call powers those things in virtue of which we are able to be affected, that is, those things in virtue of which we receive passions."[34] But powers are named with respect to their elicited acts; therefore, etc.

53 You might ask to which sense appetite the acts that generate those habits belong. I respond that they belong to the appetites of the imagination and of the internal senses, but not of the external senses. The reason for this is that those habits should only be posited in an appetite that is more inclined after an act is elicited than it was before. But the appetite of the imagination (that is, the appetite that accompanies the imagination) is of this sort, for when an object has been apprehended by the imagination and an act of wanting has been elicited, then in the appetite accompanying the imagination it is frequently the case that this appetite is more inclined to a similar act than it was before, whether that object exists or not, whether it is present or not. Consequently, in the appetite accompanying the imagination one must posit this sort of habit that is generated from acts, concerning an object of any sense to the extent that it is imagined.

But from the fact that an individual on one occasion wanted some visible thing that was apprehended by vision, that individual does not perceive themselves to be more inclined to wanting that visible object

[32] Aristotle, *NE* II.5 (1105b22).
[33] Aristotle, *On the Soul* III.10 (433a19–30).
[34] Aristotle, *NE* II.5 (1105b24–26).

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when it is apprehended again than they were at the first apprehension – and everyone has experienced this for themselves. So, in that sort of appetite a quality or habit is not generated from the acts; and just as they are not generated in the one external sense, so also not in any other external sense. From this it appears that acts of a sensitive appetite are caused by means of abstractive sensitive cognition, not by intuitive cognition, although perhaps this is not the case in the intellective appetite. I say this is true whenever an act of a sensitive appetite presupposes apprehension.

54 But if an act of a sensitive appetite does not necessarily presuppose cognition, then it is totally caused by the appetitive power and some corporeal qualities. For example, if a newborn child continued to lack the use of all its external senses, that child, so it would seem, will still be hungry and thirsty. Consequently, the child would want food and drink, and yet their appetite does not presuppose any cognition, because according to the case there is nothing in their external senses, nor in their imagination (since imagination only has acts concerning things that have been previously sensed). But it is different with respect to acts of the will that generate virtues, because some of those acts have acts of a sensitive appetite for their common objects, though (as was said earlier) other acts of the will have an act of an executive power for their object.

55 For example, not only can I will to eat according to the appropriate circumstances, I also can will to have the want for eating according to the appropriate circumstances. The common object of the first willing is an act of an executive power; the common object of the second is an act of a sensitive appetite. From this it is clear that these passions are not acts elicited from the will or from a habit existing in the will; rather, these passions are only in the sensitive part. Hence, habits in the will relate to these passions in the sensitive part as to their common objects, and also as to acts that are commanded and caused by those habits by means of an elicited act and command of the will. Or, perhaps, the act of the will is a mediate cause of those passions, because it is the cause of their cause; for the immediate cause [of the passion] is a partial apprehension that precedes this sort of act that is called a passion. But sometimes habits of the will relate to operations of the executive powers as to their objects, and the passions are partial efficient principles of those operations.

56 Because of this, I respond to the first argument[35] that, according to the meaning of the Philosopher, passions are indifferently related to praise and blame; they do not determine in themselves praise or

[35] See **[40]**.

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blame. The reason for this is that, according to the Philosopher, many circumstances are required for an act of virtue to be praiseworthy: namely, that the act be fitting with respect to both place and time; that the act be done when it ought to be done, as it ought to be done, and where it ought to be done; and so on for the other circumstances. But passions, insofar as they are passions, in themselves precisely determine none of these circumstances; they do so only to the extent that they are conformed to right or erroneous reason and to a good or bad willing, and this reason and willing are what the circumstances primarily pertain to as partial objects. So, passions, insofar as they are passions, are not praiseworthy or blameworthy.

But when passions are elicited together with the appropriate circumstances (e.g., when they are conformed to right reason and to a good willing), then someone is praised on account of passions of this sort. But when passions are elicited with inappropriate circumstances (e.g., when they are conformed to a morally bad willing and to erroneous reason or against the judgment of right reason), then someone is blamed on account of such passions.

Indeed, it is not the case that praise and blame pertain to these passions intrinsically, but only by extrinsic denomination; they are denominated as good or bad due to their conformity to a good or bad willing. For example, no one is praised or blamed because they feel afraid or because they become angry. However, an individual who is afraid to approach some terrible things when they should do so (and so on for the other circumstances) is blamed because of the vicious act of willing that is not appropriately characterized by the circumstances, and someone who is not afraid is praised. The same is the case with respect to being angry.

57 In response to the next worry,[36] I say that moral virtue in the will (which is virtue properly speaking) does not incline to contrary acts as an effective and elicitive principle, but it does incline to an act that relates to contraries as partial and common objects. So, a virtuous act of the will can be terminated in fear or confidence, which are acts of the sensitive part and are not elicited from the virtue in the will. For just as the intellect can by a single act formally dictate both that (i) one should be afraid at a specific time and place (and so on for the other circumstances) and that (ii) one should be confident at some other time and in such determinate circumstances, so the will can will by one act both to be afraid and to be confident with those same circumstances, such that both the act of the intellect and the act of the will are terminated in fear and in confidence as the common objects of

[36] See **[41]**.

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those acts. Hence, those acts are not immediately elicited from a habit of the will, but they are commanded by means of acts that are elicited from such habits. In this way the same habit can be a cause of contrary effects and can incline to contrary acts by means of other [acts], though it cannot do so immediately.

However, regarding the Philosopher's way of speaking, I say that he means that courage inclines to an act of the will that is not terminated in either fear or confidence, but it inclines toward an act that is terminated in or that commands an act of a sensitive appetite, an act by which those passions are denied. So, courage inclines to the denial of each act (both fear and confidence) because those passions are extremes and they connote vice in an act; but it inclines to an act of the sensitive part in the aforementioned way, an act that ought not be called fear or confidence. Rather, this act ought to have the denomination 'mean,' as the act ought to be a midpoint and as the midpoint of the extremes it ought to be incompatible with the extremes.

You might ask regarding the aforementioned way whether a single act of the intellect and will could be terminated in both fear and confidence at one and the same time in the sensitive part as in distinct acts and objects. 58

You also might ask whether a virtuous act in the will is an efficient cause of those acts in the sensitive part. 59

Regarding the first question, some argue that one act cannot be terminated in both fear and confidence at the same time because it is impossible that contraries naturally inhere in the same thing simultaneously. Fear and confidence concerning the same thing (if they are different acts) are contraries. Therefore, they cannot exist at the same time in a sensitive appetite, and consequently an act of courage (which is a moral virtue in the will) cannot be terminated in such acts at one and the same time. 60

Regarding the second question, some argue that a virtuous act in the will is not an efficient cause of those acts in the sensitive part because those passions are partial objects or common objects of the virtuous act in the will.[37] So, those passions are partial causes of that act of the will, and therefore that act is not a partial cause of them, at least not with respect to the same things. 61

I respond to the first question that one act cannot be simultaneously terminated in both fear and confidence for the reason that was provided, namely that contraries cannot at one and the same time inhere in the same thing. However, one act can be terminated in confidence and another act of another courage (or of the same virtue) can 62

[37] Reading *in voluntate* with manuscripts BDFGL against the edition's *et voluntatis*.

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be terminated in fear according to the determinate circumstances. E.g., if right reason were to dictate that one should fear at one time, then the will can virtuously will to be afraid, and if right reason were to dictate that one should be confident at another time, then the will can will to be confident. These volitions can belong to different courages if they are different acts, one an act that virtuously inclined to being afraid and not to being confident, while the other act inclines to being confident and not to being afraid; or they can belong to the same courage if that same courage inclines to will to be afraid at one time and inclines to will to be confident at another time.

63 In response to the second question,[38] I say that an act of virtue in the will is a partial cause of a passion in a sensitive appetite, an act I call "commanding" insofar as at its command a passion of this sort can be elicited. But that act in a sensitive appetite (that is, a passion that is a common object of a virtue) is not an efficient cause of that act [of virtue in the will]; and right reason, place, time, end, or any circumstance that is a partial object of the virtuous act in the will is also not an efficient cause of that act.

64 In response to the next worry,[39] I say that to the degree that someone is more marked by passion at a time and place where it is proper to be so (and so on for the other circumstances), then that individual is called more virtuous and more disposed to virtue, because one can only be marked by passion in this way when multiple acts that are virtuous according to the appropriate circumstances are elicited in the will, acts from which a virtue (properly speaking) is generated and strengthened. And to the degree that someone is more marked by passion at a time and place where it is not proper to be so (and so on for the other inappropriate circumstances), then that individual is more vicious as a result of that contrary cause.

Nevertheless, according to a common way of speaking, an individual is called "more marked by passion" when they have forceful acts or motions that are contrary to the judgment of reason; speaking in this way, to the degree that someone is more marked by passion they are indeed more vicious, rather than more virtuous.

65 In response to the next worry,[40] I say that it belongs to virtue to stir up the passions when and where (and so on) it is proper to do so, because a virtue can be a partial cause of a passion by means of its elicited act, as was said above.[41] It does belong to virtue to settle and restrain vicious passions (whether they are excesses or deficiencies)

[38] See **[59]**.
[39] See **[42]**.
[40] See **[43]**.
[41] See **[63]**.

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and to bring them back to the mean according to the appropriate circumstances, and virtue has to stir up these sort of passions that consist in a mean. For example, someone who does not have any passions at all is insensible and vicious, just as someone who never eats is called vicious; and someone who has excessive passions is called vicious, just as is someone who is always eating. But an individual who eats when and where (and so on) it is proper to do so is called virtuous. So virtue has to stir up passions in one way, and in another way it has to settle and restrain them.

In response to the next worry,[42] I say that temperance and self- 66
control differ only with respect to more and less, because they belong to the same species. The temperate individual has perfect virtue, while the self-controlled individual has imperfect virtue; and both the temperate individual and the self-controlled individual have malformed desires in the sensitive part, and neither one follows them. But the difference between them is this: The temperate individual does not have desires that are excessive and so forceful as to be almost indefeasible; their desires are weakened. The self-controlled individual, however, has malformed desires that are surpassing and almost indefeasible; yet the self-controlled individual does not follow those desires just as the temperate individual does not.

Another difference is that since the temperate individual has weakened and tepid desires in the sensitive appetite, they can elicit a virtuous act according to a habit of virtue (an intense act, I say) and can do so with great pleasure in the will, pleasure that surpasses the pleasure following the desire in the sensitive appetite, so that not only does the temperate individual conquer their desire, but they elicit an intense virtuous act with forceful pleasure.

But the self-controlled individual (who has excessive desires) does rightly follow (according to imperfect virtue) the judgment of reason and not their desires (indeed, this individual spurns their desires) in such a way that they are not blameworthy for the desires since they resist them. Because of this resistance, they can earn merit to the extent that they will to only follow the judgment of reason that dictates that such desires should be spurned, even though they do not follow the judgment of reason that dictates that the opposite act that is virtuous ought to be elicited. Either (i) they are unable to elicit the virtuous act that is opposed to a perfectly vicious act because of the force of the passions in the sensitive part, which they cannot entirely settle, or (ii) if they are able to do this, then that act is elicited with little to no pleasure (indeed, it is as if it is elicited with distress), and so it

[42] See **[44]**.

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will be a much less intense act. This is how the self-controlled individual differs from the temperate one.

67 As an example of this, Paul says, "A torment of the flesh was given to me,"[43] and yet it is certain that he did not earn demerit because of this; rather, he earned great merit. This is clear from what he himself says in that very place: for he says that "virtue is made perfect in weakness."[44] So, perhaps, Paul had self-control but not temperance.

Response to the Worry about Prudence

68 In response to the next worry[45] concerning the unity of prudence, I answer about the unity of prudence in a way analogous to the unity of habits. In the prologue it was said that there is one habitual and actual prudence about a premise and a different habitual and actual prudence about a conclusion.[46] There are as many distinct habits of prudence, and likewise as many distinct acts of prudence, as there are distinct sentences concerning which there can be prudence. Also, there can be one habit of prudence by means of which both a premise and a conclusion are understood, just as the same was said in the prologue concerning wisdom. The same arguments given there apply here, and the very same things should be said throughout; so this will be passed by at this time.

69 You might ask whether every practical cognition can be called prudence. I respond that it cannot, because practical cognition – especially cognition that is knowledge [*notitia scientifica*] – is about universal and necessary things. Prudence, however, is more concerned with particular things that we are capable of doing. Hence there is as great a difference between practical cognition and prudence as there is between experience and technical skill, because technical skill is of universals and experience is of particulars. Hence, all prudence is practical [cognition], but not conversely.

70 But what then is the difference between technical skill and prudence? I respond that prudence dictates about something we are capable of doing, but technical skill does not. But what then of practical technical skill? I say that it is practical because it directs practical activity or directs something we are capable of doing, even though it does not dictate that the practical activity should be elicited. For example, the technical skill of building a house does not dictate that a house should be built; it only dictates that a house ought to be

[43] 2 Corinthians 12:7.
[44] 2 Corinthians 12:9.
[45] See **[46]**.
[46] *Ord.*, Prol., q. 8 (*OTh* I: 207–225), pp. 217–220.

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composed of wood and stone arranged in such and such a way. So the technical skill directs to the extent that, if a house is built, it directs the process of building so that it is built in such and such a way.

Response to the Worry about the Connection of the Virtues

In response to the next worry[47] concerning the connection of the virtues, I say that something different should be said about the habits in the sensitive part than about those in the rational part. Speaking of the first kind of habits, I say that they are not connected in a perfect or an imperfect degree. The reason for this is that a habit is generated from acts, but someone can have an act that generates one habit even though they do not have an act that generates some other habit, and they are able to perform the former act frequently (e.g., someone can have an act of temperance even though they do not have an act of courage). 71

This argument is confirmed as follows: When some habit is generated from acts that do not relate to the object of some other habit, then that first habit can be perfectly acquired without acquiring the other. And neither the acts nor the habit of courage relate to the object of temperance in particular (although perhaps they do so in general). Therefore, etc. 72

Concerning habits in the rational part, however, one difficulty concerns the connection of prudence with the moral virtues. Regarding this, I say that there is no impossibility in prudence existing without the moral virtues. This is proved as follows: Any act that can coexist with an act opposed to a virtue can generate a habit without that virtue. But an act of prudence is of this sort. This is proved as follows: The will can will the opposite of what is dictated by reason; hence, if the intellect were to dictate that every sweet thing should be tasted, the will can be at odds with reason and can will the opposite (it can also refrain from every act). And an act by which the will wills the opposite of what is dictated by reason is contrary to the judgment of reason, and consequently it is a vicious act. Therefore, prudence can coexist without any act of that virtue [of temperance]. And just as this was argued about one virtue, so it can be argued about any other. 73

A second difficulty is about the connection of the moral virtues with prudence. Regarding this, I say that perfect moral virtue cannot exist without prudence, and, consequently, there is a necessary connection between the moral virtues and prudence. This is proved as follows: It belongs to the nature of perfect virtue and its act that it is 74

[47] See **[47]**.

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elicited in conformity to right reason, since this is how it is defined by the Philosopher in *Ethics* II.[48] And right reason is prudence, either in act or in habit.

75 You might object that when some loveable$_D$ object is shown [to the will] without any dictate of reason then the will can love$_D$ that thing, and that this [act] is morally good because it loves$_D$ something that should be loved$_D$ and loves$_D$ it in the same way (and so on). E.g., if the sentence "this good thing is loveable$_D$" is formed and the intellect does not assent to it, then there is a worry whether that love$_D$ is morally good.

76 I respond that although that act is good according to its genus and it is not morally bad, nevertheless the act is not virtuous. This is because it belongs to the nature of a virtuous act (i) that it is elicited in conformity to right reason, (ii) that it is about an appropriate object, and (iii) that the one having the act knows this. (This is why the Philosopher says in *Ethics* II that "first one must know, then one must choose."[49]) Hence if all the other circumstances required for an act to be virtuous are posited but right reason is not, then the act will not be perfectly virtuous.

Also, it should be known that the intellect's act of dictating is not formally a sentence; rather, it is an act of assenting to or dissenting from a sentence that has already been formed.[50] It is from this act of assenting that prudence is generated, rather than from the formation of the sentence.

77 You might ask about a simple act of willing by which the will unconditionally loves$_D$ something without any circumstances, whether numerically the same act of willing could later be directed or regulated by prudence or by some practical cognition.

78 I respond that this case can be understood in two ways. Understood one way, that some second act of willing is elicited according to the right circumstances, all of which are circumstances to which the first act of willing can be in conformity, so that the first act is called good by extrinsic denomination. I say that in this way the first act can be directed by prudence and by the other act of willing, as was said earlier.[51] But understood another way, that the same unchanged act of willing becomes conformed to right reason together with the other circumstances: this cannot happen. This is so because

[48] Aristotle, *NE* II.2 (1103b32–34).
[49] Aristotle, *NE* II.4 (1105a30–32).
[50] Ockham discusses the difference between the act of forming/apprehending a mental sentence and the act of assenting/dissenting to that sentence in *Ord.*, Prol., q. 1 (*OTh* I: 3–75), pp. 16–22.
[51] *Rep.* III, q. 11, n. 72, translated in chapter 14 of this volume.

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the circumstances (e.g., right reason and the rest) are objects of a virtuous act. And it is in fact impossible that the same act first be terminated in only one object and later be terminated in multiple objects; rather, that necessarily would be a different act. Therefore, it is impossible that the act be related in this way to prudence or practical cognition.

79 You might object that the will can $love_D$ some good thing that is only shown to it by reason, and the intellect can later dictate that that thing should be $loved_D$ in the very way in which the will $loves_D$ it, and so the intellect can dictate that the act [of loving] should be continued.[52]

80 Similarly, a beatified individual seeing the uncovered divine essence can $love_D$ it unconditionally, and their intellect can later dictate that this $love_D$ should be continued in the very way in which the will is $loving_D$. In this case, there is no change in the act; and yet this act was not conformed to right reason at first but was conformed to it later. Therefore, etc.[53]

81 A third difficulty concerns the connection of the moral virtues with each other. Regarding this, I say that it is the intention of both the saints and the philosophers that the virtues are connected; but their connection can be understood in two senses. In one sense, that they are connected with each other formally, so that when one virtue is posited in a perfect or imperfect degree, then by that fact another virtue is also posited in a perfect or imperfect degree. In a second sense, the connection of the virtues can be understood dispositively (i.e., inclinatively) or principiatively.

82 Speaking in the first sense, I say that the virtues are not connected, neither in a perfect degree nor in an imperfect degree. The reason for this is that, just as was said before, a virtue is generated from determinate acts; but someone can elicit an act of one virtue without thinking at all about some other virtue.[54] Therefore, in this way one virtue can be generated without another virtue and can even be strengthened all the way to the maximal degree without the acquisition of another virtue.

83 Speaking about their connection in the second sense, I say that the virtues are connected in two ways. They are connected in one way with respect to practical principles that are general to every virtue. When these principles are put forward they partially imply practical conclusions; when those conclusions are possessed then acts of virtue

[52] No response is given to the objection of **[79]**.
[53] No response is given to the objection of **[80]**. One manuscript has a marginal note that reads, "There's no response here. Go look for it."
[54] See **[71–72]**.

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can be elicited in the will, and without those conclusions acts of virtues cannot be elicited.

For example, here is one such principle: "Everything that is dictated by right reason for the sake of an appropriate end (and so on for the other circumstances) should be done." Another such principle is this: "Every good thing dictated by right reason should be loved$_D$." These and many other principles are common to every virtue, and without them a virtuous act cannot be elicited. And just as these principles are common, so the habits of these principles (which are called "prudence") are common, so that a cognition of [one] common principle is a partial immediate cause of a cognition of a specific conclusion. (I am speaking of actual cognition of both the principle and the conclusion.)

So, if one argues that, "Everything dictated by right reason should be loved$_D$; and it is dictated by right reason that my father (or my mother, or God) should be loved$_D$; therefore, my father should be loved$_D$," then the actual cognition of that principle (e.g., of the major premise) is a partial efficient cause of the actual cognition of the conclusion that my father should be loved, insofar as that is what was dictated by right reason. And just as the cognition of that principle is a partial cause of the cognition of this one specific practical conclusion, so it is also a partial cause of everything that comes after; the actual cognition of this specific conclusion is a partial effective cause of a virtuous act of willing, so that this cognition and the will are together sufficient efficient causes of that virtuous practical activity.

84 The virtues are connected in another way inclinatively and dispositively. That is, if someone has one virtue perfectly, then they have an inclination and a partial efficient principle with respect to every virtue. For example, if someone were to perfectly have virginal chastity, and if someone else were to threaten them with death, harm, or a beating unless they were to have sex, then the individual who perfectly has virginal chastity but no courage (because they never elicited an act of courage before) will choose to endure lashes, harm, and every torture before they will to have sex, and that willing or choice is a first act of courage. The immediate partial efficient cause of this act of courage is an act (or a habit) of virginal chastity (I think it more likely that the act of chastity is the immediate cause of the other act, and the habit of chastity is a mediate cause). Courage is then generated from this first act of choosing torture before losing chastity, and in this way one act of the will can be an efficient cause of another. And just as this is the case for courage, so it is for every moral virtue.

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From this it is clear that no moral virtue is incompatible with any other. Indeed, every virtue is a principle and an effective partial cause of every other. The reason for this is that every perfect moral virtue conforms to right reason (because otherwise it is not virtue, as was said before[55]) and things that are contraries and are formally inconsistent with each other cannot both conform to right reason at one and the same time. Therefore, the virtues are not incompatible with each other. So, virginity and marital chastity are not incompatible, but one inclines to the other as a partial principle, so that an act of one inclines to an act of the other. I say this speaking of interior acts, which are properly and intrinsically virtuous. 85

You might object that the act of virginity is to will to abstain from a man [*vir*] for the sake of God, and the act of marital chastity is to will to be with a husband [*vir*] for the sake of God. But these willings are incompatible; therefore, etc. 86

I respond by saying that the act of virginity is to abstain from a man for the sake of God, and to do this in the way in which God wills for me to abstain. And the act of marital chastity is to will to be with a husband in the way in which God wills for me to be with him. Now, if I were to have a will to abstain from a man in the way in which God wills for me to abstain, and if it were made certain to me by revelation that God wills or commands me to be with a husband, I then acquire marital chastity by willing to be with a husband because God wills it. Nevertheless, I retain virginity because I always have a good will for abstaining from a man in the way that pleases God. 87

The same is true for the case of poverty and generosity; for it would be astonishing for the saints and the philosophers to posit that the moral virtues are connected if they were formally incompatible with each other.

You might object that actually abstaining from every sexual act is required in order to have virginity. And although no sexual act is required in order to have marital chastity (as is clear from the case of Mary and Joseph, since they had marital chastity without any sexual act), nevertheless sexual acts can coexist with such chastity. 88

I respond that what is required for virginity is abstinence from sexual acts in the way in which God wills for there to be such abstinence; similarly, virginity can coexist with a sexual act in the way in which God wills for it to exist. 89

It should be known that right reason is required for perfect and actual virtue. So, infants and those who are insane or drunk, none of whom have the use of reason, do not sin in the sight of God because 90

[55] See **[76]**.

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no one sins out of ignorance, according to Augustine.[56] Hence someone who is drunk (who does not have the use of reason) who commits adultery does not sin, because although they have an act of willing and an intention concerning that act, they still do not have a right dictate of reason and so they do not sin.

[56] Augustine, *On Free Choice* III.19.

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16 On Self-Control, Temperance, and Prudence (Var. Ques., *q.* 6, *a.* 10)

TEXT[1]

On Self-Control, Temperance, and Heroic Virtue

In regards to virtues and vices, it must be known that at the beginning of *Ethics* VII the Philosopher assigns three degrees to the acquisition of virtue and, likewise, three opposing degrees to the acquisition of a vicious habit.[2] The first three are self-control, temperance, and heroic virtue, and they are distinguished as follows. 1

According to the Philosopher, a self-controlled individual is someone who has malformed desires but does not follow them, instead following right reason.[3] I understand this to mean that a self-controlled individual is (i) someone who apprehends some pleasurable object and (ii) wants it with a sensitive appetite, but (iii) right reason dictates the contrary of what is desired by the sensitive appetite, and (iv) the will by its own freedom does not will what the sensitive appetite desires but instead (v) wills what is dictated by right reason, so that right reason is a partial object with respect to that willing, as is made clear elsewhere.[4] A habit in the will follows from this sort of willing being elicited frequently, a habit by which one is inclined to will what is dictated by right reason; and this habit is called self-control by the Philosopher. This habit can coexist with temperance and heroic virtue, just as every virtue can coexist with every other, as is made clear elsewhere.[5] For no matter how much someone is temperate or heroic in their will, if they have the malformed desires just mentioned and have a habit inclining the will to follow right reason then they are still called self-controlled. So it is that 'self-control' principally signifies an inclining habit in the will and connotes an act of desiring in a sensitive appetite. So, the individual is

[1] *OTh* VIII: 272–286. The edition titles this essay "On Virtues and Vices," but I have given it a more representative title.
[2] Aristotle, *NE* VII.1 (1145a15–20).
[3] Aristotle, *NE* VII.9 (1151b35–1152a2).
[4] *Rep.* III, q. 11, nn. 65–78, *Rep.* III, q. 12, nn. 74–90, and *Var. Ques.*, q. 8, translated in chapters 14, 15, and 17 of this volume, respectively.
[5] *Rep.* III, q. 12, nn. 74–90, translated in chapter 15 of this volume. See also *Var. Ques.*, q. 7, a. 3, translated in Wood 1997: 91–141.

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called self-controlled when those acts of desiring exist; when those acts do not exist, the individual is not called self-controlled according to the Philosopher's intention, no matter how much the aforementioned habit of the will (which in reality is the virtue) remains there.

2 'Temperance' and 'a temperate individual' are taken in two senses. First, according to the intention of the Philosopher, for someone who follows and lives according to right reason and who does not have malformed desires. This sense does not distinguish temperance from self-control according to its species, but only according to what is more and less perfect, since entirely the same habit is weak at first and strong afterwards, so much so that those malformed acts in a sensitive appetite are weakened or totally destroyed and a different quality is generated, a quality which instead inclines that sensitive appetite to acts conforming to right reason. I say that this habit is called 'self-control' when it is weak and exists together with [malformed] desires in the sensitive part, and the same habit is called 'temperance' when it is strong and exists without those desires.

3 In another sense, 'temperance' is used strictly and properly for a habit that inclines the will to turn away not just from malformed desires that presently inhere but also from occasions for such desires, according to right reason that dictates not only to will to flee malformed desires but also the occasions for them. For example, apprehending[6] pleasurable objects (e.g., seeing, touching, and hearing such things) are occasions of such acts of desiring in a sensitive appetite. So, right reason dictates not only that the will ought to will to flee such desires, but all the aforementioned occasions for such desires, lest those desires occur.

'Temperance' taken in this sense is distinct in species from self-control, because habits whose objects are distinct in species are in all cases themselves distinct in species. Now in fact, right reason is a partial object of a virtuous act and of a virtuous habit (as is made clear elsewhere[7]), and the object of temperance (in this second sense) is a different right reason, distinct in species, than the right reason that is the object of self-control; that is, stretching the name, it is a different "prudence." For the right reason that is the object of self-control dictates that the will ought to flee malformed desires that presently inhere when it ought to do so, in the way it ought to do so, and so on. But the right reason that is the object of the aforementioned temper-

[6] Reading *apprehendere* with manuscript D for the edition's *appetere*.

[7] *Rep.* III, q. 12, nn. 74–90, and *Var. Ques.*, q. 8, nn. 3–20, translated in chapters 15 and 17 of this volume, respectively.

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ance dictates not only that the will ought to flee malformed desires that actually inhere, but also that it ought to flee all the occasions for such desires; e.g., it dictates that a human should not look at pleasurable things, not touch beautiful things, not listen to shameful talk, and so on for other occasions. These right reasons are distinct in species; therefore, the virtues that have them for their objects are distinct in species.

Temperance in this second sense remains and is denominated thus whether or not the sensible passions inhere. But temperance in the first sense is not called temperance when the malformed desires inhere.

Perseverance is in no way distinct from self-control, because someone who perseveres is one who remains engaged in a virtuous act according to right reason and continues this sort of virtuous act.

'Heroic virtue' is taken in two senses. In one sense, it is taken for a habit that inclines to some act that is beyond and contrary to the common condition of humans and that is contrary to natural inclination, and this as a result of the act's genus and its nature. For instance, enduring death and being burned up by fire for the sake of the common good and the Catholic faith. 4

In another sense, 'heroic virtue' is taken for a habit that inclines to some act that does not surpass the common condition of humans as a result of the act's nature, but which does nevertheless surpass the common condition of humans as a result of some circumstance of the act. For example, someone has chastity to such a degree that they will to not fornicate for anything contrary to right reason. Willing-against fornicating does not surpass the common condition of humans, but willing-against fornicating with respect to this circumstance (which is universal right reason) does surpass the common condition of humans. This is so because it is a willing-against fornicating such that, even if right reason were to dictate that one should readily endure a penalty of imprisonment or death rather than engage in fornication, such a will ought to will this sort of penalty before it would lose chastity. 5

Each of the aforementioned senses can be divided, because a habit that inclines to an act surpassing the common condition of humans (whether as a result of the act's nature or as a result of some circumstance) can incline to an interior act in the will in such a way that it is then prepared to elicit an exterior act that conforms to the interior act; or else the habit only inclines to the interior act without it being the case that the individual who has this sort of act is prepared to elicit the exterior act. 6

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7 The Philosopher speaks of heroic virtue in the first sense.[8] So, according to him, someone is perfectly heroic who has a habit in the will that inclines to an act of willing-for or willing-against that exceeds the common condition of humans (either as a result of the act's nature or as a result of a circumstance, as just discussed), and because of this they are prepared to perform an exterior deed conforming to the interior act. E.g., someone who wills (with a willing elicited from the habit) to be burned up in order to preserve faith, and later, before faith falters, willingly endures such burning of their body, I say that individual is perfectly heroic according to the meaning of the Philosopher. Or, if someone were to have a habit inclining them to will-against fornication for any reason contrary to right reason that can be imposed on them, and if right reason were to then dictate that they ought to readily endure injuries and lashing of their body rather than engage in fornication, and if they endure such things willingly, then that individual is perfectly heroic.

8 Speaking in the second sense (about the sort of habit that inclines only to an interior act, without any consequent exterior act), this is called "perfect virtue" but not heroic virtue (properly speaking), according to the meaning of the Philosopher and[9] according to common usage. This is because 'heroic virtue' principally signifies the habit in the will and it connotes the connected exterior act when that act ought to be done (and so on [for the other circumstances]). So, if someone were to have the sort of habit in the will by which they are inclined to will-for or will-against something that surpasses the common condition of humans (either as a result of the act's nature or as a result of some circumstance), and yet they are neither inclined nor prepared to perform the exterior deed in conformity to that willing, that individual most perfectly has the habit that is heroic virtue, although it is not denominated as heroic except when it is followed by an exterior act.

9 You may ask whether – while this willing-against concerning fornication according to universal right reason persists in the will (e.g., willing-against fornicating for something that is contrary to right reason), and while there persists the intellect's dictate that one should readily endure the penalty of imprisonment rather than fornicating or willing to fornicate – whether such an individual is necessitated to will the penalty of imprisonment. I respond that they are, while the intellect's act and the will's act both persist.

[8] That is, the first sense of **[6]**, which applies to the senses of both **[4]** and **[5]**.
[9] Reading *et* instead of the edition's *est*.

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If it is objected that then they will not receive merit in willing to endure that punishment, this is true because that act is not within their power, but they do receive merit because of the preceding act of willing that concerns the act of fornicating. 10

But with both of the aforementioned acts persisting in the intellect and will, surely the individual is not necessitated to perform the exterior deed, e.g., to willingly enter prison if they are threatened with the penalty of imprisonment? I respond that they are necessitated, because they enter prison (so long as they are not prevented) with the same necessity by which they are necessitated to will to enter prison. This is because that willing seems to be sufficient (together with God and with the other executive powers) to cause that [exterior] act, and those are all natural causes. Therefore, with those acts persisting and with nothing impeding, the [exterior] action necessarily follows. But then how is that action meritorious? Here one should give the same reply as about the preceding act of willing.[10] 11

But then there is a worry how heroic virtue is distinguished from self-control and from temperance. I respond that they are distinguished in species on account of a reason touched on earlier, namely, that they have objects that are distinct in species; for the latter two have particular right reason for their object, but heroic virtue has universal right reason for its object. Since these two reasons are distinct in species, therefore the habits (of which those reasons are the objects) are distinct in species. From this it is clear that John errs when he posits that these virtues belong to the same species and that they differ only according to degree (weak, more perfect, and most perfect);[11] for they differ not only in this way but also in species. For no matter how much the habit of the will that is self-control is strengthened to infinity, it will never become heroic virtue, nor even temperance. This is because heroic virtue has a different object (indeed, many different objects), which neither temperance nor self-control incline toward in any way. 12

But there is a worry whether, at the generation of these habits in the will, other qualities are generated in a sensitive appetite, qualities that incline to [exterior] acts conforming to the interior acts. Also, if this is so, how these qualities are distinguished in the sensitive appetite. 13

I respond to the first worry[12] that, at the generation of self-control in the will, no quality is generated in a sensitive appetite that inclines 14

[10] I.e., the same reply as given in **[10]**; the preceding act of willing is meritorious, but the action necessitated by that willing is not meritorious.
[11] Scotus, *Ord.* III, d. 34, q. un., n. 84.
[12] Namely, the first worry of **[13]**.

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to acts conforming to self-control. This is because a self-controlled individual, properly speaking, has malformed desires in a sensitive appetite, desires from which there instead is generated a quality that inclines to an act contrary to self-control, rather than inclining to an act conforming to self-control. But at the generation of temperance in the will (whether 'temperance' is taken in the first sense or the other sense), there follows either a weakening of those acts [i.e., the malformed desires] in a sensitive appetite, or else they are entirely destroyed. The temperate individual (in the second sense spoken of previously), by their act of willing-against, does not only flee desires that [presently] inhere but also flees the occasions for such desires, and so by an act of temperance those acts can be entirely destroyed. The same should be said about heroic virtue.

15 But couldn't there be some positive qualities that are generated in a sensitive appetite at the generation of these habits of temperance and heroic virtue?

16 I respond that there are some virtues in the will such that there are acts in the sensitive part corresponding to those virtues, acts that can be called virtuous or vicious by some extrinsic denomination, as is the case for temperance concerning food, drink, marital chastity, etc. But for some virtues there are no corresponding acts of this sort in a sensitive appetite, e.g., virginity and poverty. There are some qualities in a sensitive appetite corresponding to the virtues of the first kind, e.g., some quality is generated in the sensitive part from frequent temperate eating, a quality that inclines to similar acts. And if someone were heroic with respect to food and drink (as Eleazar was, who willed to not eat pork for any reason that was contrary to right reason, and so endured death according to the dictate of right reason[13]), then there can be some quality in the sensitive part corresponding to such powerful virtue, a quality generated from frequently elicited acts. E.g., we read about some saints that they felt nothing in their bodies because of frequently elicited acts conforming to the virtues of the will, acts from which this sort of quality is generated.

17 Regarding the second worry,[14] I say that if those qualities in the sensitive part were generated with respect to the same matter or the same object that is the object of temperance and heroic virtue, then they would only be distinguished as more perfect and less perfect, and they would be numerically one quality. But if they were generated with respect to different objects, then they would differ in species. This is clear from the fact that they never incline to acts of the same

[13] 2 Maccabees 6:18–31.
[14] Namely, the second worry of **[13]**.

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nature, as is clear, e.g., of one quality that is generated concerning food and drink and another quality that is generated concerning sex.

18 Similar things should be said of the three previously mentioned opposite habits that the Philosopher posits in the same place, which are being uncontrolled [*incontinentia*], being wicked [*malitia*], and being like a beast [*bestialitas*]. Uncontrolledness (as it is found in the will) is a habit by which someone who has malformed desires parts ways with right reason and freely wills to follow those desires. Wickedness (i.e., intemperance) is a vicious habit by which someone not only follows presently inhering desires but even wills to seek out occasions for having such acts. The bestial individual is one who, contrary to right reason, wills to have such desires for something that is contrary to nature. These habits in the will are distinguished by species since their objects are distinguished by species; for although they do not have right reason for their object, nevertheless they have other objects that are distinct in species. As for qualities generated in the sensitive part, here one can say just what was said earlier about the virtues.[15]

How Moral Knowledge Is Distinguished from Prudence

19 Further, it should be known how moral knowledge is distinguished from prudence. It should be understood that 'moral knowledge' is taken in two senses. In one sense, it is taken for every cognition that is knowledge [*notitia scientifica*] that can be evidently possessed as a result of teaching. This proceeds from principles that are cognized through themselves, e.g., "Some good should be done for each of one's benefactors; and anyone who frees someone from death is a benefactor; therefore, some good should be done for any such individual." In another sense, it is taken for an evident cognition that is knowledge that only is and only can be possessed as a result of experience and in no way can be evidently possessed as a result of teaching. For example, "Anyone who is enraged due to some such occasion should be calmed and soothed by beautiful words" cannot be evidently known except through experience, namely, in virtue of the fact that a human being has, from experience, evident cognition of many individual sentences, i.e., that this individual ought to be soothed, and that that individual ought to be soothed, and so on for all the individuals.

20 Similarly, 'prudence' is taken in two senses. In one sense properly for evident cognition of some singular sentence that is possessed only by means of experience. For example, the evident cognition that "this

[15] See **[13–17]**.

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individual needs to be soothed by beautiful words" is evident in virtue of the contingent truth, "they are soothed in this sort of way," and this is recognized by experience. In another sense, it is commonly taken for evident cognition of some universal practical truth that is only evidently recognized as a result of experience, such as that "every enraged individual should be calmed in this way."

21 Then, I say that, taking 'moral knowledge' in the first sense (for an evident cognition that is knowledge that can be evidently acquired as a result of teaching), it is thus distinguished from both of the senses of prudence just mentioned. For no matter which sense of 'prudence' is taken, prudence can only be acquired through experience. Taking 'moral knowledge' in the second sense, in this sense moral knowledge is the same thing as prudence as it is commonly spoken of, as is clear from what has been said. But in this sense, moral knowledge is still distinguished from prudence properly speaking, because this prudence concerns singulars, while the other prudence concerns universals. In this way it is clear how moral knowledge and prudence are distinguished.

22 From this it is clear that in the first book John does not correctly identify the difference between moral knowledge and prudence, that moral knowledge concerns universals and directs only remotely and mediately, while prudence concerns particulars and directs immediately and adjacently.[16]

First, this is clear because he supposes that moral knowledge only directs by the mediation of prudence, which is false. For someone can have evident cognition of some universal sentence as a result of teaching (e.g., "Some good should be done for each of one's benefactors" or the like), and they can also have evident cognition of some contingent sentence that falls under that universal sentence as a result of experience (e.g., "this individual is a benefactor because I have seen that he acts thusly"); and this latter cognition is not prudence because it is not capable of directing. From these sentences it is evidently concluded that "good should be done thusly for this individual"; and the cognition of this particular sentence immediately directs the interior or exterior practical activity that follows. Nevertheless, the cognition of this conclusion is not prudence, because this cognition is acquired as a result of teaching, not experience.

Second, this is clear because he supposes both that moral knowledge does not direct immediately because it is of universals and that prudence directs immediately because it is of particulars; and from this he infers that every particular directs more immediately than a

[16] Scotus, *Ord.* I, Prol., p. 5, qq. 1–2, n. 351.

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universal does with respect to practical activity – which is false, since to direct practical activity is nothing other than to cause practical activity; and, in fact, cognition of a universal sentence can immediately cause practical activity just as well as cognition of a particular sentence can. For it is clear that both the cognition of a universal major premise and the cognition of a particular minor premise equally direct the following practical activity (since those two cognitions taken together are the two partial causes with respect to the cognition of the particular conclusion that immediately directs or causes the practical activity); and just as that is clear, so it is clear that neither cognition causes before the other does, but both equally immediately cause the cognition that immediately directs the practical activity, so that they are both causes of the cause.

A Worry about the Connection of the Virtues

But there is a worry how the virtues are connected. This has been written about elsewhere, in the third book of Ockham's *Reportatio* on the *Sentences*.[17] In addition to that, though, it should be known that some virtues are compatible with the vicious habits corresponding to other virtues, but some virtues are not like this. For both self-control and temperance (which were spoken of above) are compatible with the vices opposed to other virtues, no matter how much those [vicious] habits are strengthened, whether to infinity or up to the maximal degree possible for them. The reason for this is that these virtues have particular right reason for their object; e.g., that some such practical activity should be elicited when it ought to be and in the way it ought to be. And particular reason can be right concerning one matter even if particular reason is not right concerning some other matter (e.g., concerning sexual acts but not concerning money) because the reasons in the one case are distinct from the reasons in the other. Consequently, there can be right reason concerning one matter and erroneous reason concerning some other. Consequently, a will eliciting practical activity in conformity to both those reasons elicits virtuous practical activity according to the right reason and a different vicious (or, at least, non-virtuous) practical activity with the erroneous reason. Even granting that each reason were right, the will from its freedom still can elicit practical activity in harmony with the one right reason (and thus virtuously) and can elicit in disharmony from the other right reason (thus doing so viciously since it is contrary to right reason).

[17] *Rep.* III, q. 12, nn. 73–89, translated in chapter 15 of this volume.

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24 But unqualifiedly perfect virtue – which can, according to the truth, be called "heroic," whether as a result of the act's nature or as a result of some circumstance (although it is only properly called heroic according to the Philosopher's meaning when an exterior act corresponds to it) – that, I say, is not compatible with any vice opposed to any virtue, since such virtue could not exist without every other virtue. The reason for this is that such virtue has for its object universal reason, not merely particular reason; e.g., someone who has unqualifiedly perfect chastity as a heroic virtue has universal reason for an object, so that this individual wills to act contrary to charity for no reason that is contrary to right reason. So, if they were threatened with the penalty of death or were promised great wealth (and so on for other examples) for them to fornicate, and if particular right reason were to dictate that they should not fornicate at that time (neither for death nor wealth nor anything else), then, while that perfect virtue and the universal and particular reasons all persist, this individual cannot become cowardly or greedy because of the included contradiction. This is so as follows: Suppose that they were to will to fornicate for money; then they would fall away from chastity for something that is contrary to right reason. But according to universal reason, they ought to will to not fall away from chastity for anything that is contrary to right reason. Consequently, the perfect virtue would persist together with universal reason, but because of that particular action contrary to right reason the virtue would not be perfect; and so, at the same time, it would be both perfect and not perfect.

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17 Could the Will Have a Virtuous Act concerning an Object about Which There is an Error in the Intellect? (Var. Ques., *q.* 8)

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TEXT[1]

1 It seems that it cannot, because that act of the will would either be elicited in conformity to an erroneous judgment of the intellect or else it would be elicited in deformity to that judgment. The will cannot have a virtuous act in the first case because that judgment judges the opposite of what is willed by the divine will. E.g., a deceived intellect judges that someone – call them A – should be aided as they are a needy individual in extreme need. However, according to the divine will such aid should not be given to this individual because they are not actually in need in this way; consequently, if an act elicited in conformity to that judgment were virtuous then they would receive merit by acting contrary to the divine will. In the second case, then if an act elicited in deformity to that judgment were virtuous someone would receive merit by acting contrary to conscience, which seems both false and unseemly.

A Right Act in the Will Requires Actual Right Reason in the Intellect

2 In response to this worry, it should first be known that in order for a right act to be elicited by the will, some right reason is necessarily required in the intellect. This is clear both by argument and from authority.

It is clear by argument as follows: A will that in and of itself can indifferently act either well or badly, because it is not right in and of itself, necessarily needs some standard [*regula*] other than itself directing it if it is to act rightly. This is clear, because the reason that the divine will does not need something to direct it is that it itself is the first directing standard and it cannot act badly. Our will, though, is

[1] *OTh* VIII: 409–450.

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such that it is able to act rightly and not rightly. Therefore, it requires some right reason to direct it.

This is also clear on the basis of authority, from the definition of 'virtue' in *Ethics* II, namely that a virtue is "a habit of choosing that consists in a mean that is determined by reason" and so on.[2] Many other authorities also support that an act cannot be right and virtuous unless it has right reason.

Supposing this as certain, then – that a right and virtuous act of the will is necessarily conformed to an act of prudence – then there is a worry whether conformity to habitual or aptitudinal prudence suffices for a virtuous act, or whether it is necessarily required that there be conformity to actual prudence that is actually inhering [in the intellect] at the time when the right act is elicited in the will. 3

I respond: first, I say that aptitudinal prudence does not suffice for a virtuous act.[3] I suppose that conformity to aptitudinal prudence is nothing other than this: for an act to be called right is for it to be elicited in the way in which right reason would dictate that act should be elicited if right reason were to inhere, though as a matter of fact it does not presently inhere. So then, aptitudinal prudence is nothing other than the power or aptitude for the possession of prudence prior to the act. 4

Given that, I argue that it is impossible for an act of the will that is elicited contrary to conscience and contrary to the dictate of reason (whether right reason or erroneous reason) to be virtuous. This is clear (i) in the case of acting contrary to right conscience, because such an act would be elicited contrary to a divine command and contrary to the divine will's willing that this sort of act be elicited in conformity to right reason. It is also clear (ii) in the case of acting contrary to an erroneous conscience that errs with an indefeasible [*invincibili*][4] error, because this sort of error is not culpable on the basis that it is not within the power of the erring individual; by acting in this way contrary to an erroneous reason that you do not know is erroneous (and it is not within your power to know this), you are

[2] Aristotle, *NE* II.6 (1107a1–2).

[3] The argument for this claim stretches across **[4–5]**. In short, Ockham's argument is this: No act that is contrary to the actual dictates of an individual's reason can be virtuous for that individual; but an act can be in conformity to the aptitude for prudence and yet be contrary to the actual dictate of an individual's reason; therefore, conformity to the aptitude for prudence is not sufficient for an act to be virtuous.

[4] In Catholic thought, to say that an erroneous belief B is "invincible" is to say that the individual believing B has nonetheless done all their epistemic due diligence with respect to B. Quite literally, the error is invincible to (i.e., unable to be conquered by) an honest and careful consideration of the reasons and evidence available to the individual. In general, an individual is not considered morally culpable for invincible errors or for actions that result from such errors.

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acting[5] contrary to the divine will. It is also clear (iii) in the case of acting contrary to an erroneous conscience that errs with a defeasible error, because although that error is culpable, nevertheless from the fact that you are unaware that you are erring when acting contrary to such a reason, you treat with contempt the reason that you do not know is erroneous, and so you sin due to this contempt.

5 However, someone can will a thing that right reason would dictate should be willed if right reason were inhering in that individual, even while as a matter of fact their erroneous reason (whether it be erroneous with defeasible or indefeasible error) dictates that the thing should be willed-against and that its opposite should instead be willed-for.[6] For example, let it be the case that there is some needy individual in extreme need. Consequently, if right reason were to inhere in someone capable [of offering aid], it would dictate that aid should be given to this individual as to someone who is needy in extreme need. But reason that errs with an indefeasible error can judge that this individual is not in need in this way, and consequently it can judge that aid should not be given to this individual as to someone so in need. Then the will, from its freedom, can will to give aid to this individual as to someone so in need (because in truth the individual is in need in this way, no matter how much erroneous reason judges the opposite to be the case). Therefore, this act of the will is not virtuous but is instead a mortal sin; if the act were virtuous just because of its conformity to aptitudinal prudence, then someone at one and the same time, by the same act, would both receive merit and mortally sin.

6 It might be objected that conformity to aptitudinal prudence suffices for an act to be virtuous so long as error opposed to that prudence does not inhere in the will.[7] But this is nothing but evasion, for when an error opposed to prudence inheres there is the same aptitude for prudence in the intellect as when that error does not inhere – with the exception that when error exists in the intellect the aptitude is not as easily brought to an act as when no such error exists. For when such error exists, that error must first be destroyed and then prudence must

[5] Reading *facis* for the edition's *faciens*. The edition speculates that part of this sentence is missing, suggesting something like the following italicized phrase was omitted: "by acting contrary to an erroneous reason that you do not know is erroneous (and it is not within your power to know this), *you treat reason with contempt in acting*, contrary to the divine will."

[6] I.e., someone can will a thing that is in conformity to aptitudinal prudence, even while their intellect is actually dictating something contrary to aptitudinal prudence.

[7] "…when error does not inhere in the will" (*quando non inest error … voluntati*) is puzzling; everywhere else in this question, Ockham refers to error as being in the intellect, rather than in the will. The edition notes no variant readings here other than one manuscript that moves *voluntati* next to *inest* to make the grammar even clearer.

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be generated from acts; but when such error does not exist, then the generating of the prudence [alone] is sufficient [for an act to be virtuous]. But whether such error exists or not, there does not seem to be anything different in the intellect – something in conformity to which an act of the will could be virtuous – when there is the absence of both [actual] prudence and an erroneous habit in the intellect than when there is a habitual error in the intellect opposed to that prudence.

7 Second, I say that an act of will's conformity to habitual prudence does not suffice for an act to be virtuous. This is clear because, as has been said many times, one habit never inclines to the act of another habit – not in causing, nor in regulating, nor in any way whatsoever – except by means of its own act, to which the habit primarily inclines. This is clear in the case of a habit concerning a premise, which never inclines to an act concerning a conclusion except by means of an act with respect to that premise, an act to which that habit primarily inclines. All of that is clear from experience, because if in the intellect there is only a habit concerning a premise, and if an act is not elicited with respect to that premise, then that habit will not result in knowing the conclusion any more than if this sort of habit were not in the intellect at all.

8 Since, therefore, it belongs to the nature of prudence to regulate the will's act (because prudence "is right reason concerning those things that are doable" and so on)[8] it is impossible for any habit in the intellect to regulate except by means of its own act, as impossible as when this sort of habit does not inhere in the intellect at all. Therefore, habitual prudence does not suffice for a right act; rather, actual prudence is necessarily required.

9 Furthermore, it is impossible for an act that is not virtuous or meritorious to become virtuous through some entirely natural thing that is in no way within our power. But suppose that conformity to habitual prudence sufficed for an act to be virtuous and suppose that some act were elicited in the appropriate way according to all the circumstances, with the exception that this sort of habitual right reason did not inhere. Then that act is not at first perfectly virtuous because it lacks conformity to habitual prudence. If habitual prudence were later generated while that same act remained in the will, then that same act would be called perfectly virtuous, because at first it lacked nothing needed for perfect virtue except the conformity to habitual reason, and now there is that conformity as a result of the generation of prudence. Therefore, it would follow that the act which at first was not virtuous because of this defect is now virtuous due to this habit having

[8] Aristotle, *NE* VI.5 (1140b20–21).

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been generated. Since, therefore, the generation of that prudence is entirely natural and in no way within our power, it would follow that a non-virtuous act becomes virtuous through some entirely natural thing that is in no way within our power, and in the same way, a virtuous act becomes non-virtuous through the destruction of some entirely natural thing (that is, through the destruction of habitual prudence) while the same act remains in the will all the while. Consequently, an act of will's conformity to habitual prudence does not suffice for there being perfect rightness in the act.

10 Third, I say that for the rightness of an act of the will, actual prudence is required that actually inheres in the individual to whom that right act belongs. This is clear as follows. According to everyone some prudence is necessarily required for an act to be virtuous. But neither aptitudinal prudence nor habitual prudence is sufficient. Therefore, actual prudence is necessarily required.

11 But "actual prudence is required" can be understood in two senses. In one sense, that some act of the will is elicited at first according to all the circumstances required for the act to be virtuous with the one exception of prudence (that is, right reason), and then, later, while exactly that same act remains in the will (and with no other act being elicited), that act becomes virtuous through the generation of prudence, the same act that at first was not virtuous because of the absence of prudence. (When I say that "it becomes virtuous through the generation of prudence" I mean in the way that John posits in the material on charity in book one, as well as in his *Quodlibets*.[9]) But this understanding [of actual prudence] is impossible and is argued against in the question on the connection of the virtues, on a previous page.[10] It is impossible because, given this, no act would be intrinsically and necessarily virtuous, but would be virtuous only contingently and extrinsically; this is because the act would become virtuous by the generation of prudence and would become vicious by the destruction of prudence, while the same act remains in the will all the while. Look for it there.

12 In another sense, it can be understood that [actual] prudence is required as a partial object and partial efficient cause of a virtuous act. Consequently, it must be the case either (i) that prudence precedes a virtuous act and that the prudence is that act's reason (in the sense of being the cause of the effect), or at least (ii) that the prudence is produced simultaneously with the act (I mean simultaneous in time),

[9] Scotus, *Ord.* I, d. 17, p. 1, qq. 1–2, nn. 62–65, nn. 92–97; Scotus, *Quod.*, q. 18, n. 16.
[10] *Var. Ques.*, q. 7 (*OTh* VIII: 323–407), pp. 380–384, translated in William of Ockham 1997: 149–153.

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although the prudence will necessarily be naturally prior to the virtuous act since the prudence can be separated from the virtuous act but not vice versa. This understanding of prudence is good, sensible, and true.

13 You might object that in the same way one can say that habitual prudence does not follow after the virtuous act and does not make the act be virtuous from having not been virtuous (as was previously proved[11]), but instead that habitual prudence precedes (either temporally or naturally) an act of the will as a partial object and partial cause of that virtuous act. Consequently, the previous argument does not sufficiently prove that actual prudence is required for a virtuous act, since habitual prudence suffices in this way.

14 I respond that, although this reply could sweep away the second argument given above, still it does not do so to the first argument.[12] This is so because a habit never inclines in any way whatsoever to the act of another habit, except by means of its very own act, the act to which the habit primarily and immediately inclines. Consequently, if habitual prudence inclines to a virtuous act of the will, this will necessarily be by means of an act of prudence; for otherwise it would no more cause or regulate the act of the will than if there were no such habit in the intellect.

15 You might object that positing actual prudence in the intellect together with whatever other requirements does not suffice for the rightness of an act of the will. This is so because, no matter how much actual prudence of this kind is posited in the intellect, God can suspend the prudence's activity, or else God can supply the prudence's causality in the genus of efficient cause.[13] If God does this, then even though the act is effectively elicited by the will it will not be virtuous since prudence does not concur as a partial cause in the causing of that right act.

16 Furthermore, you might object that what was brought against the first sense of positing actual prudence[14] does not seem to be unsuitable, for numerically the same act can be called meritorious and then not meritorious in succession, virtuous and then not virtuous in succession. For if at first the will elicits a perfectly meritorious act and then later God suspends the activity of the will and totally conserves

[11] See **[9]**.
[12] More explicitly, the objection in **[13]** invalidates the argument of **[9]**, but not the argument of **[7]**.
[13] The implication in the second case is that God prevents the act of prudence from having its ordinary causal activity and instead God himself supplies the causal power that would ordinarily have come from the prudence.
[14] See **[11]**.

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the original act, that act will at first be intrinsically virtuous and meritorious, and later it will not be meritorious. This is so because no act is meritorious (and then not meritorious) unless it is within our power. But when God conserves the act, then it is not within our power. Consequently, it does not appear to be at all unsuitable that an act is said to be virtuous only because of the generation of prudence and non-virtuous only because of the destruction of prudence, while always remaining the very same act in the will.

17 I respond to the first of these objections as follows: Assuming the principle that "an effect sufficiently depends on its essential causes" and so on, it follows from this that no absolute thing is necessarily required for an effect unless that absolute thing is in some way a cause of that effect. Consequently, since actual prudence is necessarily required for and is in some way prior to a virtuous act, it follows that an act of prudence is truly an efficient cause that is essentially and necessarily required for a virtuous act, just as essentially as the will is necessarily required as an efficient cause in order for an act to be virtuous or meritorious. Consequently, it further follows that when the activity of the will or of the act of prudence is suspended, then the act will in no way be called virtuous. The reason for this is that 'virtuous' and 'meritorious' are connotative names; they do not signify the act absolutely, but rather they signify it by connoting the activity of the will and of prudence together with the act. So, when something that is connoted is absent, an act of this sort is not called virtuous.

18 You might object that the act in this case[15] is effectively elicited by the will in conformity to right reason according to all the required circumstances, and therefore it is virtuous. I respond that for an act to be elicited in conformity to right reason is for it to be elicited according to a right reason that is regulating and dictating that an act of this sort should be elicited, and to dictate or to regulate is nothing other than to cause the act in a specific way, as is made clear on another page.[16] Now then, in the aforementioned case prudence does not cause the act and therefore prudence does not regulate it. Indeed, supposing that God does everything that prudence would have done had it not be impeded by God, then prudence does nothing more for the virtuous act than if no prudence had inhered at all, because the prudence does nothing other than rest there like a statue.

19 In response to the second objection, it can be answered in one way that when it was deduced[17] to be unsuitable that the same act would be

[15] Namely, in the hypothetical case proposed in **[15]**.
[16] *Var. Ques.*, q. 7, p. 374; translated in William of Ockham 1997: 139.
[17] Namely, in **[11]**.

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intrinsically virtuous and then later not virtuous, what was meant by "not virtuous" was "vicious." Now, it is impossible for numerically the same act to be intrinsically virtuous and then later be intrinsically vicious; however, this would follow if the circumstances were not partial objects of a virtuous act, as is made clear in the question on the connection of the virtues.[18] In the same way, if the act of prudence were neither an object nor an essential cause of the virtuous act, but were only one of the circumstances (as some others suppose[19]), then in the aforementioned case[20] some act of the will would be intrinsically virtuous only due to the generation of prudence. But if at a later time some erroneous reason that is contrary to right reason were to dictate that the same act should not be continued, then if the act were to be continued contrary to reason and conscience, then that act, changed in no way, would be vicious because it is a mortal sin for an act to be preserved contrary to one's conscience. However, this is not the case in the objection that was put forward,[21] for if God were to suspend the activity of the will, of prudence, or of both, then it is indeed the case that the act which at first was intrinsically virtuous is then non-virtuous, but it is non-virtuous negatively, rather than contrarily; that is, in that case it is neither virtuous nor vicious.

Alternatively, in response to the second objection one can answer 20
that an act that is intrinsically virtuous cannot become negatively non-virtuous by a natural process. For if the act of prudence is destroyed, then necessarily (I am speaking of natural necessity) the virtuous act directed by that prudence is also destroyed. This is so because this sort of act of prudence is an efficient cause and object, so that in order both to cause and to conserve that right act of the will it is necessarily required that the act of prudence actually be inhering in [the intellect]. This is how the unsuitability should be understood when it was deduced about the virtuous and the non-virtuous. Nevertheless, as was proved earlier the contrary could occur by God's absolute power, because what was said was not meant to apply to that power. In this way, then, it is clear that some right reason in the intellect is necessarily required for a right act of the will: neither aptitudinal nor habitual prudence, but actual prudence, in the aforementioned sense.[22]

[18] *Var. Ques.*, q. 7, p. 398–402; translated in William of Ockham 1997: 175–179.
[19] Scotus does not, so far as I know, explicitly call the act of right reason a circumstance of a moral act, but he does hold that it is not among the essential causes of the act (and so not among the act's identity conditions). See *Quod.*, q. 18, nn. 6, 16.
[20] Namely, the example introduced in **[11]**.
[21] Namely, the case from **[16]**.
[22] For the "aforementioned sense," see **[12]**.

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How a Right Act in the Will Can Coexist with Error in Reason and How It Cannot

21 Further, it should now be seen if a right act in the will could coexist with both an error in reason and some right reason concerning a given object. Here some distinctions should be set forth, because a right act of the will can concern the same object concerning which there is an error in the intellect, or the will's act can concern a different object. Similarly, some errors are defeasible and thus blameworthy, and other errors are indefeasible and thus not blameworthy. Similarly, an act of the will can be elicited in conformity to an error in reason, or it can be elicited in deformity and contrary to an error in reason.

22 Supposing all that, I first say that a morally right act of the will that concerns one object can coexist with an error in reason concerning some other object, whether or not that error is defeasible. For example, someone can virtuously will chastity while nevertheless erring about courage. This is clear from experience and was proved in the question on the connection of the virtues,[23] so I will pass by it here.

23 Second, I say that a meritorious act in the will concerning one object cannot coexist with a defeasible and mortally blameworthy error concerning some other object, although it can indeed coexist with an indefeasible or venially blameworthy error. The first part of this is clear as follows: When someone errs with a defeasible error on account of which they sin mortally, either by omission or by commission (e.g., someone was negligent in investigating something they are obligated by divine command to know and to avoid because they voluntarily omitted that investigation out of laziness or some similar cause which they could avoid if they wanted to), then, by omitting the act of the will by which they ought to have efficaciously commanded the intellect to investigate what is necessary for their salvation, this individual has mortally sinned with a sin of omission. Consequently, the error by which they erred concerning this object is a defeasible and mortally blameworthy error. However, this should not be understood as stating that the act of this error is intrinsically vicious, since only an act of the will is intrinsically virtuous or vicious, as was made clear elsewhere in the question on the connection of the virtues;[24] rather, the act of this error is blameworthy and vicious only by extrinsic denomination, as a result of the will's act.

If one presumes that a sin of omission could not exist without some sin of commission, then willing-against investigating this object would

[23] *Var. Ques.*, q. 7, pp. 347–355; translated in William of Ockham 1997: 99–111.
[24] *Var. Ques.*, q. 7, pp. 327–330; translated in William of Ockham 1997: 69–73, and also in chapter 20 of this volume.

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be the sin of commission here, or else willing-for something that is incompatible with this investigation would be the sin of commission and not willing-for investigating would be the sin of omission. Then the act of error will be called vicious because of the willing-against, or because of the willing-for, or because of some similar act by which the act of error could be [extrinsically] denominated. Alternatively, if a sin of omission does not presuppose a sin of commission, then the error will be called vicious because of the act of the will by which it omits to investigate something that it is obligated to investigate.

Whichever of these is the case, if this sort of omission is a mortal sin, then it cannot coexist with charity. Consequently, while such error remains the will cannot elicit a meritorious act concerning any object at all, because such an action cannot be elicited without charity.

24 Similarly, the second part of the aforementioned conclusion is clear because indefeasible error is not blameworthy, since it is not within the power of the one erring. Consequently, such error does not impede a meritorious act concerning any object because it does not demeritoriously destroy charity.

Similarly, a defeasible and venially blameworthy error (which is generated from a human neglecting to inquire about something that they ought to know, but they only sin venially by that omission) does not impede charity and consequently does not impede a meritorious act concerning any object.

25 Third, I say that a right act in the will can coexist with indefeasible error in the intellect concerning the very same object. This is clear from an example. Suppose that someone has the universal right reason that "every needy individual in extreme need should be helped so that they do not die," which is obvious from a cognition of the terms, and then comes across a poor individual who appears to be in need with extreme need. If their will commands the intellect that it should examine whether this individual is indeed in need as they appear to be (suppose this investigation is carried out by every means possible), and if, because of some concealment that is not within their power to know, the intellect assents that this individual is indeed in need as they appear to be (even though the truth is that they are not in need), obviously the intellect will dictate that this individual who appears to be in need in this way should be aided as one existing in a state of extreme need. Therefore, in this case, according to this conclusion, the intellect errs because it judges that this individual is in need with extreme need (even though they are in fact not in need) and it judges that this individual should be aided (though in truth it is not the case that they should be aided in this way), but then the will efficaciously willing to aid this individual has a right, virtuous, and meritorious act if it wills

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this out of love$_A$ for God. Consequently, a right act of the will and an error in the intellect coexist at the same time concerning the same object.

The total reason for this is that this error is not within the power of the erring individual; this is so because it was supposed that they were as diligent as they ought to be in knowing the truth. Consequently, that error excuses all sin. So, a will that elicits an act in conformity to this sort of erroneous reason acts virtuously and meritoriously. Indeed, while this sort of error persists, if the individual willed-against providing help then they would have a vicious and demeritorious act. This is because the act would be elicited contrary to conscience and contrary to non-blameworthy reason, and knowingly so; for supposing the aforementioned case, the individual would not know that they were erring, but they would believe that they possessed right reason. Consequently, they would sin mortally by treating reason with contempt.

26 Similarly, not efficaciously willing to aid them would be a sin of omission, because one is obligated to will what non-vicious reason dictates should be willed. Consequently, by omitting this one sins mortally. But although here the particular reason is erroneous with respect to the minor premise and the conclusion, nevertheless the universal reason is right (namely, that "every needy individual in extreme need," and so on).[25] This right reason concurs with the erroneous reason (perhaps immediately) in order to cause the right act of the will.

If this sort of right reason were not in the intellect, then the will's act would in no way be virtuous. So, someone who did not assent to the sentence "every needy individual in extreme need" (and so on), or someone who dissented from it because of some deception, if they still erred concerning the conclusion in the aforementioned way they could in no way elicit a right act of the will. For example, perhaps a fool would not assent to the aforementioned sentence (although it is self-evident); one who does not have the use of reason could not have a virtuous act concerning that same object. The total reason for this is that a virtuous act necessarily requires some right reason in the intellect, as was made clear previously.[26]

27 You might object that someone who has a habit of prudence and a virtuous habit can elicit the act to which the virtue inclines without eliciting the act to which prudence inclines, since they can will something according to the virtue's inclination without asserting by means of the intellect that this thing should be willed. Therefore, there can

[25] Omitting *est subveniendum igitur* with manuscripts DFG.
[26] See **[2]**.

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be a virtuous act with only a habit of prudence and without any act of prudence.

I respond that it can be said that this case is not possible. Nothing 28
is actually willed without actually being apprehended by the intellect, and when the apprehension occurs the intellect naturally assents immediately. So, an act of prudence is necessarily required in order to elicit an act according to the inclination of a virtuous habit.

This is so, first, because a virtue inclines only to an act concerning the object with respect to which it was generated. Now, as was proved in the question on the connection of the virtues,[27] an actually existing act of prudence is an object of a virtuous act; consequently, the will cannot elicit any act by means of that virtue unless an act of prudence exists as its object. For if the virtue were to incline toward an act that was not terminated in the total object concerning which it was generated (because some partial object such as prudence was omitted), then it would follow that the act would not strengthen the virtuous habit from which that act was elicited, because a habit is strengthened by elicited acts that concern entirely the same object concerning which the habit was first generated. Rather, that act would generate some other habit, formally distinct in species, because the act has a different object in species than before, since that [previous] partial object (which is not, in this case, the object of the second act elicited from the habit) is of a different species than is the second object of the act. But it seems quite absurd for some naturally acquired habit to immediately incline to an act that then generates a habit of a distinct species, without any other habit concurring to cause that [second] habit. Therefore, etc.

Second, both in the previous question and earlier in this inquiry it was said that an act of prudence not only concurs as a partial effective cause in order to cause a virtuous act, but it also does so in order to naturally conserve that act.[28] The reason for this is that the act of prudence causes insofar as it is an actually existing object of that act, so that if it does not exist the act could neither be naturally caused nor conserved. Therefore, in the same way, an act cannot be elicited by a generated virtue unless an act of prudence is a cause of that act as its actually existing object. This is so because there does not seem to be any reason at all why it would have to be the case that an act of prudence is a cause of the first virtuous act that first generates a habit and is not a cause of the second act elicited from the habit, since each act is

[27] *Var. Ques.*, q. 7, pp. 393–395; translated in William of Ockham 1997: 167–171.
[28] See **[12]** and **[17–19];** see also *Var. Ques.*, q. 7, pp. 362–363; translated in William of Ockham 1997: 121–123.

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equally virtuous and each is generated from the same thing. (Although some cause does concur for the generation of the second act which did not concur for the generation of the first act – namely, the virtuous habit that was generated from the first act.) But according to everyone each act has the same total object. So, the aforementioned case does not seem to be possible.

29 Alternatively, if this case is presumed to be possible then it could be said that if the will could elicit an act by means of the virtue without an act of prudence actually existing in the intellect, then this sort of act would not be perfectly virtuous as before, because it would lack one partial object and one circumstance that is necessarily required for an act to be virtuous – namely, it would lack an act of prudence. The act would instead be elicited in the way in which a fool or an insane individual would elicit an act by means of a virtue previously generated in the will and without right reason (since such individuals do not have the use of reason). But that is only if this were possible; for I firmly believe that in such individuals an act of the intellect cannot be elicited – especially not an act of making a judgment [*actus iudicativus*] – although perhaps there could be an act of apprehending non-sentential items [*incomplexorum*] in them, though not one of apprehending sentences [*complexorum*]. This is so because an act of the will concurs for the latter (as is made clear elsewhere[29]) and such individuals cannot have any act of the will. So, each of the aforementioned cases seems to be unqualifiedly impossible.

30 Fourth, I say that a right act cannot coexist in the will together with a defeasible and blameworthy error in the intellect concerning the same object, although a right act and error concerning different objects could persist at the same time, as was said before. This conclusion is clear, because either such an act of the will would be elicited in conformity to the aforementioned erroneous reason or else it would be elicited in deformity to that erroneous reason. If it is elicited in conformity, then it is not a virtuous or right act because that error does not excuse any act elicited in conformity to it from being a sin; rather, it makes the sin weightier since it was in the individual's power to not err with this sort of error, from which it follows that the will in conformity is willing to err. This is so because otherwise the error would not be blameworthy, because an act of error is neither virtuous nor vicious in itself, but is so only by extrinsic denomination; it is only vicious with respect to the act of the will to which that error inclines. Perhaps it is then the case that the error can be called vicious because

[29] *Ord.*, d. 3, q. 4 (*OTh* II: 432–442), pp. 438–439. See also *Ord.*, d. 3, q. 10 (*OTh* II: 552–568), pp. 567–568.

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of an act of omission: the will ought to have commanded the intellect to investigate the circumstances that are necessary for the act to be virtuous so that this sort of error would not be generated in the intellect, but the will did not command this and so it sinned with a sin of omission, omitting the act that it ought to elicit.

The will also sins when it elicits its act in conformity to that erroneous reason because the will always sins with a sin of commission whenever it elicits an act that is such that the will is bound by a divine command or by a divine ordering to do the opposite of that act (or when it is bound in some other way to do the opposite); the will never sins in any other way. Now then, the will is bound to elicit in conformity to right reason; therefore, by eliciting an act that is contrary to right reason (because it is eliciting in conformity to an erroneous reason that is blameworthy) it does the opposite of that which it is obligated to do. Consequently, it sins in eliciting this sort of act and it does not act rightly; for if it were acting rightly, it would not be obligated to elicit the opposite act.

Hence, although the will is not obligated to elicit an act in conformity to that right reason which is opposed to an indefeasibly erroneous reason (for an error of this sort is not within the power of the erring human and so this excuses the will in such a way that it is not obligated to elicit in conformity to the opposing right reason – indeed, an individual who elicits in conformity to this sort of erroneous reason does not sin but rather acts virtuously, and they would sin and err were they to elicit contrary to that indefeasible error), nevertheless I say that it is the case that the will is obligated to elicit an act in conformity to the right reason that is opposed to a blameworthy and defeasibly erroneous reason. This is so because this sort of error is within the power of the erring individual, since they were able to not err if they had so willed. Consequently, by eliciting an act in conformity to a defeasibly erroneous reason it sins, since it elicits an act that it ought not elicit. Indeed, it is obligated to elicit the opposite act, and so that error does not excuse the sin but rather adds to its weight. Such a will sins with two sins: it sins by commission by eliciting in conformity to a blameworthy erroneous reason, and it sins by omission by omitting the opposite act that it is obligated to elicit. Thus an error of this sort adds weight to sin; it does not excuse it.

But if the will were to elicit an act in deformity to the blameworthy erroneous reason (i.e., acting against this sort of reason), then it also sins with two sins. It sins by commission by eliciting an act contrary to a reason that it believes to be right, and so it sins by doing something contrary to conscience, in contempt of that which ought to be its

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standard for acting and to which it is obligated to conform itself in its operating. It also sins by omission since it is obligated (as was already said) to conform itself to the dictate of reason in its operating (whether that reason is right or erroneous); consequently, by not conforming itself in this way it omits an act that it is obligated to elicit and so it sins by a sin of omission.

32 And if the will did not elicit any act – neither an act in conformity to the aforementioned erroneous reason, nor an act that is in deformity to it, but instead were to refrain from every act – then it would sin with two sins of omission. It would sin by omitting an act that it is obligated to elicit in conformity to the right reason that is opposed to the aforementioned erroneous reason, and it would sin by omitting an act that it is obligated to elicit in conformity to that erroneous reason. (For otherwise the individual acting contrary to that reason would sin only because they were obligated to conform their operating to the dictate of the erroneous reason.)

Consequently, such an individual sins necessarily and is in a dilemma. This is so because whether the will operates in conformity to that reason, or in deformity to it, or even if it does not operate at all, it always sins in one way or another. So, the chief cure of sin for such an individual is to repudiate the erroneous conscience and reason, which can happen through an investigation of the truth.

33 You might object that it does not seem reasonable that someone be obligated to act in conformity to defeasibly erroneous reason, since they are also obligated to elicit the opposite act (i.e., to act in conformity to the right reason that is opposed to the aforementioned erroneous reason); for then an individual would be bound to elicit opposite acts at the same time.

34 I respond: Although it was said above that someone who is erring with a defeasible error is obligated to act in conformity to the erroneous reason, this is not in fact true. This is so because an individual acting in conformity to an erroneous reason sins, and no one is bound to sin. Rather, by being at odds with the erroneous reason, the individual sins because they treat with contempt the reason that they believe to be right; for if the reason were right, it ought to be that individual's standard. Also, when acting in deformity to the erroneous reason, it is not the case that the individual sins because they are obligated to elicit the opposite act (that is, the act conformed to the erroneous reason); rather, they sin because they are negatively obligated to do the opposite. That is, they are obligated to not elicit an act that is at odds with the erroneous reason, so that they do not treat reason with contempt.

Similarly, an individual acting in conformity to that erroneous reason is not said to always sin because they are obligated to elicit the

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opposite act (that is, obligated to be at odds with such reason, since eliciting such acts is a sin). Nor are they said to always sin because they are obligated to elicit the act that conforms to the right reason that is opposite to the erroneous reason, for this is not necessarily the case. Rather, they are said to always sin because they are obligated to not elicit an act in conformity to such erroneous reason; thus they are negatively obligated to do the opposite. This is how one should understand the general claim that no one sins except because they are obligated to do the opposite of what they do. In this way, therefore, it is clear to what extent and how a right act can coexist in the will together with an error in reason and how it cannot, and with respect to which objects. Search the previous question on the connection of the virtues about this.[30]

Five Worries

But there are some worries here. First, a will acting in conformity to 35
an indefeasibly erroneous reason is not unqualifiedly right; but the opposite of this was said earlier.[31] A will is right when it is conformed in its operating to the divine will as its standard, and a will is not right when in its willing it is at odds with the divine intellect and the divine will. But a will acting in the aforementioned manner is at odds with the judgment of the divine intellect and with the divine will, because God judges that those who in truth are not in need with extreme need should not be aided in the way that those who are needy should be, and the divine will wills that such individuals are not to be aided in this way. Therefore, a created will that wills to aid that individual in that way wills the opposite of what God wills and of what God judges should be willed, and consequently it will sin by being at odds with the divine will.

A second worry is whether sins of commission and omission neces- 36
sarily accompany each other. It seems that they do, because someone sins with a sin of commission only when they do something that is such that they are obligated to not do that thing or obligated to do its opposite. Therefore, such an individual omits a thing that they are bound to do, and consequently they sin by a sin of omission.

Similarly, it seems that someone sins with a sin of omission only by 37
willing-against an act that they are obligated to will-for or by willing-for an act whose contrary they are obligated to will-for. E.g., if I were obligated to love_D God above everything on Sunday, and instead for

[30] *Var. Ques.*, q. 7, pp. 350–355; translated in William of Ockham 1997: 105–111.
[31] See **[25–26]**.

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the whole day I love$_D$ sexual acts more than God, then in this case I sin twice, by a sin of omission and a sin of commission.

38 Furthermore, no one sins with a sin of omission except by refraining from an act that they are obligated to elicit. But this sort of refraining is itself eliciting an act. Therefore, etc.

39 The third worry concerns when it was said that the will is obligated to will whatever indefeasibly erroneous reason dictates should be willed; but such a dictate is bad. Let us suppose that it is so. Now then, badness under the character of badness is not, and cannot be, willed-for. This is so because, just as everything that is (or can be) willed-for is only either an actual good or an apparent good, so everything that is (or can be) willed-against is either an actual bad or an apparent bad. Consequently, no good is (or can be) willed-against, and something bad is not (and cannot be) willed-for.

40 The fourth worry concerns only what is dictated by a defeasibly or indefeasibly erroneous reason (I do not care about what is dictated by right reason at present). What is dictated (or the apprehension of what is dictated) sometimes causes pleasure in a sensitive appetite (as is clear in the case of an apprehension of some beautiful and pleasurable object), and sometimes the apprehension of what is dictated by reason causes pain in a sensitive appetite (as when someone who is imagining their death or a future deadly battle is afraid and pained in an appetite). Now in fact as a general rule in this life the will is more inclined to will-for an object the apprehension of which causes pleasure in a sensitive appetite, and similarly it is more inclined to will-against, hate, and not will-for an object the apprehension of which causes pain in a sensitive appetite.

So then, the worry is this: what is the cause of this inclination, and what is the cause of those acts that are elicited in deformity to this? The will is not the cause, because it is free with respect to every act elicited from it, and consequently in itself it is no more determined to the one act than to the other. Nor is an intellective cognition the cause, because just as right reason or erroneous reason can dictate that something pleasurable to a sensitive appetite should be willed, so they can also dictate that death should be willed; and afterwards, each dictate is just as much a cause as the other. Nevertheless, despite these dictates, the will is inclined to opposite acts concerning these objects, that it should will-for one of them and will-against the other. What then is the cause of this disparity?

41 The fifth worry is whether someone who has an erroneous reason could (while the error persists) know or believe that they are erring. It seems that they could, because otherwise they could not repudiate their error. Therefore, etc.

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Response to the Worry about Acting Contrary to God's Will

In response to the first of these worries,[32] I say that the will is not 42
always right when it is conformed to the divine will in the object being willed; for sometimes God wills something and also wills for a creature to will the opposite. For example, God willed Christ's death from eternity and yet willed for the Jews to will-against his death insofar as his death resulted from them. Augustine gives a similar example, that God wills for my father to die yet wills for me to will-against my father's death. Now then, I sin when I will-for something that God wills for me to will-against, even if that thing is willed by God. This is especially so if I know that God wills for me to will-against that thing, since then I am knowingly at odds with the standard to which I am obligated to conform in my acts; consequently, I sin.

From this it can become clear how (according to the view that pos- 43
its that God is an immediate cause of every one of our acts by willing that act to exist) we sin in a given act, even though God wills for that act to be from him immediately when he partially concurs with our will. For although the created will wills the same thing that God wills (God does will for the act to exist, since otherwise it would not occur), nevertheless God does not sin but our will does sin, because the divine will is not obligated to will the opposite of that act since there is nothing that it is bound to do. The created will, however, is obligated to will the opposite because it is obligated to will what God wills for it to will. Now then, although God wills for the act of sinning to exist, nevertheless God wills for the created will to will-against that act of sinning (or, at least, God wills that it not will-for that act). Consequently, the created will, by willing the same act that God wills, sins because the created will is bound to will the opposite. Nevertheless, God does not will unconditionally for that act to exist; rather, God only wills it with a consequent or conditional will, because God wills for the act to exist if a creature wills for it. But God wills for the creature to not will that act if it pleases them. Therefore, it is thus clear that the will is not obligated to always conform itself to the divine will in what is willed; indeed, for the stated reason it will often sin by conforming itself to the divine will in what is willed. But the will is obligated to conform itself to the divine will in the circumstance of the willed object; that is, it is obligated to will what God wills for it to will. John's view supports this, where he asks this same question in the first book.[33]

[32] See **[35]**.
[33] Scotus, *Ord.* I, d. 48, q. un. For further discussion, see also Ockham, *Ord.*, d. 48, q. un., translated in chapter 13.

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44 To the case at hand I say that although the divine intellect dictates that this sort of individual should not be aided in the aforementioned way, and although the divine will wills-against that individual's being aided in this way, nevertheless a created will is still right in following reason that is erroneous with an indefeasible error. This is so because the divine will wills for it to follow non-blameworthy reason, and so by acting against that reason it sins since it is bound to do the opposite.

45 You might object that the divine will does not will for it to aid this individual in this way. Indeed, the divine will has an act of willing-against concerning this. Therefore, the created will sins by willing to aid the individual, since it wills what God wills for it to will-against.

46 I respond that if one were to know that God wills that they will-against aiding this individual and were to then will that act, then they would sin. According to the case, though, they err only in that they believe that God wills for them to will-for the act that God in fact wills for them to will-against, and this error excuses. Therefore, etc.

Response to the Worry about Whether Sins of Omission Entail Sins of Commission

47 In response to the next worry,[34] I say that a sin of omission is entirely separable from a sin of commission, such that by nature's power one can occur without the other (and vice versa). That a sin of omission could exist without a sin of commission is clear: let us suppose that someone is obligated to love_D God on Sunday and there is no impediment to doing so. It is obvious that such an individual, removed from every impediment, is able to not love_D God for the whole day, because if they were necessitated to love_D God for the whole day, then they would not earn merit for their loving_D. So then, they are able to not love_D God, and consequently they are able to sin with a sin of omission. Now, according to you, this individual who is sinning will definitely sin with a sin of commission; so I ask, with respect to the act of the will by which they sin with a sin of commission (that act will be either an act of willing-against loving_D God or an act of willing-for what is contrary to the love_D of God), is that act within the will's power in such a way that, given the sin of omission, the will is able to elicit and able to not elicit that act of commission? Or is the will not able to not elicit it, but rather, given the first sin, it necessarily elicits it?

48 If the first option is the case, then the will is able to not elicit that act, and consequently it is able to not sin with a sin of commission when it sins with a sin of omission by parting ways with the act of

[34] See **[36]**.

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loving$_D$ God. Therefore, it can sin with a sin of omission without sinning with a sin of commission.

If the second option is given, then it will not sin by eliciting that act, since no one sins in doing what they are unable to avoid. For sin is voluntary to such an extent that if something is not voluntary then it is not a sin, according to Augustine.[35] Therefore, if that act is not within the will's power in the aforementioned way but instead the will necessarily elicits that act, then the will will not sin in eliciting that act. Consequently, whether the act is within the will's power or not, it can sin with a sin of omission while not sinning with a sin of commission. 49

You might object that the act of commission is within the will's power absolutely but, supposing as antecedent that the will is sinning with a sin of omission, then that act of commission is not within the will's power. Nevertheless, it is compatible with this that it sins by that act. It is just like when a drunk individual kills a human being while drunk: they do an act that is not within their power (since at that time they do not have the use of reason, let us suppose) but at that time they sin by committing a homicide. The same goes for the case at hand. 50

I respond that if this individual has neither the use of reason nor an act of the will, then they in no way sin by performing this homicide, no more than if they had not done it at all. Nevertheless, so that society not be undermined, this individual deserves rebuke twice from other humans, who have to judge visible wrongdoings, not hidden ones.[36] But they deserve rebuke in the sight of God only for the first act by which they voluntarily got themselves drunk. (This is so when holding the view that only an act of the will is virtuous or vicious, and that no exterior act is.) So then, it is thus clear that a sin of omission can exist without a sin of commission. 51

Similarly, a sin of commission can exist without any sin of omission that is a distinct sin.[37] For someone is bound to not elicit an act contrary to the act of some commandment for a given time during which that individual is nevertheless not bound to elicit an affirmative and positive act of that commandment. For example, someone is bound to not hate God while not being positively obligated to love$_D$ him. Therefore, such an individual is able to hate God and, consequently, is able to sin with a sin of commission, and yet they do not necessarily 52

[35] Augustine, *On True Religion*, 14.27.

[36] Presumably, the drunk individual deserves rebuke both for being drunk and for committing homicide.

[37] Ignoring the edition's period after *omissionis*. As punctuated, the edition reads, "Similarly, a sin of commission can exist without a sin of omission. That there may be a distinct sin [is clear]." But this reading makes no sense of the implicit contrast set up by the opening sentence of **[53]**.

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sin with a sin of omission; for if they did sin with a sin of omission, this would be only because they omitted an act of loving$_D$ that is opposite to that act of hating, but they do not sin by omitting this love$_D$. Just as (as a general rule) someone sins with a sin of commission only when they elicit an act that they are obligated to not elicit, so someone sins with a sin of omission only when they omit an act that they are obligated to elicit. But in the case at hand, when this individual elicits an act of hating, they are not obligated to love$_D$ God at that time; therefore, etc. (Indeed, they are not bound at that time to an affirmative act of any commandment at all – at least, this is possible.) Therefore, someone can sin with a sin of commission while not sinning with a sin of omission.

53 However, if we are speaking of sins of omission that are not distinct from sins of commission, then it is the case that anyone who sins with a sin of commission always also sins with a sin of omission. This is because anyone who sins with a sin of commission commits an act that they are obligated to omit, and consequently they sin with a sin of omission by not omitting that act. It was different in the preceding cases, because in those cases a sin was called a sin of omission when someone omitted an act that they were obligated to elicit; but here they did not omit an act that they are obligated to omit. In the first case there is a sin of omission properly speaking; in the second case there is a sin of non-omission.

54 But that when someone sins with a sin of commission, they do not necessarily sin with a sin of omission as a distinct sin is proved as follows (just like the preceding conclusion on the separability of omission from commission[38]): Either omitting that act is within the power of the individual who is omitting, or else it is not within their power. If it is within their power, then they can freely omit or not omit as they please; consequently, they are able to not omit and consequently they are able to not sin with a sin of omission – which is the claim at hand, for just as this was argued about one sin, so also for every sin. But if it is not within their power to omit that act, then they necessarily omit the act and so they do not sin, just as the previous conclusion was proved. So, I say that the one sin can be separated from the other and vice versa.

55 To the arguments given in support of this worry, I respond to the first argument[39] that there is a sin of commission only when someone does something they are obligated to not do (or they are obligated to elicit the opposite act, etc.), and so I concede that someone sinning always omits that to which they are bound. But they do not always

[38] See **[47–49]**.
[39] See **[36]**.

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omit some act that is distinct from the act [of commission], because they are not always bound to such an act. Rather, they omit the act of commission that they are obligated to not omit, because they are obligated to not elicit that act. So, an omission of this sort always follows from a sin of commission, but this is not a sin distinct from the sin of commission.

You might object that an omission of this sort always necessarily follows from a sin of commission, and therefore such omission is not a sin according to my principles.[40] I respond that it is true that an omission of this sort is not a distinct sin from the commission, and I say that the individual freely omits just as much as they freely commit, because both the commission and the omission are within the will's power, even though the one necessarily implies the other just as an antecedent implies a consequent. But this is not the case with respect to a distinct sin of omission, because then that sin is immediately within the will's power, even once whatever sin of commission has been posited; for otherwise it would not be a distinct sin, just as the argument showed.[41] 56

In response to the next argument,[42] I deny what it assumes, for (just as has already been proved effectively enough) someone can sin with a sin of omission while eliciting no act at all (or, at least, no act of sinning): I am able to not will-for the contrary of the act that I am obligated to elicit and able to not will-against the act that I am obligated to elicit. For the individual can think nothing at all about the matter and consequently is able to neither will-for nor will-against. So, what the argument assumed is unqualifiedly false. 57

I say much the same to the third argument:[43] refraining from an act is not always a positive act. It is indeed true that some act is refrained from when the contrary act is elicited; but sometimes an act can be refrained from and yet no act at all is elicited. This is so because, properly speaking, to refrain from an act is to not elicit it. 58

Response to the Worry about Willing-Against Goodness and Willing-For Badness

In response to the third worry,[44] I say that 'good' is taken in two senses. 'Good' is taken in one sense for the good insofar as it is divided into goods that are upright [*honestum*], useful, and pleasurable. In 59

[40] Taking *tua* in the objector's mouth to refer to Ockham.
[41] Namely, the argument of **[54]**.
[42] See **[37]**.
[43] See **[38]**.
[44] See **[39]**.

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another sense, the good is the same as whatever is willed, or 'good' is taken for everything that is willable. In the same way, 'bad' is taken in two senses: either for that which is opposed to the good spoken of in the first sense, or else it is taken for something that is willed-against or is able to be willed-against.

60 Taking 'good' in the first sense and also taking 'bad' as opposed to the first sense of good, then I say that the will can will-for something that is bad, something that is neither really good nor apparently good. The will can also will-against something that is good, something that is neither really bad nor apparently bad. The first part of this conclusion is clear because otherwise it would follow that one could neither earn merit nor demerit by committing an act concerning any object that is really bad and that right reason has dictated is so. I now prove that this would follow. I take some object of this sort – e.g., something that is the object of a mortal sin, such as worshiping foreign gods, which is bad. Then let us suppose that the intellect dictates that this is bad, because then it is both really bad and apparently bad. (For I call a thing apparently[45] good or bad only when that thing is judged by the intellect to be good or bad. If the thing is judged to be so by an intellect that is right and is not erring, then not only is the thing apparently good or bad but it is really good or bad, for in that case the intellect dictated just as the thing is in reality. But if it is judged to be so by an erring intellect, then the thing is only apparently good or bad, not really so.)

61 Having supposed this, I then ask whether or not the will could will-for this bad thing (worshiping foreign gods) that is dictated to be so by the intellect. If it could do so, then the claim is established that the will can will-for a bad thing that is both really and apparently bad and that is in no way good (taking 'good' in the first sense).

If it is not able to will-for this bad thing that the intellect has dictated is so, then the will can never sin with a sin of commission concerning this object; for it would not sin with this sort of sin except by willing-for the opposite of what right reason dictates about the aforementioned object. (For it does not sin in willing-for that which right reason has dictated should be willed; in that case, it instead earns merit.) Therefore, if the will can sin with a sin of commission concerning this object, it will do this by willing-for that which right reason has dictated is bad. Therefore, if it cannot will-for this sort of bad thing that the intellect has dictated is so, it cannot sin with a sin of commission.

But instead it appears to be true according to the laws commonly ordained by God that the will of someone in this life cannot earn

[45] Omitting *realiter vel* with manuscripts DP.

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merit with respect to a given thing unless it could earn demerit by committing an act concerning that thing. For although Christ and the Blessed Virgin were able to earn merit with respect to many objects and were not able in any way to earn demerit, this was the case for them as a result of a special miracle and divine dispensation; for others, however, the assumed claim seems to be generally true. So then, if the will cannot will-for the aforementioned object, it cannot earn demerit; consequently, it cannot earn merit in willing-against that bad thing that has been dictated to be so, and consequently every basis for earning merit and demerit with respect to such objects would be snatched away – and it is erroneous to say this.

You might object that the individual can earn merit by eliciting an act of willing-against concerning that object since the act of willing-against is within their power; that is, they can freely elicit that act and freely cease from it, even though they could not elicit the opposite act. 62

This is unsound. For although that is true for some (such as Christ and the Blessed Virgin when they were in this life), nevertheless this was true by special preservation and divine ordination, by which God willed to not concur with their acts of willing to elicit an act of sin. Where this sort of special privilege does not exist, though, it seems generally true that if a will can earn merit concerning some object then it can earn demerit by committing an act concerning that same object. Consequently, the response just given does not apply to wills other than the wills of Christ and the Blessed Virgin. 63

The second part of the aforementioned conclusion[46] – namely, that the will can will-against something good (taken in the first sense of 'good') that neither really nor apparently has the character of badness (i.e., it is really good and it is dictated by the intellect to be so) – can be proved of all things by use of the same premise [*medium*]. The premise is this: for any object with respect to which the will can earn merit by eliciting an act concerning it, the will can also earn demerit by committing an act concerning that object. Consequently, if the will can earn merit by eliciting an act of willing-for concerning this sort of good thing, then it can earn demerit by eliciting an act of willing-against concerning that same object (unless there is a special impediment of the sort discussed above[47]); for otherwise every basis for earning merit and demerit concerning this sort of object would be snatched away – which is absurd to say. Therefore, the aforementioned conclusion is clear. 64

[46] See **[60]**.
[47] See **[61]**.

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65 Next, I say that, taking 'good' and 'bad' in the second sense,[48] the will is not able to will-for something unless it is good, and it is not able to will-against something unless it is bad or under the character of badness. This is clear as follows: Taking 'good' in this sense, the good is the same as what is willed-for or can be willed-for, and the bad is the same as what is willed-against or can be willed-against. Now then, it seems that it is contradictory for the will to will-for something unless that thing is willed-for or can be willed-for. Similarly, it seems that it is contradictory for it to will-against something unless that thing is willed-against or can be willed-against. Therefore, etc. The authoritative texts and the sayings of those professors who say that the will cannot will-for something unless it is really good or under the character of goodness (i.e., apparently good) can be interpreted in this way, and similarly when they say that the will cannot will-against something unless it is bad or under the character of badness.

Response to the Worry about the Will's Inclination toward Pleasure

66 In response to the fourth worry,[49] I say first it is difficult to provide an explanation [*causa*] why the will is more inclined to will-for something that causes pleasure in a sensitive appetite and to will-against an object that causes pain in a sensitive appetite. No dictating cognition can be the cause of this inclination, for there can be an equally intense dictating cognition toward willing-for something that causes pain in a sensitive appetite as toward willing-for something that causes pleasure; indeed, it might even be more intense (at least this is possible). Yet, notwithstanding this equally intense cognition, the will is still inclined to the contrary of what has been dictated by right reason. This is clear from experience: if one's intellect dictates that one should die in order to preserve society, the will – as if naturally – is inclined to the contrary. Neither an act of a sensitive appetite nor that appetite's pleasure can incline the will in this way, because no matter how intense this pleasure is in a sensitive appetite, the will by its freedom can will the contrary. So, as it seems, there does not appear to be any explanation of this inclination of the will (an inclination I call natural) other than that this is the nature of the thing; and we become aware of this by experience.

67 Second, I say that an explanation can be provided how an act of willing-for is caused concerning an object that causes pleasure in a sensitive appetite, and how an act of willing-against is caused concerning an object that causes pain in that appetite. It can be said that an act

[48] See **[59]**.
[49] See **[40]**.

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of a sensitive appetite (or, better, the pleasure itself in a sensitive appetite) is an effective partial cause, immediately concurring with the will and with the cognition of this sort of object in order to cause this sort of act of willing. Similarly, pain is an effective partial cause for causing an act of willing-against concerning this sort of object. So, when pleasure is posited in a sensitive appetite, an act of willing-for concerning that object can more easily be caused in the will; and when that pleasure is not posited, this sort of act cannot be caused as easily because then a partial cause is absent, a partial cause that is required for easily eliciting this sort of act, or, at least, for eliciting it intensely.

In the same way, when pain is posited in a sensitive appetite an act of willing-against concerning this sort of object can be easily caused in the will and an act of willing-for cannot be easily caused. This is so because the pain is a partial effective cause, immediately causing (together with the will and other causes) an act of willing-against; and the pain is not a cause for causing an act of willing-for. When that pain is absent, this sort of act of willing-against cannot be caused as easily.

Also, that a quality in a sensitive appetite (that is, an act of an appetite, either pleasure or pain) is an immediate cause of some act of the will does not seem any more unfitting than that some external thing is an immediate cause of an act of assenting or dissenting in the intellect. But the latter is true, and so the former is also true. These things notwithstanding, though, an explanation cannot be provided why the will is more or less inclined when these sorts of passions are posited in a sensitive appetite. This is so because, no matter how strong a pleasure is posited in a sensitive appetite (together with a dictating cognition in the intellect and the other things that concur to bring about the act), still it is within the will's power to elicit either an act of willing-for or an act of willing-against concerning that object, or else to elicit no act at all. So, with respect to this inclination of the will, it does not seem that any explanation can be provided other than that this is the nature of the thing; and we become aware of this by experience.

Response to the Worry about Knowing that One Is Erring

In response to the fifth worry,[50] I say that it is a contradiction for someone who is erring about some particular conclusion, while that error persists, to know that they are erring or even to believe that they are erring. The reason for this is that if someone errs about a true and necessary conclusion (e.g., that God exists), then they have a habit of 68

[50] See **[41]**.

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error concerning this conclusion, by which they dissent from that conclusion. (For if they were to assent to the conclusion, then they would not be erring.) If they were to know that they were erring about this conclusion, then they would know that the conclusion is true, a conclusion that they dissent from as if it were false. (For it is impossible for them to know that they are erring about this conclusion unless they know that the sentence, which they dissent from as if it were false, is true.) Now, if they were to know the conclusion to be true, then they would assent to the conclusion, because to know that a sentence is true is to assent to it. Therefore, moving from the first conditional to the last: if they could know that they were erring while the error persisted, then at the same time they could both assent to and dissent from the same conclusion and so they would both assent to it and not assent to it – but these are incompatible. The same can be argued with respect to an error about a false conclusion.

69 Nevertheless, perhaps someone can believe that they are erring in general: that is, someone who is cognizing many things believes that they are erring about some of them, although they do not know which particular things they err about. However, one cannot know that they are erring in general and know this when they are erring. This is so because to know something, properly speaking, is to cognize it evidently. But in fact one cannot evidently cognize that they are erring unless they evidently assent to the claim that they are erring about some particular sentence, and this assent cannot coexist at the same time as the error.

One can know that they erred in the past. This is so because, once the error concerning the aforementioned conclusion has been destroyed and the conclusion has become known, one can know that they were erring at a given time, since they can remember that they had a habit of error about that conclusion.

70 But there is still a worry about this argument. If one cannot know that they are erring, how can one desist from that error? I respond that someone can newly assent to a conclusion from which they previously dissented as a result of some premise, a premise which they were previously unaware of but now are aware of because of teaching, discovery, or some other way. In this way, little by little, the habit of error is destroyed and afterwards a habit of knowledge is then generated, as has been discussed elsewhere.[51] Look for more on this worry in Ockham's question on the Word, on how someone can and cannot lie.[52]

[51] *Ord.*, Prol., q. 8 (*OTh* I: 207–225), especially pp. 213–220.
[52] *Ord.*, d. 27, q. 2 (*OTh* IV: 196–227), especially pp. 211–212.

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18 Is a Bad Angel Always Engaging in a Bad Act? (Rep. II, q. 15)

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TEXT[1]

Scotus's View

1 John says that a bad angel can engage in an act that is good according to its genus, but cannot engage in a meritorious act, even though it can indeed engage in a morally good act.[2] He argues for this on the basis that, according to Dionysius, the natural powers [*naturalia*] of a damned angel remain entire.[3] Consequently, after the angel sinned those natural powers incline toward a good act just as much as they did before; therefore, after sinning it can equally engage in this sort of act, just as before.

2 Additionally, a bad angel has a gnawing of conscience and displeasure from sin, and this is not necessarily bad as a result of an aggravating circumstance. Therefore, a good habit could be generated from that act.

3 Additionally, a bad angel can exist without any act, since "nothing is within the will's power as much as the will itself is,"[4] which he[5] understands with respect to the will's act. Therefore, the angel can make itself be the subject of a good act.

4 Although this view is probable, nevertheless when he says that the will can bring it about that it has no act, this does not seem to be true. For according to Augustine and even John himself, a damned will cannot exist without its penalty. But then this follows: its penalty cannot exist without any act of the will, and so if an angel could bring it about that it has no act, then it could bring it about that it has no penalty. The assumption is clear, since the will's penalty is distress; but distress

[1] *OTh* V: 338–358.
[2] Scotus, *Ord.* II, d. 7, q. un., nn. 40–75.
[3] Pseudo-Dionysius, *On Divine Names*, ch. 4 (726C).
[4] Augustine, *On Free Choice* III.3.
[5] I.e., Scotus.

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is in an act of willing according to the Philosopher,[6] and so, the will's penalty is in an act of willing. Therefore, since a damned will could not deprive itself of all penalty, it follows that it could not deprive itself of every act.

You might object that in that case [namely, when the angel has no act] there is pain in the angel, but not distress. Contrary to this, pain exists in the sensitive part, which an angel does not have. 5

Ockham's View

I respond, tentatively holding some conclusions without forcefully asserting them: First, a damned angel necessarily engages in some act of the will. This is not, I say, according to God's power (as if God were unable to deprive the angel of all acts); rather, it is according to the creature's power, for no creature can deprive itself of all acts. This is proved as follows: It is impossible that some creature become damned without there being penalty and distress, for they are in eternal penalty. But distress and penalty cannot exist without an act of willing-against that penalty. Therefore, etc. 6

My second conclusion is that there is some act in a damned angel that is not within its power. This is proved as follows: Although a damned will could not bring it about that it has no act, nevertheless it can refrain from any act that is within its power and elicit some other act instead. Consequently, if the act of willing-against the penalty were within its power, it could refrain from that act and make itself be the subject of an act of loving$_{D}$ itself, without having any other act. Consequently, it could bring it about that it has no penalty, but this is false. 7

A third conclusion is that God totally and immediately causes some act in the will of a bad angel. This is proved as follows: The will can impede every act that is freely caused by the will in the will. But the will cannot impede an act that is caused by God alone. Since, therefore, there is an act within the damned angel's will that cannot be impeded by its will, and since its will cannot refrain from that act, it follows that there is an act in the angel's will that is caused by God alone. 8

Additionally, if that act were not caused by God alone, it would be caused either by the damned will or by a habit. The act is not caused by the will, because then the will could impede that act. Nor is the act caused by a habit: For a habit is of the same nature both in this life and in the next life, and no habit necessitates the will in this life. 9

[6] Cf. Aristotle, *On the Soul* III.11 (434a1–4).

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Therefore, they do not necessitate it in the next life. (This is clear in the case of the habit of charity.)

Similarly, if the act were caused by a habit together with God, then so long as it is not caused by the will (so that the will is instead purely passive with respect to the act) that would suffice for my view, because then the act can be called necessary.

10 Additionally, the act by which a beatified individual loves_A God while seeing him clearly is caused by God alone, because that act is not freely caused by a created will. Therefore, there is an act that is not within the will's power.

Why the Beatified Are Confirmed in Goodness and the Bad Are Obstinate in Badness

11 From these conclusions an explanation can be given why the beatified are confirmed [in their goodness] and why the bad are obstinate [in their badness].[7] In a beatified individual, both the act of seeing God and the act of loving_D God are caused by God alone as their total cause; in no way are these acts caused by the [created] intellect or the will as partial causes. This act of love_D is formally opposed to every sinful act, and since these acts are formally opposed, they are in no way compatible with each other. So, for however long this act is totally conserved by God (just as it is caused by him) the individual is confirmed for that long, so that they cannot in any way engage in a sinful act, not even from the created will's absolute power. For the individual cannot engage in a sinful act unless they could impede the act of loving_D, because there is a formal incompatibility between that act and a sinful act. But on account of this one should not say that the will is being coerced, because the will formally wills and loves_D God by means of that act [of loving], even though that act is not caused by that will.

12 In the same way, an explanation can be given for the obstinacy of the bad: God causes as a total cause whatever absolute item is in the act of willing-against and hating God. That act is not compatible with an act of loving_D God, nor with any good act, because there is a formal incompatibility between those acts. While that act persists and is totally conserved by God, a created will from its own absolute power cannot engage in the opposite act. So, for as long as the act persists, the will is obstinate such that it cannot will the opposite act.

[7] The confirmation of the good angels is their being immutably fixed in a sinless state, while the obstinacy of the bad angels is their being immutably fixed in a sinful state. See, e.g., Peter Lombard, *Sentences* II, d. 7, ch. 1.

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That God could cause an act of hating God in a created will (with respect to every absolute item in that act) is proved in this way: God can cause any absolute item without causing any other thing that is not the same as that absolute item. And an act of hating God, with respect to every absolute item in the act, is not the same as the deformity and the badness in the act. So, God can cause every absolute item that is in an act of hating God or an act of willing-against God without causing any of the deformity or badness in the act. Therefore, etc. 13

Additionally, deformity can be separated from the hatred of God just as much as moral goodness can be separated from the love_D of God. But the love_D of God in a good angel can be separated from the moral goodness and merit [of that act]. So, the hatred of God in a bad angel can be separated from its deformity, and since everything that does not include a contradiction or sinful badness [*malum culpae*] can be made by God alone, thus hatred of God can be. 14

Additionally, God is or can be the total cause of everything with respect to which he is a partial cause, since he can supply all of a secondary cause's causality in the genus of efficient causation. But God is a partial cause with respect to every positive thing, especially each absolute item produced by a creature, as was already shown.[8] Therefore, God can be the total cause of every absolute item, and consequently can be a total cause of an act of hating God. 15

Additionally, hatred is not formally sinful, and so it can be caused by God alone. The inference is obvious. The antecedent is proved as follows: If hatred were formally sinful, then any cause of hatred would sin. Consequently, since a habit generated from an act of hating God is a cause of other similar acts [of hating God], it would follow that a habit would sin. 16

One could answer in a different way and a different explanation of the obstinacy of the bad could be provided by supposing that God concurs in every action of a creature (at least as a partial cause). Then it can be said that God concurs with a created will to cause an act of hating God and he does not will to concur with the bad angel to cause a good act (e.g., love_D), so that in this way he concurs with the one act but not the other. So, the bad angel can be called obstinate because it cannot elicit any good act. 17

You might object that then God sins and is bad, since he does not will to concur with a good act. I respond that a human sins only when they are obligated to do what they do not do or because they do what 18

[8] *Ord*., d. 45, q. un., translated in chapter 10 of this volume; also *Rep.* II, qq. 3–4 (*OTh* V: 50–79).

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they ought not [*non debet*] do; this is what makes a human a debtor [*debitor*]. But God is neither obligated nor bound as a debtor to anyone. So God is not able to do what he ought not do, nor is he able to not do what he ought to do.

19 You might object that, given the aforementioned response,[9] it seems that a bad angel can cease from every act, from the fact that it has all its acts within its power insofar as it is a partial cause of them. I respond that, although on this view the act of divine hatred does not totally come from God, but only partially so, nevertheless some other acts that are in the damned individual do come totally from God, e.g.: the acts of willing-against a penalty that is being suffered and of willing-for beatitude, the act of willing-against or hating sin, the act of willing-against being in that sort of place – all these are not sins but a penalty for sin.

20 These acts are a penalty for sin because it is a significant [*magna*] penalty to will-for beatitude and yet lack it forever. These acts are neither bad nor sins, and a bad angel cannot deprive itself of them. So, although perhaps it could cease from the act of hating God, it still could not cease from these other acts that are totally caused by God, acts in which the significant penalty consists. So, it cannot cease from every act, nor deprive itself of penalty, nor can it elicit a good act (even though it could cease from the act of hatred), because God does not concur in eliciting a good act rather than a bad act.

21 Given this, it is clear in what way there is freedom in the beatified and in the damned. There is no freedom (in either the good or the bad) with respect to those acts that are caused by God alone or with respect to the opposites of those acts. This is because the beatified and the damned cannot cease from the former acts (which are totally caused by God) and they cannot elicit the latter acts (because of the formal incompatibility between the latter acts and the former acts that are caused by God alone). So, since God totally causes the beatific act in the will of a good angel, that good angel does not have freedom with respect to the beatific act, nor with respect to its opposite (i.e., hating). Similar things hold for a bad angel. But they have freedom and indifference with respect to other acts that neither necessarily follow from the former acts, nor are incompatible with them, but are instead indifferent to them. Tempting humans in a bad angel and watching over humans in a good angel are acts of this sort, for these acts neither necessarily follow from the former acts that are caused by God alone nor are incompatible with them; rather, these acts are indifferent.

[9] Namely, the view espoused in **[17]**.

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There is a worry whether the damned angels have been banished to a place that is fitting or unfitting for them. I respond that no place is fitting or unfitting to their nature, nor is one place more fitting than another, because an angel relates equally to every place on the basis of its nature. Nevertheless, some place is fitting or unfitting to its will's acts, insofar as it wills to be in one place and wills-against being in a different place. The place that it wills to be in is fitting for it, and the place that it wills-against being in is unfitting for it. Thus I say that for their penalty they were banished to a place that they will-against being in, indeed, the place that they hate most. That act is caused by God alone, and so they are unable to cease from it; because of this, they are maximally distressed. 22

There is a worry whether good angels are incapable of sinning [*impeccabilis*]. I respond that they are, because God totally causes and conserves a beatific act in their will, and he does not act together with the angel to cause any bad act in it. So, a good angel is incapable of sinning, only as a result of God's will acting and conserving in this way, not from its own nature. This is proved first as follows: While a subject exists under one of two contraries, it cannot receive the other contrary. But a good angel always exists as a subject of a beatific act and it cannot cease from that act (as is clear from what has been said). Therefore, it can never sin, even from its own absolute power, since a sinful act is formally incompatible with the beatific act. 23

Additionally, when an agent conserving an effect is more powerful in its conserving than another agent is in causing the contrary effect, then the second agent cannot cause an effect that is contrary to the effect being conserved by the first agent. But God, who is the most powerful agent of all, conserves the beatific act. Therefore, for as long as God conserves that act, a created will cannot elicit a contrary act. From this it is clear that a good angel is incapable of sinning, not from its own nature, but only as a result of God's will causing and conserving the beatific act. 24

Nine Worries

But there are many worries brought against this. First, against the claim[10] that there is an act in the will that is not within the will's power: It is indeed true that the will's action can be impeded so that no effect is produced when the adjacent [*approximatis*] causes are concurring in order to produce some effect; at the least, the activity [*actio*] can be impeded by divine power since God is a partial cause, and an effect would never be 25

[10] See **[7–11]**.

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produced if God did not concur with the other causes, no matter how much those other causes are adjacent, since one of the partial causes necessarily required for the action will be lacking. Nevertheless, it seems to be impossible for all the causes to be adjacent, for the effect to be produced, and for the effect to not come from those causes.

For example, the will and the object are partial causes with respect to an act of willing and so, notwithstanding that all of the causes are adjacent, if the will is not acting then the act cannot be caused, for the will is a partial cause that is necessarily required for this sort of an act; and thus the will's activity can be impeded, the adjacency of the causes notwithstanding. But it is impossible for both the will and the object to be adjacent and for the act of willing to be produced by the object but not be produced by the will. However, God and the will are both adjacent causes with respect to causing a willing in the will; therefore, notwithstanding that the will's activity can be impeded if its effect is not posited, nevertheless it is impossible for a willing to be posited in the will and for the will's activity to be suspended. Therefore, it is impossible that there be an act in the will that is not within its power.

26 Additionally, the will is a free power with respect to every act existing in it, and it cannot be compelled. But it is free with respect to everything with respect to which it is active. Therefore, etc.

27 Additionally, against the claim[11] that hatred could be totally caused by God: According to the Philosopher in *Ethics* III there are some acts that have badness and deformity connected to them as soon as they are named.[12] No such act can be brought about by God. But hatred is an act of this sort, for as soon as it is named it has badness and deformity connected to it. Therefore, it cannot be caused by God alone.

28 Additionally, everything that can be made by God alone without sin – even what can be done by a will – can fall under a divine command and God can command a will that it should do that thing, because everything that is not sin can fall under God's command. Therefore, if an act of hating God can be brought about by God alone without sin, and if it can also be brought about by a created will, then God can command the will to hate God. Then, since a created will receives merit by carrying out a divine command, a created will can receive merit by hating God, which seems very unfitting.

29 Additionally, love_D of God is good on account of its appropriate end, and hatred of God is bad on account of its inappropriate end. Therefore, just as no one can love_D God without that love_D being good and meritorious on account of the appropriate end, so no one

[11] See **[12–16]**.
[12] Aristotle, *NE* II.6 (1107a9–14).

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can hate God without that hatred being bad on account of the inappropriate end. And nothing that is such that it cannot be separated from sin can be brought about by God alone. Therefore, etc.

30 Additionally, against the claim[13] that there are some acts within an angel's power with respect to which it has freedom, such as the tempting of humans: Every will that is capable of having an act of desire is pleased and rejoices in having what it desired when what was desired is obtained. Therefore, if a bad angel can desire and will to tempt humans, then it is pleased and rejoices in tempting them; but every joy is incompatible with the damned, just as every distress is incompatible with the beatified.

31 Additionally, against the claim[14] that there is no place that is fitting or unfitting to an angel's nature: It was said earlier that angels can be affected by corporeal objects.[15] But then a place in which there is a body by which the angel is naturally affected with a pleasurable passion is a place that is fitting to the angel's nature; and a place in which there is a body by which the angel is affected with a wounding passion is a place which is unfitting to its nature. It follows that, since there are many places of this sort, etc.

32 Additionally, against the claim[16] that some place is fitting or unfitting to an angel in the penalty of sin: God can make without sin any positive thing that he can make with sin. Therefore, if God can make a place be fitting or unfitting because of the penalty of sin, he can also make that without sin. In this way, a place would be fitting or unfitting to an angel on account of its nature, not on account of sin or the penalty of sin.

33 Similarly, against the claim[17] that an angel does not have freedom with respect to an act caused by God alone: According to the saints the good angels have more freedom after their confirmation than they had before it. But prior to their confirmation they had freedom with respect to every act of their will; therefore, they also do after their confirmation.

Responses to the Worries

34 In response to the first of these worries[18] I say that God can be the total cause of an act in the will (e.g., of the love_D of God or the hatred of God), just as he can be the total cause of a stone or of a human

[13] See **[21]**.
[14] See **[22]**.
[15] *Rep.* II, q. 14 (*OTh* V: 311–337), pp. 323–327.
[16] See **[22]**.
[17] See **[21]**.
[18] See **[25]**.

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being, since God can be a total cause of anything of which he can be a partial cause.

35 And when you speak of "adjacent causes" and so on,[19] I reply that even if the causes are adjacent in the appropriate way and the effect is posited, the activity of all these causes is not necessarily required. This is so because there is one partial cause that can be a total cause of anything that is producible by some other partial cause; and when that thing is in fact a total cause, then the activity of some other cause is not required. This is how it is with respect to our will and God. For even though our will (or an angel's will) is adjacent in the appropriate way insofar as it is active and passive, and God is also [adjacent], it does not follow because of this that the will has some activity with respect to a willing that is caused in the will, because that willing can be totally caused by God. If it is in fact caused in this way, then the created will has no activity with respect to that willing. In reply to the example of the created will and the created object, I reply that this case is not analogous because neither the will nor the object can be a total cause with respect to any willing; rather, each of these, when it is a cause, is necessarily a partial cause, so that neither acts when the other does not act. But if the object could be a total cause of the willing (as God is in the case at hand), then the willing would be caused just the same even if the will were not acting.

36 In response to the next worry[20] I say that the will is not compelled in receiving the act that is caused by God alone, although it is indeed necessitated. The first part of this claim is proved as follows: Properly speaking, something is compelled when it does or undergoes something contrary to its natural inclination (e.g., if a heavy object is moved upwards). Now, the will does not receive this act contrary to its natural inclination because it could naturally cause this act (at least, it could partially cause it), and in that case it would receive it naturally; therefore, it also receives it naturally in this case.

37 Similarly, something receives another thing naturally when the former is not naturally inclined to the latter's opposite. But the will is not naturally inclined to the opposite of that [divinely caused] act; therefore, etc.

The second part of the claim [that the will is necessitated in receiving that divinely caused act] is proved as follows: Something acting or undergoing is necessitated when it is not within the thing's power to act or not to act, to undergo or not to undergo, to receive or to not receive. But it is not within the will's power to receive or to not receive

[19] See **[25]**.
[20] See **[26]**.

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the act that is caused by God alone; therefore, it is necessitated. So, it is clear that the will is not compelled in receiving that act, but it is necessitated.

In response to the next worry[21] I say that although hatred, stealing, committing adultery, and similar acts have a bad circumstance attached to them by common law (insofar as they are done by someone who is obligated by divine command to do the contrary), nevertheless with respect to every absolute item in these acts they could be brought about by God without any bad circumstance attached to them. They could even be done meritoriously by someone in this life, if these acts were to fall under a divine command (in the way in which their opposites do fall under such a command, as a matter of fact). But while the divine command for their opposites stands, no act of this sort could be carried out rightly or meritoriously, since they could only be carried out meritoriously if they were to fall under a divine command, and opposites cannot simultaneously fall under a divine command. 38

Now, if such acts were done meritoriously by someone in this life, then these acts would not be called or named theft, adultery, hatred, and so on, because those names do not signify such acts absolutely; rather, they signify them by connoting or providing an understanding that the one who does such acts is obligated by divine command to do the opposite. So, with respect to the entirety that is signified, the nominal definition of such names signifies the bad circumstances. It is in this regard that the saints and the philosophers understood these names to be immediately entwined with badness. However, if these acts were to fall under a divine command, then the one doing such acts would not be obligated to the opposite, and consequently in that case these acts would not be named theft, adultery, and so on.

In response to the next worry[22] I say that there are some acts that can be done rightly by one cause, but if they were done by another cause they could only be done badly; the entire reason for this is that the one cause is obligated to an opposite act but the other cause is not. So it is in the case at hand: a created will is obligated by God's command to love_{D} God, and so while that command stands the created will cannot rightly hate God or rightly cause an act of hating; rather, the created will necessarily causes it badly, with moral badness. This is because the created will is obligated to the opposite act by God's command, and while the first command stands God cannot command it to do the opposite. But God is not obligated to cause any act, and so God 39

[21] See **[27]**.
[22] See **[28]**.

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can cause any absolute act and can cause its opposite without any sinful badness. So, just as God can totally cause an act of loving$_D$ without any moral goodness or badness (since moral goodness and badness connote that an agent is obligated to the act or to its opposite), God can also totally cause an act of hating God without any moral badness. This is for the same reason, namely that God is not obligated to cause any act.

40 In response to the next worry[23] I say that if the hatred of God is caused by God alone, it will always be for a good end, because God is in no way harmed [*damnificatur*] by a creature's hatred. However, hating God for an inappropriate end is bad, and this is the case for a creature's act but not for the act that is from God alone. Also, this worry assumes something false, namely, that the love$_D$ of God is always good and for an appropriate end. For sometimes the love$_D$ of God can be bad and for an inappropriate end, as when I love$_A$ God with desire-love$_A$.

41 In response to the next worry[24] I say that 'freedom' is taken in five senses: a first sense that is opposed to the slavery to sin, a second sense opposed to the slavery to misery, a third sense opposed to the slavery to penalty, a fourth sense opposed to compulsion, and a fifth sense opposed to immutability.

With respect to the first, second, and third senses of freedom, there is no freedom in a bad angel, because it is not free with respect to sin, misery, or penalty. This is so because a bad angel cannot will that it be in a torturous place, since (as was said) there necessarily inheres in the angel an act (that comes from God) of willing-against being in that place, and opposite acts cannot simultaneously inhere in the same thing. Nevertheless, in the bad angels there is the freedom opposed to immutability and compulsion with respect to indifferent acts, i.e., those that are not incompatible with the act that is totally caused by God or that do not necessarily follow from that act. With respect to such acts the angel can indifferently elicit one act or the other; it is compelled to neither of the opposite acts.

However, in good angels there is freedom in the first three senses, because they are free in this way from sin, penalty, and misery. They are also free in the fourth sense, because they are not compelled to will anything contrary to the inclination of their will; as such, there is even more freedom in the good angels than in someone in this life or in a damned [human], because although someone in this life could not

[23] See **[29]**.

[24] See **[33]**. From this point on, Ockham does not respond to the worries in the same order in which they were presented.

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be coerced with respect to interior acts (e.g., willing and the like), nevertheless they can be coerced with respect to exterior acts. A good angel, however, cannot be coerced into any acts against its inclination.

However, in the good angels there is not freedom taken in the fifth sense with respect to all acts of their wills because they do not have the freedom opposed to immutability with respect to the acts that are totally caused by God. Rather, with respect to such acts they are immutable, for by those acts they will one of a pair of opposites in such a way that they are unable to will the other. But with respect to indifferent acts (ones that are neither formally incompatible with the acts that are caused by God nor necessarily follow from them) they have the freedom opposed to immutability, for with respect to those acts they can will one of the opposites or the other. According to this fifth sense, there is more freedom in someone in this life than in a beatified individual, because someone in this life has the freedom opposed to immutability with respect to all acts, as does an angel prior to its confirmation. Yet afterwards the angel does not have freedom with respect to all acts, because before its confirmation it was able to sin and able to not sin, but afterwards it cannot sin; rather, the good angels are immutable concerning such acts. This, though, does not posit some imperfection in them; rather, it posits greater perfection.

In response to the next worry[25] I say that although pleasure or distress follow after desire, nevertheless they are real things distinct from every [other] act of the will in the way in which one absolute thing is distinct from another absolute thing. So, God is able to make the first thing (i.e., the act of willing) without the second thing (i.e., the pleasure or distress).[26] 42

And so perhaps God has ordained as [part of] the penalty of a damned individual that they could have an intense act of willing concerning themselves or concerning another and yet not take pleasure in it. Alternatively, it can be said that in the will of a damned individual there is a forceful distress that follows the act of willing, and that that distress is not compatible with any pleasure at all due to a formal incompatibility between the distress and pleasure. So, even though a damned individual might maximally will and love_D themselves, still they do not take pleasure in that, for the aforementioned reason. Some causes are jointly possible in this way even though their effects are not jointly possible, e.g., willing-against and willing-for, which are causes of distress and pleasure. 43

[25] See **[30]**.

[26] For more on this point, see *Var. Ques.*, q. 6, a. 9, nn. 9–11 and also *Rep.* IV, q. 16, nn. 15–21, translated in chapters 2 and 8 of this volume, respectively.

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44 In response to the next worry[27] I say that, as a matter of fact, a damned individual always elicits some bad act from the fact that they have given up hope of beatitude, even though from their own freedom they are able to not elicit that act. However, they can desist from the act that is bad with sinful badness (although they cannot stop the penalty) because that act is not necessarily caused by God, as was said earlier.

45 In response to the next worry[28] I say that a body does not act upon a spirit by destroying any of its substance; rather, it acts as a partial cause of an intuitive cognition. For when that thing is posited the angel can have an intuitive cognition, and the angel cannot when the thing is not posited. (This in no way diminishes the angel beyond indicating that the angel is not God, in whom no real thing causes a cognition.) Now then, the fact that the cognition is not within the angel's power does not make it be penalizing for the angel.

But an external thing can bring about nothing in the angel's will (neither as a partial cause nor as a total cause), because if a cognition of the thing is posited (either an intuitive or an abstractive cognition) and the object is annihilated, the will can still love_D that thing just as much, so that no causes are required for the love_D of a thing other than the intellect and the will. (However, of course, in the case of intuitive cognition the object is a cause of the cognition, and the cognition is a partial cause of the act of willing.) Therefore, since the willing is in the angel's power it is not penalizing for it; rather, only the act that is just caused by God is penalizing.

46 In response to the next worry[29] I say that God, by his absolute power, can inflict a penalty without any preceding guilt, but that penalty cannot be called punishment, for that latter name connotes some preceding sin. (Thus, in non-human animals there is penalty without any previous sin.) Nevertheless, as a matter of fact by his ordained power God does not inflict a penalty without preceding guilt, guilt that is either in the one who is punished (as in our case) or in someone else (as in the case of Christ, in whom penalty was inflicted because of our sins).

[27] This seems to be a response to a worry that was not recorded in the text.
[28] See **[31]**.
[29] See **[32]**.

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19 *On the Nature of Mortal Sin (*Rep. *IV, qq. 10–11, excerpts)*

TEXT[1]

On the Nature of Mortal Sin

First, I say that mortal sin has only a nominal definition, not a real definition,[2] because 'mortal sin' does not name any one real thing – neither a positive thing, nor a privative thing, nor a negative thing – since nothing is left behind after an act of sinning. Rather, it names many things that do not have any unity, neither essentially [*per se*] nor accidentally [*per accidens*]. So, it can be said that the nominal definition of sin is this: "someone's having committed or omitted an act on account of which they are obligated to an eternal penalty." 14

It is clear that 'mortal sin' does not name some positive thing. It does not name a substance, for there is no new substance remaining in the sinner after the act of sin that was not there before. It does not name any absolute accident in the soul, because it does not name a representation [*species*], a passion, or a habit, since all of these could cease and be destroyed while the sin remains. 15

Nor does it name the privation of any absolute accident. It does not name the privation of grace since this can occur without any guilt, as is clear in the cases of the first angel and the first human prior to sin. Nor does it name the privation of original justice since this privation can coexist with charity, as is clear in the case of a baptized infant who is not in a state of mortal sin. It also does not name the privation of any right and fitting act, because this can occur in someone lacking the use of reason, as is clear in the case of an insane individual who does not sin for this reason.

Nor does 'mortal sin' name some relational item. It does not name a real relation, because if it did, it would be a relation to a future

[1] *OTh* VII: 195–198, 208–210, 220. This selection is taken from a long question on the effects of the sacrament of Penance.

[2] A real definition, in contrast to a nominal definition, would specify the genus and contracting difference of the entity in question in order to precisely locate it on the categorical tree.

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penalty that does not now exist; but a real relation requires a real terminus.

16 Nor does it name a relation of reason, as John says in his discussion of mortal sin.[3] This is so because no such thing should be posited, as is clear from the arguments that were given in the first question of the second book.[4] It is also clear in this particular case from the example given by that professor in his fourth book[5] where he says that someone can offend a ruler and become an enemy with no new thing left behind or brought about in either the offender or the offended; this individual is called an enemy and is obligated to a penalty to which they were not obligated prior to the offense. Even when neither the offender nor the offended is willing or considering anything in any way the one is called an enemy and is obligated to a penalty; so if both of them are sleeping, then there will not be an act of the intellect or an act of the will in either of them, and consequently there will be no relation of reason by which the one called an enemy is obligated to a penalty (for this sort of relation of reason, according to him, is caused by an act of the intellect or an act of the will[6]).

The same can be said of mortal sin. Suppose (though impossible) that there was some time at which God did not understand or will, just as can be the case for a human. Consequently, according to him, there would be no relation of reason in God at that time. Still, at that time the sinner would equally be in a state of mortal sin and would be obligated to an eternal penalty for their sin, and they would be an enemy just as they are now, when God [in fact] always understands and wills. Therefore, mortal sin is not formally a relation of reason, because otherwise someone would not be in a state of sin except when that relation existed, which is false, as was just proved. So, sin is nothing other than someone's having committed or omitted some act on account of which God has ordained eternal penalty for them. Nevertheless, God could have ordained this differently.

17 From this it follows that mortal sin neither takes away nor destroys anything in the soul, because although the one who sins is lacking some act that ought to be in them and to which they are obligated, nevertheless that act is not destroyed because it did not inhere in them. Nor is anything else taken away from the soul: not a substance (which is obvious), nor an accident. For if some accident were taken away, that accident would either be a habit of the soul (and it is clear that no habit is taken away, because there need not be any habit that

[3] Scotus, *Ord.* IV, d. 14, q. 1, nn. 28–34.
[4] *Rep.* II, q. 1 (*OTh* V: 3–26), pp. 5–8.
[5] Scotus, *Ord.* IV, d. 14, q. 1, n. 33.
[6] Scotus, *Quod.*, q. 17, nn. 3–4.

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precedes this sort of act) or some passion (which is not taken away, because there need not be any passion that necessarily precedes that act) or some representation (which is not taken away, because that can coexist with this sort of act).

18 It might be objected that the inclination to virtue is diminished and taken away by sin. Contrary to this, I argue just as before; that inclination is either a substance or an accident. It is not a substance, because everyone agrees that nothing of this sort is diminished or destroyed by sin. Nor is this inclination an accident, because it is not a habit, an act, a representation, or a power, as is clear. Similarly, if the inclination were a habit, it would either be naturally instilled, infused, or acquired. It is not naturally instilled, because no such habit is posited in the soul. Nor is it acquired, because that sort of habit is acquired from acts that do not necessarily precede an act of sinning; rather, they can follow it.

19 It might be objected that as a result of this sort of act one is less disposed to an act of virtue than they were before, for as a result of this act one is inclined to the opposite of virtue. Contrary to this, God can suspend the activity of this act of sinning with respect to generating a habit and can annihilate the act; but the individual would still remain a sinner, just as they were before.

20 From these considerations it is clear how God would not sin at all even if he were to bring about as a total cause every act that he now brings about as a partial cause together with a sinner. This is so because sin, as was said, does not name anything other than an act of commission or omission to which a human being is obligated, on account of which commission or omission the individual is obligated to an eternal penalty. However, there is no act to which God can be obligated, and so by the fact that God wills something, it is just for it to be done. Here is an example of this: If someone is a superior of two others, and if the superior commands the one to do something and commands the other not to do it, then the first one would sin if they did not do that thing. But the second one would not sin if they did not do that thing, because the second is not equally obligated as the first one is.

Therefore, obligation is what makes someone be a sinner or not a sinner. Hence, if God were to cause as a total cause hatred in someone's will (just as he always does as a partial cause), neither God nor the individual would sin: God would not sin because he is obligated to nothing, and the individual would not sin because that act would not be within their power.

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Whether Sin Can Be Erased without Penance

37 Next, it should be seen whether guilt is taken away without penance. Here, I say that 'penance' can be understood to mean either an exterior act in the sensitive part or an interior act. Speaking of the first act, then I say first that no exterior penalty whatsoever is necessarily required nor suffices for the erasure of sin and the infusion of grace. Similarly, speaking of interior acts and passions (e.g., of a displeasure or detesting of sin, of the subsequent distress, and of the acceptance of those acts of displeasure and subsequent distress), I say that none of these in general suffices for the erasure of mortal sin. This is so because no act that can be done in an inordinate way and without the appropriate circumstances suffices for the erasure of mortal sin. But all the aforementioned acts are of this sort. Therefore, etc. The minor premise is clear because someone can detest sin and be distressed only on account of some temporal or eternal penalty and not on account of God; consequently, that act or that distress lacks its appropriate end since "perfect charity drives out fear."[7]

38 Second, I say that it is not contradictory for sin to be erased without penance and, consequently, without any of the aforementioned items. This is clear, because God can infuse grace in anyone without penance, so long as nothing incompatible with grace or glory is found in them. And nothing incompatible with grace or glory is found in this sinner, because the act [of sinning] has already exited from them and it need not be the case that any habit was left behind by that act (as was made clear above[8]); therefore, etc.

39 Furthermore, nothing that exists in a sinner is a necessary cause of a penalty on account of which glory would be incompatible with them; this is so because inflicting a penalty is only in God's will. Therefore, God can take away the penalty from that individual without any incompatibility.

40 You might object that God inflicts a penalty necessarily, for otherwise he would be unjust. Contrary to this, God is able to not inflict a penalty for some time; therefore, he is able to not inflict it at any time. For if things are not incompatible at some time, they will forever be compatible. This is because the passing of time does not bring about an incompatibility; rather, things that are incompatible are incompatible from themselves.

41 Furthermore, if it were granted that God inflicts a penalty necessarily, it would follow that God could not in any way annihilate this sinner. For if the sinner were not penitent, it would necessarily need

[7] 1 John 4:18.
[8] See **[17]**.

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to be the case (if God is to be just) that God inflict a penalty on them; but God could not inflict this if he were to annihilate the individual. And if they were penitent, God could not annihilate them, because then he would necessarily give them grace, and consequently, according to right reason he would give them glory. And so, God could never annihilate any sinner, because every sinner necessarily falls under one of these two contradictories, i.e., they are either penitent or not penitent.

42 Third, I say that by God's ordained power he could take away guilt without any particular interior or exterior penance. This is proved as follows: It is possible for someone to forget that they have committed a sin in such a way that they have indefeasible ignorance with respect to that sin. Consequently, that ignorance is not imputable to them, and then they are not obligated to detest that sin. But no one who has the use of reason can be placed beyond the possibility of salvation [*extra statum salutis*]. So then, if they were to love_D God above all things, by his ordained power God would infuse grace. Therefore, etc.

43 You might object that such an individual is obligated to give penance in general, e.g., "If I have committed some sin…" I respond that they are obligated to give penance if sin in general comes to mind, but if it does not come to mind (and this is not a result of their negligence), then it does not seem that the sin could not be taken away from them. For instance, if they were intensely thinking about God or about anything else and because of that they could not be contrite (neither in particular nor in general). That notwithstanding, I say that someone existing in a state of mortal sin and being conscious of their sin – or someone who is not conscious of it as a result of some imputable ignorance – cannot have that sin taken away by the ordained power of God without an act of penance. This is because God has set forth that guilt would not be taken away from anyone without some punishment.

44 Fourth, I say that the act of detesting sin is more essentially related to the removal of guilt than any interior or exterior penance[9] is. The reason for this is that, just as sin is committed by the will alone, so that act that is primarily and more essentially in the will's power is the first of all the acts that are required for the erasure of sin. An act of displeasure is this sort of act; an act of distress is not.

45 This argument is confirmed, because God could suspend the causality of that act [of displeasure] with respect to the distress, and then there would be this displeasure and detesting without any consequent

[9] Reading *poenitentia* with manuscripts DFZ for the edition's *poena*.

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distress. Nevertheless, the detester would in that case merit the removal of guilt and the infusion of grace.

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75 So, I say – without passing judgment on the views of others – that mortal sin cannot be taken away by any sacrament without contrition, either in general or in particular. I say this regarding someone who is able to use free choice, who is of the requisite age, and who does not have indefeasible ignorance. If any of these conditions is not present, then [the sin] is excused, as is clear in the case of an infant or an insane individual. For although an infant can be set free from original sin without any act of their own will (because they lack the use of free choice), still sin is not taken away from them without any act, whether their own or someone else's. But for an adult who has the use of free choice, sin is not taken away from them without a good movement of their own will.

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20 *On Acts That are Intrinsically and Necessarily Virtuous (*Var. Ques., *q.* 7, *a.* 1, *excerpts)*

TEXT[1]

The third[2] conclusion is that there is some act that is necessarily and 12
intrinsically virtuous. This is proved as follows: It is impossible for some contingently virtuous act (i.e., an act that can indifferently be called virtuous or vicious) to be made determinately virtuous by the introduction of an act that is not necessarily virtuous. This is so because no act that is contingently virtuous in the aforementioned way makes another act be or be denominated as determinately virtuous. For if an act was made determinately virtuous by some contingently virtuous act, then this second act that is contingently virtuous will be determinately virtuous either because of some other act that is necessarily virtuous or by another contingently virtuous act. If the second act is virtuous in virtue of a necessarily virtuous act, then for that reason one would stop at that second act, and then, likewise, the proposed claim (that there is some necessarily virtuous act in a human being) is established. If the second act is virtuous because of another contingently virtuous act, then either there will be an infinite regress or else the regress will be stopped at some necessarily virtuous act, and then the proposed claim is established.

But both exterior human acts and interior human acts such as 13
understanding and willing (insofar as willing is an indifferent act) are contingently virtuous. For example, going to church for the sake of an appropriate end at first is a virtuous act, but when that same going to church persists for the sake of a bad end it becomes vicious. Consequently, that going to church is contingently virtuous.

The same goes for understanding and speculating: at first, understanding for the sake of an appropriate end will be virtuous, but if later

[1] *OTh* VIII: 327–330.
[2] The first and second conclusions in this passage concern the relationships among habits, the acts of those habits, and the objects of those acts. For a complete translation, see William of Ockham 1997: 63–69.

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the intention is changed while that same act persists in the intellect (namely, the act is continued for the sake of an inappropriate end) then that speculation will be vicious. Consequently, the speculation is contingently virtuous.

14 So, I say that one must grant that there is some necessarily primarily virtuous act, one that is primarily praiseworthy and perfect with respect to the circumstances, which is virtuous in such a way that it cannot be made vicious, just as willing to do something because it is a divine command is virtuous in such a way that it cannot be made vicious while that divine command remains in effect. From this sort of act that virtue is generated about which the saints say that no one can use a virtue badly.[3]

15 The fourth conclusion is that the necessarily and primarily virtuous act is an act of the will. This is clear as follows: First, only this act is primarily praiseworthy or blameworthy; other acts are only praiseworthy or blameworthy secondarily and by extrinsic denomination, i.e., because they are elicited in conformity to an act of the will.

Furthermore, any act other than an act of the will, while remaining the same, can be either vicious or virtuous; but only that act is virtuous in such a way that it cannot be made vicious, as was made clear above in the third conclusion.

Furthermore, according to the saints no act is praiseworthy or blameworthy except because of a good or bad intention[4], but an intention is an act of the will. Therefore, etc.

Furthermore, Anselm says that only the will is punished as only it sins; therefore, etc.[5]

16 The fifth conclusion is that no act other than an act of the will is intrinsically virtuous or vicious. This is so because, first, any other act can be indifferently praiseworthy and blameworthy while remaining the same: it is praiseworthy at first when it is conformed to a right willing and later it is blameworthy when it is conformed to a vicious willing, as was made clear above in the third conclusion.

Second, no act is vicious unless it is voluntary and in the will's power, because "sin is voluntary to such an extent" and so on.[6] But an exterior act can be in the will's power at first – e.g., someone throws themselves off a cliff and later, while falling, they can unqualifiedly and

[3] Peter Lombard, *Sentences* I, d. 1, c. 3.
[4] Peter Lombard, *Sentences* II, d. 40.
[5] Anselm, *On the Virginal Conception and Original Sin*, 4.
[6] Augustine, *On True Religion*, 14.27.

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meritoriously will-against that act for the sake of God, as was made clear above in the worries in these pages.[7] Therefore, etc.

The sixth conclusion is that no habit other than a habit of the will is intrinsically and perfectly virtuous, because any other habit inclines indifferently to both praiseworthy and blameworthy acts. 17

[7] *Var. Ques.*, q. 6, a. 9, nn. 19–21, translated in chapter 2 of this volume.

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21 *Is Only an Act of the Will Necessarily Virtuous?* (Quod. *III*, *q.* 14)

TEXT[1]

1 That this is not so: Any act of the will can be elicited with a bad intention. Therefore, any act of the will can be bad.

2 Contrary to this: Loving$_D$ God is the only virtuous act, and it is nothing but virtuous. Therefore, that act alone is virtuous.

3 In response to this question I say that the exclusive sentence that is posed in the question has two component sentences [*exponentes*]. It has one negative component, namely that no act other than an act of the will is necessarily virtuous. It also has an affirmative component, namely that there is some act of the will that is necessarily virtuous.

Regarding the Negative Component

4 Regarding the negative component, I say that it is unqualifiedly true, because every act that is in the will's power (other than acts of the will) is good in such a way that it can be bad; for it can be done for a bad end and with a bad intention. Similarly, every other act can be elicited naturally and non-freely, and no act of this sort is necessarily virtuous.

5 Furthermore, every other act done by the will can be brought about by God alone, and consequently it is not necessarily virtuous for a rational creature.

6 Furthermore, for any other act, while the act remains the same it can be indifferently praiseworthy and blameworthy, and can be praiseworthy at first and blameworthy later insofar as it can be conformed to a rightful willing and then a vicious willing in succession. This is clear of the case of first going to church with a good intention and later with a bad intention.

7 Furthermore, no act is virtuous or vicious unless it is voluntary and in the will's power. This is so because "sin is voluntary to such an

[1] *OTh* IX: 253–257.

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extent," and so on.[2] And any act other than an act of the will can be within the will's power at first and not be within its power later; e.g., when someone voluntarily throws themselves off a cliff, but then later repents and meritoriously has an act of willing-against that descent for the sake of God. The descent is not within the will's power while falling, and therefore the descent is not necessarily vicious.

Regarding the Affirmative Component

Regarding the affirmative component, I say first that no act is necessarily virtuous according to the literal meaning of the words. This is proved as follows: first, because no act is necessary, and consequently no act is necessarily virtuous; second, because every act can be brought about by God alone, and consequently no act is necessarily virtuous because that sort of act [namely, one done by God alone] is not within the will's power. 8

Nevertheless, an act can be understood to be necessarily virtuous in another sense, namely, that the act cannot be vicious while the divine command remains in effect. Similarly, that the act cannot be caused by a created will without being virtuous. 9

Second, understanding 'virtuous act' in this sense, I say that some act can be necessarily virtuous in this sense. I prove this as follows: It is impossible that a contingently virtuous act (one that is such that it can indifferently be called virtuous or vicious) become determinately virtuous except on account of some other act that is necessarily virtuous. This is proved as follows: A contingently virtuous act (e.g., an act of walking) becomes determinately virtuous through conformity to another act. Now, I ask of this latter act, is it necessarily virtuous in the aforementioned sense? If so, then the claim is established that some act in a human being is necessarily virtuous. Or, if the latter act is contingently virtuous, then it becomes determinately virtuous by conformity to another virtuous act, and the same must be asked of this act as was asked about the first, and either there will be an infinite regress or else it will stop at some necessarily virtuous act. 10

Third, I say that an act that is necessarily virtuous in this sense is an act of the will. This is so because an act by which God is loved_{D} above all things and for his own sake is this sort of act, for this act is virtuous in such a way that it cannot be vicious, nor can this act be caused by a created will without being virtuous. This is so, first, because everyone is obligated to love_{D} God above all things at some place and time [*pro* 10

[2] Augustine, *On True Religion*, 14.27.

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loco et tempore], and consequently that act cannot be vicious; secondly, because this act is the first of all good acts.

Furthermore, only an act of the will is intrinsically praiseworthy and blameworthy.

Furthermore, according to the saints an act is praiseworthy or blameworthy only because of a good or bad intention; and an intention is an act of the will. Therefore, etc.

Furthermore, according to Anselm only a will is punished, because only a will sins. Therefore, etc.

An Objection

11 You might object as follows: God can command someone not to love_D him at some time, since he can command that the intellect be so intent on studying (and likewise the will) that the individual could in no way think about God for that time. Now suppose that the will elicits an act of loving_D God at that time. Then that act is either virtuous – but this cannot be said, because the act is elicited contrary to a divine command – or else the act is not virtuous, and then this claim[3] is established, that there is an act of loving_D God above all things that is not virtuous.

Ockham's Response to the Objection

12 I respond that if God could command this – as it seems that he can without contradiction – then I say that the will cannot elicit this sort of act [of loving_D God above all things] at that time. For if the will were to elicit an act of this sort, then it would love_D God above all things and consequently it would carry out the divine command, for loving_D God above all things is to love_D whatever God wills to be loved_D. But were the will to love_D him in this way, then as a result it would not perform the divine command given in the example.[4] Consequently, by loving_D God in this way, the will would both love_D God and not love_D God; it would perform God's command and not perform it. However, it could love_D God with a simple and natural love_A, which is not the love_D of God above all things.

In the same way, supposing that someone does not believe that God exists, that individual cannot love_D him, because nothing can be loved_D except what exists or can exist.

[3] Namely, the objector's claim that an act of loving God can fail to be virtuous.
[4] Namely, a will that is loving God at time *t* would not be carrying out the command to not love God at time *t*.

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Fourth, I say that only a habit of the will is intrinsically and necessarily virtuous, because every other habit inclines indifferently to praiseworthy and blameworthy acts. 13

In response to the initial argument,[5] I deny its assumption, because there is some act of the will that cannot in any way be elicited with a bad intention, as is clear from what has been said. 14

[5] See **[1]**.

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22 *Can There Be Demonstrative Knowledge about Morals?* (Quod. *II*, *q*. *14*)

TEXT[1]

1 That there cannot be: There cannot be demonstrative knowledge of those things that are subject to the will, and morals are of this sort. Therefore, etc.

2 On the contrary: Morals are knowable. Therefore, etc.

3 In this question, I first explain one term of the question; second, I posit a distinction; third, I answer the question.

4 First, I say that 'moral' is taken broadly for [all] human acts that are absolutely subject to the will. It is taken in this sense in the *Decretal*, d. 1, the chapter on "Morals."[2] This is clear from the gloss.

5 'Moral' is taken in another sense, more strictly, for "conduct" [*moribus*] – that is, acts that are subject to the will's power according to a natural dictate of reason and according to other circumstances.

6 Second, it should be known that moral doctrine has multiple parts, one of which is positive and another of which is non-positive. Positive moral knowledge is that which contains human and divine laws, which obligate that one should pursue or flee from those things that are neither good nor bad except insofar as they are prohibited or ordered by some superior whose role it is to establish laws.

7 Non-positive moral knowledge is that which directs human acts without any command from a superior, directing in the way in which principles that are self-evident [*per se nota*] or are known from experience do. E.g., that every upright [*honestum*] thing should be done and every disreputable [*inhonestum*] thing should be avoided and the like; Aristotle speaks about these in moral philosophy.

8 Third, I say that positive moral knowledge – the knowledge of jurists is of this sort – is not demonstrative knowledge, although it is regulated for the most part [*ut in pluribus*] by demonstrative knowledge. It is not demonstrative knowledge because the arguments of the jurists are based upon positive human laws, which do not include sentences that are evidently cognized.

[1] *OTh* IX: 176–178.
[2] Gratian, *Decretum*, d. I, c. 4.

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But non-positive moral teaching is demonstrative knowledge. I prove this as follows: A cognition that syllogistically deduces conclusions from principles that are self-evident or are known from experience is demonstrative, and moral teaching is of this sort. Therefore, etc. The major premise is obvious. The minor premise is proved as follows: There are many principles that are self-evident in moral philosophy; e.g., that the will ought to conform itself to right reason, that every blameworthy bad thing should be avoided, and so on. Similarly, many principles are known through experience, as is obviously clear to one who follows experience. 9

In addition, I say that this knowledge is more certain than many other kinds of knowledge, inasmuch as everyone can have more experience of their own acts than they can have of other things. From this it is clear that this knowledge is very exacting, useful, and evident. 10

In response to the initial argument,[3] I say that sentences that are true and self-evident can be formed about those [acts] that are subject to the will, and from these sentences many conclusions can be demonstrated. 11

[3] See **[1]**.

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Questions about Charity, Merit, and Grace

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*23 Is It Necessary to Posit Three Theological Virtues in This Life That Can Remain in the Next Life? (*Rep. *III, q. 9, excerpts)*

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TEXT[1]

1 It is not necessary to posit three virtues of this sort, which is proved as follows: Faith is not a virtue, since it can support something false and it can concern something false. This is contrary to the Philosopher in *Ethics* VI, where he posits that veridical habits cannot concern falsehoods.[2] Therefore, etc.

2 Additionally, cognition and love_D are sufficient for pursuing an end, and so the habits generated from them are sufficient. But these habits are [just] hope and charity. Therefore, etc.

3 Additionally, it is clear that these virtues are not necessary, because [they would be necessary] for [engaging in] either a natural act or a supernatural act. But not for a natural act, because a naturally acquired virtue suffices for any such act. Nor for a supernatural act, because it seems that this sort of act is not possible for us in this life; this is because any act that someone can have supernaturally in this life (e.g., an act of believing or loving_D) can also be had naturally.

4 Additionally, if it is necessary to posit three virtues of this sort, then either there is just one faith or there are many faiths (and likewise for the other virtues). But there is not just one faith. This is because distinct acts are able to generate distinct habits, and there are acts that are distinct in species with respect to distinct believable things; therefore, etc. Nor are there many faiths, because then there would not be only three theological virtues. Similarly, the Apostle says that there is one faith.[3]

5 Additionally, it is clear that these virtues do not remain in the next life. This is especially clear of faith, since faith is as incompatible with the vision [of God] as it is with knowledge; but faith and knowledge are incompatible. This is proved as follows: Whenever some things are formally contraries, whatever is jointly possible with one is also jointly possible with the other. For instance, whatever is jointly possible with whiteness is also jointly possible with blackness, since nothing is jointly possible with whiteness other than a subject and accidental dispositions, all of which are jointly possible with blackness. But faith and

[1] *OTh* VI: 276–299, 308–313.
[2] Aristotle, *NE* VI.3 (1139b14–18).
[3] Ephesians 4:5.

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heresy are formally contrary to each other, and knowledge is not jointly possible with heresy; rather, knowledge and heresy are jointly impossible. Therefore, faith is also not jointly possible with knowledge.

Additionally, according to the Philosopher, one thing is opposed to just one thing,[4] and this is true with respect to the opposition that exists between extremes. But heresy is opposed to both faith and knowledge. So, either (i) heresy is opposed to faith as an extreme and to knowledge as a middle, or (ii) vice versa. If (i), then knowledge is a species midway between faith and heresy. But the middle is contrary to each extreme, and so knowledge is contrary to faith. If (ii), then faith will be the midway species, and as before the middle is contrary to each extreme. Therefore, etc. Moreover, if faith does not coexist with knowledge, then neither does it coexist with a vision [of God]. The same argument can be made about [the opposition between] hope and the embrace [*tentio*] in the next life,[5] and also about hope and knowledge. 6

Additionally, it is argued of charity that, according to the Apostle, "when what is perfect comes, [what is imperfect] will be left behind" and so on.[6] But the charity of this life is imperfect according to Christ's teaching about John the Baptist, when he says, "One who is less in the kingdom of heaven is greater than him."[7] Therefore, etc. 7

For the opposite claim: 8

From Corinthians: "Now remain faith, hope, [and charity]."[8] 9

Additionally, that these three virtues remain in the next life is proved as follows: If they did not remain, that would be because either the acts [of the virtues] or the habits themselves are incompatible with that state [of the beatific vision]. Not the former: since the habits are not incompatible, neither are the acts. Nor the latter: because the habits and the state are no more incompatible than a habit of temperance is with a habit of intemperance and an intemperate act; but those two habits can coexist at the same time. Therefore, etc. The assumption is proved as follows: A temperate individual can elicit an intemperate act and still can be temperate. Therefore, when an intemperate act remains alongside a habit of temperance, and that intemperate act generates a habit of intemperance, then both habits remain at the 10

4 Aristotle, *Metaphysics* X.5 (1055b30).

5 In addition to the beatific vision and beatific enjoyment, Bonaventure also includes a third beatific act, an "embrace of the highest eternal peace" (*tentio summae pacis aeternalis*) in his *On the Threefold Way*, ch. 3.

6 1 Corinthians 13:10.

7 Matthew 11:11.

8 1 Corinthians 13:13.

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same time. Therefore, in the same way faith and the vision [of God] remain at the same time.

11 Similarly, there does not appear to be any incompatibility among the supernatural habits, and so they can coexist at the same time.

Whether Supernatural Habits Are Necessary

12 The necessity of the supernatural habits should first be considered here, and I hold three conclusions. The first is that natural reason cannot prove that we need any supernatural habit whatsoever in order to pursue the ultimate end. The second is that, given that I believe that beatitude is bestowed upon me on account of merit, it cannot be concluded via a formal inference that supernatural habits are necessary for us. The third is that we can have a naturally inclining natural habit with respect to every act that we can have in this life.

13 The first conclusion is clear – assuming that it cannot be conclusively shown in this life that humans perpetually remain in body and soul as they are now – because there cannot be any evident argument for positing such habits other than because of their operations, because all habits are made known to us through their operations. But all the operations that we experience by means of these supernatural habits can be experienced by means of natural habits. This is clear by running through each of the acts of faith, hope, and charity, since a pagan raised among Christians can believe all the articles of faith and can love_D God above all other things. Therefore, etc.

14 The second conclusion is clear from what was said about charity in the first book, namely that God can accept anyone as worthy of eternal life on an entirely natural basis without any habit of charity, and that he can also condemn anyone without any sin.[9] And if this is the view of the Master of the *Sentences* (namely, that by the absolute power of God, charity in the soul could be nothing other than the coexisting Holy Spirit accepting the natural act and, in the manner of a partial cause, spurring the will on to elicit that act) then he speaks the truth. It need not necessarily be that charity is some accident inhering in the soul. In the same way, the Holy Spirit can accept an act of hoping and an act of believing naturally, without any infused supernatural habit.

15 Additionally, it is not impossible that God ordains that someone is worthy of eternal life if they live according to the right dictate of reason in such a way that they only believe what they conclude by natural reason should be believed. This is clear as follows: The philosophers erred and they were deserving of eternal punishment because they adhered to

[9] *Ord.*, d. 17, qq. 1–3, translated in chapters 24–26 of this volume.

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things that could not be proved necessarily by natural reason, e.g., that the world is eternal. But, if God had arranged it so, in that case one of them could be accepted by adhering to the dictate of right reason. Therefore, etc. Hence, just as Paul had sinned and received grace without any merit, so God could confer eternal life to this sort of individual without any merit and without a supernatural habit. So I say, regarding this conclusion, that supernatural habits are necessary for us according to God's ordained power, but not according to God's absolute power. And I hold this just because of what was said by the saints.

16 The third conclusion is proved as follows: Just as nothing ought to be posited except when there is experience, demonstration, or authority for doing so, so nothing ought to be denied when there is sure experience for positing it. But there is sure experience for positing acquired faith, hope, and charity, for a pagan raised among Christians believes all the articles of faith; similarly, a heretic about one article can truly believe another article. But neither of them has infused faith, as is clear; therefore, they have acquired faith. Similar considerations hold of acquired charity, because an infidel educated among pagans, as a result of the teaching, can love_D God above all things on an entirely natural basis. They can even praise God, sing, and pray. Therefore, they have a love_D of God that is not infused, and so it is acquired.

17 Additionally, every act of the will that we experience in ourselves seems to be natural; therefore, the same goes for habits. The antecedent is proved as follows: Either the will has activity over the act elicited by means of charity or else it does not. If it does not, then the act is not meritorious, because a meritorious act necessarily requires the will's activity. If the will does have such activity, then a natural habit suffices for it, because the only acts we experience in ourselves are acts to which a natural habit inclines. Therefore, notwithstanding that there is a supernatural habit in the will (on the basis of authority), still a naturally acquired natural habit must be posited.

How the Supernatural Habits Are Distinguished

18 The second topic is how these three habits are distinguished; and here there appear to be three difficulties. The first is that it seems that hope is not distinguished from the other two virtues to the extent that the other two are distinguished from each other: for cognition and love_A suffice for pursuing an end; but faith sufficiently inclines to cognition and charity sufficiently inclines to love_A.

19 You might object that hope is required for the act of desire, since it is required that the thing that is believed and loved_A also be desired, and that this desire results from the act of hope. Contrary to this, it

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seems that it is only required that the loveable$_D$ object be displayed as possible for us to possess (and so on for the other circumstances), and that the object then be loved$_A$. But, as before, faith's cognition and charity's love$_A$ suffice for that.

20 The second difficulty is what the object of hope is. Since God is posited as the object of each theological virtue, there is a worry whether entirely the same thing is the object of faith, hope, and charity. If it is, then there is a worry how these habits are distinguished, especially since one habit with respect to the intellect and a second habit with respect to the will would be sufficient.

21 The third difficulty is what power hope is in. For the only act that appears to be in the intellect is an act of believing (which is the act of faith); but there are three acts in the will: loving$_A$, willing-against, and desiring. Now, it is obvious that the act of hope is not an act of willing-against. Nor is it an act of loving$_A$, because charity is [the habit] that inclines to that act; nor is it an act of desiring, because an act of desiring can exist in a hopeless individual.

22 Regarding the first difficulty, I say that hope is a distinct virtue from the others. This is proved as follows: When some things are separable from each other, they are distinct. But hope and the other theological virtues are of this sort. Therefore, etc. The assumption is proved since someone can believe and not hope, as is clear in the case of the hopeless. Similarly, someone can love$_A$ and not hope, as is the case in the next life. Similarly, someone can hope to have beatitude and yet not love$_D$ charitably, as is the case for the sinful and those who are bad.

23 Regarding the second difficulty, I say that the immediate object of these habits are different sentences. For the proximate object of faith is this sentence: "Everything revealed by God is true in the way in which it is revealed by God." The object of hope is this sentence: "Future beatitude will be bestowed upon humans on account of merit." The object of charity is this sentence: "God and everything that God wills are to be charitably loved$_D$ by me."

24 But then there is a worry about the object of hope, because it seems that God is at least a partial object [of hope] and that created [beatitude] is not. In reply it can be said that the object of hope is this sentence: "The divine vision and divine enjoyment will be bestowed upon humans on account of merit."

25 Regarding the third difficulty, I say that the act of hope is a willing and an effective desire by which someone, representing to themselves by faith that the enjoyment of God will be bestowed upon them on account of merit, immediately effectively elicits a meritorious act, if they can do so; and this act cannot exist in a hopeless individual.

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Hence, there are two kinds of desire: One kind concerns possible things, such as when someone effectively desires that something be shown to them as possible to possess through some act; this kind does not exist in the hopeless. The other kind concerns impossible things, such as when someone desires something and believes it to be impossible for them; this kind can exist in the hopeless.

But how then can hope be a distinct virtue from the other acquired and infused virtues? I respond here just as I did in the prologue.[10] There can be two kinds of inclining habits with respect to an act of knowing: one that inclines mediately and another that inclines immediately. The first is a habit that concerns the premises; the second is knowledge, which is a habit that concerns the conclusion. And when in this way there are [multiple] habits that incline to some act, the act can be had (at least once) without the immediately inclining habit. Hence understanding (which is the habit of the premises), by means of its own elicited act, mediately inclines to the act of knowing the conclusion (here I speak of the [temporally] first act of knowing the conclusion) inasmuch as that habit [of understanding the premises] is the cause of its very own act, an act which, together with the intellective power, is an immediate partial cause with respect to the first act of knowing the conclusion. So, that habit inclines mediately inasmuch as it is a cause of a cause. 26

Because the habit of understanding and its act sufficiently incline to the first act of knowing some conclusion, that first act can be had without a habit of knowledge. But after that, the habit of the premises and its act notwithstanding, another habit is generated from that first act of knowing a conclusion (and from the second, the third, and so on in succession), a habit that inclines to the act of knowing that same conclusion immediately: immediately since, as a partial cause, it causes the act of knowing that conclusion. And just as the first act of knowing some conclusion can exist without the habit of knowledge, in virtue of the act concerning the premises, so after the habit of knowledge is generated any act of knowing that same conclusion can exist without the habit and act concerning the premises.

The same is the case for the theological habits as is the case for those habits [of understanding and knowing].[11] This is so because the habits of faith and charity incline to the first act of hope mediately, that is, by means of their acts – i.e., the act of believing and the act of loving$_D$. For when I believe that something is possible for me and I 27

[10] *Ord.*, Prol., q. 8 (*OTh* I: 207–225), pp. 217–220.

[11] The edition places this sentence as the final sentence of **[26]**, but the logic of the passage demands that it be joined to **[27]**.

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love$_D$ it, then I efficaciously desire it, so that I immediately engage in a meritorious operation about that thing, and then the first act of hope can be had without an acquired habit of hope. But after that, a habit is generated from these acts, a habit that immediately inclines to the act of hope, because the habit is an immediate cause of its own act. Thus it can be posited that there is acquired hope, just as there is acquired faith and charity. In addition to those habits, there are other habits of a different nature from them; for if infused faith and acquired faith were of the same nature, it would seem to be pointless to posit infused faith, since the acquired faith of the same nature would suffice. Nevertheless, it is difficult to see how hope is distinguished from the other two, because it seems to include the acts of faith and charity, i.e., the acts of believing and loving$_D$.

On the Number of Theological Habits

28 The third topic concerns the unity of these habits, and there are two difficulties here. First, whether there are only three acquired virtues, just as there are only three infused virtues, i.e., whether there is only one acquired faith, and so on. Second, how there can be one infused faith with respect to all the articles of faith, and how there can be one charity, and so on.

29 There are two conclusions regarding the first difficulty: first, that each article of faith has a distinct acquired faith;[12] second, that those faiths are not just distinct in number but also distinct in species.

30 This first conclusion is proved by John's argument in his *Metaphysics*, in the question on the unity of a science[13]: When someone is able to have an act and habit of believing concerning one article but is not able to do so concerning another article (and even can be in error about that article), then, necessarily, the acts of believing those articles are distinct, as are the habits generated from them. But someone can have acquired faith concerning one article but not concerning another, and can even err about the other. For example, a heretic can have acquired faith concerning the article "God is three and one" and can err about the incarnation of Christ. Therefore, etc.

31 You might object that contraries are compatible with each other in diminished degrees – or if one contrary is present in a maximal degree and the other in the least degree then they are compatible with each

[12] The "articles of faith" are the distinct and separable claims made in the classic Christian creeds; for more discussion and one enumeration of the articles, see Thomas Aquinas, *ST* IIa–IIae, q. 1, a. 8.

[13] Scotus, *Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle* VI, q. 1. See also Scotus, *Quod.*, q. 14, nn. 4–7.

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other – and that a habit inclining to the understanding of just one premise is diminished and imperfect so that it can coexist with error concerning the conclusion. However, a habit inclining to understanding a premise and conclusion at the same time is perfect, and so it is not compatible with ignorance of the conclusion, as is supposed in the example of the other forms.

Contrary to this, suppose there exists a habit that inclines to cog- 32
nizing only a premise and that it exists in the maximal degree (e.g., it has been increased by one hundred acts with respect to that premise), and suppose that there is a habit that inclines to cognizing a conclusion that is only generated from two such acts. Having supposed this, no one doubts that the first habit or the first degree (whatever one calls it) is more perfect than the second habit that inclines to cognizing the conclusion. This notwithstanding, a dispositional ignorance concerning the conclusion can coexist together with the maximally degreed habit concerning the premise, and yet such ignorance cannot coexist together with knowledge of the conclusion in the least degree. (More on this elsewhere.[14])

The second conclusion is proved as follows: Whenever one thing, 33
but not a second thing, can coexist with one of a pair of contraries – indeed, the second cannot coexist with it but is instead incompatible with it – then the first thing (which can coexist with one of the contraries) and the second thing (which cannot) are necessarily distinct in species. This is clear both by example and by argument; it is clear from this example, that since sweetness in milk coexists with whiteness and since blackness cannot coexist with whiteness, then sweetness and blackness are necessarily distinct in species. It is clear by argument as follows: Whenever two things are of the same species, whatever formally can coexist with one can also coexist with the other, and whatever is incompatible with one is also incompatible with the other. E.g., whatever can coexist with one whiteness can coexist with another whiteness, and similarly whatever is incompatible with one whiteness is also incompatible with another whiteness. The presumed claim is therefore clear.

However, acquired faith concerning one article can coexist with an error concerning some other article. (This is clear in the case of a heretic.) But acquired faith and error cannot coexist concerning the same article. Therefore, the acquired faith concerning one article and the acquired faith concerning another article are distinct in species, because if they were of the same species, then error would be as incompatible with the one as it is with the other, and just as it can

[14] E.g., *Ord.*, Prol., q. 8 (*OTh* I: 207–225), p. 215.

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coexist with the one so it could coexist with the other. It is in this way that John's arguments in the aforementioned question hold, because by the first argument he proves that there are distinct [habits of acquired faith] with respect to distinct conclusions, and by the second argument he proves that [these habits] are distinct in species.

34 Regarding the second difficulty – how there can be one [infused] faith about all the articles of faith – this can be answered in two ways. In one way, that infused faith has for its immediate object some sentence that can be a premise and a partial principle that implies every particular article. That sentence is this: "Everything revealed by God is true in the way in which it is revealed to be true." For that sentence can imply every article of faith, since with respect to each article one can argue thus: Everything revealed by God is true in the way in which it has been revealed to be true. And it has been revealed by God that God is three and one, that he became incarnate and suffered, etc. Therefore, etc.

35 Hence just as that sentence is a premise implying every particular article, so the habit of infused faith (which has that sentence as its immediate object) inclines mediately to an elicited act concerning every particular article in virtue of this sentence; and so there is one [infused] faith that is mediately (not immediately) about all the articles. But the way in which faith inclines mediately to an act of believing the particular articles differs from the way a habit concerning a premise (which was spoken of above[15]) inclines to the act of knowing [a conclusion]. For infused faith inclines to an elicited act of faith concerning the particular articles in such a way that neither the habit nor the act of infused faith can be (together with the intellect) a principle sufficient for eliciting an act of believing concerning some particular article. This is clear, for a baptized child raised alone somewhere, where they are never taught about the articles of faith, has infused faith and the use of reason, and yet they can elicit no act of believing about any article. So then, to elicit an act about a particular article necessarily requires acquired faith concerning that article (e.g., as a result of hearing it) since acquired faith comes by hearing according to the Prophet,[16] or by seeing (e.g., if one saw the article written in a book and believed it).

36 A similar case concerns someone who believes "the whole story written in the Bible" and believes that "the whole Bible is true." If they were to believe this by an elicited act, from that act alone they are never able to sufficiently have an act of believing concerning each

[15] See **[26]**.

[16] The quoted text is from Romans 10:17, which Ockham apparently misunderstands as being part of a quote from Isaiah 53:1.

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particular story, except by means of acquired faith concerning that particular story, acquired faith that will either come from a professor that they believe or by looking in a book.

The habit of infused faith, therefore, inclines mediately to an act of believing concerning each particular article, because it does so by means of its own elicited act concerning its own immediate object. That act (together with acquired faith concerning the particular article and together with the intellective power) is a partial immediate cause with respect to an act of believing that article. The act of infused faith is not a cause of the unqualifiedly first act of believing, because at first acquired faith concerning that article is generated from many acts of believing, but [the act of infused faith] is an immediate cause of the first act of believing theologically and (perhaps) meritoriously, in such a way that the habit of infused faith is only a mediate cause because it is a cause of a cause.

But there is a worry whether infused faith could be sufficient (with the intellect, but without acquired faith) for eliciting an act of believing concerning its own first object (namely, the sentence "Everything revealed (etc.)." 37

I respond that infused faith would not be sufficient without acquired faith. This is clear in the case of a child that is baptized and raised as in the previously mentioned example; they have infused faith concerning that sentence, and yet they can never elicit any act with respect to it unless they are taught that everything revealed by God is true (and so on), and, having been taught, they believe this by faith acquired from acts of believing. So, acquired faith is required for an act of believing that sentence, just as it is required for each particular article. 38

But then in what way is [infused faith] said to incline immediately to an elicited act of believing with respect to the sentence that "everything revealed by God is true"? I respond that once a habit of faith has been acquired concerning that sentence, then infused faith is able to immediately concur together with the intellect and with the acquired faith, as a partial cause, in order to elicit the first act of theological and meritorious believing with respect to that sentence, in such a way that that habit of infused faith is an immediate cause of that act. But previously it could not be an immediate cause, because a necessarily required partial cause was missing, namely, acquired faith. But with respect to the other articles the habit [of infused faith] is not an immediate cause; rather, the act of that habit is the immediate cause, and the infused habit is only a cause of a cause, as was said earlier.[17] 39

[17] Ockham's theory as detailed in **[35–39]** is this: The belief that "everything God has

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40 From these things it can be made clear how the same faith was in the ancient fathers that is in contemporaries [*modernis*]. For they believed in a different way than we do in particular cases, and the sentences they believed were different than those that we believe, because the sentences they believed were about the future, whereas those that we believe are about the past. They believed that Christ would be incarnated, that he would suffer, that he would rise again, and that he would ascend; and we believe that he was incarnated, that he did suffer, that he rose again, and that he did ascend.

41 But these are different sentences. This is proved as follows: It is impossible for the same sentence to be both true and false at one and the same time. The sentence "Christ will die" was true before the suffering of Christ, and so it was true for the ancient fathers; and at that time the sentence "Christ has died" was false. But now the contrary is true, because now "Christ has died" is true and "Christ will die" is false (for "now he will not die," according to the Apostle[18]). Therefore, it is impossible that "Christ will die" and "Christ has died" are the same sentence. Nevertheless, although the sentences they believed were different than those that we believe, they were the same article, because the article is about the suffering.

However, if the sentence that they believed and that we believe are called "the article of faith," [according to that usage] it can be said that there were different articles just as there were different sentences. But if the content [*materia*] with respect to which the different statements are formed is called "the article" (statements of which one is true at one time and another is true at another time), in this sense it was the same article both then and now. But this is just equivocation about a name.

Notwithstanding that difference, there was one faith in the ancient fathers and in us – not one numerically, but one in species – because entirely the same sentence was the immediate object of their faith and ours. For just as we believe by means of infused faith that Christ has died and that he will not die, so they believed by means of infused faith that Christ would die and that he had not died.

42 That is why I said that the immediate object of infused faith is this: "Everything revealed by God is true in the way in which it is revealed

revealed is true" has three partial causes: the intellect, an acquired habit of faith concerning that sentence, and the infused habit of faith. The belief in any particular article of faith (e.g., "Christ suffered and died") also has three partial causes: the intellect, an acquired habit of faith concerning that article, and the act of infused faith (which is the occurrent belief that everything God has revealed is true).

[18] Romans 6:9.

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to be true," and not anything else. Since there were different true sentences for the ancient fathers than for us, they elicited an act of believing the articles of faith by means of a different acquired faith of a different nature than ours, together with an [infused] habit of faith of the same nature as ours. For a habit that mediately inclines toward some act is not changed according to a change of those acts. So, although the act of believing some article is different (e.g., "Christ died" vs. "Christ will die"), nevertheless the habit of infused faith is one.

From this it is apparent how someone can possess a demonstration 43
concerning some articles of faith and yet not lose infused faith, although they do lose acquired faith. It is just as someone can have faith concerning a premise and an evident cognition concerning a conclusion, but cannot have at the same time both acquired faith concerning a conclusion and evident cognition concerning that same conclusion. This is because the habit of the premise mediately inclines to an act of knowing the conclusion. One can, I say, have faith concerning the premise and knowledge concerning the conclusion, knowledge that has been acquired by experience – as I explained in the prologue.[19]

Similarly, someone can have evident cognition concerning a premise and be in error concerning the conclusion; but one cannot have at the same time both evident cognition concerning a conclusion and a habit of error concerning that same conclusion. This is so because the habit of the premise mediately inclines to an act of knowing the conclusion, but the habit of knowing the conclusion immediately inclines to that act, and also because evident cognition and error concerning the same object are opposites. So, someone can have infused faith concerning the premise that "Everything revealed by God (etc.)," and together with this they can have a cognition that is knowledge concerning some particular article. But someone cannot have both evident cognition and acquired faith concerning that particular article, for the same reason.

Nor can someone have both infused faith and knowledge concerning the sentence "Everything revealed (etc.)." This is because it is contingent, since it was false before anything was revealed by God.

Alternatively, it can be answered[20] that it is not unfitting for there 44
to be one immediate equivocal cause of many effects that are distinct

[19] See, perhaps, *Ord.*, Prol., q. 12 (*OTh* I: 324–370), pp. 339–341.
[20] This is a second answer to the question asked in **[39]**, namely, how infused faith immediately inclines to an act of faith.

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in species, as is clear in the case of the sun with respect to humans, asses, etc. So, infused faith inclines immediately, as an equivocal cause, to the acts of all the articles, articles that are distinct in species and whose acts are distinct. Infused faith can be a partial immediate cause with respect to all of those acts, but there cannot be an infused faith that inclines immediately to one act concerning all of the articles, since all the articles cannot be believed by a single act. This is so for there are as many acquired faiths as there are articles, each [faith] inclining only to an act concerning one article and not concerning any other. And since infused faith does not incline to any act except by means of acquired faith, so infused faith cannot incline immediately to one act about all the articles. Nevertheless, if acquired faith were to incline to some single act about all the articles, then an infused faith that inclined in the same way could be posited; but the opposite is commonly said. Choose whichever pleases you more.

45 This can be answered[21] in a third way, just as was said in the prologue[22] about the habit of wisdom: namely, that it is generated from a single act by which a whole argument is understood, and that habit inclines to similar acts, and God could cause that habit without causing a habit concerning the premises or a habit concerning the conclusion. So, God could cause in the intellect of someone in this life a habit of faith by which one is inclined immediately to believe all the articles of faith (presupposing acquired faith with respect to each one of them).

46 Nor does there seem to be any argument against this [third response] other than this common argument: How can a unitary faith be preserved concerning opposite sentences, such as "Christ will die" and "Christ will not die," especially since it seems that a habit that immediately inclines to an act (when it inclines naturally) always inclines to that act whenever it exists, and inclines in such a way that it does not incline to the act's contrary? For before Christ's passion the Apostles were obligated to believe the sentence "Christ will die," and after his passion they were obligated to believe that "Christ has died and he will not die," and yet throughout they always had the same faith.

47 I respond that their acquired faith is different with respect to the sentences "Christ will die" and "Christ will not die," but their infused faith was always the same. For it can be said that any cause has only one effect from itself, but concurrently with it another partial cause

[21] This is a third answer to the question asked in **[39]**.
[22] *Ord.*, Prol., q. 8 (*OTh* I: 207–225).

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has a different, contrary effect. So, it can be said that infused faith together with acquired faith and the intellect inclines at one time to "Christ will die," and after the Apostle has come to know the sentence "Christ has died" by vision, then by means of that vision together with infused and acquired faith he knows that Christ has died and he even knows and believes that Christ will not die. So, the infused faith is always the same, but the acquired faith is changed.

The same[23] can be said regarding the first object of hope, namely, 48
that it has some sentence as its immediate object, and by means of that it inclines to all the secondary objects of hope.

The same can also be said regarding charity, that its first object is 49
some phrase [*complexum*] such as this: "God and everything that God wills for me to love_D." Charity inclines to loving_D one's neighbor by means of this phrase as a partial principle, though mediately. Hence, if I love_D God and everything that God wills for me to love_D, and later I become sure from Scripture that God wills for me to love_D *A*, then infused charity mediately inclines to the love_D of *A*, because it does so by means of infused charity's act together with acquired charity and the will. E.g., if I now become sure from Scripture that God wills for me to love_D someone who is my enemy in this life, then by the habit of infused charity together with acquired charity I am inclined to love_D that enemy. This is so because God wills for me to love_D that enemy now; but when the enemy will be damned, then I will not love_D him because God does not will for me to love_D him. Nevertheless, the habit of charity always remains the same.

***[24]

So then, in answer to the main question it is clear that there are three 79
virtues, and that faith and hope do not and cannot remain in the next life. I say this only because of the authority of the saints, not because of any argument.

Five Worries

But there are some worries brought against this. The first is about the 80
positing of acquired faith with respect to each article, because two immediately inclining habits are not posited with respect to the same act. Therefore, one should not posit infused faith and acquired faith concerning the act of the same article.

[23] That is, similar to what was said about infused faith in **[34–47]**.
[24] Paragraphs 50–78 are an extended discussion of the epistemic compatibility of faith and knowledge. I have not included them here.

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81 Again, act is related to act just as habit is related to habit. But a supernatural habit is more perfect than a natural habit; therefore, the act of an infused habit is more perfect than an act of acquired faith. Therefore, they are not the same act.

82 The second worry is about the order of these virtues, whether faith is first, hope second, and charity third. It is argued that charity is prior to hope because the act of charity is prior to the act of hope; therefore, etc. The antecedent is proved as follows: The act of charity is to love_D and the act of hope is to desire. But love_D precedes desire. Nevertheless, the opposite seems to be the case, because someone can have hope without charity, but not conversely. Therefore, etc.

83 The third worry is whether the natural habits can remain if the infused habits are destroyed. It is argued that they cannot remain: because when charity is uprooted, someone cannot love_D God above all other things. The same is true of the other habits.

84 The fourth worry is about infused faith: it seems that there is not one faith with respect to all that has been revealed, which has as its first object the sentence "Everything that is revealed by God (etc.)." For in that case someone could not assent by infused faith to any article in particular (e.g., the article that "God is three and one") unless they first assent to the sentence "Everything that has been revealed (etc.)," but this seems false. For suppose that the article "God is three and one" is proposed to this individual and that they are not thinking about the sentence "Everything that has been revealed (etc.);" they can still assent by infused faith to the article "God is three and one." Therefore, etc.

85 Additionally, in that case infused faith would be subject to what is false. For the sentence "Everything that has been revealed (etc.)" is contingent, since it was false prior to any revelation. So then, it is presently contingent, and consequently it can be false. Also, infused faith can remain [when that sentence is false] by divine power; therefore, faith can be subject to what is false.

86 Another worry is about the objects of these virtues, whether those objects are sentences or non-sentential items [*incomplexum*].

***[25]

Responses to the Worries

91 In response to the first of these,[26] I say that the assumption is true only of naturally acquired habits, for two habits of this sort are not posited

[25] Paragraphs 87–90 are a series of worries related to the compatibility of contrary forms of lessened degrees. I have not included them here.

[26] See **[80]**.

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in the same power with respect to the same act. But if there is one acquired habit and one infused habit, then there can be two habits with respect to the same act. This is so in the case at hand concerning infused and acquired faith, hope, and charity.

92 In response to the next worry,[27] I say that they are infused at the same time. Nevertheless, hope is prior to charity in the order of nature. When it is said that the act of charity is prior, I say that $love_A$ is twofold, and so there is a twofold act: for there is friendship-$love_A$ and desire-$love_A$. Now then, an act of friendship-$love_A$ is an act of charity, and an act of desire-$love_A$ is an act of hope; and an act of friendship-$love_A$ presupposes an act of desire-$love_A$.[28]

93 In response to the next worry,[29] I say that the natural habits can remain when the infused habits are destroyed. Nevertheless, different things must be said about each of these habits. For when charity is destroyed, the natural habit corresponding to charity can remain by God's absolute power, but not by God's ordained power; this is because God has ordained that whenever someone $loves_D$ Him above everything, then that individual merits having charity and God infuses them with it. But acquired faith and acquired hope can remain without infused faith and infused hope, because an infidel can believe just as intensely as a Christian can with respect to acquired faith. Nevertheless, the infidel cannot $love_D$ God above everything unless they have charity and faith, because they are infused at the same time. So, that infidel, although he has acquired faith, still does not have infused faith.

94 In response to the next worry,[30] I concede that someone cannot believe any article unless they first believe that "everything revealed by God (etc.)" or something virtually equivalent to that sentence, e.g., unless they believe that "all the things that have been revealed are true," or unless they believe "everything that the Church believes."

[27] See **[82]**.

[28] Ockham makes precisely the opposite claim elsewhere, e.g., in *Ord.*, d. 1, q. 4 (*OTh* I: 444) he claims that desire-love presupposes friendship-love, and in *Var. Ques.*, q. 4, n. 84, he asserts that "some acts of desire necessarily presuppose an act of friendship and some do not" (translated in chapter 4 of this volume). Perhaps this was an error on the part of the student reporter and the final sentence should read, "the act of friendship-love is presupposed by the act of desire-love." But that is difficult to reconcile with the apparent logic of this passage, which seems to affirm that hope is prior to charity in the order of nature precisely because desire is prior to friendship (i.e., that desire is presupposed by friendship).

[29] See **[83]**.

[30] See **[84]**.

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95 In response to the next worry,[31] I say that although the sentence "everything revealed (etc.)" was false at one time, nevertheless after revelation it is not possible to specify any article to which infused faith does not incline. So, infused faith cannot be subject to what is false.

96 The response to the next worry[32] about the object [of the virtues] was made clear earlier.[33]

***[34]

[31] See **[85]**.
[32] See **[86]**.
[33] See **[23–24]**.
[34] The remainder of the text is a series of replies to the worries of nn. 87–90, which were omitted. See fn. 25.

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24 Is It Necessary to Posit, in Addition to the Holy Spirit, Absolute Created Charity Formally Informing the Soul? (Ord., *d.* 17, *q.* 1)

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TEXT[1]

1 Regarding the seventeenth distinction, I ask whether it is necessary to posit, in addition to the Holy Spirit, absolute created charity that formally informs the soul, in order for the soul to be cherished[2] and accepted by God.

2 That it is not necessary to posit created charity:

3 Charity is posited only so that by it someone is cherished by God. But something can be cherished by God without any quality of this sort, because 'being cherished' conveys a relation [*respectum*]: if a thing is cherished, it is cherished by someone. But a quality of this sort is neither the foundation nor the terminus of any relation; therefore, someone can be cherished by God without any quality of this sort. The inference is clear because a relation can exist without everything that is not its foundation or terminus. Therefore, etc.

4 For the opposite:

5 It is impossible for someone to be cherished by God without charity, just as it is impossible for someone to be white without whiteness. But charity is an absolute quality, because it is a theological virtue. Therefore, etc.

Peter Auriol's View

6 One view on this question is that in order for a soul to be favored[3], cherished, and accepted by God, some created and absolute form of this sort is necessarily required in such a way that even by God's absolute power something without this sort of form cannot be cherished by God. This form is necessarily cherished by God, and similarly so is a soul informed by that form. So, while that form persists it cannot fail to be cherished by God, even by God's absolute power; and three conclusions are argued for:[4]

7 "The first is that there is some created form that, from its nature and by necessity, is among the things that are pleasing to God. By the existence of that form in the soul, grace is bestowed upon that soul and it becomes accepted, loved, and also cherished by God. This can be shown in many ways.

[1] *OTh* III: 440–466.

[2] Note that the word *cara*, translated here as "cherished," is related to the word for "charity" (*caritas*).

[3] Note that the word *grata*, translated here as 'favored,' is related to the word for 'grace' (*gratiam*).

[4] What follows in **[7–17]** is a series of direct quotations from Peter Auriol, *In I Sent.*, d. 17, a. 2.

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"For no unchangeable and eternal act newly extends [*transit de novo*] 8
to some object except because the act's eternal and unchangeable object is newly formally participated in by that material object to which the act newly extends. It is clear, e.g., that an eternal vision of some color (if such a thing were supposed) could newly extend at one time to a piece of wood and at another time to a stone, if the color that is eternally seen is formally and inherently participated in by the stone at the one time and by the wood at the other time. But if the vision somehow immediately extended to the wood or to the stone, then it would be impossible for that act to be eternal. The reason for this is that the act cannot go from not extending to the piece of wood to extending to it, unless some change takes place in the act itself (in which case the act will not be eternal) or some change takes place in that piece of wood itself (in which case something now formally inheres in the wood that did not inhere in it before).

"But the act of divine love and acceptance, which is unchangeable and eternal, accepts one thing at one time and another thing at another time; at one time it does not love a soul and then at another time it does love it with the cherishing love of which we are speaking. Therefore, necessarily there is some unchangeable and eternal object of divine love which is formally and inherently participated in by the soul. That object, however, cannot be the divine essence, since the essence formally inheres in no one. Therefore, it is a creature." (And this creature is certainly not a substance; therefore, it is an accidental form.)

"Furthermore, being cherished by God is related to the divine will 9
in the same way that being hated by God is. But nothing is hated by God unless the divine will finds something in it that is hateable and detestable by its own nature, something that formally makes it be hated. For sin is hated by God by its own nature (thus the Prophet: 'I will see, because you are not a God who wills wickedness'[5]). Therefore, by contrast, no one is cherishingly accepted by God except to the extent that there is something in that individual such that from that thing's own nature they are rendered acceptable.

"This is confirmed because opposite forms have formally opposite 10
effects from their own natures, just as whiteness from its own nature makes something be white and blackness from its own nature makes something be black. Therefore, if wickedness from its own nature is hateable to God and makes something be hated, it is not apparent why it is not possible that there be some created form opposed to it that

[5] Psalm 5:4.

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would, from its own nature, formally make something be loved or accepted.

11 "Furthermore, God is the most rational lover, because he does not love without a persuading reason. But love [*dilectio*] and adoration [*amor*], according to right reason, merit love in return (just as Proverbs 8:17: 'I love those who love me'). Therefore, from his nature God loves all who love him and who have habitual charity (just as John 14:21: 'Whoever loves me will be loved by my Father, and I will love that one').

12 "Furthermore, anyone who from their own nature loves justice, charity, and the other virtues, also loves from their own nature anyone who participates in those virtues, for it is impossible that an act is brought to some form without its being brought to the one who participates in that form (at the least, [the act is brought to that individual] materially and incidentally). But God, unchangeably and by the necessity of his nature, loves charity, justice, and every virtue; for he unchangeably loves himself and consequently he unchangeably wills his own love, and moreover he is unchangeably just and perfect. But, according to Augustine, no one is just who does not love justice,[6] and the Philosopher in *Ethics* I says that no one is good who does not rejoice in what is good.[7] Therefore, God, by the same necessity with which he loves his own justice and takes pleasure in his own adoration, also takes pleasure in every soul that participates in justice and in the habitual adoration of him. Consequently, the habitual adoration of God, from its own nature, makes someone be accepted by God.

13 "Furthermore, whatever is truly pleasurable, acceptable, and beautiful is accepted by God. For the Philosopher says in *Ethics* III that the virtuous individual (as someone who is rightly disposed) is a rule and measure of those things that are truly pleasurable and pleasing.[8] But the virtues are, in themselves, truly beautiful, good, and pleasurable; and the adoration of God is especially so. Therefore, it seems that God from his own nature takes pleasure in the virtues, but especially and ultimately takes pleasure in the habitual adoration of him."

14 His second conclusion is this: "the form that from its own nature renders the soul to be favored by God does not flow into the soul from divine acceptance." This is argued for because "that thing by which divine acceptance and love are applied to the soul, which is such that participation in it is the formal reason that the soul is accepted, cannot result from the love of God extending to the soul, because then

[6] Augustine, *Epistle* 153.26.
[7] Aristotle, *NE* I.8 (1099a17–18).
[8] Aristotle, *NE* III.4 (1113a28–34).

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the soul would be loved prior to (at least in the order of reason) that sort of form being in it." But this form [of charity] is "that by which" (and so on). Therefore, etc.

15 "Furthermore, it is impossible for an eternal and unchangeable act to newly extend to the soul unless it is because there is in the soul a new participation in an unchangeable and eternal object. Therefore, if the soul is loved it has a form, and consequently in the soul there are two such forms that bestow grace.

16 "Furthermore, God's cherishing love relates to a soul that is accepted and favored in the same way that God's general love relates to that to which that general love extends. But creatures do not flow from the general love of God by which he takes pleasure in all creatures, for otherwise every creature would unchangeably flow into being since God unchangeably loves them all. Therefore, charity does not flow from God's cherishing love into a soul that is favored; rather, charity is more the reason why God's cherishing love is applied to that soul. In the same way, the reality of creatures is the reason for God's loving everything that exists; it is not from the fact that they are loved that their realities flow forth into being.

17 "The third claim is that this form by which the soul becomes accepted is a certain habitual love of God, a love that is infused by God and is not generated on a purely natural basis." (This statement will become clear in what follows.)

Against Auriol's View

18 This view does not seem to me to be true. So, I will argue against it and I will show that God can (by his absolute power) accept a soul without any form formally inhering in it.

First, I argue in this way: If God can prepare an individual for eternal life and can later bestow eternal life upon them without any prior habit of this sort, then God can consider that individual to be cherished and accepted without any habit of this sort. This is clear, because anyone who has been prepared for eternal life (such that, so long as that individual perseveres in the same disposition, eternal life will be given to them) is accepted and cherished by God. However, by his absolute power God can bestow eternal life (that is, the beatific vision and beatific enjoyment) regardless of whether this individual ever had this sort of habit. Consequently, this individual was in such a state that there was nothing in them incompatible with eternal life. Even supposing that this individual did not have this sort of habit, at that time God can prepare them for eternal life; therefore, at that time that individual could be cherished and accepted by God.

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19 It might be objected that God cannot give eternal life to someone without this sort of habit. Contrary to this, the beatific vision does not depend on this sort of habit. This will also be shown in what follows (namely, that no habit of this sort is required for a beatific act, by God's absolute power).

20 It might be objected that although God can give life to someone who is in this state without the form of charity, nevertheless if they always remain in that same state until beatitude, then since they lack this form of charity they are not cherished by God. Contrary to this, someone who is accepted by God as worthy of eternal life is cherished. But this individual is such; therefore, etc.

21 It might be objected that such an individual [lacking the form of charity] is not worthy of eternal life. But this objection does not work. For, I ask, what is required for someone to be worthy of eternal life? For someone to be worthy of eternal life, either (i) it is required and sufficient that God disposes that individual for eternal life according to the individual's present state; in this way the individual in question would be worthy of eternal life. Or else (ii) it is required and sufficient that the individual be such that eternal life cannot fail to be bestowed upon them without an injustice being done; but there is no one (no matter what form they have) who is worthy of eternal life in this way. This is so because, just as God is able to not bestow eternal life on someone at a given time (no matter how much they possess some such form), by his absolute power God is always able to not bestow eternal life on that individual.

22 I also argue in a second way, similar to his own argument.[9] Being accepted and cherished by God is related to the divine will in the same way that being detested and hated is related to the divine will. But someone can be hated and detested by God without any detestable form that formally inheres in them; therefore, similarly, someone can be cherished and accepted by God without any form that formally inheres in them. The major premise is clear from what he said. I prove the minor premise as follows: When someone commits a mortal sin, it is possible that, after the act of sinning has ceased, no form remains that was not present prior to the sin. Therefore, it is not the case that this sort of individual is hated by God because of some form that formally inheres in them.

23 It might be objected that a bad habit is left behind after the act of sinning, and the individual is detestable to God because of this habit. Contrary to this, a habit of this sort could be destroyed without any charity coming about. But before charity arrives the individual is

[9] Namely, Auriol's argument in **[9]**.

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always hated by God; therefore, someone without a form of this sort can be hated by God. The assumption is clear because both an act proceeding from charity and also an act proceeding from justice are opposed to this sort of sin, and on a purely natural basis one can have an act proceeding from justice; the philosophers and some pagans had acts of this sort. Therefore, this sort of justice on a purely natural basis will generate a habit that is contrary to the habit that is left behind from sin. Consequently, that prior habit of sin is destroyed by the development of this habit of justice; nevertheless, the individual who lacks every such form of sin will still be hated by God.

Furthermore, God could destroy this sort of habit of sin without the infusion of charity, and then the individual would still be hated without any such form of sin. 24

Furthermore, one born with original sin does not have some form that is necessarily detestable to God. Nevertheless, that infant is detestable to God. Therefore, someone without any form of that sort can be detestable to God. The major premise is clear, because I ask by what would this necessarily detestable form be caused? It is not caused by God as a total cause, that is obvious. Nor is it caused by the infant, because no necessarily detestable form is caused by someone except by means of a voluntary act. Nor is it caused by something else, because no necessarily detestable form is caused by an entirely natural cause,[10] but the only causes that cause anything in an infant do so naturally. Therefore, etc. 25

Furthermore, the habit left behind by any mortal sin whatsoever can coexist with infused charity. This is clear in the case of someone habituated in badness who is then newly converted and baptized. It is obvious that someone of this sort has charity, and it is obvious that they have the habit that was left behind from the frequency of bad acts, because they are more inclined toward such acts than they would be if they had never had such acts. Therefore, if this sort of habit were necessarily detestable to God, and if charity is necessarily accepted by God (as you say), then this individual would be both hated and cherished by God. 26

Furthermore, someone is accepted by someone else not only because of a formally inhering act of friendship, but also because of a transferring [*transeuntem*] act, even if nothing remains after that transferring act.[11] Hence, in the human case an individual who loves$_D$ 27

[10] The contrast here is between natural causes and free causes; i.e., something detestable to God must be caused by a free action, rather than a natural one.

[11] A transferring (or, in scholarship, often "transient" or "transeunt") act is one that acts upon some entity other than the agent and produces something in that other entity. The contrast is with immanent acts, which produce something only within the agent

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someone and does good to them merits $love_A$ in return, not only for the duration of the [initial] act [of loving], but also during the transferring act and even when no act remains, so long as no contrary act comes about. Hence, not only is a friend obligated to $love_D$ their friend for as long as their friend actually $loves_D$ and does good for them (otherwise, such an individual would only be a friend for the feast[12]), but they are also obligated to $love_D$ them after such actual $love_A$, even if no habit remains, and this is so because they ought to remember those past benefits.

But $loving_D$ God above all else is an act that is accepted by God, and this act has more of the character of acceptability from its own nature than does the habit [of charity], both because the act is more meritorious and because it is more within the will's power; consequently, when it is good it is more praiseworthy. Therefore, after the act, even if no habit remained afterward such an individual could be accepted by God, and because of their past good act God could reward them with eternal life.

28 This argument is confirmed as follows: Everyone merits acceptance and gracious returned $love_A$ to a greater extent as a result of what is within their power than they do as a result of what is not within their power. But an act elicited on a purely natural basis is more within one's power than any habit is; therefore, that act merits to a greater extent the gracious $love_D$ and reward of God, and it does not lose this just because the act ceases. Therefore, even without a form [of charity] formally inhering in the individual, someone who had an act of this sort can still be worthy of an eternal reward and, consequently, can be accepted by God.

29 Second, I show that, no matter what entirely supernatural form is posited to formally inhere in the soul, it is still within God's absolute power to accept or not accept that soul. (I am speaking of the acceptance by which someone is accepted and prepared for eternal life.) I prove this as follows: No one who is an enemy to someone and is hated by them becomes their friend and becomes accepted by them necessarily on the basis of positing something in that individual that is not within their power. However, someone who exists in a state of mortal sin (even after the act of sin has ceased) is an enemy to God and is hated by God. Therefore, no matter what thing that is not

that is acting. So, in this example, the act of loving someone is immanent but the act of doing good for them is transferring.

[12] This is a reference to a medieval proverb, as found in, e.g., Alcuin: "There are many who are friends at the feast but who scatter in times of necessity"; see Alcuin, epistle 289, quoted in Schmidt-Erler 1995: 19, fn. 55.

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within the individual's power comes to be within them, they will not, on account of this thing, be necessarily accepted by God.

Furthermore, although according to some[13] the redemption of human kind could have come about by means of something that is entirely a creature, nevertheless as a matter of fact that redemption came through Christ, as everyone agrees. However, by God's absolute power God could have never become incarnate, despite whatever absolute item existed in the holy patriarchs. Therefore, no matter the extent to which God had given that supernatural form [of charity] to the ancient patriarchs, still it was within God's power to make his Son incarnate [or not] and, consequently, to redeem human kind and confer eternal life on them [or not]. 30

Furthermore, if this sort of form (which is an inhering quality) is necessarily accepted by God, this is either because of its own natural goodness or because of moral goodness. If this form [of charity] is necessarily accepted because of its own natural goodness and perfection, then a rational creature – which is, from itself, with every form of this sort set aside, better and more perfect than this form with respect to natural perfection – will be much more accepted by God. But you deny this. So, perhaps this form is necessarily accepted because of moral perfection. But contrary to this, there is moral perfection only when something is within someone's power. Therefore, if this form has moral goodness, it must have this goodness due to being within someone's power. So, it has moral goodness either because it is within God's power or because it is within a rational creature's power. But not because it is within God's power, because angelic nature is within God's power just as much as this form is.[14] Nor because it is within a rational creature's power, since that form [of charity] comes from God alone and is not within the power of any creature. 31

It might be objected that this form is "dispositively" within a creature's power, since a creature is able to make themselves be disposed to that form. Contrary to this, that form can be given to someone without any voluntary disposition on their part; this is clear in the case of infants.[15] Therefore, then, the form has no moral goodness as a result of this sort of disposition. 32

Consequently, then, this form [of charity] is not accepted by God, unless it is accepted (i) because of [its own] natural goodness, or (ii)

[13] The edition attributes this view to Durand of St. Pourçain. See his *Sentences* III, d. 20, q. 2, n. 8.

[14] Perhaps the implicit argument here is that, since not everything within God's power has moral goodness, it cannot be the case that the form of charity has moral goodness just in virtue of being within God's power.

[15] Presumably, in the case of infants being baptized.

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because it is within God's power, or (iii) because God contingently accepts it insofar as he pleases. But in that case God could accept an angelic nature or a human nature itself if it pleased him to do so.[16]

33 Furthermore, consider an act of loving$_D$ God above all other things, together with the circumstances that one shall will whatever would please [God], even undergoing death and every danger and harm. This act is such that, from its own nature, it makes someone who elicits this sort of act freely and on their own to be accepted by God, more so than does any form that is not within the power of the one who possesses it but is only received by that individual. However, while this sort of act persists in the will, God is still able to not accept that act as being worthy of eternal life. So then, while positing any entirely supernatural form that is not within the power of the one who possesses it, God is able to not accept the one who possesses it. The major premise seems to be obvious because (i) this sort of act has more of the nature of praiseworthiness, (ii) it has more of the nature of the virtue that belongs to an act, and also (iii) it is more incompatible with sin, since this act is directly contrary to sin. The minor premise seems to be obvious, because otherwise it would follow that someone could merit eternal life on a purely natural basis, since someone can have this sort of act on a purely natural basis (this is so since someone can have this sort of act concerning a creature; e.g., in order to please someone else, an individual would kill themselves if the other were to will it).

Ockham's View

34 So, I answer the question in a different way. First, I show that someone can be accepted and cherished by God without any supernatural form inhering in them. Second, I show that someone can be not accepted by God even while positing whatever supernatural form in their soul.

35 However, first I explain what I mean by "being accepted and cherished by God." I say that an individual is accepted and cherished by God when they exist in a state such that God disposes them for eternal life unless they offend by means of a sin. This is the case for a baptized infant, for they are in such a state that, so long as they do not

[16] The argument here is that if the form of charity is accepted by God, it could only be because of (i), (ii), or (iii). But conditions (i) and (ii) were already dismissed in **[31]**. So, charity is accepted by God only because God contingently chooses to accept it. But if God contingently chooses to accept charity, then it seems that God could just contingently choose to accept a rational nature, regardless of whether the form of charity inheres in it.

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mortally sin afterwards, God will give eternal life to them. But this is not the case for that infant before baptism, because (whether they sin in the future or not) unless they are baptized by some baptism[17] they will not have eternal life.

Supposing this, I prove the first conclusion as follows: Anyone who 36
can have a meritorious act without any supernatural form of this sort inhering in them can be accepted by God without any supernatural form of this sort inhering in them. But by God's absolute power someone can have a meritorious act without any form of this sort. Therefore, etc.

The major premise is obvious. I argue for the minor premise as follows: Whenever there are within our power multiple acts (none of which by their own nature are deserving of eternal life), if each is unqualifiedly good and has no bad circumstance, then supposing that one of these acts can be meritorious of eternal life, the other act can also be meritorious by God's absolute power. However, both an act taken together with a supernatural form of this sort and also an act of loving$_D$ God above everything else are such that neither from its own nature is meritorious of eternal life; they are meritorious just because God contingently accepts them. Therefore, given that one of these acts can be meritorious of eternal life, by God's absolute power the other act can also be meritorious of eternal life.

Furthermore, whenever there are multiple acts of the same nature, 37
none of which has any bad circumstance, if God is able to accept one of them as meritorious of eternal life, then he can also accept the others. But an act elicited before charity is infused and an act elicited after charity is infused are of the same nature, and God can accept the one elicited after charity is infused as meritorious of eternal life. Therefore, by God's absolute power he can accept the other one in the same way.

I prove the second conclusion: Whenever some absolute quality 38
persists for a time in some subject that lacks some other absolute thing, then by absolute divine power the one thing can persist forever while its subject lacks the other one. However, this form [of charity] persists for a time while its subject lacks a beatific act; therefore, by God's absolute power God could preserve that form forever without a beatific act. But God can dispose and ordain anything that God is able to do, and so God can ordain that someone have this form and yet never have eternal life. Consequently, this sort of individual

[17] According to Catholic teaching, there are two other forms of baptism in addition to the typical case of water baptism: someone who wishes to be baptized but dies before being able to do so has been "baptized by desire," and an unbaptized believer who is martyred has been "baptized by blood."

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[possessing the form of charity] would not be cherished and accepted by God (taking 'cherished and accepted' in the way we have been speaking, namely, that someone is accepted just in case they would have eternal life so long as they themselves do not impede it).

39 Furthermore, with any form whatsoever posited in a soul, God can will to annihilate that soul before giving eternal life to it (and he can will to never recreate it[18]); therefore, God is able to not accept a soul of this sort [possessing charity]. The assumption is clear because God can contingently annihilate anything that he contingently created, and he can do so whenever it pleases him. But this soul was contingently created; therefore, God can annihilate it.

40 Furthermore, with this created grace in a soul, either God can annihilate that grace or not. If God can annihilate it, then he can will that this soul never possess glory. So then, while this form persists in the soul God is able to not accept that soul, since at the very same time it is the case both that a form of this sort is in the soul and also that God wills to annihilate that form. And if God cannot annihilate a created form of this sort, then he necessarily preserves that form, and consequently God would act necessarily on some item external to God.[19]

41 Furthermore, eternal life [relates] to charity just as eternal penalty [relates] to sin. But no matter what sin is posited, God can take away the eternal penalty. Therefore, no matter what charity is posited (if the charity is an absolute [created] thing[20]), God by his absolute power can will to never give eternal life to that individual; consequently, this individual will not be accepted by God.

42 So, I say that in order for a soul to be favored and accepted by God, by God's absolute power no supernatural form is required in the soul. Also, no matter what is posited in the soul, God can by his absolute power not accept that soul. So, in this way, God always contingently, freely, mercifully, and by his grace beatifies everyone who is beatified; no one could merit eternal life on a purely natural basis, nor could anyone even merit this from any gifts they are given by God unless God contingently, freely, and mercifully ordains that having those sorts of gifts could merit eternal life. Hence God could not be necessitated by anything to confer eternal life on anyone. This view is thus maximally distant from Pelagius's error.[21]

[18] Reading *recreare* along with manuscripts EHZ instead of the edition's *creare*.

[19] The reader is intended to run *modus tollens* on this conditional; according to the theology of Ockham's day, no action of God can be necessitated by a creature.

[20] The caveat here is to cover the case where one uses 'charity' to refer to the activity of the Holy Spirit. See *Ord.*, d. 17, q. 2, translated in chapter 25 of this volume.

[21] As noted in the Introduction, Ockham spent four years in Avignon being investigated

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For Pelagius supposed that if someone had an act that was good according to its genus, God would be necessitated to confer eternal life on that individual (rather than it being only from God's grace), so that God would necessarily be unjust if he did not grant eternal life to that individual. However, although the aforementioned view[22] does not posit that some act elicited on a purely natural basis necessitates God in this way, it does indeed posit that some supernatural form created by God necessitates God. For it has to posit that there is a contradiction between such a form's existing in a soul and God's never giving eternal life to that soul. 43

Therefore, I posit that no form, neither natural nor supernatural, can necessitate God in such a way that there is a contradiction between any such form's existing in a soul prior to beatitude and God's never willing to confer eternal life to that soul. Rather, from God's grace alone he will give freely to whomever he will give, although by his ordained power he could not do otherwise [than he does], due to the laws that have been freely and contingently ordained by God. This is what all the saints say about this matter, and so this view is maximally distant from the error of Pelagius, who posited that God could be necessitated in this way and that God's acceptance of someone is necessary, not gracious and free. 44

Objections to Auriol's Arguments

In response to the arguments for the other view: 45

In response to the first argument,[23] when it was said that "no eternal and immutable act" (and so on), I reply that an act can extend to an object in more than one way; namely, either contingently or necessarily. By "necessarily" I mean that the act could not exist without extending to some object, in which case it extends necessarily. Alternatively, the total act with respect to its total substance could exist and yet not extend to some distinct object; in that case the act is said to extend contingently to whatever distinct object.

In the first way [i.e., necessarily] that claim possesses truth.[24] This is clear in the case of a bodily intuitive vision, since it is impossible for 46

by church authorities, in part on charges that his views entailed the heresy of Pelagianism.

[22] Namely, Auriol's view. See **[6]**.

[23] See **[7–8]**.

[24] The claim in question is Auriol's premise that "no unchangeable and eternal act newly extends to an object except because the act's eternal and unchangeable object is newly formally participated in by that material object to which the act newly extends." See **[8]**.

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the total substance of the vision to exist without the vision extending to a distinct object.

47 In the second way [i.e., contingently] that claim does not possess truth. For when the substance of an act (with respect to everything intrinsic to it) can persist and yet the act extends to nothing, then the act can newly extend to some object, regardless of whether that object newly receives anything. So it is in the case at hand, because divine $love_D$ and acceptance (with respect to everything on God's part) can exist even if they extend to nothing. This is because "extending" in this case is not something going out from God and entering into a creature, nor is it something being transported from the one to the other. Rather, the "extending" is God's accepting and $loving_D$ someone, that is, preparing that individual for eternal life, i.e., willing to confer eternal life to that individual at some time. And surely every act and whatever else that is on God's part can exist even if God never wills to beatify any creature at all. So, in response to the minor premise I say that there is no immutable object of divine acceptance any more than there is some immutable object of divine creation.

48 It might be objected that every divine pleasure [*divina complacentia*] is immutable, and so it has an immutable object. I respond that this objection proceeds from a false imagining. For the objection imagines there to be some interior act in the [divine] will by which it is as if God delights in this form and not in some other form, and it imagines that this act always remains in such a way that [the sentence] "God is able to not take pleasure or not delight in this sort of form, and is able to take pleasure in some other form" always includes a contradiction from the necessity of [his] nature.

This imagining is unqualifiedly false and is also contrary to his view. Both according to the truth (as I believe) and also according to him, in God no absolute item is distinct in any way from any absolute thing that is there, but something there is only distinct from something else there insofar as it conveys some absolute item while connoting some extrinsic thing. Therefore, this [divine] pleasure of which we are speaking either (i) just names something intrinsic to God or else (ii) it also connotes something extrinsic. If the former, then this [intrinsic item] will not concern one creature more than another. If the latter, then there is no interior act by which God takes pleasure in this creature any more than there is an interior act by which he takes pleasure in some other creature; for on God's part there is only a single act and so one creature can be connoted [by that act] just as much as any other creature can be (albeit by different connotations).

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Therefore, I say that divine pleasure is either generic or specific. 49
The generic pleasure names nothing other than the divine essence and connotes everything that is or can be good and perfect. So in this way God possesses this pleasure with respect to all things, whether they exist or not.

Specific pleasure can be understood in three senses. In one sense, 50
that it is of some existing thing (or of something that will exist). In this sense God does not take pleasure in those things that do not exist and never will exist, and in this sense God could take pleasure in nothing other than himself, since he could destroy everything else and never produce anything.

In another sense, divine pleasure is called specific that concerns a more noble object, and God thus takes more pleasure in more noble things; in this way God takes more pleasure in a substantial nature than in any accidental form.

In a third sense, acceptance is called specific because it concerns something to be produced and perfected according to the greatest and most noble genus of accidental perfection (unless the thing itself prevents this). This is nothing other than willing to confer on some such produced thing (so long as that thing itself does not put up some obstacle) the greatest accidental perfection according to genus; and beatitude and eternal life are of this sort. And God can accept or not accept someone as it pleases him.

It might be objected that if God now accepts this individual that he 51
previously did not accept, then in this case there is a transition from one contradictory to the other contradictory, and consequently there is a change. But there is no change in God's will. Therefore, the change is in this individual, and so what he claimed is established.[25]

Furthermore, it might be objected that if divine acceptance extends 52
to this individual now but did not before, then that individual receives something, a thing to which the acceptance extends first.

Furthermore, it might be objected that what was said about divine 53
pleasure is contrary to the authority of the saints, who say, "God will delight in his servants," "He loved us and washed us in his blood," "He loved us first," "He commends his charity in us," and endless other things.[26] From these it is clear that by means of an interior act God takes pleasure in a rational creature for as long as it is in a state of grace. In the same way, God, with some generic pleasure, takes

[25] Namely, the central claim of Auriol's view, that there must be a form of charity inhering in an individual for that individual to be cherished by God.
[26] Psalm 135:14, Revelation 1:5, 1 John 4:10, and Romans 5:8, respectively.

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pleasure in every creature inasmuch as its nature exists [*quantum ad esse naturae*].

54 In response to the first of these objections,[27] I say that sometimes a transition from one contradictory to the other contradictory can result from a change in one of the extremes, sometimes it can result from a change in some other item that is neither of the extremes, and sometimes it can result from just the passing of time.

An example of the first case is someone who as a matter of fact is at first not accepted and later becomes accepted because of grace that inheres in the individual who is now accepted.

An example of the second case is when someone is offensive to someone else, and only as a result of the prayers of the latter individual at a later time, [the offense] is taken away and the former individual is no longer offensive. There can be this sort of transition in this case because of the change in the latter individual, even though the offensive one has not changed. This is similarly clear in the case of God and the souls in Purgatory: as a result of the prayers of the saints and because of a change in the saints who are praying for the souls in Purgatory, those souls immediately become worthy to receive eternal life, though they were previously not worthy of it.

An example of the third case is that some king could decree (either justly or unjustly) that anyone found in his bedroom on Monday deserves death and that anyone found in his bedroom on Tuesday does not deserve death. Then, with everything remaining the same and someone remaining unchanged in the king's bedroom on Monday and Tuesday, then because of only the passage of time there would be a transition from one contradictory to the other contradictory. So, at first "this individual does not deserve death" or "this individual should not be decapitated" would be true, and later "this individual should be decapitated" would be true (or vice versa).

So, I say to the case at hand that someone can be not accepted at first, and later can be accepted because of a change in that individual; and this can occur not only as a result of a change with respect to some sort of supernatural form, but can also occur as a result of a change with respect to a form that is possible on a purely natural basis. For God could decree that, for anyone who has committed a mortal sin, if on a purely natural basis they feel distress about their sin without any supernatural form, then because of that their sin would be taken away from them and after death they would receive eternal life (so long as they did not mortally sin again before death). An individual of this sort would become accepted from being not accepted, only as a

[27] See **[51]**.

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result of a change with respect to an act that is possible on an entirely natural basis.

And, as in the second example, this could occur just as a result of a change in something else, because God could decree by his absolute power that an infant or an adult could change to being accepted from being not accepted as a result of the prayers of some saint. For God could ordain that he would will to give eternal life to that individual if someone were to pray for them. It could even occur as a result of only the passage of time.

In response to the second objection,[28] I say that the inference is not valid. In the same way, an act of divine knowing now extends to the sentence "I am sitting" because God knows it now, but earlier the act of divine knowing did not extend to it because earlier it was not true that God knew this; nevertheless, the sentence does not receive anything. Similarly, the act of creating now extends to a soul and earlier it did not extend; nevertheless, the soul does not receive a form that formally inheres in it. So, analogously, the same could hold in the case at hand. 55

In response to the third objection,[29] I say that those authoritative texts should not be understood as saying that in God there is some act or some delight other than the divine essence, but they all mean that God will give eternal life to his servants, so long as they do not hinder this by committing mortal sin. And this could be made true even if those servants receive nothing prior to eternal life itself. 56

In response to the second main argument for the view,[30] I say that it is more in favor of the opposite than of the claim at hand. Someone can be hated, not because of some wicked or detestable thing that presently inheres in the individual, but because such a thing was in them at one time. So, for the same reason, someone could be cherished by God, not only because of a presently inhering form, but because of something that was in them. Hence, just as someone is hated because they sinned, even though they might not be sinning now, so someone could be cherished because they acted rightly at some time, even though they might not now be acting rightly and might not have any form that they did not have before. 57

Furthermore, if being hated is related to the divine will in the same way that being cherished is (and vice versa), then, just as someone can be hated because of some detestable thing that is in someone else, so 58

[28] See **[52]**.
[29] See **[53]**.
[30] See **[9]**.

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someone could be cherished because of some form that is in someone else.

59 Furthermore, no habit renders someone detestable unless it does so because it is caused by an act that is detestable and hateable. Similarly, then, no habit will render someone to be acceptable from the habit's nature unless it does so because it is caused by an act that is acceptable. This is confirmed because nothing is acceptable from its own nature unless the thing is within the power of the one who has it. Therefore, since a supernatural form of this sort is not within the power of the one who has the form, the form will not be acceptable from its own nature (except in the sense in which every creature is acceptable). Rather, it will only be acceptable by a specific acceptability as a result of divine benevolence and divine ordering.

60 So, therefore, I say in response to the argument[31] that being hated and being cherished are similar in some respect, and are not similar in another respect. They are similar in this, that just as only what is bad is detestable, so only what is good is cherished by God. But they are dissimilar in this: someone can be cherished in and of themselves (even if they do not possess anything that inheres in them, nor ever did) because in and of themselves they are good – for nothing is a positive thing unless it is good. So, without anything else, the individual can be an object of the will and of love_D.

61 But this is not the case for an object of hatred, because nothing in and of itself is bad. Rather, something is bad only because of an absence of something that ought to be in it. So, nothing can be hated unless it lacks (or used to lack) something that ought to have been in it (or unless someone else lacked such a thing).[32] So, something is cherished without anything inhering, but something is not hated unless it lacks something.

And so the argument supports the opposite of what was claimed, because something can be detestable without any detestable form inhering in it. This is clear in the case of sins of omission, where there is nothing that inheres in the thing that previously did not inhere in it; rather, it is only that the individual lacks something that ought to be in them. Therefore, someone can be cherished even though no form of this sort inheres in them, so long as they have everything that ought to inhere in them; that is, they have everything that they are obligated to have.

[31] Namely, the argument of **[9]**.
[32] The two parentheticals in this sentence were later additions by Ockham.

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In response to the confirming argument,[33] I say that "formal effect" 62
is a poor and improper way of speaking. Whiteness has no effect (neither a "formal" effect nor a "non-formal" effect) other than an effect of which it is the efficient cause (or an effect of which it is a part of a thing, if one supposes that a whole is an effect of each essential part in the way in which it is said that matter and form are intrinsic causes of a composite entity). Nevertheless, opposite forms do in some way bring about opposite denominations. But in the case at hand there is not always a "wickedness" that is an inhering form in the individual who is wicked. (This is obvious in the case of a single sin of omission.) So, it need not be the case that there always be some form opposed to wickedness that brings about the opposite denomination (although sometimes there could be, and not just a supernatural form but there could even be a natural form, at least by God's absolute power).

Similarly, even granting that there is a form of this sort that necessarily makes one be accepted and cherished in some way (say, in the way in which every good creature is loved_D by God), still it does not follow from this that a form of this sort makes one be accepted with the sort of acceptance of which we are speaking here.

In response to the third argument,[34] I say that it is not necessary 63
that God love_D as a result of some inducement. Rather, whomever God loves_D he loves_D entirely freely and generously. Similarly, even granting that there were some inducement and that someone who loved_D God were necessarily loved_A by God in return, still it does not follow from this that God loves_D the individual in such a way that he gives them eternal life.

Similarly, this argument and the authoritative texts brought forth[35] 64
argue more for the claim that actual love_D (which is possible even on a purely natural basis) would be the form by which a soul would be necessarily favored by God, and thus someone could be favored by God on a purely natural basis.[36] The proof of this is that if habitual love_D and [habitual] love_A[37] merit love_A in return, then actual love_D equally or to a greater extent merits love_A in return.

Similarly, just as God loves_D those who love_D God with a habitual love_A, so he also loves_D those who do so with actual love_A.

[33] See **[10]**.
[34] See **[11]**.
[35] Namely, the argument and the Scriptural passages mentioned in **[11]**.
[36] Ockham's objection is that, if some form were necessarily required in an individual for God to love that individual, that form should be the act of love, rather than the habit of love (i.e., charity).
[37] The syntax here does not determine whether "habitual" applies only to "love_D" or to both "love_D" and "love_A," but it is probably intended to apply to both, given Auriol's argument in **[11]**.

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The same goes for the other authoritative text, which quotes the Savior.[38] I say that [someone who loved God] merits some sort of $love_A$ in return, but not the sort that his conclusion discusses – unless this is so only as a result of divine ordering. And so God could ordain that someone also merits this sort of $love_A$ in return as a result of an act that is possible on an entirely natural basis.

65 In response to the next argument,[39] I say that God, from the necessity of his nature, does $love_D$ justice, charity, and so on, with the first kind of $love_D$ or pleasure that was discussed. But in this way God not only $loves_D$ the virtues but also $loves_D$ all creatures, especially rational creatures. God does not $love_D$ any virtue necessarily with the other kind of love, though, just as he does not $love_D$ any angel necessarily.[40] Also, it should not be imagined that God $loves_D$ charity in a different way than he $loves_D$ justice or faith (unless, perhaps, because charity is more noble than faith), nor should it be imagined that he $loves_D$ faith in a way different than he $loves_D$ a single instance of a creature's cognition.

It does not follow from the $love_D$ by which God $loves_D$ faith that the individual who has faith is accepted (even though some kind of acceptance does follow). Just as that does not follow, so in the same way the specific acceptance of the individual who has charity does not follow (formally and from the necessity of the thing in such a way that its opposite is contradictory) from the $love_D$ by which God $loves_D$ charity.

66 In response to the next argument,[41] along the same lines: given that whatever is pleasurable and acceptable and beautiful is accepted by God by his general acceptance, still it need not be the case that the thing be accepted with the specific acceptance that is at issue in this question. For else angelic nature would necessarily be accepted, since it is beautiful and pleasurable.

67 In response to the arguments for his other claim,[42] if those arguments are understood to mean that there is no way in which this sort of supernatural form [of charity] could flow out from the divine acceptance, so that there is no way in which God could accept a rational creature temporally prior to giving this sort of form to them, then I say that those arguments are unsound.

[38] Namely, the passage from John 14:21, quoting Christ; see **[11]**.
[39] See **[12]**.
[40] The two kinds of love mentioned here are God's generic and specific pleasure, which were introduced in **[49]**.
[41] See **[13]**.
[42] See **[14]**.

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Against the first of these arguments,[43] in that case this sort of acceptance would not be due to the participation in this form, as was explained earlier.[44] 68

Against the next argument,[45] it is clear that the major premise is false when the thing to which the act newly extends is such that it can immediately terminate that act, as it does in this case. 69

Against the next argument,[46] I say that – taking 'pleasure' for a divine act that is really the divine essence – in this sense I say that every creature flows out from that generic pleasure; but it does not follow from this that they flow forth immutably and necessarily, since there can be a contingent effect from an immutable cause, or the effect can come forth contingently. However, if 'pleasure' conveys not only something intrinsic to God but also conveys something extrinsic (e.g., a creature), then it can connote either a creature in real being or else a possible creature. If it connotes the former, then God does not necessarily take pleasure [in the creature].[47] If it connotes the latter, then God does indeed take pleasure [in the creature], but it does not follow from that pleasure that the thing is cherished, and this pleasure is not at issue in this question. 70

Response to the Initial Argument

In response to the initial argument,[48] I say that taking 'charity' for the absolute charity that formally inheres and taking 'cherished' for everyone who is prepared for eternal life, then by God's absolute power someone can be cherished by God without charity. 71

This is because 'charity' is taken in two senses. In one sense, it is taken only for a certain absolute infused habit, and in this sense 'charity' is not a connotative noun. In another sense, 'charity' is taken insofar as it an abstract term corresponding to the concrete term 'cherished,' and it connotes someone by whom the cherished individual is cherished. By God's absolute power someone can be cherished without charity in the first sense, but not without charity in the second sense just discussed.

43 See the latter half of **[14]**.
44 See **[38–41]**.
45 See **[15]**.
46 See **[16]**.
47 Since the creature's real existence is contingent, God's taking pleasure in that real creature is also contingent.
48 See **[5]**.

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25 Could an Act of the Will Be Meritorious without Charity Formally Informing the Soul? (Ord., *d. 17, q. 2*)

TEXT[1]

1 Second, I ask whether an act of the will could be meritorious without charity formally informing the soul.

2 That it could not be:

3 Because more circumstances are required for the $love_D$ of God to be meritorious than are required for moral goodness and moral perfection. But no one can perfectly and completely gather together from a habit of acquired virtue all the circumstances that are demanded for a moral act; as the Philosopher says in *Ethics* II, it is maximally difficult (perhaps even impossible) to achieve the mean of the circumstances. Therefore, even more so will a human being be unable on a purely natural basis to achieve the completeness of the circumstances that is required for the act of divine $love_D$, especially since among the circumstances [that need to be achieved] is that every divine willing is fulfilled.

4 Furthermore, it is impossible on a purely natural basis to achieve an act by which the entire divine law and every mandate of God is virtually fulfilled. This is so because it is impossible for the mind to actually comprehend them all and direct the will to them all at the same time. But all the divine mandates are fulfilled by the act of charity. Therefore, etc.

5 For the opposite answer:

6 Anyone who can be accepted by God without charity can perform a meritorious work without charity. But it was previously proved that someone can be accepted by God without charity.[2] Therefore, etc.

Aquinas's View

7 In response to this question, it has been said that an act could not be meritorious without formally inhering charity. This is argued for as

[1] *OTh* III: 467–475.

[2] *Ord.*, d. 17, q. 1, nn. 18–28, translated in chapter 24 of this volume.

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follows.[3] The act of charity surpasses the total capacity of human nature, and so it must be that this act is due to some other principle that is not within the capacity of human nature. But it cannot just be due to an exterior principle such as the Holy Spirit. Therefore, it must be that it is due to some habit that is added on to the will itself. The minor premise is clear since, just as a natural motion is due to some intrinsic principle, so a voluntary motion is due to something intrinsic; and so if the act of charity were totally due to an exterior mover, then the act would not be voluntary.

Similarly, if the act of charity were entirely due to an exterior mover then it would follow that the act would not be meritorious, because the things that are meritorious are in some way within us. But if the act were totally due to an exterior mover, it would not be within us whether to act or to not act. 8

"Third, something unseemly would follow: namely, that a human being who is in [the state of] charity would not be readied for an act of charity, nor would that individual perform that act with pleasure. (This is so because virtuous acts are pleasurable for us as a result of our being conformed to those acts by some habit and thus we are inclined toward them in the manner of a natural inclination.) However, an act of charity is maximally pleasurable, and by that act everything else we do and undergo is rendered pleasurable."[4] Therefore, there is a created habit of this sort in us. 9

Against Aquinas's View

This view (as is clear to anyone who examines it) supposes that it is contradictory for an act of charity to be meritorious without a created habit of this sort, just as it is contradictory for some motion to be natural to a thing and yet not be due to an intrinsic principle. He thinks this is the case for every meritorious act. 10

I consider this view to be unqualifiedly false because God, by his grace, can accept a good movement of the will that is elicited on a purely natural basis. Consequently, this sort of act will be meritorious due to the gracious acceptance of God. Therefore, this sort of habit is not necessarily required for this sort of act to be meritorious. 11

Furthermore, everything that from itself can sufficiently engage in a demeritorious act can (by the absolute power of God) engage in a meritorious act from itself. For, since meritorious and demeritorious 12

[3] The following arguments are taken from Thomas Aquinas, *Disputed Question on Charity*, a. 1, resp.

[4] Thomas Aquinas, *Disputed Question on Charity*, a. 1, resp.

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acts are contraries, an act of merit is no more incompatible with a nature consisting only in natural things than is an act of demerit to a nature consisting only in natural things. Now then, a will from itself can engage in a demeritorious act; therefore, it is not contradictory for a will to be brought to a meritorious act on a purely natural basis. Nevertheless, that act will not be meritorious on a purely natural basis, but it will be meritorious only because of God's grace, and not because [grace] formally informs the will, but rather because the act elicited on a purely natural basis is graciously accepted.

13 Furthermore, nothing is meritorious unless it is voluntary, and nothing is voluntary unless it is freely elicited or freely done. This is because nothing is meritorious unless it is within us, that is, within our power. But nothing is within our power in such a way that we could act and not act except what is from the will as from a moving principle, not from a habit. (For since a habit is a natural cause, what is due to a habit is not indifferent [to acting and not acting].) So then, the nature of merit primarily consists in the power of the will, from the fact that the will elicits freely. Therefore, no habit is required for an act to be meritorious.

14 Furthermore, for every act that is accompanied by some circumstance, if that circumstance is not praiseworthy or meritorious in itself, then the act can (by God's absolute power) be meritorious without that circumstance. But an act of loving$_D$ God above everything else is accompanied by [a habit of] charity, and that charity is not praiseworthy or meritorious in itself. Therefore, the act can be meritorious without that charity.

I prove that charity is not praiseworthy in itself as follows: No habit is praiseworthy in itself, for just as an acquired habit is neither praiseworthy nor blameworthy in itself, neither is any other habit. For any other habit, being infused by God alone, is less within the power of the one who possesses it than is a habit that is acquired from freely elicited acts. That no acquired habit is praiseworthy or blameworthy in itself: It is clear that no acquired habit is blameworthy, because it can coexist with charity, and consequently someone who has a habit of that sort is not blameworthy; for the same reason, the habit contrary to it is not praiseworthy in itself.

Ockham's View

15 So, I answer the question differently. I say that it is not contradictory for some act to be meritorious without any supernatural habit of this sort formally informing the individual. This is so because no act [that comes about] on a purely natural basis or [that comes] from any

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created cause can be meritorious unless it is freely and willingly accepted by God's grace. So, just as God freely accepts a good movement of the will as meritorious when it is elicited by someone who possesses charity, by God's absolute power he could accept the same movement of the will even if he had not infused charity.

Objections to Aquinas's Arguments

16 In response to the first argument for the other view,[5] I say first that a meritorious act does not exceed the total capacity of human nature; not even an act of charity does so. For every act of charity that we have according to the common course of this life is of the same nature as an act that is possible on a purely natural basis, and so that act of charity does not exceed the capacity of human nature. Nevertheless, for the act to be meritorious is not within the power of human nature (whether the individual has charity or does not have charity); rather, that is due to God's free acceptance. So, whether charity inheres in the soul or not, when the act is elicited, it is still within God's power to accept that act as meritorious or to not accept it. Hence, one and the same act that is now elicited by someone who possesses charity and that is now meritorious could by God's absolute power not be accepted by God. In that case the act would not be meritorious, and yet it would be the same act and the same charity. Otherwise it would follow that some creature could necessitate God to do something in the future, since God would be necessitated by the produced charity to give eternal life at some future time to the individual possessing charity.

17 Similarly, when it is said that an act would not be meritorious if it were from some exterior principle,[6] that claim is contrary to his own position. For just as no act that is totally from an exterior principle is voluntary, so too no act that is totally from a naturally acting principle is voluntary (inasmuch as the voluntary is distinguished from the natural). Therefore, if the act of charity were from [the habit of] charity and not from the will, the act would not be voluntary.

18 So, those whom he argues against[7] would easily respond as follows: No matter what charity is posited in the will, the act cannot be voluntary unless the will concurs as a moving cause, since the charity naturally does whatever it does. But the act is voluntary when the will

[5] See **[7]**.
[6] See **[7]**.
[7] E.g., Peter Lombard, who holds that 'charity' just refers to the Holy Spirit and not to any created habit in the soul. See *Ord*., d. 17, q. 3, translated in chapter 26 of this volume, and see also Peter Lombard, *Sentences* I, d. 17, c. 2.

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moves harmoniously together with the charity; and the act is voluntary not because it comes from the charity but because it comes from the will. So, in the same way, if the Holy Spirit were to cause an act of charity instead of the will causing it, that act would not be voluntary, that is, the will would not freely will it. However, the act will be voluntary if the will moves together with the Holy Spirit, because then the act is freely elicited by the will.[8]

19 In response to the other argument that he gestures at,[9] along the same lines: That act will be in us because the will itself actively moves, and so the act will be meritorious because it is effectively from the will and God accepts it. So God could accept an occurrent act that is within our power without any created habit of this sort, if that pleased him.

20 In response to the other argument that he gestures at,[10] I say that pleasure can exist without any habit. From the fact that a first act (one from which a habit is generated) can be pleasurable, thus an act could be pleasurable even if it is always elicited without a habit. So, one need not posit a habit of this sort on account of pleasure.

Similarly, a habit acquired from pleasurable acts could suffice to account for the sort of pleasure that we experience in a meritorious act; consequently, one need not posit an infused habit of this sort on account of the act's pleasure.

Similarly, a habit is a cause of pleasure only because that habit is a cause of an act that is followed by pleasure. Hence, if the same act were caused by God alone, the act would be pleasurable just as if it were caused by the habit.

Furthermore, if it belongs to the nature of a meritorious act to be pleasurable, this is only because it belongs to that act's nature that it is love_{A} or that it proceeds from love_{A}, for sometimes there can be a meritorious act together with distress or pain, as is clear when someone meritoriously suffers pain because of their sins.

Similarly, it no more belongs to the nature of a habit to cause pleasure than to cause distress. Hence just as a habit that inclines to acts of willing-for is in some way a cause of pleasure, so a habit that inclines

[8] The argument of **[17–18]** is essentially this: Aquinas had argued that charity must be a habit in the will, rather than just the activity of the Holy Spirit, because otherwise charitable acts would not be voluntary. Ockham notes that habits work naturally, not voluntarily. So what makes the act voluntary if it's due to a habit of charity? The obvious answer from Aquinas is that the act is voluntary as a result of being partially caused by the will. But, Ockham points out, that answer is equally available to the individual who thinks that charitable acts are co-produced by the will and the Holy Spirit: that act is also voluntary as a result of being partially caused by the will.

[9] See **[8]**.

[10] See **[9]**.

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to acts of willing-against is in some way a cause of distress, when what is willed-against occurs. This is because pleasure comes to be from the former acts and distress from the latter acts; thus the "pleasurability" of the habit does nothing.

Responses to the Initial Arguments

In response to the first initial argument,[11] I say that all the circumstances necessary for a meritorious act can be cognized and a human being could achieve them if it pleased God. For God could establish that just a few things sufficed: e.g., by his absolute power God could establish that anyone who loved$_D$ God above all things and did not knowingly act against right reason would merit eternal life. 21

In response to the second argument,[12] I say that it need not necessarily be the case that one actually fulfill the entire law in order for an act to be meritorious, but just that some mandate be fulfilled and that no transgression be done contrary to that mandate. 22

[11] See **[3]**.
[12] See **[4]**.

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26 Does Every Meritorious Act Presuppose Created Charity? (Ord., *d.* 17, *q.* 3)

TEXT[1]

1 Third, I ask whether as a matter of fact created charity is presupposed by every meritorious act.

2 That it is not:

3 It is pointless to do with more what can be done with fewer. But an act can be meritorious without charity. Therefore, etc.

4 For the opposite:

5 It is only charity that separates the children of the kingdom from the children of ruin.[2]

Peter Lombard's View

6 On this topic, it is said that the view of the Master of the *Sentences* is that no created charity should be posited within the soul as formally informing the soul; rather, charity is the Holy Spirit.[3] Nevertheless, in some places he seems to say the opposite, and so various authors struggle in various ways to save him and to harmonize his view with the common view.

7 However, given what has been said he can be saved, so it seems, by saying that the Master is speaking of that charity without which no one can be cherished or accepted by God, without which no one can perform any meritorious work, without which no one can meritoriously love God_D or neighbor. Speaking of charity in this sense, this charity is the gracious will of God accepting someone as worthy of eternal life; so, in that case the word 'charity' primarily conveys the divine will while connoting someone who is worthy of eternal life, and so the primary thing signified is the Holy Spirit. This is what the Master means when he states that charity is the Holy Spirit.

[1] *OTh* III: 475–479.

[2] Augustine, *Homilies on the First Epistle of John*, homily V.7; see also *On the Trinity* XV.18.32.

[3] Peter Lombard, *Sentences* I, d. 17, c. 2.

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Also, the Holy Spirit is the cause of acts of believing and hoping in a different way than it is the cause of an act of loving$_D$; for someone can believe and hope without the Holy Spirit's specific acceptance (speaking correctly about believing and hoping). However, someone cannot engage in an act of loving$_D$ (speaking correctly about meritoriously loving$_D$ God or neighbor) without the Holy Spirit's specific acceptance and without the Holy Spirit's having been given in a specific way. But someone who has been given that gift (and no other created gift) can absolutely without contradiction engage in a meritorious act, and it is contradictory for someone who has been given any other gift (but has not been gifted the Holy Spirit) to engage in a meritorious act. So, other than the Holy Spirit alone, there is no gift given to any extent whatsoever that necessarily and primarily possesses that nature of the charity without which no one is cherished and accepted by God.

Nevertheless, in addition to the gift that is the Holy Spirit, the 8
Master does not wish to deny that there is something else that is given, something that is a certain habit that inclines toward an act of loving$_D$ God. However, that gift, whatever it is, is not necessarily the charity by which someone is cherished and accepted by God, because if a habit of this sort were given to someone and the Holy Spirit were not given, the individual who has this sort of gift would not be cherished by God. Consequently, this sort of habit would not be charity.

Ockham's View

Given what has been said, the response to the question is clear: some 9
created charity is presupposed by every meritorious act. Nevertheless, when that created charity is posited it is not contradictory that the individual having it not be cherished by God in such a way as to be prepared for eternal life. Nor does anyone, as a matter of fact, ever elicit a meritorious act without charity of this sort formally informing them. This should be held because of the authority of the saints, who resoundingly say this. More will be said about this matter in the following books.[4]

Nevertheless, there can be objections made against what has been 10
said. First, according to what has been said a creature would be charity as much as the Holy Spirit; for just as 'charity' signifies the Holy Spirit who accepts and is gifted, so it also connotes the creature that is accepted and to whom the Holy Spirit is gifted. Therefore, for the

[4] See especially *Rep.* IV, qq. 3–5, translated in chapter 27 of this volume, and also *Rep.* IV, qq. 10–11 (*OTh* VII: 192–238), translated in part in chapter 19 of this volume.

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same reason that the Holy Spirit is charity, the creature to whom the Holy Spirit is given will also be charity.

11 Furthermore, if created charity is not necessarily required, then it would be totally superfluous. But there is nothing superfluous in divine acts; therefore, etc.

12 In response to the first of these, I say that it should be conceded to a greater extent that the Holy Spirit is charity, for the word 'charity' primarily conveys the Holy Spirit directly, while it instead conveys the creature indirectly.

13 In response to the second objection I say that God often does with more intermediaries what he could do with fewer intermediaries. And he does not do so badly, because by the fact that God wills it, it is done well and justly.

14 From this the response to the first initial argument[5] is clear: charity should be posited because God has ordained things this way. However, it is not the case that God could not have done the contrary.

15 In response to the contrary argument[6] it is clear that the charity that is the Holy Spirit necessarily separates the children of the kingdom from the children of ruin. Created charity as a matter of fact separates them in its own way, but it does not do so necessarily.

[5] See **[3]**.
[6] See **[5]**.

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27 *On the Infusion of Virtue and Grace and the Removal of Guilt in Baptism (*Rep. *IV, qq. 3–5)*

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TEXT[1]

Question: Does someone who worthily receives the sacrament of baptism receive grace and all the virtues that are necessary for salvation?

That such an individual does not receive grace: 1

This is argued for on the basis that habitual love_A and habitual 2
hatred concerning the same object are more jointly impossible (or just

[1] *OTh* VII: 39–61. In this text Ockham asks three distinct questions and gives separate initial arguments for each one, but answers them all together.

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as jointly impossible) as faith and knowledge concerning the same object. But faith and knowledge do not coexist at the same time concerning the same object; therefore, neither do the former.

3 However, one who at first intensely hates God acquires in themselves a habit of hating God, and along with this habit there can coexist an act by which the individual can $love_D$ God and will to be baptized. (This is argued for on the basis that, later, when this individual $loves_D$ God, they are still more inclined toward the hatred of God than if they had never possessed the habit of hating; therefore, a strong habit of hating God persists at the same time as the $love_D$, or at the least a weak habit persists.) Now, this sort of individual can worthily receive baptism because of their act of $loving_D$; nevertheless, they do not receive grace at that time because of the joint impossibility of grace and habitual hatred.

4 Along the same lines it is argued that this individual does not receive the other virtues, because an individual of this sort can receive vicious habits.

5 This argument is confirmed by the fact that the joint impossibility of habits can only be proved by the joint impossibility of their acts. But the acts resulting from habitual hate and habitual $love_A$ are not compatible with each other; so, therefore, neither are the habits. Therefore, while the habit of hating (or some other vicious habit) persists, a habit of $loving_D$ God (or some other virtuous habit) cannot be infused.

6 You might object that these habits are not jointly impossible because one is an infused habit and the other is an acquired habit. Contrary to this, the acts of these habits are jointly impossible, and so the habits are jointly impossible. Someone who is $loving_D$ God (whether naturally or supernaturally) cannot hate God at that very time, because otherwise someone could have an act of enjoyment and an act of hating God at the same time. Therefore, these habits are jointly impossible, whether one is a natural habit and the other supernatural or whether both are natural.

7 Furthermore, if the habits are infused at baptism, either those infused habits are of a different nature from the acquired habits or else they are of the same nature. If they are of a different nature and the infused habit is more perfect, then it will incline toward a more perfect act and it will incline more perfectly than the acquired habit does. Consequently, since the acquired habit inclines toward an act when everything else is set aside, so then the infused habit will incline all the more to its act when everything else is set aside; consequently, an infant could engage in an act of faith, hope, and so on as a result of their infused habit. But if the infused and acquired habits were of the same species, then the infused habits will be able to do whatever the

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acquired habits can do, which is obviously false; this is clear just as before[2] in the case of an infant: they cannot engage in an act as a result of the infused habit without having the acquired habit.

This argument is confirmed: Whatever an object does with respect to intuitive cognition, a habit does the same with respect to abstractive cognition. So then, just as an object can be a cause with respect to an intuitive cognition, a habit (if one is posited) can be a cause with respect to an abstractive cognition; but we experience the opposite of this when it comes to infused habits (if there are any).[3] 8

For the opposite conclusion: 9

At baptism there is a taking away of guilt; therefore, there is an infusion of grace and of the other virtues that are necessary for salvation. 10

Question: Secondly, does baptism remove all guilt?

That it does not: 11

If baptism does remove all guilt, then it does so either because it is formally incompatible with guilt or else because it causally drives guilt away. The first is not the case, because someone can retain all guilt and still be baptized: e.g., someone who falsely comes to baptism and who is not baptized again later. If it causally drives guilt away, it either does so effectively or meritoriously. The first of these is not the case because the sacrament has no effect on the things that are in the soul and consequently it drives nothing away from the soul. Nor does it do so meritoriously, because someone can earn demerit in the act of the sacrament. 12

In support of the opposite conclusion is what the Master says in the text.[4] 13

Question: Thirdly, is every penalty taken away in baptism?

That not every penalty is taken away: 14

For just as no good thing is unrewarded, so no bad thing is unpunished. Therefore, not every penalty is taken away in baptism without punishment. 15

[2] The same example was used in *Rep.* III, q. 9, n. 38, translated in chapter 23 of this volume.

[3] The final clause (starting with "but we experience") is not present in the majority of manuscripts, but it is necessary to understand the argument: if there were an infused habit of faith from baptism, the argument suggests, it would be possible for an infant to cognize (with an abstractive cognition) the articles of faith immediately after baptism. But that appears to not be the case.

[4] Peter Lombard, *Sentences* IV, d. 1, c. 9; d. 3, c. 9; d. 4, c. 1.

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16 In support of the opposite conclusion is what the Master says in the text.[5]

17 Also, in general the professors and the saints say the opposite.

The Structure of This Discussion

18 Regarding these questions, it is the case that the expulsion of one form is prior to the introduction of the contrary form. This is clear since, according to the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* V, something is prior by nature when that thing can exist without some other things while those latter things cannot exist without the former thing (for example, substance and accident, since a substance can exist without every accident, but not the converse).[6] Now then, there can be the expulsion of a form without any introduction of its contrary form; so, I do not deny that God could make water that was neither hot nor cold (just as the sky is neither hot nor cold). But there cannot be an introduction of one form without the expulsion of its contrary form, and so God could not introduce heat to cold water without first expelling the coldness. So, first the expulsion of guilt should be considered. Then, since there ought not be a penalty without guilt, so the taking away of penalty should be considered second, and then, third, the granting of grace.

On the Expulsion of Guilt

19 Regarding the first issue, it is said that, in any instance of generation, every contrary form is expelled by the introduction of the one form, and the disposition for the contrary form is also expelled.[7] Baptism, though, is a regeneration to spiritual life, and guilt and grace are contraries; therefore, in baptism the infusion of grace, on its own, removes actual, original, and venial guilt.

20 Although I accept that this conclusion is true, nevertheless that argument is unsound, because it supposes that every sin is contrary to grace, which is false (speaking about the absolute item in grace and in sin).

First, this is clear in the case of original sin: For whenever there are two absolute forms that are completely separate, both of which are possible for rational creatures, then the existence of the one form can coexist with both the absence of a second form that is not contrary to

[5] Peter Lombard, *Sentences* IV, d. 4, c. 5.
[6] Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V.11 (1019a1–4).
[7] Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super Sententiis* IV, d. 4, q. 2, a. 1, qc. 1.

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the first and also with being indebted to have that other form. But grace and original justice are forms of this sort. Therefore, grace can coexist with both the absence of original justice and with being indebted to have it. So grace, with respect to everything absolute in it, can coexist with original sin.[8]

Nevertheless, taking 'grace' [*gratia*] insofar as it makes someone be favored [*gratum*] by God (whether this is by means of some infused form or without any such form), then I say that such grace is incompatible with every sin (both original and actual). This is because it is by grace (taken in this sense) that someone becomes a friend of God and it is by sin that one becomes an enemy to him. So grace and sin cannot coexist at the same time.

Second, the same is clear regarding actual sin, because actual sin 21
names nothing other than some absolute past act by which someone is obligated to a penalty.[9] Now then, that absolute act [of sinning] (and also the habit it leaves behind) is not incompatible with grace understood in the first sense because they are separate absolute forms; therefore, they can exist at the same time in the same subject. Nor is being obligated to a penalty incompatible with grace taken in this sense. This is because no penalty is incompatible with grace spoken of in this sense, since it is not a contradiction that the absolute form of grace could exist in the devil. Similarly, this obligation does not name some absolute item in the soul that is distinct from the act [of sin] and its habit, nor does it name some real relation because its terminus does not exist; therefore, it is only a conceptual relation, if there is a relational item at all. However, a relational item of this sort is not incompatible with the absolute form in grace (speaking of grace in the first sense). However, the obligation to an eternal penalty is indeed incompatible with grace, speaking in the second sense.

So, regarding this issue I say that it should be (merely) believed that 22
all guilt is removed by baptism, and this cannot be shown by natural reason because there is no formal incompatibility between sin and grace. For although the form[10] of grace is formally incompatible with a present act of sinning or with a vicious habit, nevertheless it is not formally incompatible with a past act when no habit is now left behind (because, perhaps, [the habit] was previously destroyed). Nor is the form of grace incompatible with the obligation to a penalty.

[8] The unstated inference is that Ockham takes original sin to just be the conjunction of original justice's absence together with the obligation to have it.

[9] For defense of this claim, see *Rep.* IV, qq. 10–11, nn. 14–16, translated in chapter 19 of this volume.

[10] Reading *forma* with manuscripts DEK instead of *formaliter*.

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So, God is able (by his absolute power) to not take away the guilt without doing any injustice, just as God can punish someone who has no demerit without his being called unjust. (That punishment, though, would not be a penalty, properly speaking, because penalty corresponds to guilt. Rather, it would more [accurately] be called pain.) Hence, just as God can always keep alive and confine a non-human animal in penalties without any sin or injustice on God's part, so in the same way God could do this with a human being.

23 It might be objected that God is indebted to give a reward to those who have merited it. I respond and say that God is indebted to no one except when God has ordained it to be so; nevertheless, by God's absolute power he can do the contrary with his creatures without any wrongdoing. Nevertheless, it is to be believed that, by his ordering, all guilt is taken away in baptism unless the one receiving baptism puts up some obstacle; e.g., if that individual actually sinned at that time, that sin would not be taken away by the power of baptism, whether it is a mortal or a venial sin. So then, every past sin (both mortal and venial) is taken away, but no other sin is.

On the Taking Away of Penalty

24 Regarding the second issue, I say that there are two kinds of penalty: eternal penalty and temporal penalty. The first of these, by divine ordering, is taken away in baptism since the one who is baptized is rendered worthy of eternal life; however, God could, by his absolute power, not take this penalty away.

25 There are two kinds of temporal penalty: one kind that is taken on voluntarily and another that is naturally inflicted. The former is not taken away in a baptized infant, because an infant is not bound to any penalty [of this kind], neither before nor after baptism. Since they are not obligated to any penalty, none is taken away from them. However, since an adult is obligated to this kind of penalty before baptism (since they are obligated to be displeased about their past sins), that penalty is thus taken away from them in such a way that they are not obligated to be displeased about them after baptism, nor are they bound or obligated to make satisfaction for their past sins.

The second kind of temporal penalty, which is naturally inflicted and overtakes every human being according to the common course of nature (e.g., hungering, thirsting, and the like), is not taken away. This is the case only because of divine ordering, because God could do the opposite if it pleased him to do so. So then, it is thus clear how penalty is taken away and how it is not.

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On Grace, Guilt, and Penalty

There are several difficult matters regarding the third issue. First, whether God could take away guilt without granting grace. Second, whether grace could be infused without the theological virtues. Third, whether grace could be infused without the moral virtues. Fourth, whether all these virtues are infused. Fifth, whether there could be some infused moral virtues that are distinct in species from the naturally acquired virtues. 26

The first of these difficulties was already touched on in the seventeenth distinction of the first book.[11] So, in brief I say that God by his absolute power can take away guilt and penalty without granting grace – and by 'grace' I mean charity, because I suppose that they are entirely the same thing, even though they are different names and different concepts. The reason for this is that, for anyone whom God can accept as worthy of eternal life without any grace inhering in that individual, God can also take away all guilt from them without any infusion of grace. But, as was made clear in the first book, God can do the former; therefore, he can do the latter. 27

This argument is confirmed, because it does not seem to be contradictory that God could give a vision of his essence to someone presently in mortal sin at the instant at which he can give them grace; *a fortiori*, God can accept them as worthy of eternal life (which he wills to give to them later) at the same instant at which he can give them grace. But God can do the former (i.e., can cause a vision of his essence without any grace previously informing that individual); therefore, all the more can God accept them without grace, and consequently God can take away all guilt from them without grace. (About this, look it up there.[12]) Nevertheless, even though this could not be proved by argument I say that as a matter of fact grace is infused; because the authorities of sacred scripture and the saints resoundingly say this, so I hold this view along with them. 28

Whether Grace Could Be Infused without the Virtues

Regarding the second difficulty, whether grace (i.e., charity) could be infused without the other theological virtues, i.e., without faith and hope: it is argued that grace cannot be infused without them, because habit is related to habit just as act is related to act (and vice versa).[13] 29

[11] *Ord.* d. 17, qq. 1–3, translated in chapters 24–26 of this volume.
[12] *Ord.* d. 17, q. 1, nn. 34–42, translated in chapter 24 of this volume.
[13] I am not aware of the source of this argument. Aquinas considers (and also rejects) a

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But no act can exist in the will without there first being some act in the intellect; therefore, there also cannot be a habit of the will without there being a habit of the intellect. Now charity is a habit of the will by which one loves$_D$ God and faith is a habit of the intellect by which one understands God. Therefore, etc.

30 It might be objected that an act of charity can exist without an act of faith, as is clear for the next life. Contrary to this, even then the act of charity cannot exist without any act of intellect. (Additionally, the act of the next life is not relevant to the case of this life.) So, it seems that charity necessarily presupposes some act or habit in the intellect.

31 To this difficulty I respond that God can, by his absolute power, make charity without faith and hope. The reason for this is that when one absolute item does not necessarily depend on some other absolute item, the former can be brought about without the latter without any contradiction. And charity is something absolute that does not depend upon faith and hope (this is obvious, because it does not depend upon them according to any kind of cause). Therefore, etc.

32 This is confirmed because when an absolute item relates to multiple separate absolute items, if by nature the former item can exist without each of the latter taken individually, then by divine power the former can exist without all of the latter taken collectively. However, in the next life charity can be separated from each of faith and hope taken individually; therefore, etc.

Also, although it appears that there is this necessity with respect to acts (namely, that an act of the will necessarily presupposes an act of the intellect),[14] nevertheless there is no such necessity with respect to habits, for God could suspend the activity of all acts of understanding with respect to the generation of a habit (so that they could not generate a habit) and yet God could concur with an act of the will in order to generate a habit. Supposing this, in that case a habit will be generated in the will but not in the intellect. Then, an object being displayed to the will by an act of the intellect suffices for having a habit in the will, without any habit being generated in the intellect.

33 You might object that then a moral virtue can be generated in the will without any prudence in the intellect. I respond that there is nothing unseemly in God's making moral virtue without habitual prudence, for God can suspend the activity of the act of prudence with respect to the generation of a habit [of prudence], and can still concur

similar argument for the claim that charity depends upon faith and so faith is the root of the theological virtues; see Thomas Aquinas, *Scriptum super Sententiis* III, d. 27, q. 2, a. 4, qc. 3, arg. 3.

[14] See **[29]**.

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with an act of the will with respect to the generation of habitual moral virtue.

However, if God could not make an act of the will without some act in the intellect, then it could be said that moral virtue cannot exist without an act of prudence. 34

Furthermore, it is impossible for moral virtue to exist without its object, just as it is impossible for someone to understand that they understand without it being the case that they understand. Likewise, it is impossible for virtue of this sort to exist without this sort of object. Now in fact the partial objects of moral virtue are the circumstances (e.g., place and time), and foremost among these circumstances is right reason, to which the act ought to be conformed in order for it to be perfectly virtuous. Consequently, it is impossible for moral virtue to exist without right reason, which is an act of prudence. 35

In response to the argument for the opposite claim,[15] I say that there is not a similar proportion among habits as there is among acts, since the will's act is not caused by the intellect's habit except by means of an act that is elicited from that habit. So, the intellect's act is an immediate cause of the will's act, but the intellect's habit (from which the former act is elicited) is not a cause of the act of willing, nor is it a cause of the habit generated from this sort of act of willing; rather, it is only a cause of a cause. Thus it is a mediate cause because it is not the cause of the will's act, nor the cause of the habit generated by that act, except insofar as it is mediated by its own act. Now then, God is able to suspend the act's activity with respect to the generation of a habit in the intellect, and he is able to not do that in the will; so there is not the claimed similarity. 36

Regarding the third difficulty – whether the moral virtues are infused when charity is infused – it is said that they are.[16] The argument for this: God does not work less perfectly in the works of grace than in the works of nature. But in nature there is never found a principle for any workings unless he gives everything that is necessary for those works (e.g., he does not give a power of forward motion without giving organs and everything required for forward motion, and so on for other works of nature). Therefore, in the same way, in the works of grace he gives everything necessary for grace. Now, someone who has charity has a principle for every meritorious work, but those works cannot be carried out without the moral virtues. Therefore, when charity is given, he gives every moral virtue. 37

[15] See **[29]**.
[16] Thomas Aquinas, *ST* Ia–IIae, q. 65, a. 3.

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38 This argument is unsound, because in the works of nature we frequently see that God gives a principle of working to something and still does not actually give everything necessary for that working. For example, in creating a human being God gives to that individual the principle for acts of knowing and willing (that is, the intellect and will), and yet God need not give to that individual a habit by which they can easily engage in such works; rather, it suffices that God gives to them a power for acquiring such habits. So it is in the case at hand: when God gives to an individual a principle by which they can unqualifiedly engage in virtuous and meritorious works, God need not give to them everything by which they can engage in those works readily and without encumbrance; rather, it suffices that God gives to them a power for acquiring such habits for themselves.

39 Furthermore, such things that are necessary for some working are only imprinted on a nature when the principle is not sufficient on its own for engaging in these sorts of works. But this is not so in the case at hand, because someone can unqualifiedly engage in meritorious acts by means of charity, faith, and hope. And I say that they can do so if they have acquired charity (and the others) together with a dictate of right reason, without any other infused moral virtues (although they cannot engage in such acts as readily as they can with these other virtues). Therefore, grace can be infused without such virtues.

40 So, regarding this issue I say that no [infused] moral virtues should be posited in addition to the moral virtues that are apt to be acquired from acts. However, this cannot be evidently proved nor disproved. But plurality should not be posited without necessity, and there does not seem to be any necessity for doing so: not any evident argument, nor any experience, nor any authoritative text. (For all such authoritative texts – for instance, "he knows the way of prudence," "all things are made through him," and all others of this sort – should be understood as saying that God is a partial and immediate cause with respect to every effect.[17]) So it seems superfluous to posit infused moral virtues of this sort, different from the acquired moral virtues, and the answer to the third and fifth difficulties is clear.

41 Regarding the fourth difficulty, I say that moral virtues are apt to be acquired from acts and are not infused at baptism, as a general rule [*de communi lege*]. This is clear as follows: Someone who has vicious habits prior to baptism, if they do everything they ought to by doing the appropriate penance and are baptized, they will still perceive themselves to be as prone to their accustomed vices as they were before, and to be more prone than they would be if they had never committed

[17] Isaiah 40:14 and John 1:3, respectively.

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those sins at all. Therefore, there is some habit remaining that inclines to such sins. But it does not seem plausible that God would infuse one habit without expelling the contrary habit. Therefore, this sort of habit is not infused, and consequently such [moral] virtues are not infused at baptism.

Four Worries

But there are some worries against what has been said. 42

The first worry concerns whether original guilt could be taken away by baptism without taking away the actual guilt of everyone who receives baptism. It seems that it could be, for just as sin that is consensually incurred cannot be taken away without consensual penance, so sin that is incurred without consent can be taken away by the power of the sacrament without consent. However, let us suppose that there is an adult who entered into baptism insincerely, who neither consents nor is in an appropriate state [*disponit se*], and who committed some actual sin; then that actual consensually committed sin is not taken away. Therefore, since the original sin in that individual was incurred without consent, it seems that the original sin can be taken away from them by the power of the sacrament without consent, notwithstanding that they entered into baptism insincerely. 43

This argument is confirmed: Someone who exists in a state of original sin must be baptized either by a baptism of desire, a baptism of water, or a baptism of blood.[18] Therefore, if someone who is insincerely baptized remains in original sin after baptism, that individual must be baptized again, which seems absurd. 44

The second worry is why an unbaptized infant is obligated to an eternal penalty, since there ought not be this sort of penalty without guilt, and an infant has never had an act or a habit of sinning. 45

The third worry is why the theological virtues are infused at baptism, given that habits are ordered to their acts and infants cannot have those acts. 46

The fourth worry is that it seems that some moral virtues are necessary in addition to the acquired moral virtues. This is so, first, because acquired moral virtues are not apt to direct our actions to God, since the philosophers and other nonbelievers had virtues of courage, temperance, and so on, that are of the same nature as our virtues. Therefore, just as their virtues did not direct their works to the 47

[18] According to Catholic teaching, someone who wishes to be baptized but dies before being able to do so receives the grace infused at water baptism via a "baptism of desire," and similarly an unbaptized believer who is martyred receives it via a "baptism of blood."

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ultimate end, neither do our virtues do this, since the virtues in them and in us are of the same nature. Therefore, in addition to the acquired virtues one must posit other virtues that direct our works to the ultimate end.

48 Furthermore, "the works of God are perfect";[19] therefore, when God heals a human being they are perfectly healed. Therefore, not only in the intellective part but also in the sensitive part, God infuses virtues by which that part is perfectly healed. But such virtues [that heal the sensitive part] are moral virtues; therefore, etc.

49 Furthermore, if this were not so then if an infant were to die before becoming an adult, they would always lack these virtues, and this seems unfitting.

Responses to the Worries

50 In response to the first of these worries[20] I say that original sin is not taken away from an adult unless actual sin is also taken away. Two arguments for this are provided in "On Baptism and its Effect."[21]

The first of these is that either God heals the entirety of a human being and not just a part, or else God does not heal that individual at all; so, God takes away both kinds of sin if both inhere, or else God takes away nothing.

The second argument is that there ought to be an absence of the eternal vision [of God] because of original sin, and there ought to be the penalty of hell because of actual sin. So, if original sin were erased without erasing actual sin, then because of the taking away of original sin the gate is opened so that the individual can see God with a beatific vision, and yet if the actual sin remains, then the penalty of hell is still in store for them. Consequently, when such an individual passed away they both would be able to see God and would still be tormented by the penalty of hell, which everyone denies. So, I say that the one sin is not taken away without the other.

51 In response to the contrary argument,[22] I say that it is a correct inference so long as there is not some special impediment of the sort that exists in an adult as a result of actual sin being committed. But in an infant there is no such impediment, and so it is true that a sin incurred without consent is taken away without consent.

[19] Deuteronomy 32:4.
[20] See **[43]**.
[21] *Decretals of Pope Gregory IX*, book 3, title 42, chapter 3.
[22] See **[43]**.

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In response to the other argument,[23] I say that neither someone who is insincerely baptized nor someone who is actually sinning when they are baptized should be rebaptized. For although neither receives the effect of baptism at that time, nevertheless each of them can perform penance and accept their baptism, and then they receive the effect of baptism through their penance and each is cleansed of both original and actual sin. So, in no way should they be rebaptized. 52

In response to the second worry,[24] I say that there ought to be a penalty because God has ordained it. For just as God creates every creature from his will alone, so from his will alone he can do whatever he pleases with his creatures. If someone were to always love_D God and to do all the works accepted by God, God could still annihilate that individual without any wrongdoing; in the same way, even after such works God can give eternal punishment rather than eternal life to that individual without any wrongdoing. The reason for this is that God is a debtor to no one; whatever he does to us, he does from his grace alone. So, because of this, whatever God does to someone is done justly. For it is clear that Christ never sinned, and yet he was punished most weightily, all the way to death. 53

In response to the third worry,[25] I say that it cannot be sufficiently proved, neither by argument nor by the authority of the Church, that the theological virtues are infused at baptism. Although the view that holds that such virtues are infused is considered by the Church to be more probable, nevertheless the contrary view is not condemned. This is clear in the final chapter of "On the Highest Trinity and the Catholic Faith" in *Liber Septimus*[26] and also in "On Baptism and Its Effect."[27] 54

On account of other authoritative texts some have said that baptism is useless when conferred on infants since they do not possess charity; for they said that according to the Apostle "charity works upon a multitude of sins,"[28] and that Christ said of Mary Magdalene that "her many sins were taken away because she loved greatly,"[29] which can pertain only to those who consented [to their sins], and infants are not like this. The Lord Pope then responded that baptism is useful, because by it a human being is freed from their guilt and the gate is opened to them, and so on. And the Lord Pope then added,

[23] See **[44]**.
[24] See **[45]**.
[25] See **[46]**.
[26] The reference is to a seven-book collection of canon law compiled under Pope Clement V. See the *Constitutions of Clement V*, book 1, title 1.
[27] *Decretals of Pope Gregory IX*, book 3, title 42, chapter 3.
[28] 1 Peter 4:8.
[29] Luke 7:47.

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Moreover, from the force of the words it is clear enough that the aforementioned authoritative texts should be understood as only speaking of adults who have a multitude of sins, since they cannot be understood as speaking of infants, who are only obligated by original sin. That other authoritative text, "whoever will believe and be baptized (etc.)" should be dealt with in a similar way, since infants cannot believe but adults can. And because of this the entire authoritative text should be understood as speaking of adults, lest the first clause refer to some and the second clause refer to others. (Although a few do concede that infants believe not through an act [*usum*] but through the habit of faith that they receive in baptism, just as many other words according to the common manner of speaking refer to an aptitude rather than to an act.)[30]

So, whether or not the theological virtues are infused is a matter he leaves for disputing professors to investigate. It is therefore clear that there does not appear to be any necessity for positing that the theological virtues are infused at baptism. Nevertheless, because the authoritative texts of the saints seem to resoundingly say this – especially the texts of Augustine, who says in his commentary on John's epistle that only charity separates the children of the kingdom from the children of ruin,[31] and many other things on this point – and also because professors commonly hold this, so I hold together with them that these virtues are infused at baptism.

55 But why are these virtues posited in an infant, virtues from which no act can be elicited by means of them? I respond that although the virtues are not empowered with respect to the choice of acts during the time of infancy, nevertheless they will be empowered for this when the individual is an adult; this is so because at that time the individual will be able to engage in meritorious works as a result of these habits together with other acquired habits. Also, these virtues are empowered at every time for marking the individual as separated from the children of ruin and reckoned among the children of the kingdom.

56 In response to the fourth worry[32], I say that no other infused [moral] virtues are necessary in addition to the acquired [moral] virtues. This is so because charity is sufficient when accompanied by the acquired virtues, for charity immediately inclines an individual to the acts of every virtue (and so Gregory says that all the commandments are one in the root of charity[33]). In this way all the virtues are connected in charity, and hence charity inclines to the act of each virtue, although not as readily and as unencumbered as it does together with

[30] *Decretals of Pope Gregory IX*, book 3, title 42, chapter 3.
[31] Augustine, *Homilies on the First Epistle of John*, homily V.7; see also *On the Trinity* XV.18.32.
[32] See **[47]**.
[33] Gregory the Great, *Homilies on the Gospels*, homily 27 (on John 15:12–16), n. 1.

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the other virtues. So, no act is perfectly virtuous or meritorious without an act of charity. And when it is said that the other virtues do not direct an individual to the end, I say that by means of charity they are sufficiently directed to the ultimate end.

When it is said that the philosophers had virtues of the same nature 57
as our virtues, I deny this, for the moral virtues are distinguished according to a distinction in their partial objects. Now in fact the end is a partial object of a virtue, as has been said elsewhere;[34] but the philosophers had a different end in acquiring the moral virtues than Christians do.

For example, when one abstains from an act of sexual intercourse for the sake of God and because God commanded one to abstain in this way, then God (or God's command) is the final cause of this abstinence; and it is thus for all other virtues acquired by a good Christian, because God is always the chief intended end. However, a philosopher, even though they might abstain from such acts, nevertheless does so totally because of another end: either for the sake of preserving one's nature for proficiency in knowledge or for the sake of some other such end. Therefore, there was a different partial object of abstinence for the philosopher and for the good Christian; consequently, there was a different virtue of a different nature.

So, if God were to accept a human being who did not possess charity (and this is possible, as was said elsewhere[35]) these moral virtues would still direct that individual's workings to their ultimate end, since that end is a partial object of every such virtue that is in a good Christian.

In response to the next argument,[36] I say that God perfectly heals 58
by giving everything that is necessarily required for salvation. But the moral virtues are not necessary for salvation, since God can save someone without them. (Even according to them, God does not free a human being from their vicious habits in baptism; so God does not infuse the virtues that are opposed to those habits.[37]) Therefore, it suffices for God to give to a human that from which the individual could acquire such virtues and with which they could be perfectly saved without any acquired habitual virtues – for a human being who has only the acts of the virtues together with an act of charity can very truly be saved[38] (suppose that God were to suspend the activity of

[34] *Rep.* III, q. 11, nn. 65–78, translated in chapter 14 of this volume.
[35] *Ord.*, d. 17, q. 1, translated in chapter 24 of this volume.
[36] See **[48]**.
[37] See, perhaps, Aquinas, *ST* IIIa, q. 69, a. 4, ad 3 and *Scriptum super Sententiis* IV, d. 4, q. 2, a. 3, qc. 1, co.
[38] Reading *salvari* with manuscripts GZ in place of the edition's supplied *acceptari*.

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those acts with respect to the generation of a virtuous habit, as was discussed earlier[39]).

59 In response to the next argument[40] I say that if one posits that those [moral] virtues remain in the next life, then because they cannot be acquired by a child's acts God would then infuse the child with them prior to death. However, if those virtues do not remain in the next life, then it does not seem necessary for an infant to ever have such virtues.

Responses to the Initial Arguments

60 In response to the first initial argument,[41] I say that this[42] is true (and similar things also) about the naturally acquired habits of love_A and hatred. But an infused habit of the one is not incompatible with an acquired habit of the other, just as infused faith is not incompatible with knowledge. The reason for this is that an infused habit is neither acquired from acts nor strengthened by acts, but is only actively related to an act. So, just as a power can coexist with the opposite habit (e.g., if someone were to acquire a habit contrary to the inclination of the power), an infused habit can coexist with an acquired habit that seems incompatible with it even though it is not incompatible with it.

Hence the habit of charity is not formally incompatible with a habit of hating God, but an act of charity and an act of hating God are incompatible in the same way that a habit of knowledge and an error concerning the same conclusion are incompatible. And perhaps [the habit of] charity is not even formally incompatible with a present sinful act, except only by divine institution; but when that divine institution is set aside, there is no incompatibility there.

But it is different when speaking of the acquired habits [of love and hatred], because in this case there is just as much incompatibility among the habits as there is among the acts. And when it was said that "the acts are jointly impossible, so the habits are jointly impossible," this inference holds only for those habits that are acquired from acts; it does not hold for other habits.

61 In response to the other initial argument,[43] I say that infused habits are of different species than are the acquired habits. But it does not then further follow that infused habits therefore incline more to an act. This is so because it not need be that what is more perfect in

[39] See **[32]**.
[40] See **[49]**.
[41] See **[2]**.
[42] Namely, that hatred and love are jointly impossible.
[43] See **[7]**.

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nature inclines more perfectly, since it can be more imperfect in inclining toward acts. Or, if it is more perfect, it could cause a more perfect act when it is able to act, even though it does not always incline more to an act.

62 In response to the initial argument for the next question,[44] I say that although baptism is not properly a cause for driving away the guilt, nevertheless it can be posited to be a sine-qua-non cause,[45] for (as was discussed[46]) a sine-qua-non cause can be posited in voluntary cases, though not in natural cases. So, baptism is something without which God does not will to drive away guilt from someone.

63 In response to the initial argument for the third question,[47] I say that God is more prone to take away [penalty] and to reward than he is to punish, and so sometimes a bad thing is taken away without punishment, or is only lightly punished by God.

[44] See **[12]**.
[45] A sine-qua-non cause is a necessary precondition for some effect that is nevertheless not part of the total causal explanation of that effect.
[46] *Rep.* IV, q. 1 (*OTh* VII: 3–19).
[47] See **[15]**.

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